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ABSTRACT 
The protracted war and the centrality of security in Israel raises 
the Lasswellian question, can parliamentarydemocracy and political 
pluralism prevail under such conditions, without turning Israel into a 
Garrison State? 
The prevailing understanding of political-military relations in 
Israel is that the IDF is an instrumentalist army, that it serves as the 
executive tool of the legitimate political authorities and is not 
involved with state politics. Furthermore, it is accepted that the 
greatest achievement of David Ben Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister 
and Defence Minister, and the architect of the defence establishment, 
was the de-politicization of the IDF and its disconnection from party 
politics. 
a 
Both assumptions are challenged in this study. New evidence, and an 
analysis of existing material reveals the existence of a nominal control 
pattern, which has the formal appearance of an instrumentalist model, 
whereas the reality is otherwise. The IDF was not subordinate only to a 
state channel of political control, like other instrumentalist armies. 
In Israel there existed a unique pattern of. -political-military relations, 
a dual-control pattern. The political authorities exerted control through 
two channels, not only the state but also the party channel, that is of 
the dominant Labour Party: 
The state control was in fact weak and there was a lack of effective 
mediatory mechanisms between the military on the one hand and the 
Cabinet, Parliament and Defence Ministry on the other. As a result a 
pattern of civil-military partnership emerged in place of civil control. 
The boundaries between the military and the Labour Party were permeable. 
This allowed the rivalry between that party's two"sub-elites to affect 
the military which enhanced the partnership between the military and 
political elites. The emergence of the military as one of the main 
mobility channels to the national leadership, evidenced by the increased 
influence of the generals-turned-politicians, has resulted in a 
developmental construct of Military Democracy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
THE VEIL OF SECRECY OVER DEFENCE 
Academic research on civil-military relations in Israel has a 
surprisingly short history and is remarkably limited in scope. 
Of even narrower scope is the study ofý this subject by 
Israeli scholars, notwithstanding the centrality of the army and 
security matters in Israeli society. 
1 The explanation of this 
phenomenon lies in the sociology of the sociology or, to be more 
exact, the politics of military sociology in Israel. 
The problems entailed in studying the sociology of the military 
are not unique to Israel. ' As Janowitz has pointed out: 
Sociologists have avoided the study of war - internal 
and external - because of political pressures and 
personal values. The management of violence involves 
the most fundamental values and most significant 
considerations in a society. Only under the conditions 
of the widest intellectual freedom is it possible to 
pursue sociological research on these topics. 2 
There are two additional reasons which help explain the lack of 
research in Israel. The first of these is 'objective'. Since its 
establishment, and in fact even prior to 1948, Israel has been in a 
state of war. In the thirty years since 1947 there have been five 
1 
2 
The term 'army' refers hereafter to the three branches of the 
Israeli Defence Forces, in Hebrew Zahal. 
Janowitz, Morris (1968: 17) in Van Doorn, Jacques Armed Forces 
and Society Hague. Mouton. 
2 
wars, and the interval between them has been defined not as peace 
but rather as an intermediate state between peace and war. 
l 
Formally, 
several of the neighbouring countries have remained in an actual 
state of war, although there were no violent clashes, while others 
have maintained a state of 'truce', 'armistice', 'ceasefire' or 
'interim agreement'. In most of the latter cases, however, limited 
hostilities took place between the regular armies of Israel and the 
Arab states, as well as with other Arab organizations. Special terms 
were invented to describe the indeterminate situation experienced by 
Israel: 'a state of neither war nor peace', 'brink of war', 'less 
than peace', 'beleagured peace' or 'latent war'. 
2 
Any form of hostility, 
whether actual or latent, precipitates an overflow of secrecy from the 
military into the political sphere even in open societies. 
Furthermore, the totality of war in Israel and the centrality of 
security in national existence have created a situation whereby numerous 
spheres, which in parliamentary democracies are considered 'civil', 
fall within the security ambit and are enveloped in secrecy. These two 
factors, -together with the lengthy pre-state tradition of political and 
clandestine military organization under the British Mandate, also 
influenced the secretive attitude adopted by the Israeli elite on the 
subject of-national security - an attitude which was expressed by the 
much used phrase (sanctity of security'. 
1 
2 
War of Independence 30 November 1947-19 July 1949; Sinai Campaign 
29 October 1956-5 November 1956; The Six Days War 5 June 1967-11 
June 1967; War of Attrition March 1969-7 August 1970; Yom Kippur 
War 6 October 1973-24 October 1973. 
See some of these terms in Horowitz, Dan (1975) 'The Israeli 
Concept of National Security and the Prospect for Peace in the 
Middle East', in Sheffer, G. (ed. ) Dynamics of a Conflict Atlantic 
Highlands, New Jersey. Humanities Press. Also Eisenstadt, S. N. 
(1967: 269) Israeli Society (Hebrew) Jerusalem. Magnes Press. 
3 
But the smokescreen surrounding the activities of the army and 
the defence establishment was not solely a consequence of the 
'objective' need to conceal information from external enemies. As 
will be shown it also derived from the desire to achieve internal 
political aims, to limit the.. opportunities for public discussions 
about the defence establishment and to conceal, inter alia, the extent 
of the mutual involvement of the military and political systems. 
1 
That was in the interest of the higher military echelons, and even 
more of the political elite. The latter could exploit the fact that 
the security sphere was relatively free of parliamentary and public 
control in order to extend its own freedom of action. 
One of the most characteristic expressions of this-phenomenon 
is the Government's attempt to ensure that delicate political issues, 
even when not militarily significant, are allocated for discussion to 
the Ministerial Committee on Defence. Publication of the Committee's 
deliberations and resolutions, even of the fact that it has been 
convened, is strictly controlled- --by the military censorship laws. 
2 
Another more relevant fact is the military censor's consistent refusal 
to permit publication of information which exposes the involvement of 
the military in politics -a significant phenomenon of which the 
following example is typical. 
On the first Memorial Day for soldiers killed in the Sinai 
Campaign 1956, the Chief of Staff, Major-General Moshe Dayan, published 
. an Order of the Day 
in which he criticized the Government's political 
1 
2 
The term 'defence establishment' is taken to refer to all the 
bodies dealing with defence matters in addition to the army, 
including the Ministry of Defence, the Intelligence Services, 
military industries and affiliated organizations. 
The Israeli press strove for a long time to have the decisions 
reversed but ultimately failed. See editorials in Haaretz, 
6 August 1978; Jerusalem Post, 3 August 1978. 
4 
decision to retreat from the Sinai Peninsula. In response a leading 
newspaper Haaretz produced an editorial criticizing the Chief of 
Staff, stating inter alia: 
Have those at the helm shown weakness? This is the 
question which the Chief of Staff is now asking. And, 
in fact, it, is hard to escape the impression that he 
wishes to-condemn the Government for certain steps which 
it saw fit to take after due consideration. The Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defence said in a broadcast to 
the nation for Independence Day, and the implication is 
clear, that historical memories had aroused in many 
hearts 'yearnings and longings which cannot be fulfilled 
and which are not in harmony with the basic needs of the 
State of Israel'. 
l If Mr Ben Gurion sees matters in this 
light how can the Chief of Staff ask in public 'Have 
those at the helm shown weakness? ' The Chief of Staff 
appears to have plunged into the depths of the political 
controversy in composing his Order of the Day. He is thereby 
ignoring one of the basic tenets of a. democratic state. 
` 
r 
As' is customary for all military issues, the article was submitted 
to the military censor for approval. He promptly banned its publication. 
The editor of Haaretz appealed against the decision to the Censorship 
Committee, but his appeal was rejected. It was-not the condemnation 
of the Chief of Staff's political criticism of the Government which was 
proscribed, but Haaretz's public criticism of the Chief of Staff. 
When Dina Goren, an Israeli academic, was writing her doctoral 
thesis on the Israeli press, she uncovered the story in the archives of 
the Journalists Association. The military censor read the thesis in 
1971. before its final editing, and prohibited publication of the 
specific details of the story, even though it had occurred fourteen 
years previously. In 1974 Dr Goren edited the thesis for publication 
as a book and reinserted the censored details? That time, however, the 
censor permitted publication of the ultra secret material - the 
1 
2 
Note the vague phrasing which is characteristic of writing on 
defence questions in that period. 
Goren, Dina (1975: 321) The Press in a Beleagured Country (Hebrew) 
Jerusalem. Magnes Press. 
5 
Haaretz editorial. What happened between 1958 and 19742 First, 
the Yom Kippur War shattered the faith in the sanctity of security, 
and secondly the one who had been Chief of Staff in 1958 and Defence 
Minister in 1971, Moshe Dayan, was in 1974 only a back bencher in 
the Knesset. 
The traditional sensitivity of any military establishment to 
academic research on the army, coupled with the need for secrecy 
because of Israel's security situation on the one hand, and the 
exploitation of the 'sanctity of security' for the political aims 
of the military and political establishments on the other, have 
obstructed. the development of extensive research on civil-military 
relations in Israel. It is evident that there is reciprocal influence 
between the civil and military spheres. However, the publication of 
selected and misleading information has helped, to create a distorted 
picture and has led to major false perceptions in the analysis of 
the relationship and in particular that between the army and the 
polity. 
THE IMAGE: ISRAEL IS AN ABNORMAL CASE 
The first analyses of the Israeli army were made when studies of 
the military in developing states were flourishing. These influenced 
the, authors who, however, found themselves in deep water when they 
attempted to define Israel's place on the continuum of developing- 
developed nations. 
l 
From the point-. of view of geographical location, 
See e. g. Fein, Leonard J. (1967: 4-5) Israel: Politics and People 
Boston. Little Brown. 
6 
period of political independence and certain aspects of the social 
fabric, Israel was seen as closer to one extreme. But the economic 
characteristics, political regime and cultural system appeared to 
locate Israel closer to the other pole. The problem of definition 
led students of civil-military relations in Israel to adopt the 
habit of 
routinely starting out with the following statement: 
Israel is unusual among nations of its type to the 
point that it constitutes a buffer against hasty 
generalizations deriving from comparative research. 
The assumption that Israel is a unique case is held by many. 
Rustow writes that the 
practice, but conforms to ample historical precedent. 
Conversely it is the occasional spells of peaceful 
constitutional government by civilians as in Turkey 
from 1922 to 1960, in Lebanon from 1945 to 1958, in 
Israel since 1948 - which must be seen as the exceptional 
decisive role of the military on the current Middle 
Eastern scene is not a momentary lapse from normal 
situation. 2 
And Perlmutter, in his book which is an early work on the 
sociology of the military in Israel, claims that the Israeli case 
refutes several of the accepted theories of scholars in this field: 
(1) Andreski's contention that a high Military 
Proportional Ratio - the proportion of militarily 
utilized individuals in the total population - 
enhances the supremacy of the army; . (2) Huntington's 
contention that the combination of a pro-military 
ideology, high military political power, -and high 
military professionalism produces military political 
supremacy, and (3) the rigid preconception - advanced 
by General Von der Goltz - that a 'nation in arms' 
enhances militarism. None of these hypotheses applies 
to civil-military relations in Israel. 3 
1 
2 
3 
Ben-Dor, Gabriel (1977: 411) 'Politics and Army in Israel in the 
Seventies'. In Lissak, Moshe and Guttman, Emmanuel (eds. )(1977) 
The Political System in Israel (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Am Oved. 
Rustow, Dankwart A. (1963: 9) In Fisher, S. N. The Military in 
the Middle East Columbia. Ohio University Press. 
Perlmutter, Amos (1969: 1X-X) Military and Politics in Israel 
London. Cass. 
7 
Since the pattern which scholars regard as predictable in 
developing countries is that of an army intervening in political 
life, the key question in an analysis of the Israeli case is how 
the military has remained outside politics and the democratic- 
parliamentary regime has been-maintained. 
l 
Some scholars, 
mistakenly equating modernization processes with Westernization 
and making a one-to-one correlation between the degree of modern- 
ization and the patterns of civil-military relations, sought over- 
simple answers to the dilemma, citing the theory of the 'modernizing 
2 
army'. Halpern, for example, has said that Israel is unique among 
the developing countries in that it is 'a developed and developing 
country at the same time'. He explained that, generally speaking, 
the process of Westernization causes institutional imbalance, 
disorientation of values, a vacuum in the power structure and 
-economic crisis. As a result of the modernization crisis the military 
intervenes in government. Israel has undergone a modernization process 
without the accompanying crises and thus the army has developed in 
accordance with the pattern of Western Democracies. 
3 
- 
Another explanation, based on processes occurring only in the 
political system, has been proposed by Perlmutter in the wake of 
Huntington. The latter argued that intervention by the army is the 
outcome of instability in the political system, of an imbalance 
1 
2 
3 
Von der Mehden argues, for example, that 'if the independence was 
accompanied by major violence, odds are better than two out of 
three for a successful military coup'. Von der Mehden, F. R. 
(1969: 92) Politics of the Developing Nations Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 
Prentice Hall. 
A critical analysis of theories which falsely judge modernization 
as a linear, synchronized or equal process, a process of Western- 
ization, see Lissak, Moshe (1976: 47-71) Military Role in 
Modernization, Civil Military Relations in Thailand and Burma 
Beverly Hills and London. Sage. 
Halpern, B. (1962)'The Role of the Military in Israel', in Johnson, P. 
The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries Princeton, New 
Jersey. Princeton University Tess. 
between high political mobilization and a low level of political 
institutionalization. ) Israel, according to Perlmutter, is close to 
the ideal pattern of political participation which is concomitant with 
high political institutionalization, and hence has avoided the unfortunate 
experience of most developing countries. 
2 
Some scholars focusing on the political aspects of civil-military 
relations in Israel eventually concluded that Israel is closer to the 
pattern of developed countries, or to use Finer's term it has 'a`-Aeveloped 
political culture', and for that reason the army has remained professional, 
apolitical and subordinate to civil authority. 
3 
Other studies, emphasizing 
social factors, have depicted the Israel Defence Forces as closer to the 
model of armies in developing countries. - These studies have concentrated 
on the role expansion of the army and have analyzed its vital contribution 
to nation-building. 
4 
1 Huntington, S. P.. (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies New Haven. 
Yale University Press. Also Huntingdon, S. P. (1965: 386-430) Political 
Development and Political Decay' World Politics Vol. 17. No. 31. 
2 Perlmutter, Amos (1970: 4) Anatomy of Political Institutionalization: 
The Case of Israel and some Comparative Analysis Cambridge, Harvard" 
University Press. 
3 Finer, S. E. (1976 : 75 ± 98) The Man on Horseback London. Penguin. 
4 See Rapoport, David C. (1962: 71-101)'A Comparative Theory of Military 
and Political Types' in Huntingdon, S. P. (ed. ) Changing Patterns of 
Military Politics New York. The Free Press of Glencoe; Lissak, Moshe 
(1970: 441-450) 'The Israel Defence Forces as an Agent of Socialization 
and Education. A Study in Role Expansion in a Democratic Society'. 
Mens en Maatschapij XLV; Perlmutter, A. (1969: 69-74); Bowden, Tom (1976) 
Army in the Service of the State Tel Aviv. University Publishing Project: 
Glick, E. Bernard E. (1974) Between Israel and Death Harrisburg, P. A. 
Stackpole Books; Dayan, David (1977) Yes, We are Youth - The History of 
the Gadna-Youth Battalions (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Ministry of Defence, 
It should be noted that these studies preceded the growing awareness, 
even among students of the military in developed Western countries, of 
the increasing infiltration by the army into spheres of civil activity, 
and their growing involvement in areas of activity which were 
traditionally divorced from their primary function. See Harries_Jenkins, 
Gwyn (1978: 310) 'Armed Forces and European Society'. In Ginor, S. and 
Scotford Archer, M. Contemporary Europe London. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Scholars have devoted as much attention, if not more to the 
IDF's efforts in the sphere of education, vocational training, 
economic development and to its modernizing contribution to various 
developing countries, as they have to its instrumentalist nature. 
l 
There are two main reasons for this perception of the'IDF. First, 
the army has cooperated with scholars and liberally supplied 
information in those spheres. 
2 
Secondly, several of the scholars 
have tended to confuse images, declared policies and ideological 
concepts with empirical facts. 
A striking example is an article by Rapoport, in which he treats 
Ben Gurion's declarations as expresssions of reality. Rapoport 
described the role expansion of the IDF, particularly in the education 
field, and concluded that 
without universal military service Israel would probably 
find it is impossible to achieve a minimum standard of 
citizenship for individuals from forty diverse lands ... 
The military establishment provides the only point on which 
all citizens merge under one system, one command and one 
objective. 3 
These are words of Prime Minister and Defence Minister Ben Gurion - 
a baker testifying to the excellence of his own dough - and in using 
them Rapoport failed to test them against reality. In the early fifties, 
40% of IDF recruits lacked much education and knew no Hebrew, making the 
army as much a primary school as a military institution, whereas in the 
1 
2 
3 
The term 'instrumental' is employed hereafter to denote the pattern 
of an army accepting the supreme authority of the civil institutions, 
subject to it and acting solely as its executive arm, and, in this 
use of the term, apolitical. The term is preferable-to the phrase 
'professional army' because of certain reservations regarding 
Huntington's assumption that a professional army is by definition 
apolitical. See Chapter 2. 
Scholars tend to make extensive use, for example, of a booklet by 
the former Chief Education Officer, Colonel Bar-On, Mordehai (1961) 
Education Processes in the Israel Defence Forces published by the 
IDF, Tel Aviv. 
Rapoport, D. C. (1962: 85). 
sixties, the period observed by Rapoport, less than 5% of recruits 
were deficient in Hebrew. 
Thus an image was manufactured which ostensibly solved the 
problem of the 'abnormality' of the IDF's relationship with the 
civil system: the Israeli case is unique, a society which is 
'simultaneously developed and developing', having a highly stable 
and institutionalized political structure, a mature political culture, 
and one, in which the military shares with the civilians the same 
values. It has a professional, apolitical army under the institution- 
alized and objective control of the elected political authorities, 
imbued with the values of the civil culture - like the armies of 
modern Western countries. At the same time, the army is a modernising 
agent, with a wide grasp of role expansion in the economic and even 
more so the social systems, which fulfils the function of nation- 
building like the military in developing states. 
l 
The scholars' interpretation of the IDF as a military 
organization in a new state, merged with another image 
- that of the interrelation between the army and the 
social sub-system in a. state experiencing protracted war, an aspect 
which in the sixties had been secondary for the researchers and largely 
ignored by them. Israel, they claimed, was not transformed into a 
'garrison state' in spite of the protracted war, because it is a 
'nation in arms' and its army is a 'citizen army'. 
2 
1 
2 
Chatto and Windus. For discussion of principles see Rapoport D. C. 
(1962: 88-96), Perlmutter, Amos (1977: 61-62) The Military and Politics 
in Modern Times New Haven and London. Yale University Press; 
Van Der Goltz, Colmar (1906) The Nation in Arms London. Macmillan. 
I 
The most -comprehensive description is to be found in Perlmutter, A. 
(1969: 123-4,127-131). 
For definition of the terms 'nation in arms',, 'eitizen army' and 
armed people' see Roberts, Adam (1976: 34-37) Nations in Arms London. 
The main characteristics of this pattern are seen to be: 
1. That the army does not reflect a class, social, ethnic or 
other group, but rather represents the entire community. 
) 
2. That although run by a small professional group it is based 
on universal obligation and is not a closed institution, 
but is open to the society around it. 
2 
3. That the army is characterized by egalitarian values, which 
prevail in the social network as well, and these are expressed 
in the political and economic institutions. 
3 
4. That its main function is public service, an expression of 
good citizenship, virtue. - 
5. That it displays high professional standards, superior 
military ability, efficient recruitment, a high degree of 
dedication, and morale, 'great effectiveness and fighting spirit. 
In addition to these variables, peculiar to all 'nations in 
arms', scholars note several characteristics which particularize the 
Israeli model. The outstanding ones are: the rapid turnover in the 
higher command (in contrast to the Chinese army), and an anti- 
militaristic ethic (in contrast to the Prussian and French armies). 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Concerning Israel see Campbell, J. C. (1963: 105-114) 'The Role of 
the Military in the Middle East: Past Patterns and New Directions'. 
In Fisher, Sydney N. (1963) The Military in the Middle East 
Columbia. Ohio University Press. 
Roberts, A. (1976: 36) and Schild, E. O. (1973: 419-432) 'On the 
Meaning of Military Service in Israel'. In Curtis, Michael and 
Chertoff, Mordehai S. (eds. ) Israel, Social Structure and Change 
New Brunswick, New Jersey. Transaction Books. 
Luttwak, E. and Horowitz, D. (1975) The Israel Army London. 
Allen Lane. 
Perlmutter, A. (1977: 227,252) The last remark contradicts Ben 
Halpern's views (1962: 318-319) on the military attitudes of Zionism. 
That theory has lately been criticized as over-simple. Its 
critics, mostly Israeli scholars, claim that it is based on pre- 
conceptions about the nature of the modernization process in 
general and the army's role therein, and they have also stressed the 
irrelevance of modernization processes to the Israeli case. 
l 
It is further 
limited by the weakness of the general theoretical framework for 
the study of civil-military relations. 
2 
In addition there is now 
an abundance of data which refutes the theory. 
FROM THE 'ABNORMAL' TO THE 'SCHIZOPHRENIC' CONCEPT 
In the late sixties and early seventies a process occurred 
which can be described as the secularization of the security sphere. 
The. aura of sanctity which surrounded it - manifested by secrecy, 
the prohibition-of open discussion, and by being placed beyond 
public scrutiny - was shaken. As will be described hereafter, the 
Six Day War shook the national consensus on security matters and 
rearranged the political constellation. The Yom Kippur War, seven 
years later, rocked several of the principles enshrined in the 
accord covering civil-military relations. 1967 was a turning point 
in the character of the interrelations between the military and 
polity, and the raising of the veil of secrecy from that relationship 
was only one sign of a dramatic change. 
For a recent anilysis on that issue see Horowitz, Dan and Lissak, 
Moshe (1977: 47) From Yishuv to State (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Am Oved. 
A shorter English version of the book see (1979) The Origins of the 
Israeli Polity Chicago University Press. 
2 Chapter 2 deals with some aspects of the study of civil-military 
relations. 
Memoirs, diaries, and biographies of members of the political 
and military elites disclosed details about the earlier periods 
in the history of the state. 
1 
Disclosures about more recent events 
have appeared in the mass media. These processes have elicited a 
higher degree of scepticism and a more favourable intellectual 
climate for an academic study of political-military relations. 
Although it is apparent that the military has accepted the 
formal authority of the civil institutions, nevertheless, in not a 
small number of cases it neither acted in accordance with their 
policies, nor with their authorization. In October 1969, for 
e xample, Pinhas Lavon, a former Minister of Defence, told the 
Knesset Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee that 'some things were 
done without my knowledge and. others not exactly in accordance with 
2 
the instructions I gave. ' 
Furthermore, the impact of. the military on the formulation of 
Israel's national security policy went beyond the legitimate limited 
concepts of the instrumentalist army. It fulfilled all the five 
functions that Huntington. attributes tb the military - advisory, 
representative, executive and even advocacy and substantive - the. 
1 atter two are regarded by Huntington as political in nature and 
hence illegitimate for an instrumentalist, or in his terminology a 
professional army. 
3 
2 
3 
Of particular interest are Moshe Sharett}s'Personal Diary (1978) 
eight Vols. Tel Aviv. Am Oved; Moshe Dayan's books, particularly 
Sinai Campaign Diary (Hebrew) (1967) Tel Aviv. Am Hasefer; 
Milestones (Hebrew) (1977) Jerusalem. Edanim. Also see excerpts from 
Ben Gurion's diary and his private archives, which appear in his 
biography: Bar-Zohar, Michael (1977) Ben Gurion (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 
Am Oved; Eban, Abba (1978) An Autobiography London. Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson; Rabin, Yitzhak (1978) Memoirs Tel Aviv. Maariv. 
Lavon's testimony was corroborated by Dayan, the former Chief of 
Staff. See Tevet, Shabtai (1972: 436) Moshe Dayan (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 
Shocken. 
Later evidence of military action without Government approval was. 
given by Lieut. Gen. Mordehai Gur, who related in an interview 
immediately after his retirement as the Chief of Staff, that while 
Head of Northern Command he bombed and shelled Lebanese villages 
without authorization. Al Hamishmar, 10 May 1978. 
Huntington, S. P. (1957: 374) The Soldier and the State 
Cambridge, Mass. Belknop Press. 
Revelations in Moshe Dayan's diaries demonstrate that the 
'active deterrence' policy, the Israeli retaliatory actions, 
were a result of the persistent advocacy by Dayan, then Chief 
of Staff, with the backing of the entire senior officer group. 
'In this-instance there was a clear causal link between army 
officer advocacy and decision, leading to behaviour towards Israel's 
neighbours. '1 
Since- "1973 it, has. also become evident that the institutional basis of 
civil control is unstable, indicating a lack of constitutional 
clarity regarding the authority and responsibilities exercised by 
the Government, and particularly by the Minister of Defence, over 
the military. The necessity to reform the law regulating the army's 
actual existence refuted many of the beliefs which had been accepted 
in studies of the IDF. One such belief was expressed, -, in Perlmutter's 
contention that 'above all there is no constitutional dispute On the clearly 
established and separate roles of the Minister and the Chief of- 
Staff. 12 Another is Hurewitz' argument that the Minister of 
Defence serves in practice as the supreme commander of the armed 
forces, and need not consult the Government or the Knesset before 
taking decisions. 
3 
Involvement in party politics by officers is 
apparent and rivalries between political groups are reflected inside 
the military establishment to an extent that must call into question 
the IDF's prevailing apolitical image. 
1 
2 
3 
Brecher, Michael (1972: 135) The Foreign Policy System of Israel 
London. Oxford University Press. 
Perlmutter, A. (1969: 114). 
Hurewitz, Z. C. (1969: 373) 'The Role of the Military in Society 
and Government in Israel' in Fisher, Sydney N. (ed. ) The Military 
In the Middle East Columbia. Ohio University Press. 
The new evidence demands a re-examination of the prevailing 
images of the IDF and a revision of the analysis of civil-military 
relations in Israel. However, even in later works scholars 
continued to reiterate the theories prevalent in the past and to 
ignore new findings, perhaps because they are outside Israel and so 
do-not work with primary sources in Hebrew. Thus, for example, 
even Safran in his profound book states that 'Israel's record has 
so far been clean of intrusion by the military into politics in 
any form. '1 How would he define participation by the Chief of 
Staff and Director of Intelligence in the deliberations of the 
leadership of a political party? 
2 
Glick writes that there was no 
3 
political activity by army officers. How would he explain a 
situation when an IDF general, anxious to be-appointed Commander 
of the Southern Command, wins that position after threatening on 
the eve of elections-that if he did not, he would retire from the 
army and join an. opposition party? And how should one describe 
the activities of generals to prevent the resignation of the Defence 
Minister, or to bring about the appointment of a certain politician 
to that office? 
4 
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Safran, Nadav (1978: 3195 Israel, the Embattled Ally Cambridge, Mass. 
Belknop Press of Harvard University. 
According to interviews with Maj. -Gen. (Res. ) Aharon Yariv,. 13 June 1977, 
and Lieut; Gen. (Res. ) Haim Barley, 21 July 1977. Reference is to 
consultations held in Labour Party forums headed by the Prime 
Minister Golda Meir during 1969-71. 
Glick, Edward Bernard (1974: 51-56) 'Do the Generals Run Israel? ' 
Present Tense Vol. 1. No. 3. A recent book which adds little to earlier 
descriptions is Rothenberg, Gunther (1979) The Anatom ýof the Israeli 
Army London. B. T. Batsford Ltd. 
For the activities of Lieut. -Gen. Rabin and Maj. -Gen. Amit to prevent 
the resignation of Ben Gurion when Defence Minister, see Bar Zohar, Michael (1977: 1556). 
In contrast with the routine scholarship by researchers outside 
Israel, a re-examination of the Israeli pattern of civil-military 
relations was initiated by Israeli scholars. In the aftermath of 
the Yom Kippur War, Weiss and Ben-Dor proposed a redefinition of 
the interaction between the military and polity, putting their 
emphasis on the extent of party politicization in the high command. 
' 
Horowitz advanced another step by offering a new and more elaborate 
analytic model of Israeli- civil-military relations. 
The question which taxed him was how, in spite of the protracted 
war, the resultant saliency of the army and centrality of security, 
Israeli society retained its character as a pluralist democracy and 
did not become Sparta, a modern 'garrison state' in the Lasswellian 
meaning. His answer: a 'schizophrenic society' has developed, one in 
which there is a clear delineation between the security sphere and all 
the other civil spheres, the two arenas being subjected to different 
and distinct rules of the game. The citizens of Israel are ready to 
accept 
in so far as security is. concerned, rules of the game 
which differ from those prevailing in the economy, 
labour relations, welfare and education. (on the 
other hand there is a) tacit agreement between the 
state and the citizen that the rules of the game 
governing security will not be applied to other 
spheres of organized social activity. 2 
The dividing line is therefore not between institutions - 
military on the one hand, civil on the other - but between spheres, 
the security sphere and all other spheres. 
This explains why the army has the opportunity to influence 
Israeli policy making in the security field above and beyond the level 
usually acceptable in similar democracies. However, the generals 
reciprocate by agreeing to abide by the civil rules of the game in 
1 
2 
Ben-Dor, Gabriel (1977: 411-432) 
Horowitz, D. (1977); and (1979) ' Civil-Military Relations in Israel 
Unpublished paper. The Hebrew University, Jerusalem. 
all spheres of domestic politics. Thus although Israel's foreign 
policy is affected by images emanating from 'the military mind', 
there is no penetration of military values into other civil sub- 
systems. In fact the reverse is true because civil values penetrate 
into the armed forces. Horowitz sums up: 
The existence of this dividing line between matters which 
obviously come under the heading of security and issues of 
tolitics, economics and welfare which constitute legitimate 
subjects of controversy and regarding which the Israeli is 
extremely sensitive to distributive justice, enables Israel 
to function as a democratic society. This is so in spite of 
the pressure towards national consensus stemming from the 
perception of Israel as a besieged society. 1 
THE TIME 'FOR A NEW ANALYSIS 
However research still lags behind the new evidence and has 
not yet assimilated it. Two basic facts in particular, whose 
influence'on civil-military relations in Israel has been decisive 
have*not yet been subjected to searching examination. 
(a) The fact that since 1967 the IDF has been an army of occupation. 
As such it has been involved not only with security matters but has 
also carried out administrative, judicial and political functions 
over one million inhabitants in the Gaza, Golan and West Bank areas 
and has assumed a policing role. Moreover, since the future fate of 
these territories and their inhabitants have been the focus of the 
political debate in Israel, the army has become involved in that 
controversy. 
1 Horowitz, D. (1979). 
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(b) From the mid-sixties a phenomenon has developed which in 
scope and significance is unique to Israel, namely the entry of 
senior reserve officers into the higher echelons of politics. The 
emergence of the army as the most significant channel of mobility 
to national leadership is one of the most important characteristics 
of the military-political interplay in Israel and has left its 
mark both on the military and on the political systems. 
1 
A dhliberate, systematic effort to find more evidence about the 
nature of civil-military relations in Israel will undoubtedly 
reveal other problems previously ignored. The most startling 
discovery is that during a relatively short period - less than 
thirty years - Israel has undergone not less than five crises in 
political-military relations, some of them quite severe. 
2 
How is 
this compatible with the accepted image of Israel's political 
" stability? Hence there 
is a need both to analyze the new material 
and at the same time to reconsider presently accepted assumptions, 
which have so far been treated as self-evident. 
1 
2 
See on this Peri, Yoram (1973) Processes of Evolution of a New 
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M. A. thesis. Hebrew University, Jerusalem. 
Peri, Yoram (1974: 106) 'The First and Second Career of Israel Army 
Officers'. Public Administration in Israel and Abroad 1973. Vol. 14. 
Peri, Yoram and Lissak, Moshe (1976: 175-192) 'Retired Officers in 
Israel and the Emergence of a New Elite'. In Harries-Jenkins, Gwyn 
and Van Doorn, Jacques (eds. ) The Military and the Problem of 
Legitimacy London. Sage. 
Weiss, Shevah (1973: 25-42) 'Reserve Generals and Politics' (Hebrew) 
Social Research Quarterly No. 4. Haifa University. 
See Chapter 13. 
One of these asserts that there is identity between the military 
and civil society in Israel and that the IDF reflects all strata of 
Israeli society. 
1 This observation identifies the entire army with 
the military establishment, an identification lacking empirical and 
theoretical justification. Where military-political relations are 
concerned the significant group in the army is the military elite, the 
professional nucleus of senior officers in the standing army, and not 
the conscripts. Is its composition identical to that of the whole 
populace? 
2 
It is true that since 1974 about 92% of men and 50% of women who 
reach the age of eighteen are conscripted. 
3 
Hence the-conscripted 
army does mirror the entire society, but what about the officer corps? 
If the most significant attribute of Israeli society is examined, 
that is the ethnic origins-of Israelis, it emerges that in the seventies 
the proportion of oriental Jews from Africa and Asia reached 80% among 
conscripts, 30% among officer cadets, and among the senior officer corps 
only a few per cent. Furthermore, during the last decade the gap 
between soldiers and officers had widened. Whereas the percentage of 
those born in Israel to oriental families increased five-fold from 1964 
to 1972, their percentage among the officer corps increased less than 
threefold. 
4 
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See, inter alia, Campbell, C. C. (1963: 108), Hurwitz, J. C. (1963) 
and Horowitz, D. (1977: 62): 'The dividing line between the military 
and the civilian system in Israel is thus not between social groups 
and elites'. 
See Van Doorn who emphasizes the different character of the 
relationship between the officer corps and society than between 
the conscripts and society. Van Doorn, J. (1969: 456) 'The Military 
Profession in Transition' In Wilson, N. A. B. Manpower Research 
London. The English University Press. 
Data from the Ministry of Defence, September 1977. 
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The officer corps of the regular army and likewise the 
reserve officer group do not represent Israel's demographic 
composition, but rather the contrary. They highlight the lack 
of real equality between the control which various groups have 
over social resources, particularly over political power and 
social prestige. Despite its egalitarian image, the high command 
of the IDF is elitist, with over-representation of -Israelis 
born of European parentage, graduates of pioneering youth movements, 
members of kibbutzim and the sons of veteran Israelis, as opposed 
to immigrants of Asian-African origin, who are of low social status. 
' 
Unlike the attitude to the political system, there is a high degree 
of acceptance'of this inequality in the army.. This is because 
mechanisms exist which were intended to prevent civilian status 
spilling over into military status, such as the achievement ratings 
in the army which ostensibly create equality of opportunity. But 
this acquiescence should not lead the scholar to ignore the fact 
that the high command of the IDF does not reflect the whole of society. 
It is not true that 'in Israel the IDF is society and society is the 
IDF'. 
2 
Other assumptions which reflect outworn images of the IDF as an 
army with egalitarian ideals, lacking corporatism, an army ofa 
'nation in arms', require new thought because'of processes which have 
taken place in the IDF since the 1960's: changes in the motivation 
for recruitment, a shift from an awareness of social mission to 
calculations of a professional career, a new emphasis on status 
1 
2 
See Lissak, Moshe (1969) Social Mobility in Israel Jerusalem. 
Israel University Press. 
Al-Qazzaz, Ayad (1973: 143-165) 'Army and society in Israel'. 
In Pacific Sociological Review Vol. 16 No. 2. 
symbols within the army, and signs of alienation from society in the 
army. Can it be correct to treat the Israeli pattern in a static, 
structural analysis? Is it not rather a dynamic, flexible one, which 
is undergoing a continuous process of change? 
It is time, therefore, for a new analysis of civil-military 
relations in Israel. Such an analysis should be based on the 
accumulated theoretical knowledge that military sociology has produced 
in the last decade coupled with newly revealed facts about the IDF. 
Comparisons of Israel with developing countries resulted in the correct 
conclusion that there has been no attempt to create a military junta 
and to overthrow the legitimate Government by force. The central 
proposition of previous-studies of'the Israeli military is that the 
IDF is an apolitical body and that because of the strength of the 
political institutions there has been no intrusion by the military 
into politics. But it has not been rigorously tested against the 
reality. 
Other pertinent questions have been'neglected: could any society 
experiencing protracted war prevent its army from penetrating into 
civil institutional spheres and from becoming a political army? In a 
highly politicized society how is it possible to exercise control over 
the military, while ensuring the exclusion of the army from political 
controversies and from the influence of political parties? Is it 
possible to preserve an instrumentalist army within a society where 
security is such a salient factor? What are the institutional 
implications of a prolonged and high level of mobilization of the 
periphery on the social system and on civil-military relations in 
particular? Could a society undergoing a prolonged external conflict 
remain Athens and not become Sparta? 
THE ADVANTAGE OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 
This work does not deal with all relationships between the 
military and the civil systems and their total institutional 
components, but concentrates only on an analysis of the nature of 
the interrelationship between the military and the political sub- 
systems. It is conducted from the sociological viewpoint rather 
than from an historic or international relations approach. The 
most pertinent question for the latter discipline is what is the 
influence of the armed forces on the national security policy making 
process. However as Brecher rightly pointed out: 
It is difficult to document the role of the military 
as an interest group in Israel's foreign policy system ... 
Parties are the most voluble of Israel's policy advocates, 
the defence establishment is the most secretive. 1 
The existence of real obstacles in the way of obtaining reliable 
information has not prevented scholars from tackling the problem, 
nor even from reaching some general conclusions. There are some 
assessments which underestimate the extent of the army's influence 
on Israeli foreign policy, and more recently others which postulate 
the IDF as the decisive factor in the field. 
2 
It is notable that among those who hold the latter view, there 
is virtual unanimity that military influence on policy making inevitably 
means militant, activist, or hawkish influence, a product of the 
'military mind'. The definitive expression of that view is that retired 
1 
2 
Brecher, M. (1972: 134). 
Typical to the first approach are Perlmutter, A. (1960) or Safran, N. 
(1979: 317-330); to the second Shlaim, Avi and Tanter, Raymond (1978) 
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Bombing in Egypt, 1970', in World Politics "Vol. 30, No. 4. For a more 
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generals who joined the Cabinet served as the representatives of 
the military establishment and are by definition more extreme 
than the Ministers coming from a civil background. 
1 
The assertion is false, and the case of the Israeli-Syrian 
Disengagement of Forces Agreement in 1974 is only one example. 
The Ministers with a military background - Barley, Rabin and Yariv - 
supported the proposed agreement together with some other dovish 
civil Ministers, while the hawkish Ministers opposed to the 
agreement, seeing it as too great an Israeli concession, all lacked 
any military background. A similar incident occurred in 1975 when 
the IDF's General Staff supported the interim settlement with Egypt, 
and in so doing aligned themselves with the dovish group within the 
Cabinet. 
To reach more soundly based conclusions about the influence of 
the army on national policy making, it is essential to make an 
empirical analysis of the attitudes of the General Staff and to 
compare them with those of the civilian decision-makers. It must 
assess the formal process of policy making inside the Government, and 
its hatching in informal circles before it is laid on the Cabinet 
table. The analysis should incorporate many decisions taken over a 
period of time, it will then. be possible to draw soundly based 
conclusions. The nearest attempt to this method was made by Brecher, 
although even he examined only a limited number of case studies. 
2 
A possible method to overcome the difficulties of analyzing a 
series of case studies is to examine the structure of the decision- 
making process, and not the substance of the policies of the military 
1 
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Foreign Policy London. Oxford University Press. 
establishment and the civil Government. Instead of a description 
of the mass which flows through the political channels, <-a- description 
of the structure of the channels and the dynamics of the mass should 
be made, in other words the rules of the game and the pattern of 
interrelationships between the military and the political institutions. 
This method is advantageous for an understanding of the entire 
military-political relationship and not only the influence of the army 
on national security policies. 
This analysis could be made from either an historical or a 
sociological perspective. The second approach has been adopted in 
this study. Although a panoramic view could be provided through 
historical research, that method has been rejected for practical 
reasons. An historical description of the entire relationship during 
a thirty year period would be far too extensive. If this were done 
each one of the following aspects, like the'relationship between the 
IDF and the Knesset Committee for Defence and Foreign Affairs, or 
with the Ministry of Defence, would be a subject in itself. 
On the other hand the challenge to present a comprehensive 
picture of the relationship and nature of the interaction between the 
military and the political systems in Israel has not yet been taken 
up. If it is met successfully it will in the future be possible to 
, 
conduct historical research of shorter periods, or of specific 
subjects, and also to widen the research and to analyze the nature 
of the relationship between the military and other civil sub-systems 
or institutional spheres. 
What follows is therefore written from a sociological stand- 
point, and as such it is theoretical and analytic. But in order to 
illustrate the theoretical postulates and to present the dynamic 
aspects of the structure, it is interwoven with descriptive and 
historical dimensions. This interspersion is important because 
the Israeli pattern of political-military relations is not static 
and stable but changing and flexible. The historical facts that 
are threaded into the sociological analysis are therefore more 
than mere illustrations of the theoretical analysis, but less than 
a systematic, chronological historical account. 
This study covers specifically the years 1947 to 1977,, --However- 
it extends beyond that period. In order to understand what happened 
when the state was established, a concise summary of the pre-state 
period is essential (Chapter 4). However, the processes described 
in the various chapters, especially for the period 1967 to 1977, 
explain and clarify phenomena which have since occurred. 
The description of the first 30 years of statehood is not made 
redundant by the change in Government, when in 1977 the main opposition 
party came to power for the first time. Processes and phenomena 
which characterize the period of the Likud Government headed by Prime 
Minister Menahem Begin were already visible during the years 1967 to 
1977 when the Labour Party was in power, and an understanding of these 
developments requires a knowledge of the earlier periods. 
This study is based on four types of sources. The first are 
primary material, including many unpublished documents in government 
institutions and public and private archives. Other primary sources 
are diaries and books by former or present members of Israel's 
military and political elites. 
The second type consists of interviews with about one hundred 
persons belonging to the Israeli political and military elites. 
They include former Premiers and Ministers of Defence, Cabinet 
Ministers who were involved in national security affairs, chairmen 
and members of the Knesset Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs, 
former Chiefs of Staff and members of the General Staff, senior 
reserve and regular officers, former Directors-General and senior 
officials of the Ministry of Defence, Military Advisers and heads 
of the bureaus of the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, 
former Directors of Intelligence, both-the military and the Mossad, 
and newspaper editors and journalists who have covered the defence 
and political scene for at least 15 years. The list of interviewees 
is appended. 
The evidence collected in the course of these interviews was 
generally verified by documentation, even though for security 
. reasons direct quotation from some documents was not allowed. In 
cases in which the interviewees could not provide documentary 
evidence, the material was not used unless substantiated by at least 
two additional witnesses who participated in the events described. 
The insistence on verification of testimony sometimes prevented the 
use of material of great interest, but at the same time has ensured 
a relatively high standard of reliability of testimony which cannot 
be. confirmed by documentation as long as the subject remains 
restricted. Newspaper quotations have been used as supporting evidence 
for primary sources and inside information, which have not been quoted 
directly to avoid the intervention of the Israeli military censor. 
The third type includes secondary sources most of which are to 
be found in the archives of daily newspapers and periodicals, the 
IDF journals and books on the history, politics, defence and society 
of Israel. In each case the original Hebrew was preferred to English 
translations to ensure greater authenticity. 
The writer also conducted research about former senior 
officers, and is the fourth type of source material. The research 
made in 1972 involved interviews with about one hundred reserve 
senior officers. It was designed to examine the characteristics 
of the Israeli military elite and the problems of the second 
career. 
Before embarking on the Israeli case, a critique of the 
theory of civil-military relations in general may be useful. 
2. A FRAME'WJORK 'FOR: A--COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS. OF CIVIL=MILITARY RELATIONS 
IS THE MILITARY A POLITICAL PHENOMENON? 
Civil-military relations is a relatively new, if limited, field 
of study. Prior to World War II it received little attention from 
social scientists or historians, and the first comprehensive works were 
done only two decades ago by Andreski (1954), Huntington (1957), 
Janowitz (1960) and Finer (1962). 
1 
This results less from the current state of development of 
social science - lack of agreement on basic definitions, primitive 
research procedures and lack of contact points betiäeen the different 
disciplines in the field, than, as Janowitz points out, from the fact 
that military sociology has lagged behind most other branches of 
sociology. (Janowitz 1968 : 15). 
The reason for. this late development can be traced to the 
intellectual climate of social science and social philosophy in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as to the emergence of the 
new world map in the second half. of the twentieth century. . Within the 
mainstream of 'bourgeois-liberal' sociology of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries there was a clear tendency to underrate the 
military. Social philosophers 
like Adam Ferguson, de Sair Simon, 
Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer considered the military to be 
representative of a 
barbarian, authoritarian and fully obsolete phase 
in human history, and they prophesied a world where industrial activity 
2 
1 For a concise summary and analysis of the history of military 
Sociology see Janowitz, M. (1968 : 15-38), Lang, K. (1972), 
Moskos, C. C. Jr. (1976 55-77) and Kourvetaris, G. A. and Dobratz, 
B. A. (1974 : 3-41) Because this chapter deals with a wide range of 
sources they are 
listed in full at the end of the chapter. 
2 See Van Doorn, J. (1976 : 1). 
would succeed warlike activity, a world in which war will have no 
function and therefore will inevitably disappear) Ferguson, in 
1767, was already writing of the fundamental contrast between warlike 
and commercial people; and Spencer, who represented the evolutionist and 
optimistic school of social philosophy, also wrote of the evolution of 
society from militant to industrial types, a step forward towards a 
higher level of, social organization. (1969 : 499-571). 
Odd though it may seem, a similar attitude towards the military 
was adopted by Marx and Engels. In their judgement power, coercion 
and war played a prominent part in maintaining social order. -In 
modern times wars were the result of capitalism and economic rivalries, 
hence the disappearance of capitalism would root out the causes of 
wars. 'Le capitalisme porte en 1ui-meme la guerre comme la nuee f'orage', 
was the slogan: capitalism contains in itself war, as the clouds the, 
storm. After the socialist revolution, the, military, like the state 
itself and other institutions of the previous. order, would become 
2 
obsolete. 
It was not only the intellectual climate, however, that caused 
the military to be underestimated, but rather inherent developments in 
the military institution and the nature of war itself, Van Doom has 
convincingly demonstrated (1976 : 3-4) that the grand theories of 
eighteenth-century social philosophers from both camps - bourgeois- 
liberals as well as Marxists - and their dismissive view of the 
military as a relic of the past, of little importance for the future 
ran parallel to various empirical developments in their time. These 
1 
2 
See Aron, R. * (1979: 195-200). 
See analysis by Berger, M. (1977: 68-69) and also. Aron, R. (1979: 198). 
included the development of a classical 4rmy; the conduct of war by a 
small professional corps; the reduction of the concept of war to a 
limited social interaction, directed by forces outside the military, 
namely the polity, (see von Clausewitz); "and even the space and time 
limitations-on battles, which became the dominant military strategy 
expressed in the concept of-vermichtung-schlact. 
It was not until the twentieth century'that historical develop- 
ments showed how'naive these optimistic beliefs were, and how 
inadequate to explain the present role of the military in society, or 
to predict its future function. The creation of nation states in 
nineteenth century Europe, and the increased participation of the 
-periphery in the centre of societies brought-about the creation of the 
mass army, replacing the classical army. It was represented by the 
'levee en masse', of the French revolution ' and , 
later1by Von der Goltz's 
concepts of 'das volk in waffen'. 
1 
This factor, assisted by the 
rapid developments in industrialization and weaponry, inflated 
limited wars into total wars of previously unimagined dimensions, 
encroaching more widely into numerous facets and sectors of society. 
2 
Furthermore, since the Second World War new forms of warfare 
have been developed, as the use of non-professional forces have become 
common in international, as well as national, conflicts, illustrated 
most clearly by 'la guerre revolutionnaire'. 
1 
2 
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Wallach, Y'. L. (1977 : 159-161). 
See Van Doorn, J. (1975 : 35). 
See Huntington, S. P. (1962 : 19). 
3 
In the Soviet Union., and the Communist States 
, 
on the other hand, 
Marxist prophecies were not fulfilled, and the military continued to 
maintain a crucial role even after the Revolution. 
Because of the enormity of their power, the political role of 
the armed forces could no longer be ignored. 
I 
On the contrary, it 
became an important social and political phenomenon demanding study 
and observation. Students of the armed forces and society were agreed 
on one conclusion: the involvement of the military in politics in the 
second half of the twentieth century had increased. 
2 
Even in post 1945 Europe officers tried to assume power, or to exert 
direct influence on policies (France-in 1958 and 1961; Greece in 1967, as 
on five. previoüs oecäsions since_1909; -Germany 1944'; Portugal _1974 and Italy 
1975). And even when they claim to be non-partisan in national and 
international issues, in practice they have still significantly increased 
their role in politics. So much so, that one of the pioneering 
scholars on civil-military relations warned of the emergence of the 
garrison state. 
3 
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According to estimates military expenditure in 1978 exceeded 
$400,000 million, at least forty times more than it was in 
1900, at -constant prices. The armed forces in the world 
consisted of 36 million men and women with 25 
million in reserve units. The world annual expenditure for 
defence research reached $30,000 million and 500,000 scientists 
and technicians are involved in this endeavour. See Robert 
S. MacNamara's speech in Davar, 16 July 1979. See also 
Barnaby F. 'The Scale of World Military Expenditure'in 
Jolly, R. (1977) Disarmament and World Development 
Oxford. Pergamon Press. 
References on that are many. . For later ones see Cochran, C. L. 
(1974) 
., and Luttwak, E. 
(1979). 
Lasswell, H. (1941 : 455-468) and (1962). 
The emergence of nations in the southern hemisphere and the 
independence achieved by-some hundred new states of the third world 
gave impetus to this novel process of involvement in the political 
system. Aböut a third of--the countries which have achieved 
independence since World War -II have. experienced military intervention. 
The figure is, even higher - 40% - if one takes in consideration the 
' 
approximately 100 states categorized as developing countries. 
THE THREE*PHASES'IN THE'ANALYSIS"OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
There were three clearly discernible stages in the sociological 
analysis of the military. In the first stage it was realized that armed 
forces are a political phenomenon-and should be analytically studied 
as such. But involvement of the military in politics was still regarded 
as outside interference, an irregularity of. the political process. 
Typical of this stage were scholars who placed the emphasis on 
the military as a social structure which contrasted with that of civilian 
life; 
2 
others who argued that with professionalism the modern armed forces 
become non-political; 
3 
and those who explained the growing military 
involvement in politics in the new states as a result of the breakdown of 
the process of modernization. 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Von der Mehalen, Fred R. (1969 : 92). 
Many articles along this line can be found in Lang, K. (1972 
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A notion put forward by Huntington (1957 : 84). See Reservations 
to Huntington's concept of Professionalism for example in 
Van Doorn, J. (1968) and Abrahamson, B. (1972). Huntington's 
concept, developed in the 1950's might be an expression of the 
Zeitgeist, concerning the declining role of ideology, hence 
politics, in society, as was argued in Bell's "End of Ideolog'. 
See Eisenstadt, S. N. (1976). 
The second phase in the conceptualization of military sociology 
was clearly stated by Finer, Statistical data about military 
intervention reveals an impressive picture. During the period 
1945-1978 no less than 282 military coups and attempted coups have 
occurred in 77 states(151 were successful and 131 failed). Moreover, 
in 1978- 42 states, about a quarter of the world total, were under 
direct military rule, 
1 
and others had indirect military rule or militarily 
supported regimes. 
Discussing the military in the third world Finer argued that -'the 
trend is still towards more coups and more military regimes'. 
2 
It 
is reasonable therefore to conclude that intervention by the armed 
forces in politics rather than obedience to civil power is 'the 
normal' case, and 'instead of asking why the military engages in 
politics we ought to ask why they ever do otherwise. '3 
However, both phases of sociological research, i. e. that in 
which the military was regarded as extraneous to the political system 
and that which regarded the armed forces as an internal part of the 
polity, were based on a common assumption, namely that separation of 
civil and military is the natural state of human society. Indeed, 
most researchers did not even disguise their normative approach according 
to which the military should be controlled by the civil powers. 
4 
1. 
2 
3 
4 
Ltittwak, E. (1979 : 195-207) . 
See Finer, S .E. (1978 : 217), 
(1976 ; 1-3). 
Finer, S .E. 
(1974 : 4). See Also Fitch, J .S. (1977 : 3). 
Eisenstadt, S. N. (1977 1). 
This assumption was challenged later in what can be regarded as 
the-third stage of the conceptualization of -military sociology: the 
fusionist stage. 
An example of that approach can be found in Dominguez's. analysis 
of Cuba, which is governed by civil-soldiers, and where civil and 
military life are fused. In Cuba, according to Dominguez, 
-It is inaccurate to speak of civilian control 
over the military, military control over 
civilian, the politicization of the military 
or the militarization of society as if the 
civil and military spheres were clearly 
distinct. (1974 : 209-238). 
The same fusionist conception underlined Welch's analysis of the 
new type of political-military relations which has emerged in Africa: 
a professional military very much involved in politics. This involve- 
ment does not result from social or political crises, but is fundamental 
to that society. 
I 
However the fusionists did not confine themselves to the developing 
world. On the contrary, some scholars urged that fusionism applies 
to the post-industrial world. In a complex society, argued Perlmutter, 
(1977 : XIII-XV) neither military nor civil sectors can be restricted 
to their functional role. And each one of the two non-monolithic 
groups also performs the classical function of the other. 
Abrahamson (1972 : 17-18) explained the reasons for that 
phenomenon: 
With the acceleration of military technology, 
weapons-of mass destruction and the 
complexity of military organization, the power 
potentials of the military profession have 
increased. The boundaries between strategy 
and politics have become blurred to an extent 
Welch, C. E. Jr. (1977 125-145). He follows some other scholars 
like Lee, J. M. (1969 : 181-182) and Smaldone, J. P. (1974). 
The fusionist concept dominates a large number of the papers 
published in Kelleher, C. (1977). 
ui&n-own 'be¬ore. The political-role-expansion- 
-of- tF6'-El' itary 
, 
appears to be 'a 
_. 
phenomenön - 
of major importance in most countries : -"1 
Is the fusionist theory therefore unique to underdeveloped, or 
post-industrial societies, or perhaps to both? And is- 
this not the same misconception in reverse: that there is - 
a monistic pattern of civil-military relations. Previously 
the pattern was seen as a dichotomy, currently it is regarded as a 
fusion:. Furthermore, has the transition from the era when the milit- 
ary-`'was extraneous to the polity, to the era when it became part of 
the polity, really occurred, or has there merely been a change 'in the 
thinking of students of civil-military relations? 
Eisenstadt puts forward an original proposal to tackle that 
problem. There are two different kinds of societies where civil- 
military relations are concerned: those in which these two spheres 
are separate, and those where the separation is meaningless. In the 
city-states and the imperial systems the military was usually seen as 
distinct from the civil authorities, and the control of the military 
by the civil authorities was deemed a crucial problem. In feudal 
and patrimonial societies, on the other hand, there was considerable 
intermingling of various civil and military functions at all levels 
of the social hierarchy, and the distinction between civil and 
military was to a certain extent meaningless, or at least had a 
different meaning. (1976 : 5). 
As to the reasons for these two basic different types of civil- 
military relations, Eisenstadt contends that the factor determining the 
specific relation is the relationship between centre and periphery in 
1 For another explanation, in the field o, f national security 
and international relation, see Paone, R. M. (1974 : 79-92). 
any given society. 
The greater the difference and distinction 
between periphery and centre, and the greater 
the tendency of the centre to mobilize and 
control the periphery, or the more that the 
centre and periphery struggle over mutual 
control, the more will the distinction between 
civil and military authorities tend to 
develop. 1 
Eisenstadt thus distinguishes in traditional societies 
between city states and imperial systems, as opposed to feudal 
and patrimonial. A contemporary parallel might be the distinction, 
based on the different types of power-relationship between the 
centre and the periphery, between modern nation states-and the 
modern new patrimonial societies in Southeast Asia and Latin America. 
Lissak established a four fold typology of societies which helps 
the understanding of the involvement by the military in politics in 
2 
societies in a process of modernization. However, neither 
theoretical nor empirical research has yet been conducted along 
Eisenstadt-Lissak lines. 
The lack of'a'clear concept and set of propositions by military 
sociologists on the basic nature of 'civil'-and 'military', and the 
variations in relations between the two, had certain consequences. 
First, it led to protracted debate throughout the sixties on whether 
the causes of military intervention in politics lay within society or 
the military. Consensus was reached in the early seventies on the 
equal significance of both factors. 
3 
Secondly, even when both sets of 
1 
2 
3 
Eisenstadt, S. N. (1976: 12). 
Lissak, M. (1976: 37-38,62-65). 
See Finer, S. E. (1962), (1978: 217) and Janowitz, M. 
(1972: 10). 
factors were taken into account there was failure to integrate the 
various proposals, assumptions, hypotheses and insights, about the 
nature and the causes of military intervention in politics, into a 
coherent theory. Many of these viewpoints in fact seemed to be 
contradi. ctory. 
I 
Thirdly, attempts to study the involvement-by the armed forces 
in politics, rather than the act of intervention, produced an abundance 
of models of civil-military relations, and civil-military regimes. So 
much so that it became fashionable to open each case study with a 
tailor-made model, which of course did not make the comparative study 
any easier. 
2 
However, a closer look at these models may be 
rewarding. 
THE PROLIFERATION'OF TYPOLOGIES 
Because of the proliferation of models it is better to analyze 
the different typologies according to the criteria of their construction. ' 
In addition to the distinction between basic types in Western Europe. 
and North America, the Soviet Union and Qnmtnunist States, and the 
emerging states of the third world, 
3 
and other regional distinction, 
mainly within the developing -states, 
4 
seven other criteria for the 
development of models of civil-military relations can be summarised: 
1. The basis of legitimation of the political institutions 
Janowitz' typology is the most representative of this criterion. He 
1 
2 
4 
For a sample of contradictory propositions see Luckham, R. 
(1971 : 5-35), Wayman, F. W. _(1975) 
and Thompson, W. R. (1975: 459-487). 
See Fitch, J. S. (1977). 
See e. g. Moscos, C. C. Jr. (1973) and Huntington, S. P. in the 
forward to Perlmutter (1977). 
E. g. Afro-Asia as opposed to Latin America, See Von der Mehden, 
F. R. (1969 : 100-108) . 
suggested a threefold typology of aristocratic, democratic and 
totalitarian types of civil-military relations. (1964 : 2-8). He 
later modified this theory and identified four major historical models: 
the aristocratic-feudal, the democratic,. the totalitarian and the 
garrison model. (1971). (Another criterion is used for the typology 
of civil-military relations in the third world: a distinction between 
the military as the instrument of sovereignty; as a partner in a 
political bloc; and as a ruling group. 
)--Van Doorn (1968: 39-51) - 
used the same criterion when he analyzed the relations of armed forces 
with different sources of legitimacy: the monarch the national army; 
militia. or guerrilla forces as military formats based on the nation; 
and the officer corps maintaining loyalty to the rifling class 
2. The basis of -civil ' control over the military 
This criterion is used by Huntington in his observation of 
subjective and objective control. ' (1975 : 80-85). In the first case 
the guarantor of civil control is the maximization of the power of 
civil groups, whether governmental institutions, social-classes 
or constitutional forms. In the second case, control is maintained by 
maximizing military professionalism. 
3. The 'social role of the military 
Rapaport's distinction between the praetorian state, the civil 
and military polity, and the nation in arms, is based on several criteria, 
among them the social basis for recruitment. His major distinction 
is between their different roles: to serve as a guard and guarantor 
of the regime, to support the state's foreign policy, or to be an 
educational tool for the public service, the virtue of the nation 
l His fourth category, the military and the economic system 
is based on another criterion. 
(1962 : 70-101). The same criterion underlined the modernising s oldier 
theöry, _mpch used in_the sixties to explain the rise and role- 
expansion of the military in developing countries. Some typical 
uses of that theory are found'in Johnson, J. (1962) and (1964), 
Halpern, M. (1963) and Pye, L. W. (1962)o 
1 
4. Structural. characteristics of the military 
Several typologies were based on structural differences. The 
size of the dominant group inside the army, which controls the 
political machine, is Welch's criterion for military regimes. He 
differentiates between personalist military regimes, corporatist ones 
and interventionary professional types. (1974 : 125-145). A very 
refined analysis by Finer enables him to distinguish between different 
military regimes according to a set of structural characteristics 
of the armed forces. (1978 : 79-90). 
Departing from Huntington's definition of military professionalism 
and arguing that corporatism is an independent variable, rather than 
one of three basic ingredients of professionalism, Perlmutter uses 
corporatism as a criterion for identifying three modern types of civil- 
military regimes: professional, praetorian and professional revolutionary 
(1977). The original aspect of his study is that these types do not 
coincide with the usual three-way classification of political systems 
into western, communist and developing. 
Lissak uses two sets of characteristics - the level of the 
technological and logistic achievement of the military and the extent 
of its social cohesiveness and normative identity - to present four 
theoretical prototypes of armed forces. (1976 : 37-38). 
1 For an amplified list See Moskos, C. C. (1976 : 68-69). 
5. The social basis of the military 
Most descriptions of the armed forces based on this criterion are 
one-case models, rather than typologies: the Marxist concept of the 
military as the tool of the ruling class, Mosca's concept of the' 
officers as being part of the ruling class, (Mosca. G, 1939) and Mill's 
perception of the power elite. (Mill, C. W., 1956). Some of the 
studies on African armed forces as representing rival ethnic groups 
within the modem state, or even an analysis o£_the. ethnic composition 
of the armed forces in post-industrial states like the US_ -; 
the same criterion as a basis for typologies. 
) 
use 
6. The Level of military influence on the political process 
This is a very wide criterion, and several variables were used 
to express or measure the level of influence. It was applied mainly 
to developing countries, and in particular those with military regimes. 
Kourvetaris claims that the degree of military and/or civil control 
is the basis for Janowitz's typology of civil-military relations in 
the third world. 
2 
And Janowitz identifiesf. ivE. models: authoritarian, 
personal control, authoritarian mass party, democratic competitive and 
semi-competitive systems, civil-military coalition and military 
control.. (1964 : 2-8; 1971). 
Lovell (1970 : 4-7) presents a paradigm based on the degree of 
influence - high, medium or low, and the scope of influence - 
relatively extensive or relatively limited. The result is six models 
1. See Harries-Jenkins, G. and Van Doorn,. J. (1977: 21-33) and 
Moskos, C. C. (1973a)(1973b). and Enloe, Cynthia H., (1980) 
Ethnic Soldiers, State Security in Divided Societies 
Harmondsworth. England. Penguin Books. 
2 
Kourvetaris, G. A. and Dobratz, B. A. (1977: 23) However it is 
not the only criterion. See the use of that typology in 
Bienen, H. and Morell, D. (1974). 'Transition From Military 
Rule: Thailand's Experience, ' in Kelleher, C. (1974: 3-26): 
rating from the least to the greatest influence: palace guard,; 
praetorian army, competitive political bloc, predominant bloc, ruling 
coalition and ruling elite. 
As can be easily discerned his term., 'scope of influence" -includes 
two separate elements.: the number of areas in which the army-is 
interested in exerting power, and the exclusivity of its control. 
The latter criterion has often been used by, other scholars. Finer 
(1976 : 149-151) applied it as one of two criteria for his classification 
of the extent to which the military (or its representatives) control 
the major policies of society, and the degree of overtness with which 
they do so. He classified them into full, partial'and discriminating 
control policy, which can be either open, half-open or covert. He''--- 
thin -added a third criterion, the constitutional role, namely the 
military rulers proclaimed intention to stay in power. (1976 : 246). 
Adelman and Morris used the same criterion for their typology - 
direct control by the military, indirect military rule, and civilian 
rule. However, they added another dimension to the measurement of 
. what 
is described as the level of military control, which is the 
time span of implementation of this control. 
l 
A different aspect of military exclusiveness was Horowitz's 
basis for classification of military elites. He identified five types 
according to their tolerance of free civil political activities: the 
caudallistic form, in which the national leader is invariably an officer 
in the armed forces; the trustee form, in which power resides in the 
military but party politics are allowed to exist in civilian style; 
the orienter form, where the military prevents only deviant forms of 
1 They measured a period of 5 years 1957-1962. Adelman, I. 
and Morris, C. T. (1967). 
politics, the consensual form, a civilian government with the tacit 
consent of the military; and the veto form, in which the military act 
as a faction in and for itself, but is otherwise without political 
power. ' (1967: 148-149). 
An original method of both measuring and predicting the level 
of military control*of the political process is Andreski's military 
proportional ratio. 
' Andreski did not limit his classification only to 
military regimes and claimed that the higher the MPR the more 
political power is held by the military. (1954). 
A recent use of the 'level of the military influence' criterion 
is by Colton. He examines two variables: the first is the scope of 
issues the army is involved with - internal, institutional, intermediate 
and societal. The second is the means the army employs. - official, 
prerogative, expert advice, political bargaining and force. (1979). 
Several attempts have been made to establish quantitative indices- 
to measure the level of the military predominance in politics. It is 
characteristic of the state of sociological studies of civil-military- 
relations that they do-not easily lend themselves to systematic comparisons. 
Five scales based on various indicators are those of Adelman. and Morris (1968), 
Banks and Testor (1963), Colemand (1960), Banks (1971), and Finer (1970). 
Sigelman, who criticized both their insensitivity and idiosyncratic 
nature, constructed a composite indicator called the Military Intervention 
Index, restricted only to the third world (Sigelman, L. 1977: 261-267). 
7. Competitive civilian. and military values 
An original approach, different from most of the previous ones, is 
that of John P. Lowell. Instead of analyzing civil-military relations 
1 The proportion of militarily utilized 
individuals in the total 
population. 
from a structural viewpoint, and examining the relationships between 
military and social or political institutions, he proposed to study 
the relationship between two competitive sets of values: those associated 
with national security as opposed to those associated with democratic 
practices. Through the Lasswellian question of-who gets what, when and 
how, he tries to analyze the process of the authoritative allocation of 
values in society. The relationship between the two competitive sets 
of values, resulting from that process, serves as the criterion for the 
specific type of civil-military relations. (1974 : 11-33). 
8. Ideographic types 
In contrast to some of the more ambitious attempts to develop 
comparative typologies, other contributions to the understanding of 
civil-military relations were made by scholars who pointed to the 
existence of, or development towards, a particular model. No summary 
of criteria for the development of civil-military relations will be 
complete without mentioning the better known. This includes Lasswell's 
concept of the 'garrison state' (1945) , Janowitz' 'constabularyforce' 
(1960)1, Huntington's concept of 'praetorion society'and Rapaport's concept 
of 'nation in arms' and the 'guardian state'. 
1 
9. Towards a comprehensive typology 
Though the typologies basically differ in their criteria for 
classification, as well as in other aspects, - Luckham rightly argues 
that two major characteristics can be traced in most of them. 
2 
The 
first was the effort to reduce criteria to the minimum, usually to a 
single variable, and the second, their focusing on either the societal 
1 
2 
See analysis and references in Luckham, R. (1971). 
This survey is not intended to include all types and models such 
as typologies of coups (Zalberg, 1973 : 309-331), or different 
types of military governments (Von der Mehden 1969 : 91-109) 
and others. 
or military aspect.. to the exclusion. pf the other. 
l 
Later typologies, 
attempting to avoid this, incorporated a: mu1t -*yartable approach. 
The first effort was made by Van Doorn 01968 ; 35-51). He 
classified various types of civil-military relations on the basis of the 
interrelations of the military with one of the civil-"sitb-systems 
(the state, the people, the elite and the economic interests). A later 
version of that classification omitted the fourth category and described 
the third as the relation between the military establishment and 
particular social classes and groups. (Harries-Jenkins, G. and Van 
Doorn, J. 1977 : 1-33). 
Another attempt was aimed to establish a causal model that could 
explain the contribution of six variable sets to the control of the 
military on the decision- making process of foreign policy. Benjamin 
and Edinger 01971) studied 62 cases of military participation in 
foreign policy decisions in four states, examining 36 hypotheses 
concerning military involvement in politics. These hypotheses -can 
be grouped into six categories: the foreign relations of the state, socio- 
economic patterns, political structures, the decision making framework, 
normative role perception of the civil and military leaders, and 
the military resources and organization. 
The results of the study shows that at least in the cases analyzed, 
unicausal hypotheses positing a one-to-one relationship appear to rest, 
at best, on very weak empirical foundations. However two variables 
from the 'military resources and organisation' category -a relatively 
high proportion of the GNP devoted to the military expenditure, and a 
large military establishment - when combined with -others, appear strongly 
to predict military control over foreign policy. 
1 Luckham, R. (1971 : 8-9) . 
Furthermore, the authors were able to build a causal model that 
ordered the six variable sets so as to be able to indicate the relative 
contribution of each set to the overall association with the decision- 
outcome. 
A more comprehensive attempt to construct a general typology was 
made by Luckham (1971) who succeeded not only in establishing a set of varia- 
bles, to assist in a comparison of different concrete- cases, but also to 
include- nine existing analytical concepts, or ideal-types, in his 
comparative typology. 
Luckham's typology was based on two dimensions: the strength or 
weakness of civil institutions and of the military. His main 
contribution, however, is a third dimension which he introduced into 
his typology - the nature of the boundaries between the military 
establishment and its socio-political environment, as the main factor 
affecting the interaction between the two spheres. 9 
He defined three kinds of boundaries between the military system 
and the societal environment: integral, permeable and fragmented. The 
first sharply' differentiates between a system and its environment, thus 
stabilizing it and helping to maintain its integrity, even at times of 
stress. In the second there is no clear line between the internal 
system and the external environment. The third type, fragmented 
boundaries, are those differentiated in some respects and permeable in 
others. The tabulation of the three variables -, the power of civil 
institution (high or low), the power of the military (high, medium or 
low) and the character of boundaries - gave 18 hypothetical cases, half 
of which fit the existing models of civil-military relations. These 
are 'objective control, constabulary control's- 'apparat control, 'nation in 
arms; -' and'revolutionary nations in arms', `subjective control', "garrison 
state', 'guardian state, 'post colonial guardian state, 'praetorian state', 
and'political vacuum'; (1971 : 22). 
Luckham's achievement lies not only in his adoption of a multi- 
factorial approach, bringing together both military, and societal factors, 
long advocated by Finer (1962), but in his innovatory concept 
of boundaries of the military establishment. This assists in the 
analysis of the interrelations between the civil and military sectors. 
However, the long search for classification of civil-military 
relations did not made great progress. Finer argued that despite 
conceptual innovations, Luckham's proposition constituted no-real advance 
on existing knowledge. (1975 : 24). And Van Doorn admitted that 
-'almost every tendency (of civil-military relations) shows its counter- 
part. Highly divergent patterns exist alongside one another and often 
the existing civil-military relations in the various countries are on 
different levels of development' (1968 : 51). 
1 
Could not these efforts to build a typology, or to classify the 
various forms of civil-military relations on the basis of a very small 
number of components, be the reason for such unsatisfactory results? 
Would it not be more revealing to do the reverse, i. e. to elaborate on 
the complex nature of the relationship between the military and society? 
THE CONVERGENCE OF'ARMED FORCES ' AND' SOCIETY 
With this in mind, one of Luckham's inadequacies- is his 
indiscriminate classification of various institutional spheres under 
one heading 'civil'', as opposed to 'military'. This is evident mainly 
in his failure to distinguish between polity and society, and also 
between other spheres. Indeed he used the terms civil power, socio- 
economic environment and political institutions interchangeably, as 
l 
Concerning Africa for example; Smaldone argues that-each instance 
of military intervention, hence each pattern of civil-military 
relation there, must be examined in its own context (1974 : 212). 
opposed to military. 
This lack of discrimination between' various different social 
spheres fails to elucidate the analysts of the complexity of civil- 
military relations. This complexity'derives from the fact that 
diverse societal spheres may have differing relationships with the 
military. Furthermore, within the same institutional sphere there may 
be contradictory trends: i. e. the military establishment could have one 
set of relations with the state bureaucracy, and another with the 
legislature-or the parties. It is, therefore, meaningless to analyze 
the military relationship with civil institutions as'a whole. 
breakdown of the 'civil' into components and an acknowledgement of the 
multi-dimensional character of civil-military relations is necessary. 
At this point it is advisable to analyze the relations of the 
military as a sub-system,, and to deal separately with interactions, 
interplays and exchanges of the military with each one of the 
institutional spheres. 
1 
In analyzing the multi-dimensional civil-military relations four 
. elements should 
be studied: first, the characteristics of the armed 
forces and each one of the civil sub-systems; secondly, processes of 
convergence and divergence occuring in the various civil sub-systems and 
the military; thirdly, the different types of boundaries that exist 
between the military and the various civil sub-systems and their 
location, which do not necessarily coincide; and finally, the various 
On the use of that method in the study of civil-military relations 
see Kourvetaris, G. and others (1977 : 20-21), and Harri-es- 
Jenkins, G. and others (1977 : 23). For a ., wider perspective - 
see e. g. Buckley, W. (1968). 
mediatory and mitigating mechanisms. between the different sub-systems. 
These four elements are not necessarily of the same kind in the 
various relations between the military and the different civil sub- 
systems. Therefore the overäll concept of "-'civil"- as opposed to 
military., limits the possibilities for a wider and deeper analysis of 
these relations. 
The division of the civil sector into sub-systems should not be 
rigid, so that students can define the sub-systems according to the 
purpose of each particular study. After all a system is, in Easton's 
words, 'a device to help us to understand, define and redefine areas 
of human behaviour, not a strait jacket to imprison analysis permanently 
within a preconceived mould or model"". 
1 
Four sub-systems should be examined in juxtaposition to the 
military: political, social, economic, and evaluative or psychological. 
Other elements should be grouped under environment and include some 
variables very important to civil-military. relations, like the interna- 
tional relations of the state, or in the case of Israel, particular 
characteristics such as the fact that it is a pmall 'client-state' of 
the-US and has special relations with the Jewish Diaspora. 
As a division into political, economic and social sub-systems is 
most common, a word of explanation is required only for the psychological 
sub-system. The classic definition. used, inter alia by Parsons, 
is the value or culture sub-system. The introduction of the psychological 
dimension is advocated here because it includes not only norms and 
values and other social-cultural factors as they are absorbed and 
1 Easton, D. (1965 : 67) . 
internalized by people, but also the-personality traits of the members 
of the civil and military elites, their perceptionap effects and_, 
images. The reason Kenneth Boulding advocated the psychological 
study of foreign policy is also valid for the study of civil-military 
relations; 
. We must recognise that the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of 
nations do not respond to the 'objective' facts 
of the situation, whatever that may mean, but 
to their 'image' of the situation. It is what 
we think the world is like, not what 1it 
is really 
like, that determines our behaviour. 
In each set of relationships between the' military on one hand and 
one of the civil sub-systems on the other four elements should be 
examined: the-' institutional characteristics; the processes of 'convergence 
and divergence; the type and location of the boundaries; and the nature 
of the mediatory mechanisms. While the first one is almost self 
evident and was used by all the models and typologies of civil-military 
relations, the remaining three, and the last two in particular, deserve 
some more elaboration. 
The phenomenon of convergence is reflected in the fact that the 
civil and military sectors, which in the past differed greatly in 
terms of structure, mode of operation and social norms, have been 
converging since World War II, each adopting attributes'similar or 
identical to those characteristics of the other. (Janowitz, M. (1960), and 
(1965 : 223-237) ; Biderman, A. D. and Sharp, L. M. (1968 : 381-399) ; 
Lang, K. (1972); Segal, D. R. and others (1974 : 157-172), Moskos, C. C. Jr. 
(1971 : 179-294 and 1973 : 255-280). 
1 Boulding, Kenneth (1954 : 120-131) 'National Images and Inter- 
national Systems' The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. III 
No. 2. See also Brecher, Michael (1972 : 11-12) L'Indeed 
elite images are not less than the reality of their environment 
and are much more relevant to an analysis of the foreign policy 
flow. ' 
Although this process could occur in both sectors it. was generally 
accepted that it was the military system which had changed and .. 'tended 
to display more and more of the characteristics typical of any large- 
scale non-military bureaucracy. ' 
1 
Moreover this trend has been observed only in industrial societies 
and the US' in particular. No real attempt was made to analyze 
underdeveloped countries in these terms. Another phenomenon 
neglected in research was the convergence taking place in the civil 
sector due to military influence. 
The scholars who studied this process never asserted that total 
c. onvergence. would at some point be achieved or that structural 
isomorphism would be attained. 
2 
Over a period of time it became 
evident that built-in constraints in both sectors prevented a far 'reaching 
overlap between them. As Lissak stated -'It became clear that the two 
sectors, and even more so certain sub-systems within them, are not 
exposed to the same pressure for structural changes, and thus their 
motivations towards adopting new modes of operation and normative 
principles are different'. (1978 ; 10) 
3 
Soon after scholars realised that the very opposite 
had occurred. In Moskos' words: 'The over-two-decades-long 
institutional convergence of the armed forces and American society is 
beginning to reverse itself', (1970 : 170) and more evidence of that 
4 
process followed. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Janowitz, M. (1965 : 17). 
See e. g. Segal, D. R. and others (1974 : 157-172). 
See also Little, R. W. (1969 : 442-448). 
Segal, D. R. and others (1974). 
It was Moskos himself who later proposed (1973 : 
255-280) that neither convergence ; nor divergence -were. cccurring 
exclusively at that-time. Taking into account the complexity 
and high level of differentialization in the modern military it is 
more reasonable to assume a simultaneous coexistence of both convergence 
and divergence. Moskos named that type of army 'segmented, or plural 
army' -a developmental construct which incorporates both trends and 
is therefore called plural: convergence, which is the predominant 
process in the 'convergent, or civil military'-, and divergence, which 
typifies the "divergent, or traditional military'. 
Moskos described the third model as segmented, meaning that the 
various trends have different validities within different components 
of the military. The pluralistic and segmented character of convergent 
and divergent trends can be applied in the same way to components of 
the civil society, in other words, to the various institutional spheres. 
The one-sided and generalized conception of convergence in the 
past led to misleading conclusions concerning the development of mediatory 
mechanisms between the two sectors. And whereas scholars formerly 
argued as to whether divergence weakens them (Janowitz 1975 : 85) or 
strengthens them (Segal et al 1974 : 154,162- 165); the new concept of a 
segmented and plural army enables a more balanced approach. Lissak 
(1978 : 12-13) claims that 'it would be wrong to assume the existence 
of an exclusive or linear relationship between either convergence or 
divergence and either the strengthening or weakening of linkages between 
the armed forces and civilian population. ' Instead, he developed a 
model of four prototypes of interactions: convergence trends that may 
bring about the strengthening and institutionalization of linkages 
between the two sectors; convergence that may be followed by a weakening 
of these linkages; a process of divergence which strengthens the 
institutional linkages and a prototype reflecting the reverse, i. e. 
weakening them. 
Breaking. down the civil sector into institutional spheres, 
examining the two processes (convergence or divergence) 
in the military and civil sectors, and the nature of various mediatory 
mechanisms, provides an analytic tool for a better understanding of 
) 
the relationship between the armed forces and society, in a comparative, 
and more importantly, a dynamic perspective. 
THE CHANGING 'NATURE' OF' THE' MILITARY'S' BOUNDARIES 
At this juncture a further examination of the nature of the 
boundaries between the military and civil -, 'sub-systems is necessary. 
Although the concept of convergence appealed to many military 
sociologists, a thorough analysis of the definition and, use of the term 
shows that there exists a conceptual and operational ambiguity so 
pronounced that 'two scholars using the term convergence may well 
mean very different things. ' (Segal, D. R. and others 1974 : 205). 
A key error is the failure to differentiate between similar 
attributes of civil and military sectors on the one hand, and the 
types of boundaries separating them. on the other. Biderman and Sharp 
include 'interpenetrability' as one of four types of convergence 
(1968 : 383). The others are 'structural', 'dynamic' and 'similarities 
of attitude and ideology'. Others fused 'structural similarities' 
with 'overlapping' or 'coterminous' as opposed to 'separate'. (Moskos 
1971 i'273-277). 
However, these are two different categories. Two organisations 
might be similar in their structure, mode of operation, or norms and 
values, without being necessarily interconnected, let alone mixed or 
Other terms used are institutional linkages (Lissak 1978), 
or interface processes and institutions (Segal 1974). 
fused. To cite one example, the -military establishment might take part 
in politics in a party-manner, alongside or even in cooperation with 
other civilian parties, thus adopting some of their characteristics, 
without losing its identity and boundary, formation. 
l 
Just as scholars putting the emphasis on convergence. failed to 
realise that this term includes both the inter-system process and the 
type of its boundaries, so Luckham, who introduced the concept of boundaries 
into the analysis of civil-military typologies, overlooked the importance 
of the concept of convergence. 
The problems of boundaries as an independent variable, have not 
been analyzed. The result has been conflicting descriptions of the 
consequences'of convergence. While some have viewed the convergence 
phenomenon as contributing to the permeability of the military's boundaries, 
with increased military dependence on ci-vilians, 
2 
others have suggested. that 
the greater the degree of structural convergence, the less dependent 
the military is on society and the more insulated it may become. 
3 
The two concepts, the nature of boundaries and the process of 
convergence/divergence have one outstanding difference. The first is clearly 
structural, though not necessarily static. It deals with division of 
labour and roles among different sub-systems. The second, which deals 
with processes, puts the emphasis on the dynamic, historical or 
chronological dimension. 
Seeing the boundaries as analytically independent of convergence 
enables detection of various types of boundaries co-existing between the 
military system and civilian sub-systems. For instance, the employment 
1 
2 
3 
See Bienen, H. and Morell, D. (1974 : 29). 
E. g. Lang, K. (1973). 
E. g. Segal, R. D. and others (1977 : 214-215). 
of civil professionals within the armed forces might cause an opening 
of boundaries within the occupational sphere, with interactions between 
them and the civilian reference groups. At the same time however 
a growing alienation might occur with the closing of military boundaries 
in the normative and value sub-system (because of the difficulties of 
self-identification for the armed forces. ) 
The independence of the two concepts enables a further analysis of 
the. interrelation between them. Do certain types of boundaries create 
any constraints on the convergence/divergence process? If so, what are 
they? Is it more likely that certain processes will occur with particular 
boundaries. One might also ask whether. thes"e processes, which partially 
result from-external factors, cause a change in the nature of the 
boundaries. The interplay between types of boundaries on one hand, 
and of processes on the other, requires a further analysis. 
Luckham's characterization of three types of boundaries is useful. 
1 
He distinguishes between integral, permeable and fragmented boundaries 
according to two factors. On the one hand he cites the amount of 
freedom given to members of the military to interact with the environment, 
without control by the top hierarchy of the sub-system, and on the other 
the existence of a distinctive organizational format and purpose for 
the military. Where, he argued, both contrbl and distinction exist 
1 Here the military is dealt with as an analytic rather than 
as an entity system, see Easton, D. (1965 : 37-45), therefore 
with analytical, or vertical rather than horizontal boundaries. 
See Strassoldo, R. and Gubert, R. (1973 : 33). They defined 
them as 'boundaries which can be identified with the rules, 
norms and principles governing the identification of members, 
roles and behaviour belonging to the system from those that 
do not belong. ' 
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there are integral boundaries. Where they do not,, the boundaries are 
permeable, and it is when military format and purpose exist, but inter- 
actions across the boundaries escape the control of the military elite, 
that the boundaries are fragmented. (Luckham 1971 : 18). 
One of the questions that should be examined, particularly when 
the boundaries are fragmented, is their location. This is not fixed 
but rather shifts, depending upon the interaction 
between the military and civil sub-systems. Continuous negotiation 
and trade-off exists between the actors involved in the exchange relations 
in the various institutional spheres, and the determination of the 
location is under permanent, institutional and normative pressures. The 
location therefore is not static, but rather dynamic. 
Furthermore, the locations of the military's boundaries 
with each civil sub-system do not coincide. While a certain zone 
might be part of the military in its interaction with one 
civil sub-system, it might' be outside the military in its 
relation with another. One can, therefore, observe a role expansion 
of the armed forces into one institutional sphere, and, at the same 
time, pressures to limit the scope of military activity in another. 
Militarism, to choose one example, can be seen as an encroachment of the 
military-mind into the value or cultural. sub-system, which does not 
necessarily result in the same intrusion of the military into the 
political sub-system. Latin-American 'civil-militarism' is a more 
interesting case, in which civil acceptance of military political inter- 
ference does not appear to be a result of military initiative. 
) 
Scholars have already noticed that whereas in the nineteenth 
century European armed forces penetrated various social sectors, 
1 See Johnson, J. J. (1964 : 120). 
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today the situation is the reverse_ý,.: 
1 In modern liberal democracies 
a contracting process of military. boundaries occurs, reducing the 
military sphere. 
In every case under analysis students should look for the location 
of the. military boundaries with the various sub-systems, and the actors 
influencing their type and character, and establish what causes the 
difference in location. In the case of fragmented boundaries in 
particular, an important question is which parts of the boundaries are 
integral and which-permeable, what is their penetrability and what is 
the main direction of the penetration. 
2 
Answers to these and similar 
questions enable a comparative study of the role and the place of the 
military establishment in various societies. 
Just as the military boundaries in modern liberal-democracies tend 
generally to contract, so in most cases 
_they 
become more perme- 
able. The reason does not lie in the processes of convergence, but 
rather elsewhere. It is a phenomenon not only restricted to the 
military that 'more developed systems are more open', that 'development 
stimulates opening the system. '3 'The more complex a system the higher 
should be its capacity for adaptation to, and control of the environment. ' 
The 'law of requisite variety' implies that the higher, more complex 
and powerful a system is, the more elaborated and sensitive are its 
2 
3 
See Van Doorn, J. (1975 : 35) or Lovell, Y. P. . (1974 : 21). 
Following Easton, it seems worthwhile to distinguish basically 
between exchange, when referring to the mutuality of the 
relationship, reciprocity. of the influence, and 'transaction, 
when wishing to emphasise that the effective movement is in 
one direction. Easton, D. (1965: 108). 
Teune, H. and Mlinar, Z. -(1973 : 265) 'Development and the 
Openness of Systems'. In Strassoldo, R. (ed. ). 
boundaries, i. e. its capacity to react appropriately to environment 
stimuli. 
l The character of modern war and , 
litary technology has 
further blurred the boundaries between the military and the political 
sub-system. However, the specific roles and core functions of the 
military are of the kind that impose limitations on the trend of boundary 
openness as part of the civilianization of the armed forces. 
2 
THE NEED'FOR'A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL 'APPROACH* TO CIVIL-MILITARY' RELATIONS 
The type of boundaries might affect the character of the inter- 
change process across them. However, the 'major factor in determining 
this process is the nature of the mediatory mechanisms between the 
military and the various sub-systems. For example, a successful civil 
control over the military.. does not necessarily postulate integral 
boundaries. . The 
boundaries of the Soviet military are much more 
open to political penetration, with the party's influence and the 
political commissars, and civil control 
is achieved no less successfully 
than in the Western democracies. 
3 
There is no a'priori correlation between the type of boundaries 
and the character of structural linkages of the sub-systems. Integral 
boundaries may exist together with strong mediatory mechanisms, but 
might well . 
coexist with weak ones. There are however two cases 
which. should cause concern. The first 
is the existence of integral 
boundaries with the absence of effective mediatory mechanisms. Here, 
the military might retreat into self isolation and'alienation with 
1 
2 
Strassoldo, R, and Gubert, R. (1973 ; 33-34). 
'Factors of the 
opening of boundaries. ' In Strassoldo, R. 
(ed. ). 
on the limits of civilianization see Armed Forces and Society 
Vol. 4 No. 3 (1978 : 363). 
See Nolkowicz, Roman (1967) The Soviet Military and the 
Communist Party Princeton. Princeton University Press. 
disfunctional consequences to the overall system. 
I The other is 
when permeable boundaries exist and the mechani., sms, are weak, This 
might result in either militarization of society along tree. lines of 
Lasswells 'garrison-state, or dangerous civilianization of the military 
as described by Mills, where big business influencesthe military 
profession, creating the military-industrial complex. 
It remains, therefore, the task of the student of civil-military 
relations to examine all four sets of variables in the military on 
one hand and the various civil sub-systems on the other: the 
characteristics of the inter-related sub-systems, the processes of 
convergence and divergence which occurs within them, the type and 
location of the boundaries, and the character of: the mediatory mechanisms 
affecting the interchanges across the boundaries. 
Any attempt to discuss the relations between the military and the 
civil sector as a whole will necessarily obviate a profound 
understanding of these relations, as they are multi-dimensional. 
It was the unidimensional approach which underlined previous 
attempts to analyze civil-military relations in Israel, a state under 
permanent siege, a-society in a protracted war. It is this approach 
that has brought about a simplified description of Israel as either a 
modern Sparta or, more often, as a modern Athens; both descriptions 
lack depth. 
Within this work only one dimension of civil-military 
relatibas will be examined, that is the relation between the military and 
the polity. References, however, will be made to other dimensions, 
mainly the social or the value sub-systems. These dimensions merit`a 
separate analysis in the future. 
1 
See Harries -Jenkins, G. and Van Doorn, J. (eds. ) (1976). 
In examining the relationship between the military and polity in 
Israel, each of the four variables. needs ta. be questioned, Cöncerning 
the first variable,. these questions relate,. inter alia, to the structure 
of the political institutions or the nature of legitimate mass political 
participation, the codes of political behaviour, the stability of the 
party system,. -., the level "of 'poli£ieälýcüTttiret_:; örLthe 
structure, functions, powers and-authority of the armed forces. 
As for the convergence/divergence variable relevant questions 
are the structural similarities and dissimilarities in the two sub-systems, 
political homogeneity between military and civilian elites, likenesses 
in political and military decision-making process or modes of operation, 
and the extensive processes of militarization of-the polity and 
civilianiZation of the military. 
Issues that might clarify the nature and location of boundaries 
have a special significance in Israel: the civilian roles of the IDF, civil 
functions and civil sectors within the sphere of security, channels 
of communications between military leaders and the Government, the 
degree of party-political influence on career patterns of military 
officers, the involvement of officers in active political life, and the 
effect of the reserve system on political-military relations. 
Lastly, the institutional patterns of civil control, the existence of 
joint bodies for the military and the civil bureaucracy, or constitutional 
rules to regulate cases of conflict between the military and the 
political establishment, all these are but some of the questions through 
which the mediatory mechanisms could be studied. 
However, the study of the four variable sets is not easy, as 
simple correlations between these sets have not yet been found. It has been 
suggested that no a priori correlation exists between convergence/ - 
1 
divergence and mediatory mechanisms. The same is proposed here 
1 Lissak, M. (1978). 
regarding the relation between convergence/divergence and boundaries, 
as well as between boundaries and. mediatgTy , jnechanjsugs. 
The main contention which is the basis of the aforementioned set 
of variables'and principles is the complexity of the relationship between 
the armed forces and civil society. A one-variable, or 
one dimensional model is inadequate to describe this complexity. 
The purpose of this analysis is not to construct yet another 
typology of civil-military relations, but rather to depict a set of 
analytic elements making possible the study of those. iriter relations within 
a more systematic framework. Though close to some structural approaches 
it is not static and does not suffer from the consensual bias in 
perception of the social order. Conversely, it recognises conflict and 
the permanent process of change within society. 
As will be seen later, both domestic conflict and processes of 
change hold a very important role in the peculiar Israeli pattern of 
civil-military relations. However, prior to the detailed study of 
these factors it is worthwhile examining briefly some of the more 
important characteristics of Israeli society and to analyze the centrality 
of security. 
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3. THE CENTRALITY OF SECURITY IN ISRAEL 
THE MEANING OF CENTRALITY 
Two forces, Huntington writes, shape the military institutions 
in any society, 
a functional imperative stemming from the threats 
to the society's security, and a societal imperative 
arising from social forces, ideologies and institutions 
dominant within the society. 
The most important constraint which influences both the military 
institutions and their relationship with the civil sector is the nature 
of the conflict in which Israel is engaged. It is an acute and prolonged 
conflict, and even during periods when active hostilities have not 
occurred a latent war had existed. This situation did not commence with 
the establishment of the state in 1948, but dates back thirty years to 
the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 and the beginning of the 
British Mandate in 1922.2 
Israel perceived the conflict as 'a given' because it had judged 
that the Arabs would never agree her existence and also because 
international constraints would have deprived her of the option of 
terminating the conflict through war. Israelis, collectively and 
individually, believed that the Arab goal has been not only to annihilate 
the state as a political entity but also to destroy its population. 
3 
1 Huntington, S. P. (1957: 2) The Soldier and the State Cambridge. 
Harvard University Press. 
2 
3 
Waves of violence by irregular Arab forces erupted in 1919-20,1926, 
1929 and 1936-39, were known as meoraot (incidents). See Horowitz, 
Dan (1975: 236) 'The Israeli Concept of National Security and the 
Prospect of Peace in the Middle East'. In Sheffer, Gabriel 
Dynamics of a Conflict Jerusalem. Humanities Press. 
The first aspect has been defined 'politicide', by Yehoshafat Harkabi. 
See (1968: 117-147) Between Israel and the Arabs (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 
Maarahot. 
The severity and intensity of the conflict are exacerbated by 
Israel's extreme vulnerability, the nature of the arena and the 
available weapons systems. Hence security is the central problem 
to Israel'-. 's existence. 
l 
The fundamental question in this study is what influence the 
enduring conflict has had on the social system, and how political 
pluralism and a multi-party competitive political structure have 
prevailed in a society in which the security sphere, the army, its 
elite and values are so central. 
The centrality of security is therefore the issue which must 
feature as the crux of the discussion of civil-military relations in 
, 
Israel. Horowitz rightly adopted this term, coined by Shils, to 
convey the pervasiveness of the subject of security, its high status in 
society and the large amount of resources allocated to it. 
Furthermore, 
it differentiates between the values, spheres of social 
activity and institutions which are located at the centre 
in terms of the national-social significance attributed to 
them, and tv-is-e"-values and institutions which may be seen 
as peripheral. 2 
The centrality of security is not only an outcome of Israel's 
immediate situation, but is also a feature embedded in the value system 
of modern Jewish society. Defence has been a central issue in this 
society ever since the beginning of the Zionist Movement in both Central 
and Eastern Europe at the turn of the century. 
For a survey of the causes of Israel's vulnerability see 
Rosen, Steven J. (1977) Military Geography and the Military 
Balance in the Arab-Israel Conflict. Jerusalem Papers on Peace 
Problems. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 
2 Horowitz, D. (1977: 58-75) 'Is Israel a Garrison State? ' 
The Jerusalem Quarterly No. 4. See also Shils, Edward 
1961: 117-130) Centre and Periphery, The Logic of Personal 
Knowledge London. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
The security value operated at three levels in the Zionist 
mvement. For the individual it promised to solve the personal 
insecurity of the Diaspora Jew. At the collective level defence 
offered self-reliance or auto-emancipation, liberation for Jews 
from their dependence on Gentiles, which was a consequence of their 
life in exile. At the symbolic level it advocated the transformation 
of Jewish society and the creation of a 'new Jewry, in Max Nordau's 
phrase a 'muscular Judaism'. 
These three levels of the centrality of security in the Zionist 
movement were transposed to the political arena in which Yishuv Jewry 
found itself. The need for personal security found expression in 
l 
Government policy which took a grave view of the undermining of 
2 
current security. Golda Meir testified that Ben Gurion devised the 
reprisal policy partly for domestic considerations: 
The citizens of Israel - that conglomeration of people, 
languages and culture - had to be taught that the 
Government... was responsible for their security... "3 
1 
2 
3 
The term 'Yishuv' was coined to identify the Jewish community 
in Palestine before Israel's establishment. 
The term 'current security' imports the degree of latent or 
active manifestations of the conflict in daily life e. g. 
terrorist attacks, border incidents etc, as opposed to'basic 
security'which is the overall balance of power between Israel 
and the Arab states. 
Meir, Golda (1975: 236) My Life London. Wiedenfeld and. Nicolson. 
'i 
On the collective level it clothed itself in a policy of 
self-reliance, non-acceptance of international guarantees, a 
critical approach to the United Nations, 'orientation on ourselves' 
and efforts to attain self-sufficiency in weapons'- supply. 
Ben Gurion himself said: rWhat matters is not what the Gentiles 
say but what the Jews do'. 
' At the symbolic level the centrality of 
security is expressed in Israel's perception of its relationship to 
the world in terms of power politics. In the early years of statehood 
the political school which advocated real politik in world relations 
dominated the opposing school, which urged conciliation with the 
Arab states and moral criteria in world relations. 'Israel will 
2 
survive as long as she is strong'. 
The centrality of security both on the physical plane (the need 
to safeguard the physical existence of the community and in the value 
sphere) security as a symbol of the values and self-images of the new 
society dictated a stringent military and political concept of 
national defence, and made security a vitally important factor in the 
political system. * Success in fulfilling security functions became 
the supreme test of the political leadership and the guarantee of 
political stability. So much so that Israeli foreign policy was 
enslaved to considerations of defence policy. `Small nations do 
not have a foreign policy. They have defence policy', Moshe Dayan, 
Ben Gurion's disciple said. 
3 
Consequently decisions on military 
1 
2 
See Ben Gurion's speech in the Knesset: Divrei Haknesset, ' (the 
Official Record of the Knesset'proceedings November 1955. 
See Bialer, Uri (1971: 71-84)'Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett: 
Crystallization of T: wo concepts of the Israel-Arab Conflict' 
(Hebrew) in State and Government (Hebrew)-University of Jerusalem. 
Vol. A. No. 2 1971. 
3 
Divrei Haknesset, 30 July 1975. 
actions were sometimes taken not only out of purely professional, 
military considerations, but as a response to domestic needs such as 
the fortifying of national morale, in response to political pressure 
groups, to release military tensions and because the political leader- 
ship needed to demonstrate forcefulness. 
l By adapting Mirabeau's 
epigram about Prussia and war one can say that 'security is the national 
industry of Israel'. 
ECONOMIC BURDEN OF A PROTRACTED WAR 
The most prominent symptom of the centrality of security in Israeli 
society is the amount of national resources allocated to it, an amount 
the magnitude of which places Israel amongst nations with the highest 
defence allocations in the world. A thorough examination of these 
resources is complicated, and the accepted measuring techniques, though 
useful'for comparative purposes, do not illuminate the full burden of 
security. The two most common calculations are the share of defence 
expenditure as part of the State budget or as a percentage of the G. N. P. 
In Israel defence spending consumes the larges slice of the 
overall national expenditure. This percentage has been steadily 
increasing during the past thirty years, as the following table 
illustrates :2 
1 
2 
Sharett, Moshe'Personal Diary (Hebrew) (1978: 950) Tel Aviv. 
Maariv. Prime Minister Eshkol also describes in his unpublished 
diary how in 1965 domestic considerations, namely the need to 
. satisfy the population of northern 
Israel on the eve of elections, 
affected decisions to make retaliatory raids against Syria. 
There is no agreement on the figures of-Israeli defence budget. 
For different information compare Felber, Moshe (May 1976) The 
Government Budget and the Economic Policy for 1976 (Hebrew) 
Jerusalem. Government Information Centre; and Safran, Nadav - (1969: 158) From War to War New York. Pegasus; Brecher, Michael 
(1972: 80-84) The Foreign Policy System of Israel London. Oxford 
University Press. Accurate source see The Economic Quarterly 
(September 1973: 78-79) . (Hebrew) Jerusalem; Lifshitz, I. 
(December 1974) 'Macro Economic Aspects of Defence Expenditure' 
in Studies of Israeli Economy (Hebrew) Jerusalem. Folk 
Institute. See also Annual Reports of Bank Israel. 
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TABLE 1 
THE INCREASING BURDEN OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURE 
Year Total Growth Index Defence Defence Defence 
Expenditure in Fixed Budget as Budget as Budget as 
Current Price Price From % of GNP % of % of Total 
in IL Million Year to Year Government Resources 
Budget 
1950 47 9.5 8.2 
1951 57 8.0 6.8 
1952 82 -37.3 5.1 4.1 
'1953 96 15 5.9 4.8 
1954 122 27 6.9 5.6 
1955 169 24 7.9 6.2 
1956 359 93 14.1 10.9 
1957 246 -35.2 8.3 6.7 
1958 289 13 8.4 22 6.9 
1959 315 5.6 8.0 21 6.8 
1960 346 5.3 7.9 19 6.7 
1961 400 8.9 7.6 17 6.4 
1962 580 27 9.3 23 7.3 
1963 686 11.6 9.1 24 7.5 
1964 917 27 10.7 27 8.5 
1965 999 1.2 9.8 23 8.2 
1966 1,252 14.4 11.1 27 9.5 
1967 1,969 54 169'8 34 14.3 
1968 2,536 29 18.4 36 15.1 
1969 3,360 28 21.2 40 14.5 
1970 4,867 34 26.3 44 16.7 
1971 6,134 9 26.5 39 15.4 
1972 5,757 -9 19.4 34 13.3 
1973 16,495 127 44.1 49 24.0 
1974 15,898 -26 30.0 40 18.2 
1975 25,425 -6 48.0 39 19.4 
1976 34,130 35.2 38 20.6 
1977 87,000 34.4 34 19.2 
Sources: Year Books Central Statistic Bureau, Jerusalem and Data from 
the Budget Division. Finance Ministry, Jerusalem. 
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In constant prices the defence budgets from 1948 to 1978 
rose almost fifteenfold, with an average annual increase of about 21%. 
Six sub-periods can be discerned in the table: 
(a) From the Independence War until 1952 when there was an absolute 
decrease in the level of expenditure, and defence spending was only 
a minor component of the G. N. P., between 6% and 9%. 
(b) In 1953 a new phase began with an appreciable increase in real 
terms in defence spending and it peaked in 1956, the year of the 
Sinai Campaign. In that year defence expenditure amounted to 14% 
of the G. N. P. 
(c) During the third period between the Sinai Campaign and the Six 
Day War, a relatively moderate increase occurred. However because of 
the rate of growth in Israel's economy - the average annual increase 
of G. N. P. was about 6% - there was a real increase of between 8% and 
10% in defence spending, without a parallel increase in-defence 
expenditure as a proportion of G. N. P. 
(d) A new period was initiated by the 1967 June War which caused an 
escalation in the defence budget from an annual average of about 257 
of the state budget to an average of 36% with a peak in 1970 of 44%. 
The share of defence spending of G. N. P. grew from one fifth to one 
quarter. However, the real increase was even higher than indicated 
by the increased share of G. N. P. In 1971 defence expenditure was four 
times higher than the pre-war level, even after taking into account 
price rises during. the period, and the*average-annual increase in these 
five years' was about 30% in constant price terms. After the end of the 
War of Attrition there-was a relative decrease in the level of defence 
spending. In 1972 the decrease was 10%. from. the previous year and the 
share of G; N. P. expended declined to 20%. 
(e) The Yom Kippur catapulted the expenditure to more than 40% of the 
G. N. P. and to about 49% of the state's annual budget. This was in 
addition to the actual cost of the war which amounted to a whole 
year's G. N. P. After the war Israel entered a very difficult 
economic period with an unprecedented increase in defence spending 
taking place simultaneously with a very acute inflationary process. 
American aid was raised'dramatically, and even after the annual 
defence spending was stabilized in 1974 it still remained at one 
third of the G. N. P. 
In a discussion of the allocation of resources to defence three 
factors require consideration. First, for 30 years there has been a 
steady increase in defence expenditure. Secondly, increases were in 
spasms as each war advanced the percentage of defence spending in a 
dramatic way, and even when it was subsequently stabilized, it 
remained at a higher level than before the war. Thirdly, the 30 year 
period was divided into two by the 1967 June War. 
The enlargement of the standing army and the reserve units, the 
holding of the territories acquired in the-war and the massive expansion 
of military industries caused spectacular increases in defence 
expenditure. Before then the increase was not a weighty factor in the 
annual growth of the Government's budget, and during the years 1958 to 
1966 increases accounted for only about one quarter of the rise in the 
Government's budget. Whereas from 1967 to 1971 the enlarged defence 
budget accounted for 48% of the increase. 
The usual method of defining the defence burden is as a 
proportion of the G. N. P., but it is inadequate. If the hidden cost of 
conscripting manpower is added in, then a calculation nearer to the 
real cost than the budgetary figures show is reached. Capital. imports 
must be excluded, but other burdens, like the national debt caused 
by borrowing to cover defence imports, must be included in the 
calculation. These calculations are complex but have to be considered. 
1 
1 See an example in Rivlin, Paul (1978: 154) -'The Burden of Israel's 
Defence' in Survival, July - August 1979, Table 8. 
A simpler and more realistic expression of the actual defence 
expenditure is its proportion to the overall resources. In Israel 
large capital imports have given the economy much more extensive 
resources than the G. N. P. provides. It is more accurate, therefore, 
to express the defence financial requirement as a percentage of the, 
overall resources which the economy has each year. Over the years 
defence has consumed a significantly higher proportion of the overall 
resources. Prior to the Sinai campaign, the average annual defence 
expenditure was about 5.5% of total resources, it rose to an average 
annual amount of 6.7% from 1957 to 1963, and to 8.6% from 1964-1966. 
After the Six Day War it increased sharply, reaching 15.4% in 1971 
and 24% in 1973. In 1974 there was a decrease to 18%, but from then 
until 1977 it remained at around 20%. 
A few facts only will suffice to convey the huge size of the 
defence investment: had Israel saved in any one year of the seventies 
a billion dollars of its defence budget it could have increased 
investment in the economy by 507,1 Had Israel devoted more or less the 
same as each NATO country to defence it would add 5% to the annual 
growth per capita of the G. N. P., an amount much higher than the overall 
per capita increase today. 
2 
Until now no published calculations have taken into account the 
incidental expenses for security needs, which are so difficult to 
measure. These are inter alia: production losses because of 
compulsory service or compulsory reserve duty, expenditure needed to 
divert industries to defence production or civil expenditure such as the 
costs of. domestic,. shelters. If all these factors are included, the 
size of the security sphere in the Israeli economy is much bigger. 
1 Yair Feldman, Davar, 25 November 1977. 
2 Hershlag, Yehuda (1979: 363) 'The Middle East Economy from Peace to 
War'. In Arian, Asher (ed. ) Israel, The Founding Generation 
(Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Zmora Bitan Modan. 
WHEN 92% ARE CONSCRIPTED 
The second aspect of the size of the security sphere in Israeli 
society is the weight of manpower absorbed by security activities. 
Two groups have to be examined. The first comprises military personnel 
which includes conscripts, regulars and reserves, and the second 
production and service workers employed in the defence establishment, 
workers in the Ministry of Defence, the military industries and 
security services, and civilians working in the IDF. 
From the early fifties the number of Israelis serving in. the army 
has consistently grown. The expanded army was a consequence both of 
the increase in the size of the'standing army, and the widened range of 
potential conscripts. This happened after the 1967 War, when the age 
limit for military service was raised from 49 to 54 for men, and again 
in 1974 after the. Yom Kippur War, when the minimum psychotechnical and 
educational requirements for potential recruits were lowered. As a 
result, since 1974 the IDF has been conscripting some 92% of all males. 
l 
Another factor in the enlargement of the army is the-extension of 
the period of compulsory service. This has happened three times during 
thirty years. Israel is approaching the point of maximum. exploitation 
of conscription, and future growth of the army will be mainly a function 
of an increase in population or of a further extension of the service 
period. 
After the 1973 October War steps were taken to reach an even 
greater exploitation. of manpower. First, 107,000 previously'exempt 
candidates were reassessed, and 42% of them were reclassified'fit for 
military service, 10% for the conscript army. 
2 
1 Sources: The IDF Recruitment Bureau's documents. 
2 Peres, Shimon (1978: 54) Today, Tomorrow (Hebrew) Jerusalem. Mabat. 
Secondly, the criteria for the allocation>of manpower within the 
army between combat and service units have been changed. Thousands 
of soldiers have been transferred from rear to front line units. 
so doing an improvement has been made in the ratio of 'teeth to tail' 
which was formerly quite high, but which had deteriorated after 1973.1 
There was a radical change in the placement of women soldiers. Before 
1973 they were appointed to about 210. of the nearly 900 professions 
within the IDF, and almost 60% of. them were employed as clerical staff. 
Since 1974 the pool of professions open to women has been enlarged 
dramatically, and they now serve in technical jobs like tank-and 
aircraft engineering, and in combat units like the armour and artillery, 
though not in combat roles.. 
2 
Thirdly, the reserve framework was improved, particularly its 
recruitment capacity. This mechanism has become so sophisticated that 
special measures have been prepared to locate, mobilize, and transfer 
thousands of soldiers and officers from Europe and the US back'to-the" 
front lines. 
Though the reserve units, which contained 400,000 in 1977, are 
large, this mere fact does not reflect the actual size of the security 
sphere in terms of manpower. That will be revealed only by the number 
of reservists who are actually on duty at any particular time, as a 
proportion of the general available manpower. These statistics are not 
published. However, parts of the available data can reveal the weight 
of the defence sector relative to the overall employed manpower. 
1 
2 
It was estimated that until. 1967 it was a 50: 50 ratio in comparison 
with the more common 20: 80 ratio in large armies. See Safran, 
Nadav (1978: 233) Israel, The Embattled Ally Cambridge and London. 
The Belknop Press of Harvard University Press. 
Source: The Recommendation of the Prime Minister's Commission on 
Women's Status 1978. Recommendations No. 145-176. The Prime 
Minister's Office, Jerusalem. 
In 1965 and 1966 some 5,300 people on average were serving in 
reserve units at any given time. 
' If it is assumed that each served 
30 days, then in effect some 60,000 were called up for variousperiods in 
one: -year. 5,300 accounted for only 0.5% of the civilian manpower force. 
In 1967 the average number serving at a given time was 25,700, 
and the proportion of reservists on duty within the civilian labour 
force was some 2.6%. This figure stemmed, inter alia, from the fact 
that in the 'waiting period' before the war, more than 120,000 people 
were mobilized for a period of more than one month. The burden on the 
economy of maintaining such a large force on reserve duty was one of 
the factors which impelled Israel to make a pre-emptive strike. 
In 1968, after the war, the rate of reserve mobilization dropped 
again, but like the other parameters of defence expenditure was 
stabilized at a higher rate than before, -accounting for 1.1% of the 
civilian labour force. The proportion increased-steadily, with a 
relative drop in the. period between the War of Attrition and the Yom 
Kippur War. The latter war elevated the'reserve duty burden'to the 
highest rate ever. In October 1973 250,000 persons were mobilized, some 
22.5% of the total civilian labour force. During 1973 the average 
mobilization rate was 7.2%. Since the war the number has begun to 
decrease and in mid-1974 it was 30,000, slightly more than in 1967. 
This rate has remained more or-less steady in subsequent years. 
The striking importance of the absorption of manpower into the 
military can only be fully appreciated in the knowledge that over the 
years a substantial increase in manpower has been directed to the 
military instead of to the civil sector. This was particularly 
noticeable after the 1967 and 1973 wars. 
Data for production losses between 1965 and 1979 show that the 
relative size of the military doubled from 7.1% in 1965 to 13.4% in 
1 Data taken from Finance Ministry documents. 
1978. In absolute figures the military manpower increased from 
62,000 in 1965 to 162,000 in 1978, that is a rise of 160%. That 
increase took place-during a'period when the overall increase 
in manpower was only 36%, from 880,000 in 1965 to 1,200,000 
in 1975, which shows that of the total additional manpower in that 
period about 30% was recruited to military service. One estimate 
asserts that about 60%-707 of that 30% is in the 20-30 age group. 
Treasury assessments suggest that the high proportion of manpower 
recruited to the military contributes to the manpower shortage to 
such an extent that it limits the potential capacity for economic 
growth. 
The absorption of manpower resources into the defence sector 
can be measured in economic terms by calculating the`loss of G. N. P. 
consequent on the employment'of conscripts, regulars and reservists. 
The estimated loss of G. N. P. assumes that there is full employment 
and that therefore each additional employee is a potential contributor 
to the G. N. P. Applying this assumption it seems that the loss of 
G. N. P. in the first half of the sixties was relatively low - about 
7% - but increased to more than 10% after 1967 and has exceeded 13% 
since'the 1973 October War. 
Available data reveals that until the June 1967 War the 
proportion of those employed in defence was less than 10% of the 
total employed in Israel. After the war it rose to 157 and reached 
19% in 1973. -After the Yom Kippur War it jumped again, and then 
stabilized at about 25%. (In 1979 the number of employed in Israel 
1 
was 1,250,000). 
1 See'Basic Facts About The Economic Development In the 30 Years 
Of The State' (Hebrew) A publication of the Bureau of the 
Economic Adviser to the Minister of Finance April 1978. 
There are certain sectors in the economy which are extremely 
dependent on the defence establishment. This applies particularly to 
industry which employs one quarter of the available manpower in 
Israel. 
I In general, 50% of the employees in the industrial 
production sector work for the defence establishment. The 
electronics and metal industries, the two main arms manufacturing 
branches, are overwhelmingly committed to 'the- defence sphere. 
2 
'SOLDIERS ON 11 MONTHS LEAVE' 
The dimensions of the security sphere are further illustrated by 
the length of time members of Israeli society are required to invest in 
some form of military duty. Conscript service in Israel is among the 
longest. in the world. The Defence Service Law has empowered the 
Minister of Defence to recruit any male Israeli citizen or permanent 
resident between the ages of 18 and 54. Women are conscripted until 
the age of 24 and serve in the reserves until the age of 34. Married 
women, mothers and pregnant women are exempt. 
3 
The length of 
conscription is now 36 months for men and 24 months for women. The 
following table shows the changes that have taken place over the years. 
1 Kohav, David (1975) The Economics of Defence in Israel 
International Symposium on Military Aspects of the Israel-Arab 
Conflict. 12-18 October, Jerusalem. 
2 See Neubach, Amnon (1976: 60) A Comparison between the Six Day 
War and Yom Kippur War Relating to Industry, Employment and 
Prices (Hebrew) unpublished M. A. thesis, Bar-Ilan Univers y. 
Hamat-Gan. 
3 Defence Service Law (Consolidated Version). State of Israel, The 
Book of Laws 196.24 September 1959. 
TABLE 2 
CHANGES IN THE LENGTH OF CONSCRIPTED SERVICE (IN MONTHS) 
Year Men Women 
1949 24 12 
1950 24 24 
1952 30 24 
1963 26 20 
1966 30 20 
1968 36 20 
1975 36 24 
The Defence Service Law prescribes reserve service and also 
empowers the Minister to issue special decrees (once known as a State 
of Emergency Decree, or Decree 8, and later as Para. 26 of the 
Defence Service Law) to any reservist to serve for as long as the 
decree is in force. Recruitment by this decree is by no means rare. 
It was used before the Sinai Campaign, during the two years War of 
Attrition and after the Yom Kippur War. In the latter case numerous 
reserve troops served under Para. 26 for up to 80 days. 
The amount of time which Israelis devote to the IDF amounts to 
between five and six years during a lifetime. An Israeli male now 
aged 18, with the rank of private will have served 36 months as a 
conscript and some 28 months as a reservist by the age of 54.. This 
applies to the lowest ranks and excludes mobilization under'special 
decrees. 
The continuing state of war has also taken its toll in death 
and injuries. In 1974 the Minister of Defence Shimon Peres said 
that 
over a period of 27 years of almost incessant warfare... 
Israel has lost 11,347 men and women, a third of one 
percent of the population. 
He compared this figure with the 27 million Russians killed in two 
World Wars (13% of the population) with France (5%) and with 
Britain (4.5%), and said: 
Anyone who lives through war must, to our regret, pay a 
price, but we must take. a sober view of the price we have 
paid... one third ofla percent of the civilian population 
is not so terrible. 
But the Minister of Defence had compared the total deaths for 27 
years with the population in only one year - 1974. However in that 
year Israel had more than four times its 1948 population. During the 
War of Independence, for-example, between 30 November 1947 and 
7 January 1949, about 10% of the Jewish population (60,000 out of 
650,000) were mobilized, and the casualty rate of dead and wounded reached 
3.2% of the population. During the War of Attrition on the Egyptian 
front between April 1969 and August 1970 two brigades containing only 
10,000 people, out of a population of 2.5 million, were defending the 
east bank of the Suez Canal. These . Brigades' rate -of casualties 
in that war, a 
little more than 1,000 persons, was only 0.04% of the population, but 
10.1%. of the brigades' fighting force., 
2. 
It is not surprising that the 
public morale of a small and closed society like Israel was severely 
affected by such a casualty rate. 
I Shimon Peres, 'The Main Principles of Israel's Defence Doctrine', 
speech delivered to senior officers of the IDF 1 November 1974. 
(Jerusalem, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Division). 
2 There is no unanimity about casualty statistics in Israel's wars, 
and the figures varied by a few percent. See similar figures 
in Rosen, S. J. (1977: 56). 
In the first 30 years of statehood, during overt or latent wars, 
there were 40,000 casualties. Of these some 14,000 were killed. 
1 
12,000 
families are on the bereaved files in the Ministry of Defence, and 
there are 4,000 orphans. In 1976 31,528 war disabled came under the 
rehabilitation branch of the Ministry of Defence. These figures mean 
that by 1976 one in a hundred people was disabled and - assuming that an 
average family has 3 members only - one in a hundred bereaved. 
In reality, neither the statement of the Defence Minister, nor the 
statistics, illustrate the burden of security on life itself in Israeli 
society. This is because that society places a particular value on 
Jewish life, a value which is engendered by the memory of the 6 million 
Jews killed in Nazi Europe. The disproportionate effort to avoid 
casualties during combat and to obtain the release of P. O. W. 's has 
become a vital and decisive consideration which has influenced the IDF's 
military tactics and strategy. It has persuaded some strategists to 
argue that such an excessive constraint on military, planning has 
become unprofessional, 'an intellectual corruption', which prevents 
military success. 
3 
The last official figure published relates to the period ending on 
the 31 March 1976. It is 13,143. See Haaretz, 4 May 1976. This 
figure matches estimates that 30% of total casualties in Israel's 
wars are deaths. 
2 
Figures given by the Director of the, Rehabilitation Branch, Arieh 
Fink, Haaretz, 17 May 1976. 
3 
See for example E. Luttwak's articles in Haaretz, 1,3,4 March 1974. 
See also Col(Res. ) Prof. Yuval Neeman, 'Haaretz, 6 February 1976. 
The drastic effect of military losses on the morale of civilians is 
taken into consideration by the Arab armies. They emphasize the 
infliction of losses rather than conquest of territory as their 
central objective, and their strategic approach favours, therefore, 
lengthy hostilities and wars of attrition. See Heikal, Mohammad 
(1975: 220) The Road to Ramadan London. Collins. He quotes both 
President Sadat and the Egyptian Commander in Chief General El-Gamasy. 
SECURITY DEFINES THE ISRAELI COLLECTIVE 
In Israel the centrality of security is not expressed solely 
by the resources absorbed from society and its significance in the value 
sub-system or institutional sphere, but also by the fact that security 
is the prime issue which determines the boundaries of the collectivity. 
Military service has become one of the hallmarks of citizenship in 
. 
'most modern states and a symbol of the individual's identification 
with the centre of political authority. 
I In Israel it has assumed an 
added importance, expressing not only political affiliation but also 
membership in the collective, whose basis is more exclusive because 
it reflects the social basis itself. 
Although the Defence Service Law does not distinguish between 
Israeli citizens according to their ethnic origin, in practice the 
State of Israel does not assert its right to conscript its Arab 
citizens. On the other hand permanent residents who are Jews are 
obliged to serve even though they are not citizens. Hence a Jew 
residing in Israel, although a citizen of another state, is a member 
of the collectivel'he is in',, and an Arab, an actual citizen of Israel, 
is outside the collective. For this reason many people have over the 
years demanded that the Defence Law be applied to Arabs to 
demonstrate their equal status with Jews. 
2 
1 Jänowitz, M. (1975: 85) Military Conflict Beverly Hills and 
London. Sage. 
2 See Horowitz, Dan and Baruch, Kimmerling (1974: 262-"276) 'Some 
Sociel Implications of Military Service and the Reserves System' 
Archives Europeenes de Sociologie XV. The Druze minority 
illustrates this. Of all ethnic minorities it was closest to the 
collective, which was shown when the Druze asked to be made subject 
to the conscription laws. Growing alienation in the seventies is 
expressed in the increasing requests by Druze for exemption. 
Security not only defines the collective's boundaries but also 
determines the position of individuals and groups within the 
collectivity on the centre-periphery continuum. The differing 
participation in the defence effort determines the location along this 
continuum. There is a correlation between the rate of Volunteering 
to elite units by members of different social groups and their proximity 
to the centre. 
The numbers of Kibbutz sons in commanding positions and elite units, 
such as paratroops or pilots, is several times higher than their relative 
size in the population. 
I Peripheral groups in Israeli society fill 
marginal positions in the army, and some are even exempt altogether 
from military service. In the latter category are some ultra-religious 
Jewish groups who denounce the secular Jewish state.. Young people in 
these groups are exempt from military service under special provisions 
which allow them to study in religious institutions. The army also 
exempts religious girls, who come mainly from oriental religious 
immigrant families. Their self-induced exclusion confirms the extent of 
their peripheral position. If they do decide to serve, then their 
involvement. in Israeli society is affirmed. 
Military service in Israel indicates proximity to the supreme values 
of society, and the greater the contribution by an individual or group 
to the military, the stronger is the expression of his closeness to the 
centre. The secretive nature of the defence sphere adds an. esoteric, 
sacred dimension which typifies the centre. Consequently, having control 
over these concealed matters offers political power and provides an 
essential confirmation of social status. 
T. Research in the early sixties found that the proportion of sons of kibbutzim was-22% of the officer corps, compared, with theix. 4%' 
proportion in the population. The casualty rate in this group in 
military operations was also disproportionately higher than their 
representation in the population in the Yom Kippur War, because of their 
volunteering to combat units. See Amir, Yehuda. (1967: 250-258) 'Sons 
of Kibbutzim in the Israeli Army' (Hebrew) Magamoth No. 2-3. 
The centrality of security is therefore the key to the 
understanding of civil-military relations in Israel. It elucidates the 
characteristics of the army, its boundaries, their location and their 
nature, and explains the convergence and divergence processes occurring 
in the. army and the various sub-systems, and the mediatory mechanisms 
operating between them. 
The centrality of security in Israel can explain the 
differences between Israel and states with similar professional armies 
and a similar political system - i. e. parliamentary democracies with 
competitive parties. The comparison to be made between the IDF and the 
other armies is done not so much as a comparative study in itself, but to 
illustrate the characteristics of Israeli society and the IDF. 
Just as participation in the army expressed membership of the 
collective, so the army was itself a symbol of the collective's 
expression of what was central in society. If there is a problem 
in Israel it derives, as will be seen, not from detachment but on the 
contrary from phenomena related to certain forms of over-involvement. 
The isolation of the army and its detachment from society are 
connected to the crises of legitimization from which armed forces in 
most developed societies suffer. 
Critics of the military establishment have persistently 
argued that these are 'self-recruiting and self-defining 
institutions which do not receive general approbation'. 
Armed forces, by this argument, are not legitimate by 
virtue of affectual attitudes. There is no general belief 
. 
in their absolute validity by virtue of a rational 
acceptance of a' natural law'. 
1 Harries-Jenkins, Gwyn (1978: 309)'Armed Forces and European 
Society'. 'In Ginor S. and Scotford Archer, M. (eds. ) Contemporary 
Europe London. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
In most relatively developed countries with democratic regimes 
and instrumentalist armies, the army undergoes a process of seclusion, 
segregation and alienation from the civil society. These phenomena 
are strengthened by the transition from mass to all-volunteer armies. 
The disfunctional implications of this process are so grave that some 
scholars see it as the most acute problem in modern civil-military- 
relations. 
I 
However the relations of the IDF with the social system 
around it were characterized between 1947 and 1977 by the reverse: 
It was highly involved in society, and problems of segregation, 
seclusion or alienation were non-existent. 
Furthermore, in the Western democracies the army no longer serves 
as a focus for the expression of sublime values as it did in the past, 
or of civil qualities which the state is anxious to foster. The military 
has changed from being a focus of positive identification to a target 
of negative indentification. Military service is seen as a denial of 
liberty and a hindrance to the furtherance of a career, wherein the 
recruit is obliged to act according to a set of values which contradict 
the ethics of civilian society, and particularly the values of the 
on. This is manifested most clearly in the declining young generation. 
2 
prestige of the armed forces. 
In Israel there was a tötally different situation. In the first 
thirty years the army remained the core of supreme values, at both the 
individual and collective levels. Ben-Gurion once said that the army 
must 
forge a fighting pioneering youth, healthy in body and'spirit, 
with initiative, courage and the ability to act, light of foot 
and diligent, who will not be deterred by difficulties and dangers. 
See e. g. Janowitz, Morris (1971: 253) "; he-, -Emergent Military'. In Mosckos, C. C. Jr. Public Opinion and the Military Establishment 
Beverly Hills, Calif. Sage. Also Van Doornj. Jacques (1975: 35-37) 
'Models of the Emergent Military: Civilization or Remilitarization'" 
Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies 
Vol. 120 No. 1. 
2" Van Doom, J. (1975: 35). 
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He envisaged the army's task as changing the image of a people which 
had once been 
like dust, without a language, a tradition, roots and loyalty 
to-a national existence without the habit of an independent 
society. (The army) provides not only informative and 
vocational education, it also bestows on Israeli youth moral 
values, self-respect, attachment to the heritage of Judaism, a 
sense of fraternity and patriotism, a historic sense of mission. 
The military role epitomizes the central values of Israeli 
society such as bitzuism (drive, initiative), the expression of the 
spirit of the new non-diaspora Jew and of pioneering. 
l 
It is not, 
therefore, surprising that the prestige of the IDF was always high. 
2 
And if there were groups with a negative attitude to the army, their 
attitude alone expressed their marginality in Israeli society. 
Furthermore, in Israel military service is not regarded as simply 
a resource which the state recruits from the members of the collective, 
but rather, simultaneously, as a social reward. Military service is 
taken to reflect adherence to the most elevated values and to the social 
centre. In being allowed to participate in determing Israel, 's fate 
control is gained over political resources and prestige. 
In the West, and especially in those countries whose armies are 
becoming all-volunteer armies, ' the crisis in legitimacy. is reflected, 
inter alia, in the reduction of the military establishment and a 
distorted representation in the military of the various social strata. 
3 
The process of technological change now affecting these armies, together 
with the changed attitudes to military service, have led to increased 
opposition to enlistment and a drop in the number of recruits. It is 
estimated that selective self-recruitment will lead to distorted 
representation of social groups. The army will become a centre of 
1 See Chief of Staff Mordehai Gur, in Yediot Aharonot, l July 1977. 
2 Kimmerling, B (1971: 141-149) 'The Military Roles and the Evaluation 
of the Occupational Hierarchy' (Hebrew) in State and Government 
Vol. A. No. 2. 
3 Janowitz, M. (1971: 258-260); Van Doorn, J. (1975: 59) The Soldier 
and Social Change Beverly Hills and London. Sage. 
attraction for the lower and medium strata who will try to utilize 
it as a channel for social and economic mobility .1 
In Israel there has been no reduction in the rate of conscription, 
nor a narrowing of the potential choice of recruit. Rather the reverse 
has occurred. As has already been described there was an expansion in 
both areas throughout the first 30 years. Furthermore, after 1974 , 
special rehabilitation projects were introduced to enable the recruitment 
even of groups previously excluded because of low educational standards 
or psychotechnical levels and with a low commitment to society. 
2 
The 
army's enlargement has affected both conscripted and reserve units, as 
well as the professional core of the standing army. 
The tension between army and society in Western-countries is 
reflected in increasing pressures to reduce the amount of material 
resources allocated to the army at a time when military-technological 
developments dictate its expansion. In Israel, despite the tremendous 
increase in the quantity of resources allocated to security, no such 
tension exists. The accepted pattern is that the military, "in effect, 
determines its own share of the national cake, not only in the budgetary 
sphere but also as regards such, other resources as manpower, and it gets.. 
more or less, what it wants. 
In the past decade controversy has erupted several times about the 
proportion of allocation to defence from the total annual government 
expenditure. But the degree of consensus on the centrality of security, 
and on the army's right to determine its own needs, is striking. This is 
of decisive significance for civil-military relations in Israel, because 
in general the corporate interests of armed forces are a prime catalyst 
1 Moskos, Charles C. Jr. (1971: 22? ). 
r'Armed 
Forces and American 
Society Convergence or Divergence? ' In Charles C. Moskos Jr. (ed. ) 
Public Opinion and the Military Establishmentý, Beverly Hills. Sage. 
2 Interview with Head of IDF Recruiting Centre Col. Yitzhak Rosen, 
11 September 1977. 
for military involvement with the political process. As yet no 
opportunity has arisen to examine how the IDF would react if faced 
with a sharp conflict with civilian society on these two issues. 
OFFICERS - HEROES NOTMANAGERS 
One of the main differences between the IDF and European armies 
an& -to a lesser extent even the US Army, lies in the definition of 
its central function and the degree to which it is actually fulfilled. 
These armies have undergone a transition from participation in actual 
warfare to deterrent tasks, and are now in the stage of developing their 
constabulary characteristics. 
The military establishment becomes a constabulary force 
when it is continuously prepared to act, commited'to 
the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international 
relations rather than victory, lbecause 
it has incorporated 
a protective military posture. 
Janowitz emphasizes that for constabulary forces the distinction 
between states of war and peace is blurred, the main function being 
deterrence. 
The military profession will increase its capacity to 
understand the limitation on military force and will 
be able to incorporate such understanding into its 
doctrine, training and organization. 
This is not true of the Israel Defence Forces. Whereas 'most European 
armies have taken little part in hostilities for the past few decades, 
the IDF in addition to five wars has been fully occupied with problems 
of current defence. 
1 Janowitz, M. (1960: 418) The Professional Soldier New York. 
Free Press. 
2 Janowitz, M. (1971: 258-9). 
The IDF has developed a doctrine of deterrent force. However 
it. has 
built its power on a compellence capacity=and 
it has demonstrated this 5. n the 
wars. There is abundant evidence that because it is a fighting force 
rather than a constabulary force, the IDF has not undergone the 
transition mentioned by Janowitz, that is to adopt an appreciation of 
the limitations of military force. On the contrary, various statements 
by Israeli army officers, particularly in the past decade, reflect the 
reverse trend. They argue that the state should adapt national objectives 
to its military abilities and translate its military position as a 
second-rank power to the political sphere. 
1 
These proposals stand on 
its head the classical Clausewitzian proposition about the proper 
relationship between'politics and war. 
The fact that the IDF is engaged in incessant combat affects its 
structure, modes of operation and normative dimensions. Several 
European armies have reached the post-bureaucratic stage, 
2 
when 
recruitment and promotion are based on organizational 
and administrative ability rather than on the primary 
combat skill which hitherto had been more closely 
identified as the relevant expertise within a military 
organization. 
The IDF is still at the bureaucratic stage, and recruitment and 
promotion are more strongly based on fighting ability, the classical 
function of any armed force. 
3 
1 
2 
3 
The main advocate in 1978 was the outgoing Air Force C. O. Maj. -Gen. 
Benjamin Peled. 
This term is used by Segal, D. R. and M. W. (1971: 282-4) in 
'Models of Civil-Military Relationships at the Elite Level'. 
In Van Gils, M. R. (ed. ) The Perceived Role'of the Military 
University of Rotterdam Press. 
The first severe public criticism of this pattern was voiced by 
Lieut. CoL(Res. ) Y. Chasdai. He claimed that the IDF was losing 
good officers because the criteria for recruitment to officer 
courses were only suitable for officers in the parachute Corps, 
whereas many candidates could prove successful in senior command 
posts in other units. Chasdai, Y. (1978) Truth under the Shadow 
of War (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. -Zmora Bitan Modan. 
The fighting function affects not only patterns of recruitment 
and promotion but also the army's structure. Modern armies 
are characterized by a process of change in occupational structure and 
convergence with the structure of the civil sector. 
1 
In the IDF 
although technological development requires proliferation of civilian 
occupations, great emphasis is placed on expanding fighting units and on 
a constant change of the balance between'teeth and tail' to the 
advantage of the former. 
The fact that the IDF is engaged in constant hostilities- also 
affects the predominant type of military leadership. In European 
armies there has been a considerable shift in balance from the 
"heroic leader" type to the 'military manager' type. 
2 
In 'Israel . on 
the other hand. emphasis is still placed on the former. Technological 
and organizational. developments have increased the functional need 
for the military manager in all modern armies, and only the fact that 
the IDF -is engaged in ceaseless combat can explain why it fosters 
that type of commander. 
According to Moscos' definition, the IDF is a segmental and 
pluralistic army. 
3 
Different Corps display different patterns of 
social norms: e. 9-types- of authority structure and disciplinary 
frameworks or even patterns of operation, such as variations in 
initiative and improvisation. The most striking difference is perhaps 
that between the Parachute Corps and the Air Force on the one hand, 
and the Armoured Corps on the other. From this point of view 
1 
2 
3 
Biderman, A. D. and Sharp, L. M. (1968: 331-399)'The Convergence of 
Military and Civilian Occupational Structures. Evidence From 
Studies of Military and Retired Employment. ' American Journal of 
Sociology No. 73. January; Lang, K. (1972) Military Institution 
and the Sociology of War Beverly Hills and London. Sage. 
Janowitz, M. (1960: 21). 
Moskos, C. C. Jr. (1973: 255-280)4The Emergent Military, Civil 
Traditional, or Plural? ' Pacific Sociological Review Vol. 16 No. 2 
April. 
-It would: be a mistake to argue that there is only one type of 
military leadership. In the IDF, as indeed in every army, there 
are different types of professionalism, both bureaucratic and 
achievement orientated. 
) 
The question is which are the-predominant 
types. 
_ 
THE IDF'S ROLE-EXPANSION 
Luckham presents the IDF as the definitive example of a 
'nation in arms, ' an army whose boundaries with the civil sector are 
fragmented. Although it is a basically correct description it does 
not conveyvery much. Are the boundaries between the military and 
all the other sub-systems of the same nature, or are there different 
types of boundaries between the military and each individual sub- 
system? Where are the integral sections and*where are 'the 
permeable ones-along the IDF's fragmented boundaries? Is-the. -situation 
static or fluid and what are the factors that bring about 
fragmentation? A thorough investigation of the Israeli case reveals 
a very complex picture. First there is no congruence between the 
location and nature of the various boundaries of the military with 
the civil sub-sectors. Location and character are not fixed but 
frequently shift, undergoing constant redefinition, so that the 
entire system is in a dynamic and fluid state. 
However what is characteristic of the military's relation with 
all the institutional spheres is its role expansion and varying 
degrees of penetration into the civil sectors. From this viewpoint 
the IDF differs from the armies of Western states. Since the 
Second World War their armies have undergone a process of contraction 
and shrinkage. This is reflected, inter alia, by an intensified process of 
1 The distinction is based on their proximity to the centre - their 
location on the continuum between experts in conducting warfare on 
the one hand and civilian professionals on the periphery of the 
military occupation on the other. See Harries Jenkins, G. (1978: 
300-301). 
*P 
civilianization: an increase in the number of professionals who 
deal with the periphery of military activity, changes in the 
structure of authority from being based on 'bureaucratic professionalism' 
to a basis*of 'achievement professionalism", infiltration of civil 
agencies into the army and the entrusting -to civil bodies of various 
functions which were previously dealt with directly by the army. 
ý} 
y{ 
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A different situation prevails in Israel. ` The centrality of 
security in the social system and the existence of a constant. state 
of latent war have resulted in the fact that numerous spheres of 
activity, which in similar regimes are usually located in the civil 
sector, are in Israel located in. the military sector. Another reason 
is that the roles were distributed between the military and civil 
sectors during the War of Independence. But more than anything else 
the IDF was granted civil functions by the man who moulded the 
Israeli defence establishment, David Ben-Gurion. 
He, more than any other single political factor, envisaged the 
I. D F. from its inception as much more than an armed force: 
The IDF is one of the-central forces which moulds the 
shape of the state, uniting the nation, integrating Jews 
arriving from many different countries, and educating the 
young generation. The IDF. will betray its mission if 
it does not serve as a school of excellence, efficient 
and dedicated to the education of the youth in the full 
meaning of that word, if it-does not serve as a school to 
raise. up manhood in the general human and civic sense, 
with Jewish and pioneering characteristics. The I, D F 
will not have fulfilled its mission if it attains only a 
high level of combat - although that is its foremost 
obligation - it has also to offer values to the youth 
whom it embraces, all the healthy Jewish youth, the sense 
of mission and duty to build the motherland and to shape 
the Chosen People, a free Jewish people who will be a 
1 Harris-Jenkins, G. (1978: 301-303). 
source of pride to all the Jews in the Diaspora, the 
loadstone for all Jewish youth in exile, and wh1 will 
evoke respect amongst all nations of the world. 
An integrative factor in a society of immigrants, an 
instrument of education for the younger generation, an agent for 
national Jewish, civic and human socialization, a focus for nation 
building, a means of modernization, a symbol of national identity, 
these are but a few of the non-military roles that Ben Gurion wanted 
the IDF. to perform. 
The years immediately after the establishment of the gtate were 
those when the IDF adopted for itself the widest röle. The 
-Defence Service Law 1949 stated that soldiers must perform pioneering 
roles in agriculture for one year of military service. Even after 
that practice was discontinued the law itself was not abrogated. 
During the early fifties the IDF took upon itself the performance of 
many activities in the fields of immigrant absorption, when 
hundreds of thousands of immigrants were sheltered in more than one 
hundred maabarot - temporary 'refugee' camps. The IDF built these 
camps and acted as caretakers in the sanitation, health and nutrition 
fields. Actually most civilian services were provided by the army. 
Even after the maabarot period the army maintained its self- 
perception and continued its role expansion. During the austerity 
period in the, 1950's there were attempts to make it an'arm for the 
agricultural industry. It was also engaged in constructing roads, bridges 
and settlements, and performed many other civilian development tasks. 
After the evacuation of the maabarot the army's prime civil function 
was in the educational sphere, and the armed forces became in practice 
Ben Gurion, David (1971: 215) Uniqueness and Mission 
(Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Maarahot. - 
the largest school in the country. All recruits study Hebrew, 
History, Geography and Civics. The extensive IDF activities in the 
field of education during this period is what proiected_ 
the image of the I. D F as a nation-builder. 
l 
These activities were defined as 'emergency measures', and it was 
held that summoning the assistance of the-armed forces did not constitute a 
deviation from the pattern of the instrumental army. But the IDF 
continued to fulfil civic röles even after the state of emergency 
had ended. Female soldier-teachers 
continued to work in schools in 
development towns, although that was indubitably the function of the, 
civil educational network. It engaged in a variety of cultural activit- 
ies, including the operation of a radio station and a publishing house 
which served the entire population, both military and civilian. It 
dealt with national information activities which should have been in the 
domain of the Government. Its workshopswere engaged in producing many 
things from shoes to tanks, and its Planning Branch implemented 
purely civil projects. 
1 See Rapoport, D. (1962: 71-101)'A Comparative theory of 
Military and Political types. in -Huntington , S. P. 
Changing Patterns of Military Politics N. Y. Free Press of 
Glencoe. See also Perlmutter, A. (1969). Out of 4 levels 
of possible role expansion by the military into the civil 
sector, the IDF lies on the highest level. Its clients 
are not only its own members, but the civil sector too, and 
the substance of its services is not only the military 
profession, but other capacities of a general civil nature. 
See Lissak, Moshe (1970: 441-450)'The Israel Defence Forces 
as an Agent of Socialization and Education: A Research in Role 
Expansion in Democratic Society. Men en maatschopij XLV. 
The encroachment of the I. D F into the'civil sub-systems in 
Israel is easily made because the IDF is not only responsible 
for military activity, but for 'security' too. The security sphere 
is defined not spatially but rather analytically. 
) 
There is no 
distinct correlation- between the performance of military functions, 
and the mere existence of a military institution. The distinction 
between what falls within and what outside the security ambit is 
not an institutional one, but analytic between sectors. Not only 
is the army entrusted with carrying out security functions; there 
are also civilian institutions whose functions include security. 
It is possible to find greater affinity between civilians in the 
Defence. Ministry and members of the armed forces, than between the 
former and civilians in other Ministries. It is the analytical 
rather than the spatial definition of the security sphere in Israel 
which reflects the widely fluctuating definitions of the areas 
included in the security sector. It is neither the wearing of 
uniform, nor working in an army camp'nor being subject to the 
jurisdiction of military law which identifies those who deal with 
security, but rather the political elite's decision which 
determines what falls within the seicurity- sphere. *. And as 
that decision is made within the political system it became a topic 
for dispute between political groups, rather than between civilians on 
the one hand and armed forces on the other. 
1 Strassoldo, R. (1977: 82-4)'The Study of Boundaries. ' The 
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations. Vol. 2, No. 3. 
The analytic perception of the term 'security', rather than 
the institutional one, was fostered by Ben Gurion, who desired to 
extend the boundaries of security as much as possible. Shimon 
Peres, who was successively the Director-General of the Ministry 
of Defence, Deputy Minister-and the Minister of Defence, gave 
evidence about his mentor: 
The security of Israel implies immigration, and it 
means settlement. Security includes control of the 
sea and the air,... security is the development of 
scientific research and scientific aptitude in all 
disciplines - physics, chemistry, biology and advanced 
technology. The security of Israel is the mobilization 
of our youth and the involvement of the people and its 
scholars in the pursuit of difficult-and vital 
objectives - settlement, defence and integration of the 
exiles. 
Security is not a limited function but a multiple effort; 
It is like a high-tension cable, concentrating national 
energy and using it to reinforce the nation's ability 
to survive. It is both existing energy and. potential 
energy. Ben-Gurion saw this potential of consisting in 
scientific and technological development 
The role. expansion of the military is also evident in the 
relatively wide 'grey area' between the civil and military sectors. 
This 'grey. area''can, be analyzed in terms of both time and space. 
As regards time, there are para-military and post-military 
organizations and arrangements. i. e. Gadna (Youth Battalions), 
run jointly by the Ministry of Defence, the IDF and the Ministry of 
Education, pre-military cadet activity for school pupils and working 
youth; and Hamishmar Haezrahi (Civil Defence) a volunteer organization 
1 Peres, Shimon (1979: 47-48) From These Men London. Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson. 
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which recruits many people beyond the 
-age 
of compulsory geryice. 
Another manifestation is the arrangement whereby senior officers 
retiring from the army receive a 'year's leave' during which they 
remain under military jurisdiction, receive salaries and benefits 
such'as a car and-driver,. but do not wear uniformand have no 
military function. 
2 First and foremost'the`grey area is'manifested 
by the frequent changes which the Israeli undergoes from being a civilian to 
being a soldier, as was vividly expressed by the aphorism coined by former 
Chief of Staff Yadin. 'The Israeli citizen is a soldier on 11 months 
annual leave. ' 
The spatial dimension of the 'grey area is shown'in several ways. 
The-. Border Guard, a unit whose original aim was military, i. e. to 
patrol the border against infiltrators,, was assigned'in the seventies 
to ordinary police duties in urban areas. Though established as a 
military unit, it belongs to the Police Force. 'Nahal (acronym of 
Fighting Pioneer Youth) is supervised jointly by the IDF, the 
Ministry of Defence, the youth movements and the kibbutz movements, 
and fulfils military functions together with the characteristically 
civilian tasks of agricultural and industrial settlement. The 
guard duties performed in settlements also belong in this 'grey-area'. 
1 
2 
The organization was established because of the increased 
terrorist attacks within Israel in 1974. By 1977 it, 
encompassed some 40,000 volunteers, of whom some 1,000 work 
full or part-time for remuneration. Despite its 'military' 
function of guarding against sabotage by enemies from outside, 
it actually fulfils police patrolling functions as well. 
This arrangement sometimes created tensions in the case of 
officers who entered into full political activity on the 
assumption that they had completed their active service 
but were, however, still members of the armed forces and bound 
by regulations banning such activity. The most striking 
example was Moshe Dayan in 1958 and_Mordhai_Gur_20. 
_years later. 
Semi-military activity goes on in other spheres too, and 
most significantly in-the political field. The civil intelligence 
institution, Mossad, plays a relatively extensive part in political 
liaison, as distinguished from intelligence activities, more so than 
similar organizations elsewhere. 
1 The Mossad served in the late 1950's 
and the 1960's'as the political arm of the Government in its relations 
with 'peripheral countries' Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia, and has also 
fulfilled other functions in various African States. 
2 
THE FRAGMENTED BOUNDARIES 
The boundaries of the military system in Israel are characterized 
by the fact that they have never been rigidly delineated. They are 
variable and have shifted several times over abrief period of thirty 
years. They are fragmented and the degree of fragmentation - the 
ratio between the permeable and the integral sections - the type of 
interaction occurring along them, the siting of the boundaries and their 
nature, were all political decisions,. Hence political feuds became the 
most important factor in their modification. 
The advantage'of the multi-dimensional analysis of civil-military 
relations is apparent when the interaction between the IDF and civil 
sub-systems is examined. The boundaries of the IDF with some of the 
institutional spheres are permeable, with others they are either 
fragmented or integral. The most extreme example of the integral 
boundaries is the relationship between the military and the 
1 Interview with Maj. -Gen. (Res. ) Meir Amit, 1 August 1977. Director 
of Military Intelligence 1961-1963 and Mossad 1963-1968. 
2 Interview with Iser Harel, l8 July 1977, Director of Mossad 1952-1963 
and Adviser to the Prime Minister in 1965-1966. 
legal system. Here the army penetrated into the civil-. -sector 
and formed a closed and autonomous structure. The army does not only 
deny civil courts jurisdiction over military personnel in cases of 
civil offences, but also tries civilians for military offences. 
I 
Furthermore, military law is not only separated from the civilian 
legal system but has different procedures. And, as already noted, 
until the late seventies there was almost no pressure by civil society 
to change either the location of the boundaries or their definition, 
even when their location was undermining, civil control of 
the military. 
2 
The converse example is the social sub-system in which the 
boundaries are permeable because the IDF is a 'qitizen-army'. 
The armed forces have been described as having certain of the 
characteristics of Redfield's'folk society'or of Goffman's'total 
institution'. - Although in many armies some of these characteristics 
disappear, and in several societies a deliberate attempt has been 
made to reduce their impact, armies still remain not only professional 
groups but also communities. 
In Israel. on the other hand, 'most of the distinguishing features 
of the total institution or of a community do not apply, and the IDF's 
boundaries with the social sub-system are completely permeable. A 
considerable part of the soldier's daily tasks is carried out not 
within the armed forces, but outside them. 
1 
2 
3 
Hadar, Zvi (1970: 34-84) Military Law (Hebrew) Jerusalem. Academon. 
The first serious attempt has been made by a committee headed by 
Supreme Judge Shamgar in 1978. Report No. 2 of the committee, 
May 1978. Archive of the Supreme Court. 
See Harries-Jenkins, G. (1978: 305-307). 
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The time spent in army camps is relatively brief, since a large 
proportion of standing army personnel return to their homes in town 
after completing their, day's work. The conscript spends a large 
part of his service in the field. Camps are usually close to towns, 
and are integrated with society (inter alia, through the activities 
of the Committee for Soldiers, adoption of units by towns and other 
similar bodies). Social contacts for members of the armed forces, 
including the professional core, ire not restricted to the military 
institution, and their primary groups include civilians. 
) 
The demand for universal participation in the military effort 
also illustrates the permeability between the army and the social 
sub-system. The participation by most men in military service means 
that no one stratum or social group can claim a monopoly of the 
acquisition of the defence capability and the concealed areas of 
knowledge. Consequently no single group can claim ownership of the 
military. The military embraces everyone, and it belongs to 
everyone. The fact that the basis for recruitment into the officer 
corps is not exclusive further serves to open the boundaries. 
2 
In this connection the reserve army, as part of the IDF 
structure, must be included. The need in war time to absorb into' 
the permanent skeleton hundreds of thousands of citizens, and to 
mingle regulars and reservists in the routine army activities, has 
compelled the army to adopt a way of life which was not divorced 
from civilian life. Actually the awareness of the necessity to 
1 
2 
Schild, Ozer (1973: 419-432) 'On the Meaning of Military services 
in Israel'. In Curtis M. and Chertoff, Mordehai S. (eds. ) 
Israel Social Structure and Change New Brunswick New Jersey. 
Transaction Books. 
See Abrahamsson's observation of four patterns of officer 
recruitment in contemporary society, according to their 
social basis. Abrahamsson, -Bengt (1972: 44) Military Professionalism 
and Political'Power Beverly Hills. Sage. 
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become attuned to civilians in uniform' obliged the army to 
develop a high degree of organizational and operational flexibility. 
) 
Midway between thetwo extremes, permeable boundaries with 
the social system and integral boundaries with the legal system, lies 
the third type separating the military and the stratification 
sub-system. They are virtually integral, but there is nevertheless 
a certain amount of exchange across them. It is widely supposed 
that civil stratification is not the starting point for determining 
military status. This is evident in the lack of military academies 
or of separate routes to officer rank. In the IDF any recruit who 
satisfies certain achievement criteria can join an officer course, and 
there is no legitimization for direct transformation of civilian status 
resources into advantages within the army. 
However, it cannot be ignored that the components of civilian 
status, such as'education, ethnic origin or seniority in the country, 
have an indirect impact on the recruit's ability to pass the universal 
attainment tests; There are also special arrangements which 
counteract the universal nature of recruitment, such as the academic 
reserve,, which permits recruits to complete university studies before 
doing military service and gives them officer rank (though in 'payment' 
for this privilege they are required to sign up for several years in 
the standing army). Other arrangements enable students in religious 
academies to be exempted from military service. 
1 See in this context the article of the first commander of the-- 
IDF 's Staff and Command College, Col. (later Maj. -Gen. ) 
Rabinowitz (now Yariv). '. Maarahot" Vol. 96 November 1955 
(Hebrew): 'The IDF as an army of -a democratic state is an 
inseparable part of the nation and the state. ' 
Conversely there is no obvious legitimacy to convert military 
status in order to achieve stratification benefits in the civil 
sector. After demobilization, however, army status can be trans- 
lated into the civil stratification system to provide resources 
which bestow political or economic power. The civil sector also 
makes use of military tests - the service record card - to check 
health and social qualifications when interviewing candidates for 
employment. Thus there is a certain degree of overlapping between 
the sectors. 
The most complex boundaries are those between the army and the 
political system. Since these boundaries are fragmented certain 
processes occurring inside the political elite - the psychological 
makeup of its members, interpersonal relations and power struggles - 
influence the nature of inter-institutional relations, and cause 
frequent changes in the nature of the boundaries between the army 
and the, political -system. 
A MILITARIZED BUT NOT ' MILITARISTIC' SOCIETY 
In spite of the varying nature of the boundaries of the security 
sphere with the several civil sub-systems, many processes of convergence 
have occurred along them during the first 30 years. Most research 
dealing with these processes in modern armies suggests that changes 
occurring in the modern instrumentalist army result from its civilian- 
T 
ization. Although it is justifiable - to' examine these processes 
in the-IDF, in Israel' it is the reverse- process which is -more 
Lissak, Moshe (1978: 8) 'Some Reflections on Convergence and 
Structural Linkages. The All Volunteer and Conscription Armies'. 
Paper presented at the 9th World Congress of Sociology, Uppsala 
August 1978. 
1 
remarkable, for there have been changes in the structure, modes of 
operation and norms of the civil sub-systems because of the 
protracted war, the centrality of security and the special position 
of the army. 
The following example, perhaps more than any other, illustrates 
to what an extent the security needs were the instrument which 
fashioned Israeli society at large. One of the reasons for Israel's 
vulnerability is the imbalance of its population with the populations 
of the surrounding Arab states. (In 1979 Israel had 3.8 million cit- 
izens in contrast to about 132 million in 22 Arab states) "After the-. <- 
proclamation of statehood a fierce debate was conducted in Israel as to 
whether to introduce selective immigration-'to what extent free 
immigration should be permitted, especially for Jewish communities 
from underdeveloped countries. There were certain economic 
considerations in favour of selective immigration. The ability of 
the society to absorb such large numbers was questioned and fears 
that the social and cultural composition of society might change for 
the worse were also expressed. Nonetheless it was decided to permit 
mass immigration. 
The ideological consideration __- the 
belief that Israel was 
a refuge for all Jews- was a vital factor in this decision. But it 
was the security factor - the need to reduce the demographic gap 
between Jews and Arabs - which tipped the balance. And, in-fact, the 
1948 ratio of 45: 1 between the five major Arab states and Israel was 
halved within three years by mass immigration to a ratio of 23: 1. 
The social cost of this decision was high and its impact on 
Israel's social development was considerable. For a few years 
strict austerity had to be imposed because of' the heavy burden of the 
absorption of 700,000 immigrants. And for many subsequent years 
the generation which grew up in the maabarot was the source of 
what became known as'the--second Israel', with its social, educational 
and occupational backwardness and political under-representation. - 
The impact of security needs on the shaping of Israeli society 
was also manifested in the settlement field. The lack. of 
strategic depth and the incapacity to keep large formations of 
the standing army on the borders, resulted in a territorial 
defence system whose main component was to transform civilian 
settlements along the border into a military line. This concept was 
active rather than passive; .. e. it did not merely create a framework of 
civil defence based on existing settlements. Defence calculations 
dictated a policy of establishing new settlements. The result was that 
a substantial sector of the population had to become accustomed to 
life in border settlement. Children in the Jordan Valley, for example 
had to live for years in underground shelters. At the institutional 
level the result was that the military and the defence establishment 
played an important role in fulfilling the conventional civil 
function of urban and rural settlement. 
In the pre-state days a special unit in the Haganah command 
played an active part in directing land purchase policies, approving 
settlement plans and in the actual establishment of new settlements. 
) 
The defence establishment has had a say in settlement policy since the 
1 Allon, Y. (1970: 240). * 'The -Making of the Israeli Army London 
Vallentine Mitchell. 
establishment of the state and, because of thatithe army's 
dealings with the political problems concerning the future of 
the territories has deepened since 1967.1 Just as this example 
illustrates the influence of security considerations on 
civil society, a vivid expression of the convergence of the 
civil sector caused by the army is the process which took place 
within the educational sphere. In order to make optimal use of 
skilled manpower, the I D. F trains some young people for various 
tasks before their conscription. For ten years until 1973 it absorbed 
some 1,000 technicians each year who had acquired their vocational 
experience at Air. Force, Navy or .,: Ordnance Corps boarding schools. 
After the 1973 War, when-the IDF decided to double its manpower, 
the existing para-military frameworks proved insufficient and it was 
obliged to utilize the civil . education -network. Thus, 'the army 
began to exert influence on the curricula of civil. vocational 
schools, in order to increase the number of graduates with the 
specific skills it required. It also penetrated into the Ministry 
of Labour's network of vocational training and many of its curricula 
are now dictated by the army, in such areas as motor mechanics, 
mechanical equipment repairs, catering, electrical work, and aviation 
mechanics . The Ordnance Corps, 
for example, helps to formulate 
the study programmes for motor mechanics and pupils attend 
courses held in the Corps workshops. Some 1,000 boys participate 
each year in these courses. 
1 The disclosure in 1972 of the army's involvement with the 
preparations for the development of Yamit, a coastal town in 
the Rafiah salient, caused a public row, particularly when it 
was revealed that the plans had been made without the knowledge 
and consent of the Government. See Ran Kislev. Haaretz, 
24 October 1972. 
The idea of using the civil educational network as a framework 
for training skilled manpower for the IDF was not new. But after 
the October War the emphasis changed. 
In contrast to periods when the educational network was 
only tenously linked to the IDF, military involvement 
was extremely high after 1977. There were years in which 
the Ministry of Labour determined the vocational training 
programmes without our having intervened at all. At 
present we are submitting a clearcut p}an to the Minister 
of Labour and are stating our demands. 
The growth of the defence industries in Israel is the most 
significant quantitative example of the convergence occurring in the 
civil occupational structure. It is impossible to imagine the 
development of the metal, electronic and chemical industries in 
Israel without the national decision taken in 1967 to move towards 
autarky in the manufacture of armaments and weapon systems. Although. 
the processes of the evolution of a military industrial complex -a 
clear expression of convergence in this area - have gained real 
momentum since 1967, they have not yet been scrutinized. 
Convergence processes occurred in spheres with widely differing 
characteristics, one of them is the cultural sub-system. 
2 
This is 
reflected in the introduction of military forms of speech, expressions 
and slang into the civilian lexicon, in the importance of the army 
milieu in light entertainment, and in the fact that military 
situations, and above all war, are central themes of artistic and 
literary creation in Israel. 
1 Interview with Col. Y. Rosen Commander of Recruiting Bureau of IDF, 
11 September 1977. 
2 Reference is not to militarism but to militarization, i. e. not the 
introduction of militaristic values but military behaviour, norms 
and patterns of activity. See the distinction between the terms 
by Vagt, A. (1959) A History of Militarism New York. Meridian. 
- 108 - 
Two mechanisms encourage this process of convergence. The 
first is the fact that every consumer of civil. culture and 
entertainment is 'a soldier on 11 month's leave', for whom military 
experience is an essential reality. Secondly, the army is in fact 
the main trainer of Israeli performers and artists, particularly in the 
theatre and the light entertainment field. Most of Israel's actors 
and entertainers have begun their careers during their conscripted 
service in army entertainment groups . The impact of this professional- 
ization process is still evident many years later. 
An exhaustive analysis of the various institutional spheres will 
indicate other examples of convergence that have occurred in the 
civilian sectors of Israeli society. The centrality of security, the 
role expansion of the army, and the prolonged war have caused 
militarization of civilian life in Israel. 
However, as Horowitz and Luttwak have correctly pointed out, Israel's 
highly militarized society is not necessarily a militaristic one. 
The ethos of militarism - the glorification of war and the celebration 
of martial virtues - is not readily apparent in Israeli life. 
I 
The 
processes of convergence described earlier and others impinged 
mainly on the structural dimension of the institutional spheres 
(e. g. division of labour). But in other dimensions, like the modes 
of operation (e. g. the decision making process) and in particular 
the normative dimension (disciplinary norms), the civil sector itself 
influenced convergence processes actually taking place inside the army. 
In other words a process of civilianization in the army happened when 
the army and the value-psychological sub-system collided, and the 
vigour of the latter prevailed. 
1- 
Luttwak, Edward and Horowitz, Dan (1975: XIII) The Israeli Army 
London. Allen Lane. 
CIVILIANIZATION OF THE IDF 
It is a common assumption that 
the special organizational structure of the armed forces, 
with their emphasis on effectiveness, coordination and 
subservience, created in the army inevitable priority fir 
authoritative values rather than democratic approaches. 
Attempts made within the Israeli army to create a different normative 
system from that prevailing in civil society have failed. Israeli society 
was characterized by egalitarian values, at least formally, and 
experiments to inject a note of authoritative discipline into the IDF 
have not proved effective. Immediately after the establishment of the' 
state ättempts were made to introduce norms borrowed from the British 
Army, which emphasized formal status, drilling, saluting and 
segregation of officers from other ranks as a substitute for participation 
and explanation as the way to ensure allegiance. 
When Moshe Dayan was appointed Chief of Staff this experiment 
came to an end and the army reverted to the Haganah ethic of 'inner 
discipline' rather than of 'formal discipline'. The commanding. 
officer was regarded as a source of emulation rather than as a being 
socially remote from his men. Efforts were made, from time to time, 
to improve discipline, inter alia by 'punishment marches', but 
these aroused considerable resentment both in the armed forces and 
in the civil sector. 
2 
1 
2 
Abrahamsson, B. (1972) Militäry Professionalism and Political 
Power. London. Sage. 
On the first years after the establishment of the IDF see 
Shabtai Tevet (1971) Moshe Dayan (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Schocken, 
and on the past few years- the annual reports of the Military 
ombudsman , e. g. Davar, 
23 May 1978. 
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Another expression of the convergence process within the IDF 
occurred at the ideological level. In contrast to the findings of most 
studies on Western armies, which reveal a tendency on the part of 
professional officers to represent the more rightwing conservative 
elements in society, the military elite in Israel is characterized by its 
heterogeneity, and reflects the proliferation of political views and 
l 
ideological outlooks in civil society. 
In Israel, therefore, civil modes of operation, norms and values 
entered the military institutional sphere, thereby balancing in a very 
sensitive area of Israeli society the processes of militarization 
occuring in other sub-systems. It is in the very sensitive value sphere, 
where the. transformation of society, from being democratic to being 
authoritarian, from being militarized to being militaristic, could 
inevitably take place. 
During the 30 years since the establishment of the IDF in 1948 processes 
of convergence between the army and the civil sector, civilianization of 
the military and militarization of the civil institutional spheres, have 
continued. They have been more vigorous- in the second half of this period, 
increasingly so after 1967. These phenomena have been accompanied by', another 
development, the weakening of the processes of divergence between the 
two sectors. 
An effort was made when the IDF was formed artificially to create 
divergence, not only in the structural dimension but also in the operative 
and normative dimensions. This was one aspect of Ben Gurion's blue-print 
to make the IDF a model, an antidote, to what he perceived as the 
sickness'-in. society. The achievement-of his aim is_a matter of doubt. 
But it is clear that he succeeded in projecting this image to 
1 See e. g. Kourvetaris, G. A. and Dobratz (1973: 238) 'Social 
Recruitment and Political Orientation of the Officer Corps in 
a Comparative Perspective. ' Pacific Sociological Review Vol. 16 
No. 2; and Peri, Yoram (1973). Retired Officers in Israel and the 
Emergence of a New Elite . 
(Hebrew) Unpublished M. A. Thesis. 
The Hebrew University, Jerusalem. 
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Israeli society. From the state's establishment until the Yom Kippur 
War the prevailing view was that the IDF had escaped the defects of 
Israeli society, that inside the army people demonstrated a higher 
level of commitment to the collective, behaving contrary to the egoistic 
and utilitarian norms of the civil market, displaying a willingness to 
volunteer and even a readiness for self-sacrifice. These attributes 
were shown especially in the modes of operation and management. 
The common image of the IDF was that of an efficient and effective 
organization, an organization with integrity, which performed in 
accordance with clearly defined rules and customs. The image worn by 
Israel's civil public administration, that of an inefficient, 
ineffectual and corrupt body, suffering from non-professional factors 
like patronage, or personal and party influence, was repugnant. It was 
believed that the IDF was guided by universal and achievement criteria 
while the civil administration was conducted under the influence of 
particularistic and sectional interests. 
This image of the IDF was shatttered in the Yom Kippur War, 
which produced one of the most traumatic revelations of civil-military 
relations in Israel. It was reinforced by the-State Comptroller's 
subsequent and repeated disclosures of inefficiency and illicit conduct 
in the army in his annual reports. 
The trauma continued when in later 
years corruption scandals were disclosed. 
The new image worn by the IDF in the late 1970's more closely 
reflected reality, and indicated that the characteristics attributed-to 
the army were not so different. from those; attributed to the civil<isector. 
So far the description of some basic characteristics of civil- 
military relations in Israel has not been comprehensive. Neither all 
the institutional spheres, nor all the ingredients of the interchange 
between the military and civil sub-systems have been scrutinized. Only 
some of the problems have been presented to serve as background 
material for a deeper and more elaborate analysis of the relationship 
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between the army and the political system. Set against the. backdrop 
of this larger canvas, even though incomplete, the particular 
characteristics of the interrelationship which is the subject of 
this study. stand out more starkly - the interrelationship between the 
military and politics. 
The outstanding phenomenon is the preservation of the multi-party 
democracy, and competitive parliamentary regime in a state undergoing 
a prolonged war, a state which devotes a substantial percentage of 
its resources to security and maintains such a large army. Is it 
inevitable that the increase in the centrality of security will bring 
about the insinuation of 'experts of violence' into the political 
sphere, thus destabilizing the democratic nature of the state? Is it 
unavoidable that a state under siege becomes a garrison state? 
Lasswell, who devised that developmental construct, thought that 
militarization was inevitable, though not necessarily via a formal 
military seizure of power, nor the destruction of democratic institutions. 
1 
Perhaps such'a process is happening beneath the surface in the 
Israeli corridors of power. This brief analysis suggests that the 
protracted war and the centrality of security brought about convergence 
of the military and the civil sectors, especially of the latter. 
However although the army has influence over some civil dimensions 
and many of the institutional spheres, in others the influence is 
exerted from the opposite direction. What is the nature of the 
interaction between the army and the political system? 
Lasswell, Harold D. (1962: 65) 'The Garrison State Hypothesis 
Today'. In Huntington, S. P. (1962) Changing Patterns of 
Military Politics New York. The Free Press of Glencoe. Also 
Lasswell, H. D. (1941: 455=468) 'The Garrison State ' American 
Journal of Sociology January. 
4. THE EVOLUTION OF DUAL CONTROL 1918-1938 
THE INSTRUMENTALIST ORIGIN OF THE MILITARY 
A comprehensive study of the relations between the political and 
military systems in Israel must commence with the period prior to 
Spring 1948. These relations, like other aspects of Israel's 
political structure, are basically the outcome of the organizational 
and political patterns crystallized during the period of the Yishuv. 
l 
Although the establishment of the sovereign national state of Israel 
transformed Israeli society, the contemporary political system cannot 
be comprehended without an analysis of the patterns which emerged in 
its formative period. 
a 
The Yishuv period was marked by far-reaching social and political 
changes. First by the increase in the Jewish population from some 
30,000 at the turn of the century to about 700,000 in May 1948, but 
also and more importantly by a change in its political character 
through the development of a state in embryo. These three decades 
witnessed the emergence of a national centre with a relatively high level 
of institutional authority and charisma, lacking only political sovereignty. 
1 
2 
The name given to the Jewish community in Palestine from the 
beginning of the waves of Zionist immigration at the turn of the 
century until the establishment of the State. The vital 
importance of the Yishuv in crystallizing the Israeli social 
structure is a central thesis of the sociology of Israeli society. 
See Eisenstadt, S. N. (1967) Israeli Society (Hebrew) Jerusalem, 
Magnes" Press; Shapiro, Yonathan (1977, Israeli Democracy (Hebrew) 
Ramat Can. Masada; 'Horowitz, Dan and Moshe Lissak (1977) From 
Yishuv to State (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Am Oved. 
The terms, and in particular the term 'charisma', are borrowed from Shils, and differ from the classic definitions used by Weber. See Shils, E. (1958) 'The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma'. In World Politics Vol. 11, No. 1. 
.- -- - -- -2 
Thus the pattern of military-political relations was also the 
outcome of the process of institutional construction which took 
place throughout the Yishuv period. 
The Israeli pattern of military-political relations is based 
on the instrumentalist principle that. the army i oi3'1A _b-e-: subördihate 
. tc-thy-civil= authority and should serve as the professional instrument 
of the state's political institutions to implement violent policies in 
foreign relations. 
1 
But how did this approach, which originated in 
the transition from feudal rule to modern national frameworks in 19th 
century Europe, take root in Israel with its totally different 
2 historical background?. 
Throughout the Yishuv period there were*two schoöls-of thought 
concerning the. ao_s-ition of. the military.. The first. held' that military 
force-is the instrument of the political authority. The second, that 
the armed forces should enjoy organizational and political independence 
and power not only to determine methods of implementing violent 
policies, but also to formulate actual political goals and aims. 
These two contradictory approaches struggled for pre-eminence, and 
were involved in other controversies too. One of these was the rivalry 
between political groups for power in the Yishuv and in the World Zionist 
Organization. After - the Labour Movement had gained control of the 
national centre, the rivalry-became focused on the degree of central 
authority towards the periphery or the sub-centres. 
See Abrahamsson_Bengt (1972: 17-18) Military Professionalism and 
Political Power Beverley Hills. Sage. 
2 
An analysis of this process of development see Huntington, S. (1957: 
10-59) The Soldier and the State Cambridge. Harvard University 
Press. 
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A second dispute centred around political strategy, and 
particularly the question of the use of force in the national 
struggle. How should the political objectives of the Zionist 
Movement be implemented? Should it be mainly through diplomatic 
measures in the international arena, by establishing economic and 
political facts in Palestine, or by using military force? 
' 
The organizational structure and social basis of the military 
force was a third subject of debate, and here the conflict focused 
on the concepts-of the professional army, the revolutionary cadre or 
militia. In the sphere of internal organization one of the central 
issues was the degree of decentralization of the military force.. 
The--. two conflicting approaches were debated within 'and 
between parties, political groups, and military bodies. ' The concept 
of the instrumentalist army was reflected in the demand for civil 
authority over the armed forces either particularist (through party 
or movement) or collectivist (on a national scale). The demand for 
an independent military derived. in some cases, from the fundamental 
outlook of the founders of the military force and sometimes from the 
desire of the commanders, appointed by political bodies, to free 
themselves of their dependence.: 
I 
In a classic expression of the anti-military approach, Eliyahu 
Golomb, central figure in the Haganah, wrote: 'W do not delude 
ourselves that the Zionist question will be solved by force of 
arms. It will be solved by the power of the creative effort of 
the Jewish people, the power of immigration and the opening of 
a legal route of immigration, and it will be solved by the power 
of the enterprises which the Jewish people will set up in our 
country. The arms are needed only in order to defend these 
enterprises. ' Slutzky, Yehuda and others, Haganah Book (Hebrezi) 
(1959: 606) Tel- Aviv. Maarahot. 
Despite the conflict between the two basic approaches, which 
spilled over into other areas, the Yishuv period is characterized 
by the fact that the instrumentalist principle was the dominant one. 
It was accepted by the political. elite, which tried to ensure its 
institutionalization in well-defined frameworks. The second principle 
was able to survive because of the. nature of the political system, 
which lacked coercive power, had no monopoly over the use of force and 
was based on consensus. However it was regarded by the majority of the 
society as a deviation. 
THE EMERGENCE'OF'THE HAGANAH AS A-NATIONAL'TOOL 
'Pockets of Jewish self-defence had existed in Palestine in 
the Ottoman period, but they lacked a political nature'. 
1The 
modern 
Zionist settlement of Palestine was'initiated by the First Aliyah 
(wave of immigration) consisting of members of'the Hibat Zion 
(Lovers of Zion) movement in 1882-1904. This Aliyah "confined itself 
to settlement activity without a deliberate political plan and, by its 
nature, did not produce associations for armed activity ranging beyond 
the protection of life and property, ''2 that is to say organisations 
with police functions. 
3 
At the beginning of this century and 
particularly in the Second Aliyah period (1904-1914) from which 
emerged the 'nation-building elite' or 'founding fathers'. of Israeli 
society, the first nuclei of a Jewish military force in Palestine 
began to develop. 
1 
2 
3 
Allon, Yigal (1966: 58-80) 'Israeli Defensive Forces from Yesterday 
to Today' (Hebrew), Maarahot ,- April. 
Niv, David (1965: 28-30) The Beginning of the Irgun Zvai Leumi 
(Hebrew) Vol. 1. Tel Aviv. Klausner Institute. 
See the last chapter of Eilam, Yigal (1979: 321-330) The Haganah, 
the Zionist Way to Power (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Zmora Bitan Modan. 
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The Yishuv force grew spasmodically. in response both to 
manifestations of Arab hostility and to the needs of the struggle 
for independence against the British Mandatory-"Authority. Each 
stage brought in its wake not only changes in,. the size of the 
military force, its strength, structure and tactical approaches, but 
also in its relations with the political"system. Each spasm in the 
development of the Yishuv's central military force, the Haganah, 
was characterized by the transfer of jurisdiction to a more central 
political body with a wider basis of legitimization. 
The Haganah was created from independent cells in various- 
settlementsduring the First World War and after the first-serious 
wave of Arab hostility in'1920. In June of that year the Ahdut Haavoda 
Conference decided to implement a resulution passed one year previously 
at the constituent conference, and established-the Haganah. 
l 
1 The decision of the constituent assembly in March 1919 was that 
the party 'should deal with all questions of national defence'. 
Ahdut Haavoda Compilation (1919: 127) Tel Aviv. Ahdut Haavoda. 
The party was founded in 1919 by members of Poalei Zion and a 
non-party group. Poalei Zion, a social-democratic workers 
party, was founded in 1905, and was one of the two great socialist 
parties in the Yishuv, with a radical leftwing, trend. Ahdut 
Haavoda also had Marxist tendencies , but from the mid-twenties, 
the party adopted a social-democratic orientation. In 1930 
it 
amalgamated with the second largest labour party, Hapoel Hatzair, 
set up in 1905, which was more moderately socialist in tone. 
Together they set up Mapai which remained the predominant party 
in Israel in different forms until 1977. Ahdut Haavoda (which 
had seceded in 1944) and Rafi(which left in 1965), returned to 
the ranks in 1967 and the reunited party was renamed the Israel 
Labour Party - ILP. For a bibliography on these parties see 
Lissak M., and E. Gutman, eds. (1977: 51-53). The Israeli Political 
System (Hebrew). Tel Aviv. Am Oved, and Shapiro näthan (1976: 
273-278). 
The party leaders envisaged a military force, serving as the 
party's instrument and formally subordinate to it. But they were 
obliged to content themselves with something less than this, namely 
" an independent organization under their influence. The compromise 
was required because during that period Hashomer, an oganisation with 
military functions, already existed. However the members of 
Hashomer, most of whom belonged to Ahdut Haavoda, continued to 
advocate complete political independence and organizational autonomy. 
The leaders of the party opposed it, but lacked the ability to 
impose their views on the Hashomer members. Hence the party 
conference agreed that the new military organization should be run 
by Haganah members but demanded that the party's influence be safe- 
guarded by 'active participation of party members'', obeying party 
authority in the military organization. 
1. 
Six months later the labour parties established the General 
Federation of Hebrew Workers in Palestine' (Histadrut). The 
leaders of Ahdut Haavoda, the dominant group in the new Federation, 
proposed that the new organization deal with" organization of 
guarding and defence'.. As a result, responsibility for the Haganah 
was transferred in March 1921 from the party to the HiAtadrut'. s Defence 
Committee, a special budget was allocated to the organization 
'for a person to be wholly dedicated to defence work'. 
1 Resolutions of first Ahdut Haavoda Conference, 25 June 1920, 
Vol. 11,42: 4. 
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The second wave of riots, in 1929, was more violent than the 
preceding one. Because the years between had been relatively 
peaceful, the Haganah had. relaxed its vigilance and had been, further 
weakened by internal strife. Its partial failure in the 1929 riots 
further convinced the Histadrut leaders that quantitative expansion, 
organizational strengthening and a change in outlook were required, 
as well as widening the popular base of the organization. This was 
done by extending political jurisdiction over the Haganah from one 
single sector - the Labour Movement - to a wider Yishuv body, and 
further to the World Zionist Organization. 
Although the Haganah had been set up as a national organization, 
it was really a relatively tenuous federation of local cells. Each 
was subordinate to a local defence committee, in which were 
represented the various public bodies in the Yishuv which supplied 
their budgets. The level-of institutionalization in this framework 
was relatively low and varied from one settlement. to another. 
But whereas the socialist parties were organized in a , national 
framework, having many resources like the Histadrut with its own 
national defence committee, the other political groups, called 
the 'bourgeois circles' were less organized politically. Some were 
mainly economic rather than political in orientation and all lacked 
a central body to deal with defence. 
1 
Therefore, to the extent that 
there was central activity, it was carried out by Histadrut members. 
In addition, the majority of the prominent members of the Haganah's 
local cells were labour people so that in. effect they dominated the 
organization. 
1 The term 'bourgeois circles' was applied in the Yishuv period to 
groups which did not belong within the Labour Movement. See the 
description of one of the leaders of the Haganah, who was the 
head of the first National Command, Ratner, Yohanan (1978: 262) 
My Life'and Myself -(Hebrew) Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Shocken. 
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The first step in the expansion of the base of popular authority 
was the establishment of a Yishüv body in which 
I bourgeois circles' 
were partners with the Histadrut. After the 1929 disturbances the 
National Committee (Vaad Leumi), the representative body of the 
Yishuv, set up a defence committee encompassing representatives of 
both the 'bourgeois' and the labour sectors. In 1931 another 
important step was taken when a Na. tignal Commäný of the'--- 
Haganah was set up, composed equally of three representatives of 
the Histadrut and three from `bourgeois circles'. 
After this step, which took place in Palestine, civil' 
jurisdiction over the military organization was transferred from 
the representative organizations of the Yishuv to the political ',. 
institutions of the World Zionist Organisation. In contrast to the 
previous stages - the party, the Histadrut and Vaad Leumi' - this 
was a slow and gradual process. In summer 1930, a representative of 
the Zionist Executive was coopted onto the Yishuv's Defence 
Committee (which now had five members) and in 1933 the World Zionist 
Movement began partially to finance the Haganah Centre. 
' 
The third wave of riots, the Arab revolt of 1936-39, accelerated 
the process and in 1938, for the first time, a representative of the 
Jewish Agency Executive was appointed Chairman of the Haganah's 
National Command, - composed of three representatives of the Histadrut 
and three from the 'bourgeois circles'. The admission-of several rightwing 
parties, excluding the Revisionists, into the political 
leadership of the Haganah in July 1937, further extended the base of 
political and public support for the organization. 
I 
The Zionist Executive was the executive institution of, the 
World Zionist Organization. After it agreed to accept non- 
Zionist Jewish groups the new body was called the Jewish Agency, 
its composition however was almost identical with that of the 
W. Z. O. Executive. 
The 1936-39 events were the main catalyst for the process of 
d 
professionalization of the Haganah, reflected both at the level of _ 
military skills and in the separation of political-civil and technical- 
military functions, culminating in 1939 in the establishment of the 
General Staff. 
I 
In the present context it is illuminating to examine 
the increased authority of the Jewish Agency as the political body 
operating and responsible for the military organization. 
The Arab revolt influenced the attitude of the Zionist leaders 
towards the question of force and its use in their political struggle. 
The British Government succeeded in breaking the Arab Revolt, but agreed 
to the political demands of the moderate Arabs concerning the future of 
Palestine. Hence the 1939 British-Government White Paper restricted 
Jewish immigration 
'while 
the 1940 Land Laws prohibited Jews from 
purchasing land in large parts of Palestine. The heads of the 
Zionist Movement, who had previously assumed that Great Britain 
would be the main influence to impose a Zionist solution in Palestine 
in the face. of Arab opposition, were now confronted by .a British 
policy which aimed to halt the development of the Jewish National 
Home. 
1 
In this period, for example, there evolved the principles of 
mobile combat night-fighting, self-discipline in battle, fighting 
leadership, the people as a"reserve army and other concepts which 
found clear expression during the War of Independence and after 
the establishment of the IDF. See Milstein, Uri (1973: 65) 
In Blood and Fire Judah (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Levin Epstein. 
On the establishment of the General Staff and the conflicts which 
arose against this background between the General Staff and the 
civil- National Command, see Pail, Meir (1973: 48-51) 
Development of the Structure and Command of the Haganah between 
1920 and 1948 (Hebrew) Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Tel Aviv 
University. A book based on the thesis was published later (1979) 
The Emergence of Zahal (I. D. F. ) (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Zmona Bitan Modan. 
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Until 1936 the Haganah was essentially a reactive 
force,. - activated in accordance with local defence needs and 
directed mainly against the Arabs. After publication`of the White 
Paper, however, the Zionist leadership realised that it required a 
power instrument in the political struggle against the'British. In 
1939 the Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive David Ben Gurion 
formulated'the goals of the Zionist movement: 
The First World War brought us the Balfour Declaration. 
This time we must bring about a Jewish State, ... the way 
to achieve it is by 'militant Zionism'. The Zionist 
enterprise went through two periods until now. The first is the 
period of Hibat Zion, the love of Zion, when the Zionist work 
was done without any real basis. The second period, that of 
political Zionism, was based on international rights and 2 
with British support. The new phase is the phase of the war. 
A similar classification had been made several months previously 
by Menahem Begin at a convention in Warsaw, when he said that 
The Jewish national movement began with practical 
Zionism, moved on to political3Zionism and has reached 
the verge of militant Zionism. 
I 
2 
Ben Gurion, David (1971: 376) Singularity and'Mission 
(Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Maarahot . 
Ben Gurion, David (1959: 158-160) In the *Battle (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 
Am Oved. 
3 
Elam, Yigal (1973: 159) Introduction to the Other Zionist 
History (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Levin Epstein. 
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LEFT V -RRIGHT'-*THE*DISPUTE'OVER'THE HAGANAH 
But the attempt by the national leadership of the Zionist 
Movement to take over responsibility for defence from the Yishuv 
encountered obstacles. This dilemma illustrates the extent to 
which the various aspects of political struggles were interwoven 
with the sphere of military-political relations in the Yishuv era. 
Furthermore, it reflects the important role played by security in 
the process of crystallization of the national centre as the 
focus of authority accepted by the Yishuv. - 
Several issues became the subject of public debate at this 
time. The first was the question of what policy should be adopted 
in reaction to the White Paper. The activists, leadera of Mapai 
and Haganah commanders, advocated the 
practical abolition of the White Paper through a 
fierce struggle against the restrictions imposed by 
the British Mandatory rulers to be expressed in the 
organization of wide scale. i. llegal immigration, the 
establishment of many new settlements, and the 
expansion of the Haganah. Moderate circles, either farmers 
or bourgeoisie , as well as several of the leaders 
of the tabour Movement, demanded restraint in the 
struggle, non-recognition of the White Paper, and 
development of industry, and thought that 
achievements already gtined should not be endangered 
by intensive struggle. 
The second hotly-debated issue was the mission of the Haganah. 
The activists believed that the organization should be the Yishuv's 
weapon in the political struggle against the British White Paper. 
The moderates continued to regard it as the means to implement its 
original functions, defence against Arab attacks. 
I Maj.. Gen. (R es) Avidar, Yosef (1970: 145) On the Road to the 
IDF , Memoirs 
(Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Maarahot . vi ar ocTiel), 
one of the first commanders of the Haganah in Jerusalem reached 
the position of Head of the Operations Branch in the Haganah 
headquarters, and deputy Chief of Staff in the IDF. 
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A third controversial issue was the location of political 
responsibility for the Haganah. If the Haganah was the instrument 
for political struggle against the British, it was argued that it 
should be activated by the body conducting the general political 
struggle, namely the Jewish Agency. If, however, its task was 
only the defence of the Yishuv against the Arabs it should be 
supervised by the Yishuv's representative body, namely the National 
Committee and its institutions. 
These three dimensions of the debate related to the political 
struggle within the Yishuv. The left-wing parties were the largest 
bloc in the World Zionist Organization and particularly in the 
Jewish Agency Executive. In Palestine, however, the Haganah was 
still under the jurisdiction of coalition bodies composed on. a 
basis of parity. This is why the 'bourgeois circles' demanded that 
supreme authority be vested. in these bodies. Furthermore, 
whereas the Haganah cadres were a focus for left-wing influence, the 
'bourgeois circles' constituted the majority in the financial 
institution of the Haganah, Kofer Hayishuv. 
l 
Hence the latter 
objected to-transfer of authority over the Haganah to the Jewish 
Agency executive and demanded that it be retained-in Palestine. 
Israel Rokach who headed the 'bourgeois circles', demanded that the 
controlling authority be the directors of Kofer Hayishuv. 
The organizational structure of the Haganah was also the subject 
of controversy. The decentralized structure inevitably strengthened 
the influence of local political bodies over the Haganah cells. A 
Kofer Hayishuv (Yishuv ransom) was a voluntary tax framework 
for financing defence. See Berger, M. ed. (1964) Kofer 
Hayishuv (Hebrew) Jerusalems Tax Museum Publication. 
.- 
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centralized structure promised greater influence to the central 
institutions, hence to the strongest party, Mapai. The same-is true 
of the debate on the degree of permanency of the organization - 
should it be rallied in times of need and disbanded immediately 
afterwards, or should it be a permanent framework with a standing army 
and a professional command 
1 
The view of the founding fathers , the leaders of Mapai, " 
prevailed in this multi-faceted dispute, and the process of boosting 
the Jewish Agency's authority over the Haganah continued. The heads 
of the National Command were appointed by the Jewish Agency, and were 
under the jurisdiction of the head of the Agency's'Political Department. 
2 
The Jewish Agency played an increasing part in funding the Haganah, 
while the influence of Kofer Hayishuv diminished. When a new military 
unit, the Department for Special. Activities (PUM), 'was established 
within the Haganah in 1939 - the first unit to be organized on a 
nation-wide basis for offensive operations - it was not responsible 
to the National Command, but directly to-the Jewish Agency Executive. ' 
The changeover from a federal to a central structure also meant 
that the local Haganah committees were no longer responsible to local 
civil. institutions. A uniform and hierarchical structure was 
created with more distinct channels of authority and responsibility. 
The principle of civil authority was not changed, _ 
but the Haganah 
attained more integral boundaries and its interrelation with the, 
civil. authority was increasingly canalized through the peak of the 
command pyramid. 
1 
2 
Moshe Smilansky, one of the leaders of the Right, wrote: 'The 
spear is only for times of need, only for the fleeting hard times, 
and not, Heaven forfend, a permanent feature. For if the spear is 
permanent, even if it were originally created for a sacred task, 
it will become, because of this permanency, the weapon of the 
devil... ' Haaretz, 5 November 1940 and 19 November 1940. 
Yohanan Ratner (1938-9) Yaakov Reizer (1939-41) and Moshe Sneh (1941-46). 
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The last phase of the Yishuv era, between the end of World War II and 
summer 1947, witnessed the further strengthening of the status of the 
Jewish Agency Executive as the political body with supreme authority 
over the Haganah. It provided 60% of the Haganah's budget and 
determined the allocation of the budget as a whole. In August 1945 
Moshe"Sneh the Head of the National Command was appointed a full 
member of the Jewish Agency-Executive, and this created a situation 
whereby the Zionist Movement's executive actually appointed for the 
first time a 'Minister of Defence'. 
Security became an even more vital issue after the SecondyWorld 
War, and after the 22nd-Zionist Congress in February 1947 it was made 
the direct responsibility of the Chairman of the Jewish Agency 
Executive, Ben Gurion. Other civil institutions dealing with 
defence were abolished, and the Jewish Agency Executive replaced the 
National Command as the supreme civil forum directing the activities 
of the military organization. 
) 
When the Zionist Organization set up the institutions of statehood' 
- the Provisional State Council and the Provisional Government - these 
new institutions took over the functions of civil supervision of the 
military organization, and the Haganah became the Israel Defence Forces. 
The transformation of the underground Haganah to the'armed forces of 
the state was revolutionary in that the national leadership, for the 
first time, enjoyed a monopoly in the use of force within the 
sovereign political framework. Hence the army and the security sphere 
had to be removed from the influence of different political bodies and 
located at the national centre. However, the basic principle of the 
supremacy of political jurisdiction by the civil body, over the army 
As, for example, the'X'Committee, set up in 1945, which coordinated. 
the struggle against the British among the various underground 
movements in the Yishuv, or the Yishuv Security Committee. 
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prevailed, and hence there was no need for a reform or adaption of 
this attribute. 
NATIONAL AUTHORITY - PARTY CONTROL 
Why did the pattern of the instrumentalist army. determined in 1920 
remain dominant throughout the Yishuv period, and how was the process 
of transfering the focus of civil. - authority from one political body 
to another accomplished so successfully? 
The core of the answer is to be found 
in the single factor which 
linked all the transitional stages and'was the common denominator of 
all the political bodies, and labour parties, the Histadrut, the National 
Committee and the international associations. of the Zionist movement)- 
namely the leadership of Ahdut Haavoda and, ":. fter 1930, of Mapai. 
It was 
the nation building elite whose ideology remained dominant and who 
retained power as a political party for 44 years, the longest 
consecutive period of rule by one party in any democratic 
The leaders of this party who came to Palestine during the Second 
Aliyah, and the younger generation, who arrived during the Third 
Aliyah and made up the core of the party apparatus , were all of 
Russian origin. 
1 
Their political socialization took place within 
Russia's revolutionary movements, - where they not only absorbed 
socialist ideology, adapting it to their Zionist philosophy but also - and 
'herein lies the key to their historic success - absorbed the principles 
of constructing effective political power within an organizational 
framework, which bestows power on those who head it. 
1 The Second Aliyah was the term coined for the immigration wave 
1905-1912. The leaders of this wave were born in Russia during 
1885-1890. The younger generation's leaders emigrated from 
Russia in the Third Aliyah 1919-1923 and had already experienced 
life under a communist regime. 
- 128 - 
The success of this group of leaders derived not only 
from the power orientation which enabled them to take control of the 
centre, but from the very fact that they came to power while they were 
forming the political, economic and social institutions of the system 
within which they operated. The construction of these institutions 
was designed to ensure that their control persisted. 
The leaders of Poalei Zion in Russia brought with them to Palestine 
the Leninist conceptions of the decisive importance of the party in 
directing political action. In 1919 they founded their own party, 
Ahdut Haavoda, and when they realized that they would not succeed in 
persuading all workers to join it, they set up the Histadrut in 
conjunction with other labour groups. 
From the outset they constituted the majority in this hew 
federation, and also soon held the central positions in the Histadrut, 
becoming the predominant force. in the Yishuv Labour-Movement and hence 
in the-Yishuv as a whole. 
1 
The next stage was to capture the central positions in the Zionist. 
Organization - i. e. the national institutions until then under the. 
influence of bourgeois and middle-class elements. The process began in 
1928-9. A year later they amalgamated with Hapoel Hatzair, the second 
largest party in the Yishuv, and established Mapai. This step was 
reflected in electoral achievements, the new party won 40% of the seats 
at the 1931 Congress and 44% two years later. It became the dominant 
party in the coalition and retained this status and, to a large extent, 
its electoral weight, throughout the Yishuv period. When sovereign state 
For a detailed and absorbing account of the Ahdut Haavoda leaders 
and the political system they constructed see Shapiro, Yonathan 
(1976) The Formative Years of the Israeli Labour Party London. 
Sage and Shapiro, Y. (1977). 
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institutions were set up in 1948 - the balance of power between 
parties remained more or less unchanged. 
Bolshevik concepts influenced the Ahdut Haavoda attitudes to 
power. One of the central principles was that an armed force must 
be unequivocally - subordinate to the party. This principle was first 
implemented in Russia in the early twentieth century. The first 
wave of pogroms (1881-2) led to spontaneous organization of self- 
defence by Jews, but it was only during the second wave, in 1903-5 
that the main political bodies in the Jewish community at the time, 
the Zionist parties and the Bund, formally established defensive 
forces. 
-. Inspired as they were by revolutionary ideologies, the members 
of the Zionist-Socialist parties were unwilling to cooperate with 
bourgeois parties. or other bodies. in joint defence organizations. 
The class struggle insisted that class be the organizational base, 
hence the parties' absolute control over the military might be 
weakened if other groups participated in it. 
3 
1 
2 
3 
The version of Mao Tse-tung is succinct, although the Russian 
revolutionaries had formulated it earlier: The party commands 
the gun, and the gun must never command the party'. Mao Tse 
Tung. (1963: 272)- Selected Military Writings Peking. Foreign 
Languages Press. 
The Bund was an anti-Zionist socialist party which died out 
towards mid-century. 
At the first conference of the Zionist-Socialists in Leipzig 1906 
it was decided that 'we must endeavour to place the independent 
defence organizations of the Jewish masses under the supervision- 
and direction of the party. ' Similar resolutions were passed at 
this time elsewhere-as well. See Niv, D. (1965: 34-40). 
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When they arrived in Palestine, they immediately grasped the 
importance of armed force for the success of their-political ventures 
in domination. The first test was to subjugate the existing defence 
association, Hashomer, to their authority. This was not easily done 
since the Ahdut Haavoda leaders had no means of controlling the 
association. They chose to employ the favourite tactics of 
communist cells, taking over control from within, by infiltrating 
loyal party members into the association. 
The special pattern of military-political relations in the Yishuv 
period now began to emerge more clearly. This pattern is termed 
'dual-control' The establishment of the Histadrut and placing of the 
Haganah under its jurisdiction crystallized the distinction between 
formal authority over the military organization and practical control. 
The leaders of Ahdut Haavoda made sure that they always wielded 
actual control of the organization, but as it was clearly in their 
interest for political authority to be vested elsewhere, in wider 
representative bodies encompassing additional political groups. 
The Yishuv lacked sovereignty, and the legitimacy of the central 
political bodies was based on consensus; hence the more parties "to share 
in the consensus, the greater the actual power of the representative 
bodies. This meant that even though military force was controlled by 
1 The term 'dual-control" is usually used'to describe the pattern 
of political-military relations in the Soviet Union, namely the 
parallel channels of commanders and commissars. While in the 
Israeli case the 'dual' refers to two channels for civil control 
over the military. 
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a small group of party leaders, they were endowed with wider legitimacy 
because of their roles as heads of the wider representative bodies. 
l 
The process by which the Haganah expanded its role from the 
military instrument of a party, then of the entire Labour Movement, 
the Yishuv and the Zionist movement, which handed it onto the independent 
state, constitutes a fascinating parallel to the political career of 
Ben Gurion. He immigrated to Palestine in 1906 with the first groups 
of Second Aliyah pioneers. He was a member of the first committee of 
Poalei Zion in Palestine, established in 1906, and one of the main 
negotiators for the establishment of Ahdut Haavöda in February 1919. 
After the Histadrut was established he was elected its first Secretary 
in December 1919. He joined the Zionist Executive in 1933 and became 
its Chairman and two years later became Chairman of the Jewish Agency 
Executive. In 1947 he was also made responsible for dealing with 
defence matters on behalf of the Jewish Agency Executive, and 
continued to combine the two functions even after his election as head 
of the National Administration, later to become the Provisional 
Government. The transition to the position of Premier and Minister 
of Defence was a natural step. 
1 Separation between authority and control existed not only with 
regard to the Haganah, but in many other spheres as well. flavar, 
to use one example, ostensibly the mouthpiece of the Histadrut 
as a whole, was in fact exclusively dominated by Ahdut Haavoda 
leaders and reflected their stand. 
There is much evidence of party control of the Haganah, although 
political authority over the Haganah was entrusted to the 
Histadrut, the National Committee or the Jewish Agency Executive. 
Several examples: the discussions in 1925 between the Haganah and 
Hashomer on the Haganah`s political subordination were held in a 
party forum and not within the Histadrut Haganah Book(1959: 232) Vol. 2. 
When the Haganah commander. Yosef Hecht was accused in summer 1931 
of flouting political authority, he was permitted to choose between 
a Yishuv tribunal (the Haganah was then under the National Committee) 
or a Histadrut Tribunal, and naturally chose the latter, which 
consisted solely of Mapai members. Haganah Book (1959: 425) Vol-2. 
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Ben Gurion defined himself as a Bolshevik. 
) 
In the twenties and 
thirties he tried to emulate certain of the patterns of the Russian 
Soviets and the Bolshevik Party. Even after his ideological views 
changed and he moved his party towards the centre of the political 
map, his approach to the problem of political power and the vital 
importance of party organization remained unchanged. Having achieved 
national leadership by 'day by day drab construction of political 
power', 
2 
and as an admirer of Lenin, he insisted on party control of 
the military power, and made constant efforts-to-expand the political 
frameworks under the party's influence. 
3 
- 
Ben Gurion was one of the chief opponents of those Hashomer 
members who were unwilling to accept the party's authority. As 
secretary of the Histadrut he dismissed the Haganah: commanders who 
tried to flout the authority of the political institution. After 
1 See Bar Zohar, Michael (1975: 160-180) Ben Gurion (Hebrew) 
. Tel 
Aviv. Am Hasefer and Kolat, Israel (1973). 'Ben Gurion, 
Image and Greatness'(Hebrew)in Bitfutzot Hagola No. 67/68: 9. 
Organization and Information Dept. of Zionist Organization. 
2 Eilam Y. (162: 197) and Shapiro, Y. (1976: 261) reject. the 
accepted explanation of Ben Gurion's charisma and claim that the 
key to his power was organizational and was provided by the party 
machine. The charisma was a manufactured image. 
3 Ben Gurion's admiration for Lenin - the one who was the Prophet, 
the Warlord and the Legislator in revolutionary Russia - was so 
profound that people around Ben Gurion in the Yishuv period used 
to whisper that it was the description which Ben Gurion would 
like to choose for himself. See interview with Israel Galili, 
Yediot Aharonot, 20 October 1978. 
. 
he became Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, Ben Gurion 
was the prime mover in the campaign to remove the Haganah from 
the control of the Yishuv's institutions and place it under the 
Jewish Agency Executive, under his personal influence. 
l 
In that 
position he was. also one of the fiercest campaigners in the Yishuv 
against the military organizations which seceded from the Haganah 
and refused to accept the authority of the national institutions. 
And finally, as Head of the National Administration, the Provisional 
Government and as its Minister of Defence, he fought to detach the 
military force from the influence of various political factors and to 
ensure-his exclusive control as the sole legitimate representative of 
the political supervisory system. 
LABOUR LEADERS MECHANISMS OF CONTROL 
The organizational principles which guided the dominant party 
shaped the pattern of military-political relations in Israel. But how 
did the political elite, which lacked sovereignty and coercive power, 
ensure the subordination of the military force in a period of political 
and social change? 
Several of the commonly accepted explanations do not apply in this 
case. Finer, for example, says that a 'high political culture' restricts 
the chances of military pressure for political intervention. 
2 
It is 
difficult to claim that Yishuv society had a mature level of political 
culture according to Finer's variables. Legitimization of the political 
centre was partial, a major part of the political functions were not 
1 
2 
See Bauer, Y. (1973: 49). 
Finer, S. E. (1975: 75-80) The Man on Horseback Harmondsworth, 
England. Basic Books. 
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carried out by it but by other agencies like the colonial power and 
other inStitions in the society. The effectiveness of the implementation 
of other functions was dependent on factors outside the system, and in 
particular the World Zionist Organization. In addition, there was no 
absolute consensus on. the rules of the game in the political system. 
Huntington's explanation that maximization of the professionalism 
of the military intensifies civil supervision, was the basis for 
Pail's suggestion that 'as the professional level of the Haganah 
improved, there was an improvement in civilian supervision of it. '1 
This statement calls for close scrutiny. First, Huntington's 
original theory has been criticized, but, even if valid, it cannot 
explain the willingness of the Haganah to accept civil. authority. 
If professionalism means high technical standards and control over the 
art of war, then this undoubtedly improved immeasurably between the 
establishment of the Haganäiin 1920 and its transformation into the 
IDF in 1948. If professionalism, however, is the accepted 
principle of the supreme authority at the political level than the 
Haganah commanders subscribed to it from the outset, i. e. from 1920. 
A partial answer to the question is supplied by the ideological 
factor. A comparative study of military coups in new states revealed 
that in communist regimes coups were less frequent. The reason for 
that was not the high level of political culture or the professional 
level of the military but the strong emphasis on political ideology in 
these -states .2 
1 
2 
Huntington, S. P. (1957: 83) Pail, M. (1973) first chapter, and 
Perlmutter, Amos (1977: 16) Politics and the Military in Israel 
1967-77. London. Frank Cass. 
Van Doorn, J. (197580). -He-compared North and. South Vietnam, 
North and South Korea. The Soldier and Social Change. Beverly 
Hills and London. Sage. 
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The building up of the military body in the Yishuv was accompanied 
by an intense ideological effort by the political and cultural leadership 
in the Yishuv. In this indoctrination, two principles were emphasized: 
the instrumentalist principle, that is the need to wield military force 
out of political considerations and through the civil. authority and, 
secondly, the principle of 'comprehensiveness', that is to say that the 
control over the Haganah must be in the hands of the civilrauthority 
through representative bodies which reflect as many sectors of society 
as possible. 
The first principle stresses the moral dimensions that force for its 
own sake is immoral and its use can only be justified by its integration 
in the framework of a responsible social movement. Israel Galili was 
expressing this idea when he said that the subjugation of power to the 
Yishuv institutions could prevent 'transformation of man into a beast 
of prey', and ensure 'his mobilization in the service of a social ideal. '1 
Hence the Haganah objected to the use of the word 'army' for the 
armed forces, and preferred the term 'defence' as reflecting anti- 
militaristic trends. After the 1929 riots, Yitzhak Tabenkin wrote: 
Education in defence is not subject to the rules of 
military education., There is a great contrast between them 2 
... the soldier and the 
defender are two different types. 
1 
2 
Golomb, Eliyahu (1953: 56) Latent Strength. (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 
Maarahot. Galili was one of the heads of the Haganah and the 
head of its National Command, one of the leaders of the Kibbutz 
Hameuchad, and Ahdut Haavoda - the group which split from Mapai 
in 1944 and rejoined in 1967 (not to be confused with the Ahdut 
Haavoda which was established in 1919, and established Mapai in 
1930) a member from the first Knesset until 1977, and a Cabinet 
Minister from 1965 to 1977. 
'Haganah Book, (1959: 620-5) Vo1.2. The fear that the defence function 
would escape the overall framework was so great that, at the 
"Histadrut Conference which decided to deal with defence matters, 
it was proposed that this function should not be defined 
independently and that the term 'arranging guard duties and 
defence in the course of work' be employed instead. See Haganah 
'Book, (1956: 72-3) Vol. l 
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The principle of comprehensiveness was the outcome of the 
collectivist ideology of the founding fathers, and also offered a 
solution to the problem of lack of sovereignty of the political 
system, i. e. lack of monopoly of coercive force. Since the consensus 
served as the basis for-legitimacy, extension of the base guaranteed 
wider public support. In contrast to the approach of the heads of 
Mapai and the Haganah, there was another school of"thought which 
took issue with the democratic principle and held that during a 
struggle against a foreign ruler, the criteria for subordination of 
military force should not be democratic, that force should be 
controlled by whoever best fulfilled the national function of liberation, 
whether it was a majority political body or a clearly military 
organization. 
) 
But this view was held by only a small minority in the - 
Yishuv. 
The ideological basis was employed to win wider'public support 
for the political leadership's demand to control the military 
organization; but it could not in itself suffice to control this apparatus. 
According to Van Doorn, what finally ensured the subordination of the 
army to the political institutions in certain new states were mechanisms 
-of organizational and institutional control. These states are 
characterized by 'systematic construction of political organization 
throughout society, including the one-party system, mobilization of 
the masses, organization of youth and direct control of the party 
over the army'. 
2 
The Yishuv society was multi-party, nevertheless the leaders of the 
Labour Movement used several mechanisms which are typical of socialist 
regimes. A particularly interesting one is related to the social sub- 
system. In socialist societies immediately after the revolution, a 
1 
2 
Milstein, U. (1973: 94-5). 
Van Doorn, J. (1975). 
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process of proletariatization of the military takes place. This is 
effected by the fundamental change in the basis for mobilization and, 
by bringing into the ranks social strata more loyal to the political 
elite. In the Yishuv the military organization developed from a 
vacuum, but during its formation an emphasis was put on the social 
basis for recruitment. One of the fundamental debates of that period 
was the nature of the membership of the military organization. Whenever 
facing demands for a restricted and elitist cadre, a professional 
army, or provisional military bodies, the leaders of Ahdut Haavoda and 
Mapai stood firm in their demand for a wide popular militia. Their 
arguments for the establishment of a militia were educational and 
professional. They claimed that self-defence, like self-work, was an 
expression of the creation of a 'new Jew' and a new Jewish society. 
There were functional advantages to such a militia, mainly the 
fact that it could better utilize the fighting potential of a small 
society. However one cannot ignore the political advantage that the 
militia gave to the leaders of the Labour lbvement. 
Because the Labour Movement was the most organised in the Yishuv 
and its leaders controlled _ 
larger and more accessible manpower 
resources than all-the other parties, particularly through the 
Kibbutz movement and the Histadrut', they could ensure that their members 
would be the great majority 
in the ranks of the Haganah, in the volunteer 
combat units and particularly among the commanders and regular staff. 
When the first regular professional units were set up - the Special 
Operations Unit in 1939 (which existed for only six months) and the Palmah 
in 1943 - they were composed of party loyalists. 
I 
1 Bauer, Yehuda (1966: 59) Diplomacy and Underground Activity in 
Zionist Policy, 1939-1945 (Hebrew). - 
Merhavia, Sifriyat Hapoalim. 
English version (1970) From Diplomacy to Resistance Philadelphia 
The Jewish Publication Society of America. 
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Furthermore the existence of a militia which reflects all parts of - 
society.. can -prevent the identification of the military organization 
with one group, sector or factor in the population, and give the national 
leadership the right to have the authority over the military organization.. 
However, the leaders of Ahdut Haavoda were not satisfied with the 
indoctrination nor with the safeguard of the military organization's social 
base. They contrived, therefore., more mechanisms which would ensure 
their actual control. 
The primary mechanism- of civil- - control was the channel. which 
operated directly from the party to the professional. levels. But, in 
addition, mechanisms of civil supervision were constructed which were 
entrusted to bodies with formal authority over the organization. In 
the manpower sphere the appointment and promotion of senior officers 
were carried out at'the political level. Even after the General Staff 
was established, it was stated that it would only act as 'adviser to 
the National Command on appointments at the officer level. ''1 
A much wider field was control of material resources, 'budgeting, 
armaments, and defence intelligence. It has already been noted that in 
the first period, when the Haganah was a loose federation, the financing 
of defence committees was carried out by the committees of the various 
settlements. Thus civil supervision was achieved at the local level. 
When'the centralization of the organization was intensified and the 
Kofer jlayishuv association was set up in 1938, financing was carried out 
through the Finance Department of the National Command, i. e. in the central 
echelons of the Haganah. 
1 
Statutes of General Service/Command, General Staff (Hebrew) 
Haganah Archives. File 73/97. 
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a 
In 1939 the National Committee began to levy an emergency tax, 
and Kofer-Hayishuv became an ancillary source. In July 1942 a 
recruitment fund was established, further weakening Kofer Hayishuv. 
" Simultaneously with the Labour Movement's increased involvement 
with financial matters in the Yishuv, the Jewish Agency began to play a 
greater financial role compared with the Yishuv. In 1939 . 
it supplied 
less than 20% of its budget as against 70% supplied by Kofer Hayishuv, 
but in 1941-3 it outweighed the latter. The strengthening of its 
organizational ties with the Haganah was reflected in the authority 
to distribute the budget. 
1 
The political echelons also controlled arms. The purchasing of 
arms abroad, the development of local armament industry (Taas) and the 
purchase or manufacture of ammunition, (activities developed in the 
thirties), were managed by special committees affiliated to civil-aut- 
horities, that is to the-National Command äiid not to the General Staff, 
The intelligence sphere, which provides a vital military and 
political resource, also remained the domain of political bodies 
'although this was detrimental to total General-Staff control of the 
operative aspect'? Until 1940, this sphere was'divided between 
several civil authorities: the Political Department of the Jewish 
Agency, the Histadrut Executive, Jews in the British Palestinian 
Police ranks and Haganah branches. The Counter Espionage Department 
and the Arab Department, both affiliated to the National Command, 
were set up in that year, and the Intelligence. Service began to 
operate as a national body. 
1 The Haganah Book (1956: 1003) Vol. 2. 
2 Pail, M. (1973: 35). 
At the beginning of 1942 all the intelligence services were 
amalgamated into one service - the Information Service (Shai). 
i 
This body was not answerable to the-G. H. Q., but to two other 
authorities, the National Command and the Political Department of 
the Jewish Agency, even though the Service was not confined to 
military intelligente only. The possible harm to the operative 
ability of the General Staff was regarded as outweighed by the need 
to safeguard control of this resource through civilian bodies. 
And, finally, a mechanism of civil control over the- bperätibnal 
sphere was established. The-political level retained the authority 
to implement activities of a political nature within the framework 
of the national struggle. Thus, for example, activities in Europe 
such as illegal immigration were directly controlled by the Jewish 
Agency. The manning and financing of Haganah activities in Europe 
were carried out not by the General. Staff in Palestine, but directly' 
by the Jewish Agency Executive. Other spheres of activity in 
Palestine, such as illegal immigration and settlement, were also 
the preserve of civil authorities. 
It was made absolutely clear that. military operations must' 
receive the approval of the political level. The political leaders 
of the Haganah insisted that all retaliatory action must obtain prior 
approval of the civil National Command. 
I 
It is of interest to 
compare that with the opposite command given in IZL-, where local 
commanders could retaliate on their own initiative, without a 
directive from the central body. 
1 Order issued by National Command, 2 July 1939. G. H. Q. File 
155/39. Haganah Archives. 
Niv, D. (1965: 18). Vol. 2. See pp, 149-157 for-the discussion on 
IZL or the Irgun - the right-wing underground "National Military 
Organization". 
'TWO'GENERATIONS: '`THE'FOUNDING'FATHERS AND THE SABRA COMMANDERS 
The institutional mechanisms could not have guaranteed political 
control over the military organization in the absence either of an 
ideological justification-or of the social base from which the military 
organization germinated. The social moral and other attitudinal 
pressures were expressed not only in the consolidation of the military 
instrumentalism and in the provision of social resources for the 
fighters, but also through the leadership of the Labour Movement 
which acquired a special position, and was to become the 'elite of 
the founding fathers', who were the 'nation-building elite'. Although 
it comprised several groups, it was cohesive including people of the 
same generation, who had experienced the same process of socialization, 
who had developed a common perception of life during their formative 
years, and who had witnessed 'historical events' on the eve of and 
during the 1905 revolution in Russia. That generational unit was the 
basis for a political organization which matured while the organizational 
frameworks were being formed in Palestine. The Yishuv political system 
was shaped by this powerful political elite from the. end of the First 
World War until the end of the thirties. It did everything to 
consolidate its monopoly of power and it succeeded. 
l 
1 
For an analysis of the Mapai elite using the concept of 
generation units and inter-generation relationships see 
Shapiro, Yonathan (1979: 137-151) 'Generation Units and tnter- 
Generation relationships in Israeli Politics' (Hebrew) in 
Arian, Asher (ed. ) Israel, the founding Generation Tel Aviv. 
Zmora Bitan Modan. 
The heads of the military organisations came from two groups. 
They differed in age, but shared the common experience of being born 
and raised in the Yishuv. The first group blossomed in the 1920's, 
in the early stages of the Haganah's formation. ` Those who had been 
educated in the Herzliya Gymnasium Tel Aviv 'became the most prominent 
members of the group and were known as 'Gymnasists'. '' Their 
involvement with security activities began in the First World War. 
The most notable men in the group were Eliahu Golomb, Moshe Shertok 
(later Sharett), Shaul Meirot (later Avigur), David'Hacohen, Dov Hoz, 
and Yitzhak Ulshinski (later Ulshan). They were joined'in-the early 
1930's by a number of"younger people, including the founding members 
of'the Hanoar Haoved youth"movement. The best known of this group 
was Israel Galili. 
The younger, second group comprised people who had been born in 
the First World War and the 1920's. Their participation in security 
activities began in the decade inaugurated by the Arab Revolt (1936-1939) 
and gradually increased when the Palmah was formed,,, - during the 
struggle against the British occurred after the Second World War, and 
during the War of Independence. 
The first'generation was characterized by its intimate involvement 
with life in the Yishuv. Having been born there they knew its geography 
much better than those in the founding elite. They spoke Arabic, 
were free of the older generation's outmoded military concepts, 
and could easily adopt and implement modern ideas about warfare, some 
of which they had absorbed during the First World War. From the 
beginning they used the security sphere as the route for entry into' 
the higher echelons of the_political elite. They exploited their control 
over the vital defence resources to gain entry into that elite, but 
once inside they accepted the absolute authority of its political leaders. 
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As the professionalization of the Haganah accelerated and the differenti- 
ation between the political and military spheres increased, the 
'Gymnasists' moved on to the former plane as civilians responsible for 
defence on behalf of the national leadership. Eliyahu Golomb, for 
example, the most prominent among them, was denoted 'Minister of Defence 
of the Yishuv. '1 Their professional skill endowed them with authority 
vis-a-vis the younger professional military level. The younger group's 
members matured to become the professional soldiers. In the second 
half of the 1930's, they occupied the Haganah's command-level, out of 
which the IDF's military elite emerged, an elite which preserved its 
position until the early 1970's. 
Like the nation-building elite which had control over the political 
system, the Sabra elite was also a generation unit. 
2 
Its members were 
of the same age group, similar in their social affiliation, being the 
first generation born in the Yishuv of parents who had arrived with the 
Second and Third Aliyot, and in their socialization patterns. That 
group developed solidarity, cohesiveness and a similar life-style. But 
unlike their parental generation, they did not evolve for themselves an 
independent philosophy of life, which rebelled against their seniors. 
In contrast to the founding elite they did not establish political 
organizations to realize revolutionary ideas. They saw themselves 
as the disciples of the previous generation from whose spiritual 
domination they did not even try to break away. They upheld the 
ideals handed down to them and accepted the authority of the Yishuv 
leadership. 
1 
2 
On Golomb's activity as Ben Gurion's right-hand man, see Hebrew 
Encyclopaedia (1953: 400) entry on Golomb, and appreciations by 
Galili, Sharett and others in Golomb, E. (1953). 
Sabra was adopted as the nickname for those born in the Yishuv, and 
later in Israel. It is the name of a cactus fruit, prickly on 
the outside, soft on the inside. 
Those in this group with political ambitions were faced with 
a dilemma. From the latter half of the 1930's, when they had 
reached an age to take over the political roles, they confronted a 
political system fashioned and operated by the veteran leadership and 
its generation unit. 
Among the members of the generation unit in the 
different organizations informal relationships developed, 
and they were the backbone of the organization and 
strengthened the authority of their leaders. However, 
as a consequence there was no place for the(sal-ras)in 
these organizations; and they were locked out. 
It was a twofold barrier, for not only were there very few 
available political positions, but also a negative discrimination 
against those who did not belong to the power elite's generation unit. 
A new channel was opened up to the younger generation in the 
1930's after Arab-hostilities had erupted in 1936. The Haganah had 
been caught off-balance, unprepared, disorganized, lacking both 
professional manpower and proper military concepts. This situation 
offered scope for public activities which the younger generation 
had the necessary attributes to perform, and which suited their 
expectations. 
-Involvement 
in. defence meant to- participate 'zn actions 
which served the collective, were of a pioneering nature, and whose 
performance would fulfil the mission for which they had been nurtured 
for so many years. It was a channel for political activity which gave 
them prestige, the channel of mobility closest to the political sphere, 
and one with a central significance for society. 
1 Shapiro, Y. (1979: 142-3). 
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Even after they occupied the professional peak of the 
Haganah underground, members of the younger generation unit 
continued to accept the authority of the founding generation, 
and therefore readily internalized the instrumentalist 
concept that the political leadership preached. 
The younger generation accepted the parental generation's 
leadership from the beginning, and the complementary paths 
military for the former, politics for the latter-made 
harmonious relations between the generations possible. 
l 
On the founding fathers and their heirs see Horowitz, D. 
and Lissak, M. (1977: 173-175) although they use a 
different description for the younger generation. 
For an analysis of the nation-building elite and the second 
generation see Shapiro, Y. (1977). Shapiro went further 
and said (1979: 145) that ''one of the explanations for 
the enthusiasm and dedication of the sabras far ; the 
military role was their desire for a role in the system 
which would continue their subordination to the authority 
and philosophy of the elders ... in the military 
underground they found a task that demanded discipline 
and not initiative, and that the-discipline itself 
fascinated them no less than the actual military action'. 
This suggestion of the self-belittling of the sabras 
seems a little exaggerated. 
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THE FAILURE OF THE WATCHMEN 
The description of the institutionalization of the instrumentalist 
model may give the impression that the process evolved smoothly. 
This, however, was not so. Throughout the Yishuv period there 
were repeated attempts by different groups to preserve their 
independence from any political factor and to determine their own 
political and military objectives. The process described so far 
is the process of making the Haganah into the IDF. The process 
described hereafter is the establishment and the dismantling of 
several military groups. 
In 1907 a group of Poalei Zion activists arrived in Palestine 
from Russia in the wake of the 1903 Homel Pogroms. This group set up 
the first armed body in Palestine, known as Bar Giora. Two years 
later in April 1909 this group served as the nucleus of the new 
Hashomer Association. 
Hashomer (The Watchman), which reached the peak of its strength 
in 1912 with 100 members, was a clandestine, elitist ahd cohesive 
order, and it even displayed a tendency to endogamous marriage. 
Despite their vital function in the Yishuv, the organization members 
were at loggerheads with their Jewish environment for several reasons. 
They were a problem to the bourgeois farmers because they demanded 
higher wages than Arab watchmen, and their militant attitudes 
exacerbated relations with the Arabs, whom the farmers wanted to 
conciliate. But they were regarded with apprehension mainly because 
they did not accept the authority of the general political institutions 
of the Yishuv. 
l 
1 See testimony on this subject in The Haganah Book, vol. l (1954.: 215-270) 
For example, when the Yishuv institutions appealed to them, 
during the First World War, to hand over their arms to the 
Turkish authorities they refused and the Hashomer, head Yisrael 
Shohat was denoted a 'traitor'. 
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Although they were members of Poalei Zion and later Ahdut Haavoda, 
they were unwilling to subordinate their organization to the party. 
In contrast-to the unequivocal attitudes of those who held the 
'bolshevistic approach' like Ben (urion and their disciples, the 
Hashomer leaders believed that the military organization should not be 
a militia but should remain a-small, closed`professionäl cadre, whose 
leadership must, be appointed from within and not by the party or 
other outside groups. The Hashomer members, rather than the party, 
they emphasized should Wield authority within the organization and 
determine its policies. 
I 
The controversy between the two schools of thought was intensified 
in 1919-20 and Hashomer members disbanded their organization some three 
weeks before the Ahdut Haavoda conference in June 1920, so as to make 
way for the Haganah. The Ahdut Haavoda leaders agreed that the 
Haganah should be an independent organization, their covert intention 
being to dominate it from within. The Hashomer, in its turn, 
compromised and disbanded the old organization, hoping to win control 
of the new one. 
The basic conflict between the two schools continued throughout the 
twenties, since Hashomer members continued clandestine activities. At 
one point the Legal Committee of the party discussed Golomb's complaints 
about Hashomer's unauthorised actions. - The organization was finally 
abolished for several reasons: its failure to provide a functional 
answer to the new defence requirements of the Yishuv, its alienation 
from civil society as a result of its corporatism, but above all, 
because of its inability to face up to the most prominent force in 
the Labour Movement, the leaders of Ahdut Haavoda. 
2 
1 
2 
Ben Gurion then declared: 'If the members of the conspiracy 
conceal facts from the party - the party cannot be responsible 
for them. The members must draw the conclusion and decide whose 
authority they accept. ' Haganah Book, Vol. 1 (1954: 304) 
On criticism of Hashomer, see Israel Shohat's statement in 
Hashomer Book (1957)(Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Dvir. The Haganah Book 
details story of Hashomer. See also a concise account in Elam, Y. 
(1978: 22-44). 
The second manifestation of the independence of the military 
force occurred after the solution of the Hashomer crisis. Because 
of the political controversy on the nature-, of the Haganah, and the 
slackening of security tensions in the twenties, a group of 
commanders headed by Yosef Hecht, were able to attain a. very high 
measure of independence. 
When it was decided, as a result of the 1929 disturbances to 
revive Histadrut control of the, Haganah, to introduce reforms into 
its internal structure and to set up a National Command encompassing 
the'bourgeois circles as well, Yosef Hecht objected and rallied the 
support of various other commanders. 
' 
According tb the evidence of 
one of these officers, Abraham Ikar, Hecht said:. We are the only 
people who know how to do-what is necessary and correct, and the 
others know nothing. '2 
Whatever his motive, personal unwillingness to take orders 
instead of issuing them or a basic desire to maintain the independence 
of the organization, Hecht fought to preserve the organizational 
status quo. His viewpoint, however, did not prevail. When the 
political base of the Haganah was extended, Hecht found himself in 
confrontation not only with the Histadrut leaders, but also with the 
heads of the 'bourgeois circles'. After being accused several times 
of acting on his own initiative, and overstepping his authority, he 
was dismissed in the summer of 1931-by the Secretary of the Histadrut 
Ben Gurion. Several of his supporters left or were dismissed at the 
same time. 
3 
1 
2 
3 
The most vehement opponent was Rosa Cohen (Mother of Yitzhak Rabin) 
who spoke out 'against the desire of politicians to intervene in 
defence matters'. 
Testimony of Avraham Ikar in Haganah Archives, File 28, No. 505. 
Hecht also said that Haganah people knew better than politicians 
what the organization should do. 
Haganah Book, (-1956: 422-424) Vol. l. The last straw was Hecht's 
action in forcing a young Jew found guilty of spying for the British 
to commit suicide. Before that he ordered the killing of Israel 
Dehan, an activist in the ultra-religious, anti-Zionist party. This 
was the first political assassination in the Yishuv. 
THE IRGUN - BEYOND POLITICAL AUTHORITY 
The third controversy was much more serious and multi-faceted. 
The Haganah Commander in Jerusalem, Avraham Tehomi, and several 
officers who supported him, criticized the Histadrut leaders on 
three issues. In the organizational sphere they objected to the 
militia-like nature of the Haganah , 
though they also opposed the 
Hashomer model of the closed cadre instead they called for a professional 
military organization. In the political sphere they opposed the 
Histadrut's policy on the 1930 White Paper and demanded a more 
activist Zionist policy towards the Arabs and the British. Im the 
party political field, they objected to the fact that the Labour 
Movement and the Histadrut exerted strong influence over the Haganah, 
and demanded that the latter be placed effectively under the 
jurisdiction of the Yishuv's general institutions. 
Ahdut Haavoda could tolerate the first two demands, but saw the 
third as a threat to their control over the Haganah and as an attempt 
to augment the influence of the Revisionists. 
1 
Tensions between the 
two camps were then at their height. When the rift between the Haganah 
central office and Tehomi's group widened, the latter seceded and in 
1931 set up the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization), on 
the model they had recommended to the Haganah. 
2 
1 
2 
The right wing of the Zionist Movement led by Zeev Jabotinsky. 
See notes next page. 
Memoirs by Tehomi written more than 40 years later, YediOt Aharonot, 
20 January 1967. The founders of the new organization called it 
by this name, but in the Yishuv it was known more as 'National 
Defence', 'the Parallel Organization', or 'Irgun B'. After that 
it vas k norm only as the Irgun Zvai Leumi - National Military 
Organization (Irgun). 
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Tehomi realized that-under the political conditions prevailing 
in the Yishuv and within the Zionist movement he could not maintain 
a military organization without party support and he began to seek out 
such support. His first objective, the establishment of a highly 
professional military organization, was attained relatively easily. 
The rebel officers were joined by graduates of the bourgeois youth 
movement Maccabi and the Revisionist youth movement Beitar. 
Together they made up the junior officer corps and rank and file of the 
new organization. On the other hand, Tehomi did not succeed in 
gaining the support of the leaders of the General Zionists and'the 
Revisionist leader Zeev Jabotinsky. 
2 
1 
2 
The General Zionists were the outstanding political bloc in the 
'bourgeois circles'. This party (after the split, two parties) 
essentially reflected middle class and rightwing ideology, 
. mainly 
in the economic sphere. It first appeared as a party 
in the 1931 elections to the Asefat Hanivharim, representative 
assembly of the"Yishuv. 
In 1925 Zdev'Jabotinsky (1880-1944) founded the Revisionist 
Zionist Organization, the main opposition to Chaim Weizmann's 
leadership and to the coalition between the Labour and centre 
parties which was to control the Zionist Executive from the 
thirties. In 1935 he seceded from the World Zionist Organization 
and set up the New Zionist Organization with the aim of creating 
an alternative to the former. He was the dominant figure in the 
Revisionist Movement, propounding the establishment of a 
regular, official Jewish army to realize Zionism by military 
means. 
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Two years later, when the conflict. between the 
Revisionists and the Labour Movement had further deteriorated, 
Tehomi was more successful. In August 1933, at the 18th Congress, 
a supreme political institution of the Irgun could be established 
consisting of representatives of several non-labour Zionist parties. 
The Revisionist Hatzohar, the religious Hamizrahi, the General 
Zionists and the group which had seceded from the Revisionists - 
the Hebrew State Party. A wide-ranging public council and a small 
supervisory committee were set up. Within the Yishuv, on the 
other hand, the Irgun failed to attract the support of two members 
of the influential 'bourgeois circles', who continued to 
cooperate with the Haganah on a basis of parity. 
l 
In the first phase of the establishment of the Irgun, it was 
Tehomi and his colleagues who. searched for political partners, but 
the tables were subsequently turned. When the Revisionists seceded 
from the Zionist Organization, their leader Jabotinsky sought 
ways of creating a military instrument for his association, in order 
to compete for national leadership. Tehomi and his supporters, at 
that particular moment preferred to reunite with the Haganah: 
2 
When negotiations between Tehomi and the Haganah began, Jabotinsky 
tried to persuade Tehomi not to pursue that course. To this end he 
drafted an agreement in which it was stated that Tehomi -had been 
appointed Commander of the Irgun by the President of the New Zionist 
Organization Jabotinsky and would run the Irgun in the spirit 
of-the latter's instructions', ' and therefore cannot negotiate a political 
agreement with. the Haganah. 
These were the Tel Aviv Landlords Association and National Farmers 
2 
Association. 
The reasons included the willingness of the Mandatory Government to 
recognize a legal defence organization. and the subsequent 
establishment of the Guard Units (Notrin), which enabled the 
Haganah to operate under legal cover; and the'fact that the Jewish 
Agency and National Committee recognized no military force. ather. 
than the Haganah etc. See Niv, D. (1956: 
_. 
177) .' 
3 Haganah Book, ... (1956: 725) Vol. 1. 
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Tehomi signed the agreement, though aware that the formal 
description of the ties of the Irgun with the New Zionist Organisation 
was not commensurate with historical developments or the relations 
between the military body and the political organisation. In August 
1936 a platform was drawn up for the amalgamation of the Haganah and 
Irgun. It came into force in April 1937, and half of-the 3,000 
members of the Irgun, headed by Tehomi, returned to the Haganah 
ranks. 
There was a parallel development on the political plane. While 
the Revisionists opposed the amalgamation with the Haganah, the heads 
of the bourgeois" parties in the Yishuv, Hamizrahi and the General 
Zionists,. approved it. Thus, when the Irgun returned to the Haganah 
it forfeited not only its senior officer class; --but also the 
support of the bourgeois parties. It remained a military organization, 
headed by a younger generation of officers, (who had grown up under 
Tehomi's command) and supported by one party, the Revisionists. 
) 
But the direction of. growth of the Irgun -a nucleus of army 
people seeking political support - was evident even after the ties between 
the Revisionists' and the new command were consolidated. Unlike the 
Haganah, which though officially the instrument of-the national 
institutions was actually at the service of the Labour Movement, the 
Irgun, ostensibly connected with the Revisionist Party, did not in 
fact accept its authority. The appointment of Jabotinsky as 'Commander 
of the Irgun' provided only a formal solution to the problem of 
2 jurisdiction. 
1 
2 
E. g. such people as Esther Raziel-Naor, Yaakov Meridor, Avraham 
Stern and other graduates of the Revisionist movement. 
See Bauer, Y. (1966: 19). Jabotinsky was also head of Betar, the 
youth movement from which the Irgun drew most of its manpower. The 
heads of Betar, however, regarded the Irgun's attitude. towards them 
as one of 'unjustified arrogance. 'See Niv, D. (1967: 34-36). 
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The Chief Commander of the Irgun was under the political authority 
of an executive committee, but the cooperation between the committee 
and the Irgun Command was marked by frequent crises. 
' The relation- 
ship between the Haganah and its own political-echelon was similar 
to that in the Russian or Chinese revolutions, when military activity 
was subordinate to the political one. The IZL'. evokes more the 
Cuban revolution, when the guerilla movement was independent of any 
political party and created political institutions only after the 
victory. 
When a military organization is not bound by the authoritative 
instructions of the political. body, it is difficult to regulate 
internal conflicts resulting from political differences of opinion. 
Hence the disintegratory pressures increase. That was the case with 
the Irgun. During the Second World War Jabotinsky favoured suspending 
the struggle against the British and concentrating on the military 
effort against Hitler and was supported by the majority of the Irgun 
Command-. But a group of officers headed by Avraham Stern, whose 
underground name was Yair, argued that the struggle for national 
liberation should continue during the War, and that it was even 
permissible to collaborate with the Axis countries against Britain. 
1 The party institution was called 'Vaad Hamurshim' and 
corresponded to the Mapai central committee. In the early 
forties, for example, a supreme supervisory committee was 
set up after negotiations between the Irgun commanders and 
the party leaders, but it too failed to alleviate the 
tension. See Lev-Ami, Shlomo (1972: 40-44) Underground 
Organization in Palestine, 1943-46 (Hebrew) Ph. D. thesis, 
Hebrew University Jerusalem. 
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When the debate became heated, Stern claimed that the 
underground must free itself of the influence of the legal movement 
and operate along the political lines formulated by its leadership 
alone'. He cited the Irgun's character in support of his argument: 
The Irgun is an army, and an army cannot belong to 
a party. The Irgun may, and in fact must, free 
itself even from Jabotinsky's supreme authority if 
and when he restricts his own political activism. 
As a result of the controversy Yair left the Irgun in March 
1940 together with a group of commanders and rank-and-file members. 
Lehi (an acronym for Israeli Freedom Fighters, as the movement was 
called after Yair's death) existed as a military-political 
underground movement. But unlike Tehomi, Yair and his supporters 
did not seek party support, and there was no differentiation within 
the movement between military and political functions. When the 
state was established and the IDF set up, the Lehi members realized 
that the goal of ridding Palestine of the British colonial rulers 
had been achieved. They acceded to an appeal by Ben Gurion, gave up 
their arms and joined the state military force. 
2 
Yair's defection did not solve the problem of the tense relations 
between the Irgun Command and the heads of the Revisionist Party. On 
the contrary in Autumn 1942 Menahem Begin, who had been the last Betar 
Commander in Poland, was appointed Commissioner of the Movement in the 
1 
2 
Niv, D. (1967: 33-34). 
At the time the IDF was founded, the Haganah had about 43,000 
members, the Irgun 2,000 and Lehi only 500-600. See Friedman; S. 
(1955: 183) Israel Freedom Fighters (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 
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Yishuv, and in January 1944 he became Commander of the Irgun. After 
Jabotinsky's death in August 1940, the status of the party had been 
weakened and the Irgun Command had become the dominant political force 
in the Revisionist Movement. In 1944 Dr Aryeh Altman, Head of the 
Political Office of the World New Zionist Party, claimed at a meeting 
with the Irgun leaders Aryeh Ben Eliezer and Menahem Begin, that 'we 
must establish underground-political relations on the same basis as in 
the Jewish Agency. '1 The Irgun Command totally rejected this approach 
and the Irgun detached itself from the party and became, in practice, 
an independent military-political body. 
When the independent-political and military activity of the 
seceding organizations began to aggravate the Yishuv leadership, they 
tried to exert influence over the Irgun through the Revisionist Party. 
But it soon transpired that the Irgun'in no way accepted the authority 
of the party from which it received political inspiration. '2 
The outcome was that the institutions of the organized Yishuv took 
direct steps against the Irgun with the object of crushing it physically. 
DuringFThe Season'the name given to the winter of 1944-5, the Haganah 
followed, kidnapped, investigated, and tortured Irgun members, and 
even handed them over to the British Mandatory Authorities. 
Furthermore, several years later when the heads of the organized 
Yishuv conducted negotiations for the disbanding of the Irgun, Israel 
Galili, on behalf of the Haganah, did not consider it necessary to 
talk to representatives of the Revisionist Party but preferred to 
hold discussions with Menahem Begin and the Irgun commanders. 
1 
2 
Niv, D. (1973: 38). 
See Bauer, Y. (1973: 272) and remarks by Begin himself (1959: 
200-214). Underground (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Hadar. On Jewish Agency's 
standpoint, see Jewish Agency Executive protocol, 27 February 1944. 
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After the establishment of the state the Irgun was disbanded 
as a military association (not without further crises) and it 
participated in the elections to the first Knesset as a political 
party, most of the members of. the former . 
high : cbminänd appearing 
as candidates on the party list. 
l 
Various military groups in the Yishuv attempted to realise the 
principle that. a military organization is not invariably subject, to: 
political -authority- ' 
but they all failed, including the Irgun. 
Although some Haganah people and members of Zionist parties concurred 
at times with the Irgun's viewpoint on foreign affairs and defence, 
they were not ready to accept the basic principle that the military 
should not be subordinate to elected political institutions. 
The political centre lacked authority actually to prevent the 
existence of a separate military organization, but it was able to 
relegate it to the sidelines, outside the social consensus, as the 
names given to Lehi and IZL demonstrate - the seceding organisations. 
As for the military organizations themselves, at a time of social 
and political change in such a highly politicized society, the military 
framework could not itself suffice to ensure the stability of the 
organization and to create mechanisms neutralizing the centrifugalist 
forces operating within it. Secessions and fragmentation were the 
inevitable outcome. 
1 The Lehi was also transformed after its dismantling into a political 
body, when its members formed "the fighters' list in the elections 
to the first Knesset and gained one seat. When after the elections, 
the ideological cleavage inside the party deepened between the right 
and left wings, the organization disintegrated. 
MAPAI'S ACHIEVEMENT - CIVIL CONTROL 
The two processes which occurred during the Yishuv period, 
the building of a professional military force answerable to the 
political bodies, and the abortive attempts to create an independent 
military force, were paralleled by a third process. This was the 
attempt to create a military instrument under civil. control but 
on a national rather than a party or movement basis. 
This process began in Europe at the turn of the century, within 
the framework of 'Military Zionism', when-the idea of setting up a 
Jewish army to invade and conquer Eretz Israel was first advocated. 
Similarly, Yosef Trumpledor planned, after the 1917 revolution., to 
mobilize a Hebrew army of 100,000 men to be sent to the Caucasians 
front with the aim of breaking through to Transfordan. 
1 
The first attempts to create an all-embracing national military 
organization in Russia failed. This was for example the fate of the 
efforts made in November 1905 in the Russian Zionist Executive. - 
Similar efforts in Palestine had the same outcome. For example, a 
proposal to place the Haganah under the national. authority of the 
Vaad Leumi, put forward at so early a stage as the Constituent 
Assembly of the Histadrut in December 1920, --was rejected by the Ahdut 
Haavoda leaders. 
The sole case in which non-political Jewish army units were set 
up was during the First World War within the framework of the British 
Army. . These units, the 
Jewish Battalions, took part in combat 
but Zionist leaders did not succeed in perpetuating them 
and they were disbanded after the War. Their dissolution was a 
1 On these attempts see Niv, D. (1965: 31-32) Vol. 1. On that of 
Isidore Shalit see Davar, 31 July 1942. 
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result not only of British opposition but also of the discord among 
Jewish political leaders. 
I 
The idea of realising Zionism through a 
Jewish army was again fostered after the War, but was never actually 
implemented. 
The leaders of Ahdut Haavoda and Mapai perceived the military 
organization as a militia and not as a professional army. This perception 
was linked to their practical Zionism, that is to say an inter- 
locking of the military action and the political efforts with the 
colonial activities. The Revisionist school had an opposite 
perception " Militant Zionism. On the ideological plane the Labour 
leaders criticized and attacked the idea of the 'Legion' (professional. 
army) as advocated by the Revisionists, identifying it with militarism. 
Yitzhak Tabenkin claimed that 'defence (as opposed-to 
militarism) is a moral obligation, to be regarded like self-labour, '" 
and was therefore the duty of the self-fulfilling pioneering movements 
2 
The implication is plain. According to this outlook, party members are 
also soldiers, and hence the rule of the political elite over the 
military force is ensured. In a professional national army such control 
is not guaranteed. 
The failure to establish a national army derived from the 
structure of the social system in the Yishuv period, which lacked a 
dominant authoritative centre. Such a centre evolved gradually during 
the period, with parallel activity in the sub-centres, which were 
autarkic or partially-autarkic enclaves. The centre was not a source 
1 
2 
The main controversy was between Josef Trumpeldor, who wanted to 
integrate the units into the socialist movement in the Yishuv, and 
Zeev Jabotinsky who wanted to preserve their national character. 
Yitzhak Tabenkin was a founding member of Ahdut Haavoda. See his 
article in Mibifnim, 3 May 1930. $elf labour was one of the principles 
of the Labour Zionists. It meant that everyone should earn his living 
through work, and not by exploiting others. 
of charisma, in the sense that Shils employs. Its growth and 
consolidation depended on the willingness of the stronger sub- 
centres to recognize its authority in certain areas, while 
preserving their autonomy in others. 
1 
The early federal structure of the Yishuv was not conducive to the 
development of a general military organization, an instrument of 
power which might constitute a grave threat to the sub-centres. Such 
an organization could only develop gradually during the construction of 
the national centre. 
This explains how the Haganah became the central military 
organization of the entire Yishuv. As the leaders of the Labour. 
movement increasingly dominated the evolving centre, the Movement's 
organizations became part of that national centre and won legitimacy 
from growing sections of the periphery, although the veteran leaders 
never relinquished actual control of them. 
Historians of the Yishuv period see the political split at the 
time as a negative phenomenon from the national point of view and 
disfunctional from the military aspect. 
2 
The party rift was regarded 
as a factor weakening defensive capacity from the time of the Russian 
pogroms throughout the Yishuv period. On the other hand, it may be 
stated that it was those very rifts, the emphasis on power,. - and the 
organizational conceptions of the Mapai leaders, which ensured the 
2 
See-Horowitz, D. and "Lissak, M. (1977: 37-38). 
This is most clearly expressed in the Haganah Book-and in Niv's 
books. 
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creation of the Israeli pattern of the instrumentalist army. It; was 
their particularist interests, and the 'bolshevist' outlook, which 
sought to gain control of the military, not only as a weapon for 
implementing anti-colonialist policy and ensuring the security of the 
Yishuv, but also in order to consolidate political power within the 
Jewish society, * -That would create the'basis for that pattern of military- 
political relations whereby the army is subordinate to the supreme 
civil authority. 
The leaders of the Labour Movement were influenced by the 
communist model in their perception of civil control by the political 
echelon over the military. Though it was not control only by the 
. party, neither was 
it the instrumentalist pattern of liberal 
democracies. It was an intermediate pattern, made possible by the 
distinction between authority and actual control, the Yishuv bodies 
having formal authority, while actual control was in the hands of the 
party. 
The voluntary federal character of the Yishuv and the 
revolutionary nature of the military organizations conributed to the 
intermediary pattern. The Haganah, especially the Palmah, was an 
underground movement serving a social as well as a national purpose. 
In spite of its institutionalization during the Yishuv period, it 
developed permeable boundaries with the political system, and in 
particular with the Labour Movement. 
Nevertheless, the dual control contained an inherent contradiction 
which strengthened as the Haganah developed into a state army, because 
a state instrument by definition denies a dual loyalty, the coexistence 
of a parallel party channel for control. 
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This contradiction persuaded the Labour leaders not to base 
state control on a highly institutionalized level, but rather to 
use two other mechanisms. They based the civil authority over the 
military by using both the social sub-system - the source for 
mobilization, the nature of the leadership's authority - and the 
value sub-system. And in fact the social and ideological bases 
created a military elite saturated with the values of military 
instrumentalism. 
After the state's establishment Ben Gurion argued that 'the 
Israel Defence Forces were not the continuation of the Haganah but a 
renewed manifestation of the Hebrew sovereign force from the time of 
the kings of Judah and Israel'. 
' He also wrote that 'the Zionist 
Organization had authority over the Haganah. However this authority 
was to a large extent fictitious'. Historically speaking the remark 
was inaccurate. Pail is more correct when he says that: 
The IDF is the characteristic product of the historical 
development of the Haganah organization... the organic 
link between them is so strong that there is no escape 
from defining the IDF as the natural continuation of 
the Haganah, which developed in evolutionary fashion from 
within it. 
2 
Pail was referring to organizational structure, patterns of 
operation and a professional approach. But the same is true of 
patterns of military-political relations. The basic pattern created 
in the Yishuv period between the Haganah"and the national institutions 
was carried over to the State of Israel. 
Ben Gurion, David (1959: 60) History of the War of Independence 
(Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Maarahot. 
2 Pail, M.. (1973: 263). 
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It follows that Ben Gurion was also wrong when he claimed - 
that when the state was established it was necessary to adopt 
different patterns of relations between the army and the political 
authority from those prevailing in the underground movement, which would 
ensure the dependence of the military instrument on the political 
authorities. 
' 
It is true that during the Yishuv period there were frequent cases 
where local commanders acted without instructions from central head- 
quarters or without the approval of the political,, echelons. It is 
also true that even in later years the Haganah was a militia with a 
relatively high level of politicization, rather than an apolitical 
army. There were also some cases where the commanders disputed the 
policies that were adopted by the political echelons. However, the 
fundamental principle of accepting political authority was loyally 
kept by the Haganah command. 
2 
During the Arab Revolt in 1936, many of the Haganah commanders 
disagreed with the policy of restraint determined by the political top 
brass, a policy designed not to exacerbate the Arab-Jewish hostilities. 
Although the military accused the political leadership of cowardice and 
defeatism, they"accepted the political command. The Palmah, for 
example, opposed the UN Partition Plan, which was supported by Zionist 
institutions, and took issue with the national leadership on the 
question of the need to mobilize the Yishuv to the British cause 
during the Second World War. But the Palmah and its command were 
3 
also characterized by acceptance of political authority. Even if the 
principle of the subordination of the military to civil authority was 
1 
2 
3 
Ben Gurion, David(1955: 46) Army and Defence. (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 
Maarahot" See also (1971: 231-6) Singularity and Mission (Hebrew) 
Tel Aviv, Maarä hot. 
See Elam, Y. (1978: 77-78). 
Bauer, Y. (1973: 263). For other cases when the Haganah disagreed 
with political directives, but obeyed them nevertheless, see Ber, 
Israel (1966: 104) Israel Defence, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow 
(Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Amikan. 
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sometimes violated, both the norm and the definition of a violation were 
clearly realized. Yigal Allon was therefore more accurate when he wrote: 
The Haganah, from the beginning of its illegal underground 
activity, was the creation of a popular movement for national 
liberation, which was directed by democratically elected 
civil institutions... It is not surprising that the IDF 
inherited from it democratic values and full loyjlty to the 
new forms of. parliamentary and social democracy. 
When the state was founded, Ben Gurion did not need to redefine 
the type of interrelationship between the military and the political 
system to. ensure the authority of the civil power over the military, 
but had to reformulate mainly the relations between the particularistic 
bodies within the political system and the national centre in the 
defence sphere. 
Allon, Yigal (1966: 174-5) 'Israel Defence Forces from 
Yesterday to Today' Maarahot; April. 
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5. BEN GURION AND THE POLITICIZATION OF THE IDF 
ý_` .. ýý --- ý-ý... 
FROM NATION IN ARMS TO PROFESSIONAL ARMY 
The pattern of military-political relations contrived during the 
Yishuv period was not unique. It was comparable to the pattern of a 
'revolutionary nation in arms' or 'revolutionary professionalism'. 
' 
This pattern is characterised by fragmented boundaries, with an army 
undergoing a process of professionalism, but subordinate to and weaker 
than the political institutions. 
The most significant relationship in the 'revolutionary nation in 
arms' is that between the National Liberation Movement (NLM) and its 
military arm, the National Liberation Army (NLA). This relationship 
differs according to the nature of the social, political and military 
institutions, and to the peculiarities of the revolutionary war. What 
is common to all cases (the Russian or Chinese Red armies, the Algerian 
and Vietnamese armies are four examples) is that the military arm is 
controlled by the politicians. The military struggle is a part of the 
overall political one and political considerations are given priority. 
The functions and attributes of the fighting force as well as military 
strategy are shaped by the imperatives of the political struggle - the 
struggle for independence. It is usually an anti-colonial struggle, 
but in the Israeli experience resistance to their Arab neighbours' desire 
to frustrate the independence struggle was a complicating factor. 
1 Luckham, A. R. (1971: 25) 'A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military 
Relations', in Government and Opposition Vol. 6 No. 1 and Perlmutter, 
Amos (1977: 205-280) The Military and Politics in Modern Times 
New Haven and London. Yale University Press. Perlmutter s 
observation is valid for the Yishuv period, but as Finer correctly 
pointed out it lost its validity once the IDF was formed. S. E. 
Finer, Times Literary Supplement 17 February 1978. 
After the Arab Revolt in the 1930's and the formation in 1939 of 
the Haganah General Staff, the Haganah military corps became professional 
and was prepared fiercely to defend its professionalism as its exclusive 
commodity. However, it lacked a corporate . perception, seeing 
itself 
essentially as a servant of the national movement in its revolutionary 
struggle. The East European bolshevik experience had more impact than 
the evolution of . 
West European professional armies. 
But 'a revolutionary nation in arms' is not a pattern which prevails 
for long. After the independence war and national revolution it tends 
to get a new shape. 'Nation in arms' or 'the apparat control' are the 
most similar patterns, both having a low corporate basis in spite of 
epjoying a high level of professionalism. The fragmented boundaries 
remain, as does the decisive authority of the political bodies. The 
striking difference in the two cases is in the nature of the ciil 
control. 
l 
The East European revolutionary background of'the Mapai leaders 
might reasonably be expected to have influenced the development of the 
'apparat control' pattern, in which party and army are inextricably 
linked. In Luckham's words: 
A well articulated ruling party has emerged ... the military has fragmented boundaries. The power of the party apparat 
balances the military... boundary roles are deliberately 
established in order to institutionalize links between the 
party and the army at levels beneath that of the high command, 
to ensure the armed forces' political loyalty; lateral 
pressures on the army are thus deliberately created and importance 
is attached to the diffusion within the military of political as 
well as military doctrine ... The history of civil-military 
relations is thus one of a constant dialectic between political 
controls and strategic imperatives, between politics and 
professionalism, in which neither of these two aspects is 
entirely abandoned (China and Yugoslavia are two examples of 
this pattern). 
1 Luckham, A. R. (1977: 23-24). 
The pattern of civil control developed in the Yishuv period was 
however different and it comprised of two parallel channels, one 
being the national institutions, the other being the party. Mapai's 
dominant position in the Yishuv afforded it simultaneous control 
through both channels, thereby securing for itself both the national- 
political and the party-political loyalty of the military command 
levels. 
The transformation of the Jewish community in 1948 into a 
sovereign state did not require a change neither in the ideological 
basis of civil control, nor in the social one. The state institutions 
took over the Zionist Movement and Yishuv institutions, while the 
need to sustain a 'nation in arms' continued because the war with 
the Arabs did not cease with the state's establishment. 
However, the state's establishment was a revolutionary, change 
politically'. The national leadership's basis of legitimacy no 
longer needed to be consensual. The state governing institutions 
were given, for the first time, a monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force and they were able and entitled to impose their authority. 
Did this revolutionary change demand a change in the pattern of civil 
control over the military? Had not the political leadership lost 
the necessity for a party channel of control? 
The widely held assumption is.., that the security sphere was the 
first to express the transformation from community to state: 
The real question was ... would the new Israeli army 
be under the sole control of the Government, or is it 
worthwhile to maintain some of the previous federative 
arrangements? The Prime Minister of the time, David Ben 
Gurion, was against maintaining the previous arrangements 
and emphasised the importance of the . "depoliticization of 
the military., 
According to this view, the IDF was the first institution which 
went through a process of nationalization or mamlachtiut, which 
approximates to the term etatism. It imports two meanings, a general 
national basis, rather than a particularist or sectorial'one, together 
with an obligatory participation with the state, as opposed to a 
voluntary one. - The term which took root in Israel to describe this 
phenomenon was depoliticization it has even been called institutionaliz- 
ation. 
2 
Ben Gurion, the first Prime Minister and Defence Minister of the 
State of Israel, was, according to common opinion, the driving force 
behind the process of the depoliticization of the IDF. Even his 
sworn political enemies finally accepted this image and conceded that 
the depoliticization of the IDF was the most distinguished achievement, 
with historic consequences, with which that national leader could be 
credited. 
3 When the political structure in the Yishuv experienced the 
transformation to statehood, the military undergrounds, whether - 
independent or connected to political organisations, disbanded. The 
Haganäh*was itself turned from an underground, voluntary, revolutionary 
body into a professional army, detached from the party political system, 
and intended to serve as the executive arm of the elected political bodies. 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Eisenstadt, S. N. (1967: 265) The Israeli Society (Hebrew) Jerusalem. 
Magnes , The Hebrew 
University. 
Perlmutter, Amos (1969: 54-55,180) Military and Politics in Israel 
London. Cass. 
See interview with Mapam Leader Meir Yaari in Hotan, 10 May 1978. 
See Halpern, B. (1962) 'The Role of the Military in Israel' in 
Johnson (ed. ) The Role of the Military in Under-Developed Countries 
Princeton N. J. Princeton University Press. 
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Since then these two elements have been the central props for the 
instrumentalist image projected by the IDF: non-involvement in party 
politics and a professional tool. solely to , 
implement state policy in 
the security sphere as- formulated by the Government. 
The premise that the pattern of civil control over the army 
deviled after independence, was typical of the instrumentalist 'nation 
in arms', and not of 'apparat control', could ostensibly be supported 
by the developments within Mapai itself. In spite of its leaders' 
origin, the party did not develop in the same direction as the communist 
parties in the USSR or China, the latter two demanding primary loyalty 
to the party, all other loyalties being regarded as secondary. The 
leaders of Ahdut Haavoda, and later Mapai, departed from the totalitarian 
approach and adopted a pluralistic, social democratic Outlook with 
Western European features. They preferred a mixed economy and a 
l 
competitive political strncture. Such a parliamentary democratic. 
regime incorporates an; instrumentalist control pattern. 
Mapai became like a Westen European labour party, but the question 
remained as to whether the Yishuv dual control pattern was really changed 
into an instrumentalist control pattern. Had the military in fact been 
depoliticized upon the establishment of the state? A theoretical 
analysis of this term, the illumination of facts previously discounted, 
and the discovery of new facts throw doubt on the prevailing image 
of the IDF. 
See, for example, Gorni, Yosef (1972) Ahdut Haavoda 1919-1930: 
Its Ideological Foundations and Political Methods. Tel Aviv. 
Tel Aviv University and Hakibbutz Hameuchad. 
'THE'CONCEPT OF'THE'ARMY'S POLITICIZATION 
Politicization means the incorporation of a certain component 
into the system in which the political process occurs, that is to say 
the system where society's overall needs are transformed into mandatory 
decisions. 1 However, the term politicization of the military , like 
its 
derivative'depoliticization of, the military, contains more than,, one" 
component. An analysis of the depoliticization of the IDF requires 
the examination of at least five components. 
First, the area in which the process occurs has to be examined, 
the public, party or national area. Public politics includes individuals 
and groups at various organizational levels, associations and pressure* 
groups, while party politics is conducted only within and by parties. 
The national political process is the process that occurs in the 
Government and the state administration. The army might participate in 
the political process in one area, e. g. joining in a matter of public debate, 
without taking part in the-political process in another area, e. g. by taking 
sides in inter-party disputes. The second component ii the means, employed 
by the military when it takes part in the political process in, any of 
three areas, but most importantly,. the state area. Does the army confine 
itself to the implementation of the decisions made by the civilians 
or does it participate in the decision-making process? The traditional 
concept that the armyishould only be an implementory agency, in the 
instrumentalist model has been long abandoned. But it is still . 
considered that the army should restrict itself. to the policy-making 
stages, and not to the decision making stage. It is usually possible 
to distinguish between three means of participation. The constitutional 
On politicization in Israeli society see Gal-Nor, Yitzhak (1977: 5-25) 
'Changes in the Israeli Political System since the Yom Kippur War' 
State, Government and'International Relations (Hebrew) No. 11. 
one, which is the use of the official prerogatives and authority as - 
stipulated in the state's normative code, which includes both policy 
implementation, participation in the decision-making process, and the 
supplying of advice to the political leaders. 
A second means is the army's uses of political bargaining to 
influence the decisions and its exchanges of - its own valuable 
commodities with other political actors. The third and ultimate means is the 
utilization of the armed forces' unique political resource, force. 
l 
The third component of the term politicization is the direction of 
the process. It is an oversimplification to assess politicization as a 
uni-directional process, and a distinction has to be drawn between two 
directions, towards and from the army. The political sub-system can 
influence the military but can also be influenced by it. While the former 
process is the politicization of the military, the latter is the milita- 
rization of the polity. These two processes are to a large extent 
interdependent. It is legitimate to analyze each one of them in each of 
the three areas of the polity; the public, the party and the nation. For 
example, where does the authority over the army lie and who exercises the 
control? Is it the state institution or perhaps the parties and to what 
extent is public opinion involved in the civil supervision? 
The scope of the military's involvement is the fourth component. 
The army can exert varied degrees-of influence over a continuum of issues 
ranging from internal through intermediate to societal; internal military 
issues, issues that impinge on national defence and those which are 
divorced from defence and are of a. purely civil nature. Whatever the 
scope of the army's involvement, it can adopt different approaches, 
specific or diffuse, according to the-basic-outlook of the officers. Are 
their considerations primarily military or are they affected by non- 
Variation of the three tier means are common. The best known is 
Finer's. See Finer, S. (1976: 125-148) The Man On Horseback: The 
Role of the Military in Politics (second, enlarged edition, first 
edition 1962) Harmondsworth, England. Penguin Books. 
military factors, economic, ideological or others? It can be argued 
theoretically that when a professional outlook is applied to a societal 
issue there is nevertheless a lower degree of involvement by the 
military with the polity, than when the officers apply non-professional 
criteria. For example, when the army is required to advise the Cabinet 
on future borders, does it make an evaluation only on defence criteria, or 
is it influenced by ideological and political arguments, like the 
historical or biblical rights to the conquered territories? 
And lastly, the method of involvement should also be taken into 
account, which is the degree of exposure of the involvement. Whatevdr the area, 
means, direction, scöpe or approach, there are different levels of 
exposure of the military's involvement. Between full exposure and a 
-high degree of secrecy (absolute'secrecy of political involvement is by 
definition impossible) lies the 'censored' level, when there is a certain 
degree of exposure but not'to the general public because of censorship 
of the mass media. Figure No. 1 illustrates the 5-dimensions: 
PATTERNS OF POLITICAL MILITARY PARTICIPATION 
AREA Public Party 
} 
National 
MEANS Constitutional. Bargaining Force 
DIRECTION- From Into Exchange' 
SCOPE Military Borderline Civil 
APPROACH Specific Combined Diffuse 
METHOD Covert Censored Overt 
BEN GURION'S'AUTONOMIZATION OF THE'SECURITY-SPHERE 
An analysis of the depoliticization of the IDF must, first and 
foremost, involve an appreciation of Ben Gurion, the man who proclaimed 
the Declaration of Independence, and whose hand more than anyone else's 
shaped the new army and formed its relationship with the political 
system. The depoliticization of the IDF was Ben Gurion's banner which 
he waved during the transition stages from Yishuv to statehood, even 
during the battles of the War of Independence and for ten years after 
the state's establishment. 
Ben Gurion's declared position on the IDF's depoliticization can 
be summarised as follows: the army should be detached from the polity. 
No outside political influence should be allowed on it and it should 
not be involved in the political process. This should apply to the 
public area and above all to the party area: 
... one should not let the army become a ring for political 
and ideological wrestling for parties and factions... 
Israel is almost the only state in the region, both in 
western Asia and northern Afr a, 'where the army is not a 
domestic political factor .... 
The army should therefore not take sides in a political dispute 
on any subject, whether a public dispute or an inter or intra-party 
one, 'and it should be immune from political influence. The IDF's 
interaction with the political system should be limited to the third 
area, that is to the national institutions. But even in this instance 
its role should be very restricted: it should only use the constitutional 
means. Ben Gurion stipulated a very restricted means. The army is 
'solely the executive arm of the elected institutions of the nation; 
only they decide what it will do and what it will not do. '2 
1 
2 
Ben Gurion, David (1955: 141) The Army and Defence (Hebrew) 
Tel Aviv. Maarahot. 
Ben Gurion, David (1971: 339) Singularity and Mission (Hebrew) 
Tel Aviv. Maarahot. 
It follows from this that the army should employ a specific 
professional attitude to security matters, should remain free from 
any non-professional influence . 
and especially from-any ideological 
influence. This principle, adopted by Ben Gurion, was interpreted 
as widely as possible. Any problem impinging in: the slightest way 
on security should not be handled in a political way, but in a 
professional manner. It should therefore be divorced from all 'political 
bodies and delegated and entrusted to the army to determine. 
The permissible political activities of the IDF in the state 
area and by constitutional means must be performed covertly and 
clandestinely. Ben Gurion accorded high importance to the last 
attribute and the covert activities of the IDF were concealed not only 
from peripheral groups and organizations, but even from those which 
were central in the Government, including Cabinet members. 
Ben Gurion perceived the term 'security' in its analytic rather 
than spatial sense. The security sphere, for him, included not only 
military organizations, but also anything associated with the survival, 
defence and development. of Israel: 
The security mission would not be performed exclusively 
by the army. Without settlement, without industry, 
without the education of the nation, without sympathy 
from other nations, not even the army itself will secure 
the peace of the nation. 1 
The uncoupling of the army from politics was part of a very far- 
reaching, fundamental decision by Ben Gurion. He determined to make 
the security sphere an autonomous one. He held that it must be 
neutral, where national consensus would prevail, the only sphere which 
1 
'Divrei Haknesset, 31 October 1960: 79. 
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would be liberated from 
The basic defects and obstructions in our national life: 
the many cleavages and divisions ... (party, ideological 
and political rifts) and in particular another cleavage 1 
flowing from social, cultural and ethnic divisions... 
The IDF is the only body in the nation which is beyond 
debate, which does not have divisions and contradictions ... 
which is free from the malignancy of fissures and fragment- 
ation which they nation in Israel inherited. 2 
Autonomization of the security sphere according to Ben Gurion 
also involved divergence. Not only was disconnection from the civil 
system to take place, but structural differences, quite dissimilar 
modes of operation and normative principles were to be introduced. 
These divergence patterns are stark when compared with those in 
the political system. In the latter there is fragmentation while the 
army is united. In political life, sectarianism and self-interest 
dominate, while in the security sphere the authority to decide and 
direct is invested in one man. There is excessive disputation in the 
political system, whereas in the security sphere the factors involved 
in the process are limited and civil control is concentrated in the 
hands of the Prime Minister, who is also Minister of Defence. The 
political system is open, 'exposed, whereas the security sphere must 
be concealed and secretive. 
Ben Gurion envisioned the IDF as an army conforming almost to 
the ideal type of instrumentalist, apolitical army. It was denoted 
'tsava mamlachti' - an etatist army. His attitude to the army 
exemplifies his etatist approach, which he saw as the antithesis-to 
the political voluntarism characteristic of the Yishuv leaders. Only 
to one component, scope, did Ben Gurion apply his concept inconsistently. 
He allocated to the army extensive spheres of activities reaching far 
beyond the limited meaning of national defence. The role expansion 
1 
2 
Ben Gurion, David (1955: 60). 
Ben Gurion, David (1971: 339). 
of the army to societal issues seemed to him not only legitimate but 
positively desirable. He viewed the army as an educational instrument, 
not only for professions and the acquisition of discipline, but also 
to elevate the moral-, cultural, civil and intellectual level of the 
younger generation. To him it was one of the most precious influences 
which would mould the new nation which had been created in the 
independent state. 
For this reason, Ben Gurion tried to make the army a symbol of 
identification and glorification, a supreme value: 
We should destroy and uproot the false assumptions 
inherited from primitive, backward countries, which 
assert that an army is by definition mindless, 
humiliating and degenerate. There are such armies in 
the world, but they arer. the fruit of backward, primitive 
regimes which produce primitive and inferior armies. 
In a blameless society the military can be, and our 
army must be, an educational instrument which improves 
and invigorates. The army will not fulfil its mission 
in the State of Israel, neither in the outside world, 
nor within, if military service is not directed to the 
enhancement of the physical , cultural-and moral 
standing of the youth. 1 
Whereas at the state's establishment Ben Gurion presented this 
model as the aspiration, from the early fifties onwards he acted as 
though the pattern was already imprinted, and in this way it actually 
took root in the Israeli public consciousness. But did the image 
reflect the reality? 
Not only is the answer negative, but that Ben Gurion himself did 
not know that there was a gap between the model and the reality lacks 
credibility. The answer is in a technique often used by Ben Gurion, 
the statesman and the leader: 
Ben Gurion, David (1969: 389-399) The State of Israel Reborn 
(Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Am Oved. 
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Regarding the gap between the evaluation of reality 
and its presentation to the public, Ben Gurion used 
to present Israel not strictly as in reality but to 
harmonise with his chosen image, an image which 
served as a tool to change the face of reality and 
an instrument to educate the younger generation. 
The gap between the reality and its appearance might be a positive 
catalyst for 'social change. However such a discrepancy in a sphere 
concealed and shrouded in secrecy, which makes it difficult for the 
public to compare the image with reality, could be a destructive factor 
which smothers contradictions, disguises weaknesses and defects, which 
fosters delusions, and prevents their correction. And that is what 
resulted from Ben Gurion's image of the security sphere. 
When statehood-was achieved the principle of civil control had 
already been internalized by the leaders of the main military force, 
the Haganah, including the Palmah. = The fears that the Cabinet might 
have to use excessive efforts to impose its authority were groundless. 
On the other hand, the new framework of interaction between Mapai and 
the other parties had to be redefined. Thus in 1948 when a change from 
a voluntary consensual association to a sovereign structure took place, 
it could be based on the legitimate coersive authority in the absence 
of consensus. The main problem for Ben Gurion and his associates was 
not the relationship between the civil authorities and the military but 
the relationship between the different political associations. Those 
relationships had a profound influence on him when he drew the pattern 
for political-military relations. 
1 
See Shlomo Aronson, Migvan, April 1978. 
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By nurturing the idea type of the etatist army, Ben Gurion tried 
to find a solution to this dilemma, but in so doing he brought forth 
even more acute dilemmas. Before analyzing the problems which result- 
ed from the failure of Ben Gurion's model, a cursory description of 
the background in which Ben Gurion acted is given; namely a description of 
a few basic characteristics of the Israeli political system. These 
features are characteristic -of the 
Yishuv period and of the. period 
after statehood. 
THE ADVANTAGE OF ETATISM FOR THE DOMINANT PARTY 
Israeli society is highly politicized. Many activities within 
its political system are, apolitical in other societies, or at least, 
they are less dependent on political decisions. 
1 
The penetration 
by the political institutions into other social sub-systems began in 
the Yishuv period, when parties and political bodies served as a 
basis for the federative structure of society and supplied many 
services to their members, such as employment, education, welfare, 
health, sport and culture. The centralist nature of the political 
system which was already formed in 1948, the structure of the power 
hierarchy in Israel, as well as objective needs for nation building, 
the absorption of immigrants and development, and the security 
problems meant that even after the state's establishment, Israel 
remained a highly politicized society. 
I See Gal-Nor, Y. (1977: 5-25). 
In the Israeli political system there is an identity between 
politicization and the party politicization of many spheres. One 
scholar wrote in 1967:, 'The beginning of wisdom in Israeli politics 
lies in recognising the political parties '. pre-eminence. Israel's 
political system is, in many ways, of and by, if not for, political 
parties. 
" 
Another scholar adds: 
When comparing the part played by the parties in Israel 
with the part, played by them in other countries, it will 
be found that they occupy in Israel. a place more 
prominent and exercise an influence more pervasive than 
in any other state, with the sole exception of some one- 
party states. In this sense Israel can be regarded as 
an example, par excellence, of the etat partifaire or 
partienstaat. 
The judgement that the parties constituted the decisive influence was 
correct both during the Yishuv period and after the state's establishment. 
So much so that some scholars have argued that in Israel, the parties 
perform the constitutional role which is reserved to the parliament in 
the classical parliamentary political system. 
3 
Only during the 
third decade of statehood was the depoliticization apparent. 
4 
Israel is not just a 'political society' and partienstaat. It has 
a multi-party political system, though there has been a- dominant party 
which has had a peculiar and decisive vlace in the political 
structure, and which has had the paramount and permanent patition 
of power. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Fein, Leonard J. (1967: 67) Politics in Israel Boston. Little Brown. 
Akzin, Benjamin (1970: 9-10) 'The Role of Parties in Israel 
Democracy'. In S. N. Eisenstadt, Rivka Bar-Yosef and Haim Adler 
(eds. ) Integration and Development in Israel New York. Praeger. 
See Yaacobi, Gad (1980: 78-87) The Government (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 
Am Oved, Zmorah Modan Bitan. 
Gal-Nor, I. (1977). 
The analysis of Mapai as the dominant party is"a major contribution 
by Asher Arian to the Dolitical study of Israel. See, for example.. 
his book (1973) The Choosing People; Patterns of Voting in Israel Tel Aviv. Masada. 
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Duverger in his classic book on parties, diagnosed precisely the 
features of the dominant party. He distinguished a dominant party 
from a majority party. A dominant party is first larger than all 
others, it attains the leading place in elections over a very long 
period, but the more important factor is the sociological one. 'A 
party is dominant when'it is identified with an epoch; when its 
doctrines, ideas, methods, its style, so to speak, coincide with those 
of the epoch'. 
' 
It is dominant when public opinion and even its 
opponents perceive it so and acknowledge its senior position and its 
influence. 
Mapai consolidated itself as the dominant party during the 
formative years of Israeli society, the Yishuv period, when it took 
control of the Histadrut and the Jewish Agency apparatuses. After the 
state's establishment it continued to extend its control over the 
public apparatuses and the Government administration, where the parties' 
apparatus (mainly that of Mapai) was involved in administrative decisions. 
2 
And where administrative positions were almost synonymous with 
political positions. 
3 
As Mapai took over the public administration the etatist approach 
was evolved, an approach which was presented as the antithesis of the 
Yishuv party regime. According to this perception, not just one class, 
but the nation as a whole should be the party's reference group; not 
particularist organisations but national executive instruments should 
fulfil the collective aims; political neutrality and professionalism 
should guide the public administration. 
1 
2 
3 
Duverger, Maurice (1955: 307-309) Political Parties London. Methuen. 
Shapiro, Yonathan (1978: 83) Democracy in Israel (Hebrew) Ramat Can. 
Masada. 
Akzin, Benjamin and Dror, Yehezkel' (1966: 26,21) National Planning 
In Israel (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Midrasha Leminhal Publication. 
When a dominant party adopts an etatist' political philosophy 
it gives the party in Government a. treriendons'adväntage. ' 
Hundreds and thousands of new immigrants, who came from undemocratic 
political cultures, identified the national institutions, particularly 
the Government, with a particular party, whose leaders were the national 
leaders. At the same time party functionaries were perceived as the 
emissaries of the nation. Because Mapai was in power and had a 
majority in the public apparatuses, the etatist image enabled its 
leaders to present a fundamental difference between them and all-other 
parties, which reinforced their public appeal. The etatist banner 
enabled Mapai to speak in'the name of the entire nation, and to refer 
to all other parties as sectarian, pursuing their limited partisan 
considerations. Mapai could offer itself as the only party which sought 
the nation's welfare, while all the others were self-interested. 
Although Mapai flourished the etatist banner no real change 
had'taken place, neither in-its principles nor in its practices. 
In spite of its being entrenched in the minds of scholars and 
the public alike, the distinction between the etatist Mapai and all the 
other self-interested parties was groundless. Recruitment to senior 
and middle range positions in the public sector and the mobility pattern 
there, were to a large extent and in many spheres, based on party 
considerations. In settlement, agriculture, housing, health and 
welfare, the public apparatuses were tools to execute party policies, 
which were coloured by normative sectarian criteria. Decisions on 
important issues in all public spheres of life were taken by party 
institutions and bodies and were affected by party considerations. 
Even in cases where some functions previously held by parties were 
transferred to the state, for example employment exchanges, practical 
control remained with Mapai. The transfer amounted to no more than 
Mapai's former Yishuv approach and was merely a distinction between 
formal authority and practical control. 
The expansion of public bureaucracies augmented and strengthened 
opponents of the politicization of the public services and they 
nurtured the etatist concept. Nevertheless, in so doing, the new 
bureaucrats, including Mapai members, acted contrary to their leaders' 
basic premises and not, as is widely assumedýin accordance with them. 
To the extent that Mapai in general and its leader Ben Gurion in 
particular, coined, "the term 'mamlachtiut' (etatism) and waved its flag, 
it was an emblem which helped to fortify the party's power position 
in the competition to gain public support, rather than a principle 
which was put into practice. 
In the security sphere the etatist approach was most rigorously 
applied. From the late forties Ben Gurion preached the adoption of the 
etatist approach in the military organization, and soon after the state's 
formation he was claiming that the new pattern was no longer an 
aspiration but was already a reality. In fact it was not, being only a 
facade, and there was a yawning gap between it and reality. 
While still in office Ben Gurion strove to find time to record his 
role in'the establishment of the state. He used constantly to recount 
the crisis which occurred when the Provisional Cabinet was formed, as 
a justification for his insistent demand to constitute an etatist army. 
After he had obtained, in addition to the chairman's post, the defence 
portfolio on the Jewish Agency Executive at the end of 1946, he had 
been supported by Mapai leaders in his demand to apply the principle 
of universality to the military organisations. He wanted to detach 
army personnel from all party ties and to increase the national 
leadership's direct influence, by placing the army, like other national 
institutions, in their hands. In 1949 his ultimatum on this point delayed his 
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appointment as Defence Minister in the Provisional Cabinet until all 
other parties' representatives had been compelled to accept his approach. 
l 
Did Ben Gurion in fact behave accörding to the instrumentalist 
pattern? 
'MAP AM' S' CHALLENGE' TO'MAPAI'S CONTROL 
The answer is negative. The evidence is set against the background 
of an historically important and dramatic event which occurred in the 
Yishuv's political system in 1944. In that year the tension between 
the Mapai leadership and 'Faction B' reached a peak. The latter minority 
group was based primarily on Hakibbutz 'Häinelihad, the Mapai kibbutz 
organisation. Ben Gurion considered the 'Faction B' leaders to be both 
too far left and pro-Soviet, yet too nationalistic and rigid regarding 
the inevitable territorial compromise that would be necessary to attain 
independence. 
His attitude to them precipitated their secession from Mapai in1944. 
-'Faction B', or 
Ahdut Haavoda, merged with Hashomer Hatzair, a small ---- 
M arxist party, and together they founded Mapam, the United Workers Party. 
Although Mapai did not lose its prominence on the party map, Mapam 
constituted a new challenge. For the first time since Mapai's 
establishment in 1930, there was inside the Labour Movement a rival 
party, with economic and manpower resources, backed by a settlement 
movement, enjoying public appeal, with a leadership which had national 
standing. But the most significant aspect of the 1944 split was in the 
security sphere. 
1 
See Ben Gurion, (1969: 80-143). 
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6 
Ahdut Haavoda and later Mapam, although representing only a 
minority of the Yishuv (they received 19 seats in the first Knesset 
as against Mapai's 46) in effect dominated the armed forces. Most of 
the senior Haganah commanders were Mapam members. The head of the 
National Command, Israel Galili was one of the party's leaders. In 
particular it controlled the highly prestigious Palmah, which was the first 
regular professional unit of the Haganah, and the strongest military 
force in the Yishuv. The Palmah was subordinate to the Haganah, 
but most of its senior officers were Mapam members. Five of its brigade 
commanders, its commanding officer Yigal Allon and many of its fighting 
officers were members of Mapam, mainly from the Hakibbutz Hameuhad 
settlements. 
) 
Thus overnight Mapai's control of the military force, which had 
been nurtured for more than 20 years, had been dramatically weakened'at 
the same time that its political power in the Labour, Movement was waning. 
Furthermore, in the forties the Palmah commanders were perceived by 
Mapai leaders, especially by Ben Curion, as potential political rivals 
in the not too distant future, because of their greater public appeal. 
After 1945. control over the military arm was increasingly necessary, 
since the critical moment of the establishment of the state was rapidly---. 
approaching and armed struggle against the Arabs and possibly the 
British seemed likely. 
In these circumstances, Mapai's etatist approach was the most 
effective democratic instrument to gain control over the Palmah. By 
detaching the military organizations from the parties, ostensibly from 
all of them, the identification of the Palmah with Ahdut Haavoda could 
Bauer, Yehuda (1966) Diplomacy and Underground (Hebrew) Merhavia. 
Sifriyat Hapoalim. Also Palmah Book (Hebrew (1955) ed. Gilad D, 
Tel Aviv. Hakibbutz Hameuhad. 
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be averted and it would be possible to prevent the Haganah Commanders 
from translating their popularity into political power. For this 
reason, once Ben Gurion had obtained the defence portfolio, he acted 
tirelessly to impose the instrumentalist approach in the defence 
sphere. 
Between 1947 and 1953 he acted in three phases which sometimes 
overlapped. In the first place he adopted measures to detach different 
political organisations from the army, and to strengthen the sole 
authority of the head of the administrative branch, i. e. the Chairman 
of the Jewish Agency, and after statehood the Prime Minister and Defence 
Minister. 
In the second phase Ben Gurion contrived the dissolution of those 
military organisations which wer e linked with political movements - 
the Palmah, the IZL and the Lehi, and he forged a unified army. Had 
he contented himself with these measures, then it could be claimed that 
Ben Gurion genuinely wanted, to impose the authentic instrumentalist 
pattern on the army. But he did not confine himself to that. While 
acting to weaken the influence of parties and political movements over 
the army, Ben Gurion also endeavoured to reassert Mapai's former 
dominance. He did not desist from this activity throughout his term as 
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. This was done in the most 
insidious way because it violated the instrumentalist approach to 
which Ben Gurion loudly proclaimed his adherence. Therefore, he 
peremptorily dismissed a proposal put forward by Moshe Dayan in 1947 to 
establish military units similar to the Palmah, which would comprise 
Mapai members from the agricultural settlements and-which would therefore 
be loyal to Mapai. 
l 
1 
See Uri Milstein, Davar Hashavua, 28 September 1978. 
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Instead if was done by a systematic replacement of politically orientated 
commanders who were not loyal to Mapai with two groups of officers: an 
apolitical group loyal to the elected national leadership, and groups 
of politically orientated officers loyal to the Mapai leadership and 
to Ben Gurion personally. Unlike the Mapam commanders who came mostly 
from the Palmah, most members of the former group were veterans of the 
British Army, and most of the second. group were Haganah -veterans. 
Ben Gurion was not satisfied with severing the army from parties 
and political movements and with replacing officers, so he introduced 
yet another method. He initiated a strong effort to autonomize the 
. security sphere and to 
foster its divergence, but primarily he wanted 
to grasp authority in his own hands. In'so doing he incurred the 
resentment not only of the other parties' leaders, but'also of the Mapai 
leaders, his colleagues, who were not ready to hand over their control 
over the central sphere of national activities. But his leadership 
status permitted him to force their surrender to his ultimatum and to 
accept his virtual monopoly in control over the army. 
Thus did Ben Gurion mould things on the eve of statehood. There- 
after he imprinted a unique and complex pattern of civil control, different 
from the instrumentalist image which he projected. The army was 
uncoupled from parties and movements and subordinated mainly to him, 
whilst he used the two channels that had been created during the Yishuv 
period, the Mapai party channel on the one hand and the state channel on 
the other. 
Ben Gurion used to praise the efficacy of the state channel, but 
he disguised its real nature. Because he did not want to fetter his 
personal freedom of action, he fiercely resisted the institutionalization 
of the state mechanism and permitted a nominal pattern of control to 
suffice. That pattern apparently gave considerable authority to the 
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Cabinet and Knesset, but in practice it lacked effective institutionalized 
mechanisms of control. The gulf between the image projected by Ben 
Gurion and its reality existed also in the party channel. Ben Gurion 
denied the very existence of that channel and concealed it, knowing that 
it contradicted his declared instrumentalist concept. He testified: 
When the defence portfolio was thrust on me by the Zionist 
Congress in December 1946 and when I was nominated Defence 
Minister in the Provisional Cabinet in May 1948, and once 
again in February 1955, I believed in my heart, that when- 
ever I would deal with defence I am not a member of any 
party and I do not receive instructions in security matters 
except from the authorised institution - the Zionist 
Executive and later the Government of Israel. When I 
appointed an officer to be Chief of Staff not once did I. 
ask to what party he belonged ... I wouldn't pretend that, I 
had never made a mistake as Minister of Defence, but I can 
say with a clear conscience, that I have never done 
anything as Minister of Defence from. a party inclination, 
or out of party interest ... 
This description was far from the truth, perhaps even its opposite. 
Ben Gurion coupled his efforts to fortify his party's control over the 
army with ,a series of attempts at organisational reform, first of the 
Haganah, later the IDF. These efforts were supposedly only in response 
to military exigencies, but in fact they derived to a large extent from 
his desire to conceal'his party considerations and to increase the 
number of his supporters, even among those who could see through his 
actions to the political intentions which lay behind them. 
1 Ben Gurion, D. (1971: 385). 
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Ben Gurion's advantage over his adversaries was not that he was 
free from personal or factional influences, but that the arena and 
the argument that he chose were, unlike those of his -opponents, the right ones 
from a national viewpoint, persuasive from the democratic standpoint 
and necessary from the Zionist perspective. 
1 
Although he was a national leader, Ben Gurion knew the anatomy of 
public life and democracy in which the operative factors were parties, 
and in- this aspect he was indubitably a party man. He jealously 
guarded the interests of the party whose leader he was, feeling an 
identification of interest between it and the nation-as a whole, and in 
total confidence that his opinions and attitudes were synonymous with 
the collective's interests. 
The party tool was not used only during the transition from 
underground to IDF in the early years of statehood. But, as will be 
elaborated later, throughout his entire term as Prime Minister and 
even thereafter. 
4 
BEN GURION'S'NOMINAL CONTROL"PATTERN 
The pattern of political-military relations drawn by Ben Curion was 
very intricate. First, because of the contrast between the pattern and 
its image which took root in the public's mind. Each time the mask was 
lifted and the gap between the image and its reality was revealed, a 
crisis occurred in political-military relations. This happened in the 
sixties, during thb Lavonaffair, and in the-October 1973 war. 
The inescapable source of the problems was the inherent contra- 
dictions in Ben Gurion's pattern. The creator of the Israeli defence 
Shabtai Tevet in Haaretz, 30 April 1979. In a serialization from 
his forthcoming book on Ben Gurion. 
establishment wanted to achieve two goals simultaneously:. absolute 
civil control over the military and the isolation of the military from 
any politics. 
In such a politicized society as Israel and with the Paganah 
tradition as the background, the first goal was not difficult to attain. 
But how was it possible to achieve the depoliticization of the army, 
which being militia-like had permeable boundaries, particularly when 
it perceived itself as having a propensity for wide role expansion? 
Ben Gurion knew very well that because the Israeli political 
system was based on parties, absolute state control over-the 
military through the Cabinet and the Knesset must reflect the party 
bases. In other words that civil control was impossible without party 
involvement. In theory full civil control could be ensured in another 
way, through a bolshevist solution, when direct party control by Mapai 
would amount to a version of the 'apparat control'. However, this 
drastic solution was unrealistic for it would not have been granted 
legitimacy in the social democratic system which had evolved in Israel. 
Furthermore, it would pave the way for other parties to interefere in 
the army. 
To achieve civil control over defence matters, without allowing 
other parties to-put a foot in the door, Ben Gurion chose the inter- 
mediate pattern, the nominal pattern. The Cabinet and the Knesset would 
theoretically serve as supreme authorities as in all other fields, but 
in fact their role would probably be quite restricted. In practice the 
supreme-civil control was appropriated by Ben Gurion, the man, not the 
role performer. In all cases when he abandoned his job in the Cabinet, 
whether for a long absence, as in 1953, for a short temporary retirement 
in 1954 or for his final retirement in 1963, he recommended the 
separation of the functions of Prime Minister and Defence Minister, whereas 
he himself invariably played both parts. 
Because the state control was not sufficiently effective, stable or 
institutionalized, Ben Gurion leaned on the additional Mapai party 
channel. The latter was even less institutionalized than the former 
and had to be used informally, circumspectly and clandestinely. 
Consequently,. inner contradictions were woven into Ben Gurion's pattern. 
The prolonged war, the army's wide role expansion andtthe perception 
that security issues were of professional and, not political concern, 
inevitably caused the-IDF to try to become involved in the political 
process. The autonomist approach weakened the control agencies, which 
consequently could not resist the penetration. Furthermore, to ensure 
. control 
Ben Gurion needed the party channel as well. But by exploiting 
it he brought about the politicization of the IDF in absolute contra- 
diction to his declared intentions. 
The end result was, therefore, 'that the dual control failed to 
achieve either of Ben Gurion's aims. The IDF did not develop into an 
apolitical, instrumentalist army under the absolute'supervision of the 
state institutions. Instead it ultimately became an army working as 
a partner in the political process, the military'arm being integrated 
with the civil arm not only in the national security field, but in other 
fields too. It is not a civil control pattern but a political-military 
partnership. Although the civil partner has a constitutional advantage 
which it can exploit whenever it chooses to do so, the question which 
remains is whether it chooses to exploit its constitutional advantage. 
Just as the state control's weakness rendered the army apolitical 
partner with the administration, so the failure to detach Mapai-from 
the IDF meant that the army became a participant in the political 
processes taking place inside the Labour Movement. For this reason 
army involvement with party politics continued for many years after Ben 
Gurion's departure. Moreover its involvement made the army susceptible 
to whatever happened within the Labour Movement. In the early 1950's 
the arrays involvement in both national and party politics became 
apparent. From the late sixties it developed into a close partnership. 
After the June 1967 War processes occurred both in the nation's 
political situation and within the political elite which reinforced 
the pattern of army participation in politics. These issues are 
expanded in later chapters. Meanwhile, the most important events to 
occur on the eve and dawn of statehood will be recounted, events upon 
which Ben Gurion's personality were indelibly stamped. 
BEN'GURION CONSOLIDATES HIS CONTROL'OVER'THE'IDF 
Ben Gurion's most significant action as regards the abolition of 
the political bodies dealing with defence was his attempt to undermine 
the political status of the National Command. - His objective was to 
subordinate all the bodies dealing w&tý defence to the Defence 
Department of the Jewish Agency. whose chairman he was. 
This was done by removing various matters from the jurisdiction 
of the National Command and transferring them to the Defence Department 
of the Jewish Agency (for example military industries) or to the G. H. Q. 
(for example the Quartermaster Branch). Attempts by members of the 
National Command to resist this trend, mainly in the Yishuv Defence 
Committee, proved fruitless in the face of Mapai's dominant status. 
1 
1 
For evidence of this see protocols of meetings of the Defence 
Committee. 25/9349 and 25/9342. Central Zionist Archives. 
In mid-April 1948, Ben Gurion decided to abolish the National 
Command, first by dispensing with the post of head of the National 
Command and dismissing the holder, Israel Galili. In his letter. dated 
3 May 1948 to the National Command and G. H. Q. he wrote: 
From now on the headquarters of the defence forces will 
receive orders only from the defence director (Ben Gurion) 
or his representative. The'Natianal Command as long as it 
exists will also receive orders from the Chairman of the 
Jewish Agency (Ben Gurion). 1 
In unilaterally creating facts in'the structure of the defence 
institutions, Ben Gurion raised a storm throughout the political system, 
even within Mapai itself. Had resistance to his action expressed itself 
only in political rumblings, then he could easily have withstood it. 
However, an unpredicted and fierce resistance came from another quarter, 
from the pinnacle of the Haganah Command itself. Five-generals decided 
to lobby against Ben Gurion's decision. Some did so for purely 
professional reasons; others belonging to Galili's party, Mapam, for 
political reasons. When after two weeks they realised that they had 
not succeeded they took an extreme step and wrote to Ben Gurion on 
6th May threatening to resign if he did not reinstate Galili. 
Ben Gurion denoted this act a 'political revolt', and it was in 
fact the most drastic case in the annals of the Haganah of a military 
ultimatum to the civil. authority. It is noteworthy that of the 
five generals, only two were members of Mapam, two being Mapai members 
and one, Yigael Yadin, apolitical but closely associated with Ben 
Gurion. Hence Ben Gurion's description was incorrect. It may have 
been a rebellion by officers against the supreme civil. - authority, 
but it was the former who acted out of professional calculations and 
Ben Gurion's letter to the G. H. Q. 2nd May 1948, in the Ben 
Gurion archive. 
- 192 - 
against Ben Gurion's party dictate. 
l 
Ben Gurion made a characteristic 
tactical retreat by abolishing the post while allöwing Galili to remain 
in the Haganah G. H. Q. in an ambiguous position. 
The National Command, though the most important of the political 
bodies which controlled the Haganah, was not the only one. Ben Gurion 
wanted to abolish the others as well. At a meeting of the Defence 
Committee on February 10,1948 he claimed that: 
In my opinion there should be only two institutions 
instead of the six existing ones: namely the Jewish 
Agency Executive, the National Committee Executive, 
the Situation Executive, the Security Committee, the 
National Command and the Staff H. Q. 2 
The establishment of the state and the vesting of authority in the 
formal state institutions did not automatically spell the end, of the 
process. It was only the decision to dissolve the Palmah, seven months 
after the declaration of statehood, which indicated an acceptance of 
the principle that, with the exception of the Government, no political 
body had the authority to deal with defence. 
Ben Gurion's struggle to abolish political bodies dealing with 
defence matters was conducted on the political plane. But the 
dissolution of military organisations affiliated to political movements 
was potentially a cause for conflict with the armed units. He therefore 
took the most, drastic political measures at his disposal. He announced 
that his acceptance of the defence portfolio in the new Cabinet rested 
1 
2 
This affair is described in detail in many places. See Sherf, Zeev 
(1959: 145-153), Three Days (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Am Oved. Kimche, John 
(1973) Both Sides of the Hill (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Maarahot. 
Protocol No. 25/9346 of the Defence Committee. Central Zionist 
Archives. According to Galili, Ben Gurion deliberately exaggerated 
the weight of several of these bodies in the defence sphere, in 
order to claim more convincingly that they should be abolished. 
Interview 27 July 1977. 
on three conditions: 
1. That the army to be founded would be the army of 
Israel and all parts of the army would be subordinate 
to one single authority - the state and its authorised 
institutions. 
2. Complete equality between all parts of the army. 
The abolition of military units with separate political 
affiliation] 
3. Each member of the army should act according to the 
limited and delineated authority determined by the 
state's authorised bodies. 1- 
Other political movements found it difficult to accept these 
conditions, which contravened the Yishuv tradition and could neutralise 
their potential influence in the security sphere. Hence the negotiations 
on Ben Gurion's conditions were protracted. Consequently, the IDF was 
not founded together with the other state institutions on 14 May 1948, 
but 12 days later when the Provisional Government approved the 
'IDF Order'. 
2 
His conditions having been accepted, Ben Gurion dissolved the Lehi, 
Irgun and Palmah, in that order. There was no great problem with Lehi 
and most of its members joined the IDF. It was necessary, however, to 
make temporary compromises to enable Irgun members to serve within the 
IDF in units consisting mainly of their own people. It was even 
permitted to operate separate frameworks in Jerusalem, which in 
accordance with the UN resolution was not included within Israel's 
borders. These interim arrangements led to misunderstandings and 
1 
2 
Ben Gurion, D. (1955: 51-52). Army and Defence (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 
Maarahot. Ben Gurion himself repeated this description in many of 
his writings, such as Singularity and Mission (Hebrew) (1971: 36,52, 
201,312) Tel Aviv. Maarahot. 
Formally the IDF had two other beginnings, on the 30th May the Prime 
Minister published the Order of the Day to the IDF establishment and 
on the 27th June 1947 the army began to take the oath of allegiance. 
conflicting interpretations, culminating in the 'Altalena Affair'. '. 
The crisis which ensued between the army, notably the Palmah 
units, and the Irgun could have developed into a civil war, but was 
checked. In its wake and after the further tension engendered by the 
murder of Count Bernadotte, UN emissary, on the 17th'September 1948, 
the Irgun units were totally disbanded. 
Whereas the dissolution of the Irgun marked the end of the struggle 
between the organised Yishuv and the 'secessionists', the disbanding of 
the Palmah was more complicated. It involved a military unit which 
belonged to the Haganah and was considered its crack force. In the 
eyes of Ben Gurion and his comrades this fact made it even more essential 
to dissolve it. Referring to 'Altalena' Ben Gurion attributed to the 
Irgun intentions to 'murder the state': 
1 
2 
The state does not exist so long as we have no army and 
no control over the army. This (the Altalena Affair) is 2 
an attempt to destroy the army and to murder the state. 
The arms ship Altalena reached the coast of Israel in June 1948, 
carrying arms for the Irgun. Debate raged between the heads of 
Irgun andýthe Government leaders on the legitimacy of this 
voyage and the destination of the arms. When the former refused 
to accede to the latter's demands to place all the arms at the 
disposal of the IDF, orders were given to IDF units to open fire 
on the-ship, which was anchored off the Tel Aviv shore. The 
Irgun leader Menahem Begin decided to avoid confrontation, 
although Irgun supporters deserted from IDF units and arrived on 
the scene with arms. This affair had-a strong impact on the 
politicalihistory of the state. Ben Gurion and Begin discussed 
it in their respective books and from time to time it surfaces as 
"a subject of public debate. The most recent case was when books 
were published in 1978 presenting the Irgun case and that of the 
organised Yishuv and Labour Movement. See Nakdimon, Shlomo (1978) 
Altalena,. and Brenner, Uri (1978) Altalena A political and 
military study (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Ha -kkibutz'Hameuhad. 
Ben Gurion at Cabinet meeting, 22 June 1948. Ben Gurion, D. (1969: 
1976). 
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The same could not be said of the Palmah, which was part of the 
Labour Movement. and the fight was therefore even more intense. However, 
Ben Gurion wisely chose the right tactics for this battle. When resist- 
ance surfaced in the Labour Movement, particularly from Mapam, he 
decided to make the central issue of the debate not the dissolution of 
the Palmah H. Q., the rather the question of the location of the supreme 
authority on defence. 
The dissolution of the Palmah H. Q. which resulted in the dissolution 
of the Palmah itself was achieved not only because of Ben Gurion's 
political success, but to a no lesser extent because of the Palmah's 
reaction. Its members and commanders accepted the political decision and 
implemented it without hesitation. Ben Gurion had calculated that the 
Palmah commander would forcibly resist the attempt to dissolve their 
H. Q. He had told some ofohis own supporters that the Palmah commanders 
might try to take over the IDF's H. Q. and he even added that he was 
uncertain 'whose side some of the army officers in the G. H. Q. will 
choose. '1 For that reason he: placed on alert the Alexandroni Brigade, 
commanded by Dan Even, an apolitical British Army trained officer. 
However Ben Gurion's anxieties proved groundless. The Palmah 
commanders did not deviate from their Yishuv tradition which was strong 
enough to stand the test. After the Histadrut's Executive's discussion, 
the Palmah H. Q. disbanded and the brigades. took part in the war like 
all other infantry brigades. 
-The Mapam members presented their own case for debate in'the 
Histadrut Executive Committee on 14 and 15 October 1948. However, Ben 
Gurion argued, that following the establishment of the state, the 
Histadrut should no longer be empowered to deal with or even to discuss 
1 Interview by Shlomo Nakdimon with Dan Even. Davar, 18 January 1979. 
See also Even, Dan (1973: 153) Tel Aviv. Milo. 
security matters. These issues, argued Ben Gurion, fell within the 
exclusive domain of the Government and no other body was qualified to 
discuss them. Faced with Mapai's safe majority in the Central Committee, 
Mapam's efforts to appeal against this decision were doomed to failure, 
and the Histadrut's Central Committee decided that'the question of the 
fate of the National Command ... ' is not a matter for its decision'. 
' 
Ben Gurion's dispute over the Palmah was not only about the existence 
of such units, but also about their potential impact on the ideological 
nature of the IDF. From 1947 he argued that there should be a change 
from a militia-like framework based on voluntarism and internal discipline, 
to a regular, professional, apolitical army based on external discipline, 
like the British Army. Both before and after the IDF's formation he cited 
functional arguments and explained that the model he proposed would more 
effectively answer Israel's military needs. But both his supporters and 
rivals were aware of the political significance of his policy, and the 
nature of the army was central in the raging debate. A voluntary 
organization requires social awareness which is itself linked to 
ideological outlook and party affiliation. The demand for a professional 
army was perhaps designed to bring greater efficiency to the military 
framework but was more likely intended to remove the army from the 
political influence of other parties and movements to enable the 
exploitation of the state instruments by the ruling party and its leader. 
The new-, structure of the army, said one of Ben Gurion's rivals, 
See on this affair the Palmah Book (1955: 979-1,004). For one 
of the explicit debates on the subject see Divrei Haknesset 
3 July 1961: 2,129-2,131. 
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is being established on the pretext of so called de- 
politicization (but) there is a certain element of 
deception. This is only a way to safeguard the 
exclusive political rule by one party, by administrative 1 
political rule of one party, by administrative domination. 
THE 'GENERALS REVOLT' 1948 
During the War of Independence two of the three stages in Ben 
Gurion's plan were accomplished. He successfully dissolved the political 
and party bodies which had control over the military in the Yishuv and 
transferred and concentrated in his own hands control over security 
affairs. He also achieved the dissolution of military units connected 
with political movements and created a unified national army. But he 
aid not succeed in building an army according to his own blueprint, on 
the British Army model, by breaking away from the Haganah and Palmah 
traditions and influence. The main reason for his failure was that. it 
was impossible to form a high command of apolitical officers reared in 
the British Army tradition and of officers who were Mapai members. 
This task became overriding once the war was won. 
His efforts to alter the political composition of the high command 
began in 1946 when he tried to insert into the National Command people 
who supported him and who were loyal to-him. 
2 
The first attempt to do 
this was made in 1947, when preparations were being made for the 
outbreak of all out war between the Yishuv and the regular armies of 
the Arab states. In'the middle of 1947 a fierce debate about the shape 
1 
2 
Israel Bar-Yehuda MK (Mapam) in a debate on the Defence Service 
Law 9 November 1949. Divrei Haknesset V-ol. 4.9 November 1949: 18. 
Israeli, Yosef (1972: 44-47) Security Mission (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 
Am Oved. 
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of the new army raged inside the defence establishment. Would it be a 
modification of the Haganah or an entirely new organisation modelled 
on the British Army? Ben Gurion hoped to solve his political problem 
by emulating the British model. For this reason he established a new 
H. Q., parallel to,; the Haganah's H. Q., but composed of officers who were 
not members of Mapam. He asked the H. Q. to prepare for ,a possible war 
against the invading Arab armies, while the Haganah was supposed to 
continue the war against the Arab Palestinian units. 
l 
No authorised 
body, either national or partisan, decided to set up the parallel H. Q., 
and it was mockingly nicknamed by the Haganah commanders as 'Ben Guriou's 
officers' or 'the war office'. When Ben Gurion realized that his efforts 
to mould an army on the British model shook the entire defence establishment 
and caused demoralization among the Haganah units, and furthermore, when 
he realised that without the Haganah he could not go to war, he desisted 
with his efforts, so that the political balance of the, reorganised 
Haganah H. Q. in November 1947 was not tampered with. 
Ben Gurion, however, did not lose heart and tried again to purge 
the H. Q. of officers who were not Mapai members. It happened again 
during a lull in the fighting in June 1948. As in previous attempts he 
disguised his intention to replace the commanders by suggesting an 
overall organizational reform. On this occasion it was not as far- 
reaching as when the IDF was established, but a more modest reform: to 
alter the unified structure of the army command and to divide the battle 
area into four zones, (later called Commands). 
Among the members of the parallel H. Q. Q. were Yehezkel Sahar, Fritz 
Eshet, Ephraim Ben Arzi, all graduates of the British Army. Haim 
Laskov, Dan Even and Yohanan Ratner, the: -latter a graduate of the Russian Army, were participants in the discussion. 
A group of staff officers, headed by the Chief of Operations 
Yigael Yadin, submitted a plan for reform to Ben Gurion, including a 
proposal for appointments. This group (and particularly Yadin, who 
was in effect the senior commander, because of the Chief of Staff's 
illness) had professional reasons for their action. They recommended 
the appointment of experienced Palmah commanders as Commanders of 
three out of the four new Commands: Shimon Avidan in the South, Yigal 
Allon in the Centre and Moshe Carmel in the North. 
Ben Gurion, who wanted to counter the influence of Mapam, could 
not accept these proposals. He did not give up his hope to promote 
the officers in whom he had political and professional faith, veterans 
of the British Army, from the second to the first rank of commanders 
as Heads of General Staff Branches and Front Commanders. 
) 
Ben Gurion therefore prepared a counter proposal, designed to alter 
the status of Mapam officers in the higher echelons of the army. He 
proposed that the Deputy Chief of Staff, Zvi Ayalon of Mapam, be 
transferred to command a biigade and be replaced by Yosef Avidar of 
Mapai. 
2 
One of the Heads of Branches, Eliyahu Ben Hur (Mapam) resigned 
and Ben Gurion proposed that British Army veterans, such as Shlomo 
Shamir, Efrain Ben Arzi and Fritz Eshet be appointed Branch Heads. 
He agreed that Allon should be appointed as one of the Front Commanders, 
but preferred however to assign him to the South and to assign officers 
not associated with Mapam to the other Commands. 
1 
2 
See Bar Zohar, M. (1977: 802). 
Avidar had been loyal to Mapai and Ben Gurion since in the 1930's 
he opposed Yosef Tehomi who broke away from the Haganah in Jerusalem. 
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Of particular significance were the appointments he made on the 
eastern front where the IDF confronted Jordanian forces led by King 
Abdullah. He appointed Mordechai Makieff Commander of the Eastern 
Command and Moshe Dayan Commander of Jerusalem, two 'aficers loyal and 
-faithful to Ben Gurion. 
Ben Gurion's proposed appointments were sharply criticized by the 
General Staff, especially by Mapam supporters who recognized the 
political intentions, and also by professional officers, headed by Yadin 
who disapproved of the precedence given to party considerations over 
professional calculations in wartime. Yadin was unable to accept Ben 
Gurion's choice of the less experienced Makleff in preference to the 
more experienced Allon, as Commander of the crucial Eastern Command. 
Ben Gurion defended his standpoint by adopting an offensive strategy. 
He claimed that it was Yadin who had proposed appointments based on 
political considerations, while he himself was trying to eradicate 
party influence within the army. 
The crisis reached the point where a group of generals, led by 
Yadin, submitted letters of resignation. But in contrast"to the first 
'revolt' the signatories this time included the Mapam Generals Cohen 
(Ben Hur), 4yalon and Galili. Avidar and Zadok did not-join the 
initiative. The political affiliation of the rebellious generals made 
it easy for Ben Gurion to claim that this was a Mapam political tactic. 
But Yadin's support for the group eventually persuaded Ben Gurion, who 
knew that Yadin was apolitical, who held his military skills, in the 
highest esteem and did-not want him to resign, to bring the matter to the 
Cabinet. 
On 2 June 1948 the Cabinet discussed the issue and Ben Gurion 
launched his onslaught. He called the Yadin plan 'an attempt. to 
transform the army as a whole into the army of one particular party'. 
He called the letters of resignation 'political revolt' inside the army. 
To prove his point he said that of the IDF brigade commanders, eight 
were members of Mapam, three had no party affiliation and only two 
belonged to Mapai. He added that he, Ben Gurion, had never introduced 
party considerations into his military appointments. It was Yadin's 
proposal which was intended to give them a political stamp. 
' Finally, 
Ben Gurion demanded that the Cabinet approve his reorganization and 
appointment proposals, and Tor that reason agreed that a. Cabinet 
committee should study the whole issue. 
The Greenbaum Committee, called after the name of the Interior 
Minister who chaired-it, was supposed to confine itself to that subject, 
but enlarged the scope of its investigations after its deliberations 
had revealed a depressing picture of what went on in the army, -the 
conduct of the war and the nature of civil control. The Committee not 
only recommended the rejection of Ben Gurion's reorganization plan, but 
accepted the accusation that his appointments were political. - In 
addition, their conclusions proposed organizational changes which struck 
Ben Gurion like a'bolt from the blue. Their practical import was that 
control over security, which during the war was almost exclusively in 
Ben Gurion's hands, would be wrested from him and transferred to more 
representative bodies: a multi-party war cabinet above and two General- 
Directors below, one between Ben Gurion and the Minister of Defence 
and one between Ben Gurion and the army. 
2 
1 
2 
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This was the severest test to Ben Gurionts leadership in the heat 
of the battle, and he decided to fight back by threatening his own 
resignation both as Prime Minister and Defence Minister, thereby putting- 
the Government in a dilemma: either to withdraw the Greenbaum 
Committee's recommendations or to accept his retirement from the Cabinet. 
The Cabinet members, including his rivals, could not contemplate losing 
their national leader only eight days before the end of the lull and 
they retreated. 
The different approaches which Ben Gurion showed to the political 
rebellion and to the military rebellion are important. Regarding the 
first, it did not suffice to cancel the Committee's recommendations and 
to. return to the status quo ante, and he set a high price for his 
readiness to stay in the Cabinet: the total ousting of Galili from all 
defence matters and the reinforcing of his own stature as the sole civil 
factor in charge of defence. On the other hand he displayed considerable 
indulgence towards the army H. Q. and agreed to accept a compromise 
proposal from Yadin, which in fact meant that Ben Gurion withdrew both 
his reform and appointment proposals. 
Although his struggle with the Greenbaum Committee members was a 
legitimate political struggle, Ben Gurion did not hesitate to demand 
all or nothing. On the other hand he practically agreed to conclude 
the 'generals'revolt' which triggered off the whole incident -a revolt 
which was described by Ben Gurion as 'a severe matter without precedent 
which can endanger the whole war"- with his virtual withdrawal, and 
he conceded to the rebellious officers without demanding any personal 
consequences. Why? 
Ben Gurion must certainly have known, contrary to his public 
protestations, that the danger he faced was not from the IDF, but 
from his political rivals and colleagues in the Cabinet. 
1 Ben Gurion Diary, entry for 1 July 1948. 
The generals' behaviour was far from being a rebellion and was 
certainly not disobedience to the supreme civil authorities. 
Yadin said that clearly to Ben Gurion: 
The decision about appointments impinges on my responsibilities. 
I, as the Head of Operations Branch, will not take the 
responsibility for such a decision, if you insist I will 
resign, you can send me anywhere as alsoldier, but you can't 
compel me to accept responsibility. - 
It is not easy to dismiss the likelihood that some army commanders, 
Mapam members, were not affected by party considerations when they 
opposed Ben Gurion's proposals. But this consideration was secondary; 
and in Yadin's eyes, whom Ben Gurion -held 
iii great esteem, it 
was irrelevant at all. The more important aspect was-the professional 
criticism of Ben Gurion*for wanting to appoint as Front Commanders and 
Heads of Branches not the most proficient, but those who were more 
politically acceptable. The rebellion by the generals was therefore 
resistance by professional commanders to the attempt by the Minister of 
Defence to impose decisions on them, taken not according to professional 
criteria, but from party considerations. 
Ben Gurion must have realised that the generals' conduct demonstrated 
that he could not dictate whatever he wanted to the army, but his 
principle authority over the military command was not endangered, and 
at the worst a few generals would have resigned and others could have 
replaced them. That was not the case with Ben Gurion's battle against 
his Cabinet colleagues. It should be borne in mind that this affair took 
place during the war, a few months after the state's establishment, 
. when the 
different parties were competing to crystallize patterns and 
structures and the new rules of the game following the transformation 
from Yishuv to statehood. 
1 
Interview with Yigael Yadin, Maariv, 6 May 1973 and Dvar Hashavua, 
17 March 1972. 
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Central in the debate was Ben Gurion's autonomist concept for the 
defence sphere: would that sphere be similar to other civil _ spheres 
as it was in the past, or would it develop in a fundamentally different 
way? Would the rules of the political game which were accepted by the 
political elite apply to this sphere too - the striving for consensus 
through a process of bargaining, compromise and majority decision - or 
would it -be. distinct f rom all others *and 
have different rules 
of the game, which would give one man the authority to decide? 
Ben Gurion and his supporters claimed that the party cleavages and 
the pattern of political decision making in Israel must handicap the 
capacity to concentrate the national effort on security needs. The 
exigencies of war, they claimed, demanded the acceptance of a different 
pattern. Ben Gurion's opponents saw in his position an attempt to create 
an undemocratic regime, even an authoritarian one, in which power would 
be concentrated in his hands, even to the detriment of his"Mapai 
colleagues in the Cabinet. 
The Greenbaum Committee's deliberations; supported even : by Mpai 
members, were on this question.., Furthermore it recomnendeo"the creation of 
a multi-party war cabinet and the nomination. of deputies to Ben Gurion 
from different parties., All of this was a clear expression of the 
bargaining attitude of the Yishuv's elite. 
But a victory over the politicians was essential to enable Ben 
Gurion to dictate the new structure for the security sphere according 
to his own concept. If he failed in his battle with the politicians, 
even though he succeeded in that with the generals,, the latter would in the 
long run be inconsequential. For this reason Ben Gurion was prepared to 
compromise over Yadin's proposal, while throwing all his political 
weight against his Cabinet colleagues. In time it became apparent that 
his success in the political fight won him full control over the army. 
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From the revolt until the end of the war he never again faced a united 
front from the G. H. Q. The group of Mapam generals dispersed and Ben 
Gurion could dictate the high command appointments policy as he wished. 
THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE: THE 'GRAND PLAN' V. BATTLE-LOGIC- 
The 'generals' revolt' in 1948 was a turning point in the development 
of political-military relations in Israel. Ben Gurion's victory over 
his rivals and colleagues enabled him to mould the defence establishment 
and the pattern-of civil control over the army according to his own 
perception. He effected divergence of the normative codes in the 
security sphere from all other spheres. 
The importance of the party considerations which motivated Ben 
Gurion is illustrated by the case of the Jerusalem Command. Ben 
Gurion's appointment suggestion for the Eastern Command as a whole and 
Jerusalem in particular, astonished the IDF commanders. It seemed clear 
to themithat these proposals were not taken out of professional consider- 
ations and were to be effected in the worst possible front, both 
militarily and politically. 
But it was precisely this. delicate connection between party and 
politics, the delicate interrelationship between the political aims 
of the civilians on one hand and the professional logic of the military 
on the other that drove Ben Gurion to make the political appointments. 
"Ben Gurion had conceived a 'grand plan' for the conduct of the 
War. He reached a tacit understanding with King Abdullah of Transjordan, 
which allowed the latter to move into the territories west of the 
River Jordan, which had been allotted by the 1947 UN Partition Plan 
to the Arab Palestinian state. This would limit the war on at least 
one front, leading eventually to peace; would absolve Israel from. 
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having to rule over about one million Arabs, and would pave. the way 
for Israel to join the Western bloc by colluding with Britain's 
regional client, Transjordan. The crux of the arrangement was that 
Jerusalem, intended to be internationalized by the Partition Plan, 
should be divided between Israel and Transjordan. 
l 
Ben Gurion did not reveal his plan either to the Cabinet or to the 
military command. The Haganah and Palmah commanders were against a 
war with limited objectives on the eastern front and urged a decisive 
war, to conquer the West Bank territories. Several times during the 
battles on this front, military logic dictated actions which-the 
military commanders endorsed, but which contradicted the political and 
diplomatic considerations contained in Ben Gurion's grand plan. 
Hence, for Ben Gurion, his control over the military command on this 
front was crucial. 
1 See Col. (Resa Dr. Meir Pail, Davar 30 April 1979. Newly. publishdd 
documents from this period reveal more about the Jewish/Arab 
negotiations, for example that letters were sent by Eliahu Sasson 
to the Jordanian King. See Dan Margalit, Haaretz, 14 December 1979. 
See also Uri Milstein 'Conspiracy in Jerusalem', Dvar Hashavua, 
23 December 1977. 
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In Jerusalem the front was even more intricate. Because Jerusalem 
had not been integrated into the Jewish state, the IZL" and Lehi 
groups insisted on pursuing independent policies outside the jurisdiction 
of the Government. They even aimed to liberate the 'entire Motherland' 
and not just those territories which the Government saw as belonging to 
the state. Among the -IZI. commanders were some militants who in this 
period contemplated the possibility of attacking the IDF's G. H. Q., 
seizing power, and of establishing a government in exile which would not 
recognise the legitimacy of Israel's Government. There were even plans 
to unite the "Izt and Lehi forces in Jerusalem and to declare the 
establishment of Free Judea, an independent state outside the State of 
Israel. 
' 0 
In order to undermine IZL's justifications the Cabinet approved 
on 25th June 1948 Ben Gurion's proposal 'to impose the authority of the 
State of Israel and its laws on Jerusalem'. But the only way he could 
enforce his policies on the eastern front was. to appoint commanders 
who were personally loyal to him, those who would accept his authority, 
and who would not question his orders. Netanel Lorch records that 
Ben Gurion 
when coming to appoint a commander to Jerusalem, preferred 
a party comrade to a member of any other party. This makes it 
clear thatit was more important for Ben Gurion to appoint 
somebody whose2total identification with his policies was 
indisputable. 
I 
2 
iI 
The proposal to effect a coup d'etat was raised by the operational 
commander of the IZL, Amichai Paglin. The initiative to establish 
free Judea wasemade by the Lehi commander Dr. Israel Shaib LElded) 
See Nakdimon, S. (1978: 358-419). 
See Uri Milstein, Dvar Hashavua, 1 December 1978. 
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Suitable commanders were David Shealtiel, formerly head of the 
Haganah intelligence, Makleff, a young relatively inexperienced general, 
schooled in the British Army and Moshe Dayan, a dedicated Mapai 
member and devoted to Ben Gurion. 
The incongruence between the military situation on the battle- 
field and Ben Gurion's intentions was exemplified on several occasions 
on the eastern front. The most noteworthy was in October 1948, when, 
after the 'Yoav' and'El Hahar' operations, the IDF forces realized that 
advantages accrued from these two strategic successes in the northern 
Negev and southern tip of the Jerusalem corridor, made. - feasible an 
expedition towards the Hebron mountains and even to the Jericho-valley. 
The Southern Commander Allon asked his military and political 
superior for permission to launch the expedition. Ben Gurion refused 
and prevented it. After the ceasefire agreement Egyptian forces in 
the Hebron area withdrew and the Jordanian Arab Legion forces went in. 
Allon was astonished at Ben Gurion's decision. He went to Yadin, the 
Head of Operations Branch , and asked why? His reply was that 
'it was a political decision, imposed on him by the Prime Minister; that 
Ben Gurion calculated that this military action would over-excite the 
British, Abdullah's allies'. Allon did not give up and asked Ben 
Gurion the same question, but he did not get the same answer. Ben 
Gurion told him that he had decided not to let the IDF embark on the 
journey to Hebron ' because of professional military considerations 
which had been put to him by Yadin. '1 
Allon was one of the few military commanders who had devised an 
overall political concept which opposed Ben Gurion's. Reared in the 
Palmah tradition he resisted the new patterns which Ben Gurion tried to 
introduce into the TDF. When he received an order whose political 
implications he rejected, he was not prepared to reliquish his right 
1 
Interview with Yigal Allon, 1 March 1978. 
to offer his own opinion to his civilian superiors. However, he 
invariably accepted the verdict, even when he disagreed with it, once 
the discussion stage was over. 
It was just this kind of cooperation with officers who held 
different outlooks and who had " formed' political attitudes 
dissimilar to his own that Ben Gurion wanted to eliminate. Therefore, 
he preferred officers schooled in the British Army, who accepted orders 
without hesitation or debate, even when they thought that Ben Gurion's 
orders were wrong. 
1 
Ben Gurion's highest political achievement in the War of Independence 
came at the end, when he wore the victor's crown, which immeasurably 
strengthened his political position both inside the party and in the 
eyes of the nation. To his statesman's mantle was added the image of a 
great warlord, and he forced the political system to accept his role in 
the security sphere as the sole arbiter of defence issues, above and 
beyond what his formal positions as Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defence allowed. 
l 
For examples see interview with Y. Yadin, Davar Hashavua, 
17 March 1979. 
`NATIONAL'CONSENSUS ON SECURITY . 
Once the noise of battle had died away, Ben Gurion could direct 
his attention to fashioning the IDF, to impose the pattern of dual 
control on political-military relations without the disturbances and 
constraints which had impeded him from 1947-1948. To begin with he 
worked vigorously to create a national consensus in the security sphere 
and to immunise defence issues from political disputes, by transferring 
them to the military for professional decisions. 
Until 1953, there was fierce controversy about the character of 
the army. Mapam continued to demand that it be based on-the militia 
model and on revolutionary social concepts. In the early fifties the 
territorial status quo was still disputed and there were pressures to 
change it both inside the political parties and the military high 
command. 
1 
And there was no Political consensus as to how force should 
be used in Israelas foreign policy. Although in practice force was 
employed, there were wide fluctuations between the two conflicting schools 
of thought within the national defence leadership. 
After the 1956 Sinai Campaign Ben Gurion could look back on a record 
of considerable success in creating a consensus on national security. 
The dispute on the character of the army had ended when Mapam deserted 
the arena. The demands to change the territorial status quo had been 
significantly dampened. There was a high degree of accord between parties 
on the basic components of the national security concept, and it was 
accepted that the defence sphere was outside the framework of party 
controversy and had become a professional and secretive sphere. There 
was connivance in the fact that the army participated in determining 
See for example Sharett, Moshe (1978: 81) Personal Diary 
Tel Aviv. Maariv. 
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national security policy in its widest sense. 
As well as trying to make the security sphere autonomous, Ben 
Gurion aspired to turn the IDF into a sacred national institution, a focus 
of identification for new immigrants, and a symbol of the revival of the 
new nation in the new state. The political leaders strove to decorate 
the army with a 'halo of pioneering', a fount of national values. They 
presented this elite group as the inheritor of the earliest pioneering 
image, which had been the political ideal in the Yishuv period. 
But Ben Gurion, more than any other leader, conveyed these notions 
in his speeches and writings. The army was the antithesis to the 
prevailing social and political order and was an expression of-national 
unity. A statement he made on retiring from his two posts in July 1963 
clearly illustrated his viewpoint: 
Under prevailing conditions, when the millenial vision has 
not yet been fulfilled (the army) is the most precious thing 
to the people of Israel. On the army we pin our hopes, our 
existence depends on it. 1 
The parallel to the traditional Jewish saying regarding the 
importance of the Torah to Israel's existence is striking. In addition 
to the indoctrination which was intended to place the army in the centre 
of national identification, and to the detaching of the army from party- 
political 
influence, Mapai excepted, Ben Gurion also took legal measures 
to further the autonomization of the security sphere. He was the 
driving force behind legislation which prohibited party activists inside 
the army and participation by soldiers in party politics. 
1 Ben Gurion, D. (1971: 373). 
During the elections to the Constituent Assembly at the end of 
1948 and the beginning of 1949 there was no legal ban against the 
inclusion of military personnel on active service in the lists of 
candidates. Para. 6 of the Election Order to the Constituent 
Assembly stated, inter alia: 'Soldiers in the Israel Defence Forces... 
are entitled to elect and to be elected... ' and this was not 
questioned in the Provisional State Council debate on the elections. 
However, the Security Service Law 1949, prepared shortly after 
the elections, reflected the intention to detach the military from 
party activity. In a debate on 15 August 1949 on the draft proposal, 
the Opposition saw this as an attempt to change the revolutionary character 
of the army and to use the military framework to increase the influence 
of the ruling party, while neutralizing that of all other parties. 
Galili (Mapam), for example, requested that associations of 
soldiers on an ideological basis be permitted, in order to prevent 
the domination of the military framework by the ruling party. 
Shmuel Mikunis (Communists) asked for a guarantee of 'freedom of 
political identification of soldiers and their free participation 
in society and its struggles, and a ban on the use of the army for 
intervention in internal social struggles of the state'. These 
Opposition proposals were rejected and the Knesset approved the 
formula that a soldier could be a member of a political party and 
attend political meetings, but only in a passive capacity, without 
engaging in active politics in any way. 
' 
1 
Divrei Haknesset Vol 2: 1336-1530. 
The attitude has not changed since th, ät Law was passed. When 
the Knesset discussed the Second Knesset Elections Law on 12 April 1951, 
the draft bill included numerous restrictions on methods of conducting 
election propaganda in army camps. According to the Law, only the names 
of candidates and party platforms could be publicized on camp notice 
boards and written propaganda was permitted only'on condition that 
it was not directed at soldiers as such. Proposals by the left-Ring 
parties that soldiers be permitted to take part in election propaganda 
were rejected. 
1 
The Law was subsequently interpreted more restrictively and the 
dissemination of all written propaganda material was banned, only lists 
of candidates and party manifestoes being permitted. On 4 March 1963 
Mapam representatives attacked the Government, arguing that the phrasing 
of the prohibition against disseminating propaganda granted a monopoly 
for the Minister of Defence's views. The Law defined propaganda 
material as any written or oral material, or material in any other 
form which expressed or hinted at political ideas. Said Yitzhak Ben 
Aharon: 
The army, by its very role, is at the disposal of the 
state and hence at the disposal of the Government, and 
the army cannot be at odds with the Government. This is 
a fact which we do not dispute. But what is stated here 
is not the same thing... What is said here is that there 
is a monopoly for the Minister of Defence to declare that 
his beliefs foster loyalty to the state, while all others 
undermine it. l 
Notwithstanding his'safe majority in the Knesset Ben Gurion fiercely 
attacked Mapam. The decision to include further restrictions in the 
Law derived, so he said, from the fact that Hashomer Hatzäir, Mapam's 
youth movement, had distributed leaflets among soldiers, calling on 
them to oppose the extension of military service. They claimed that 
I Divrei Haknesset Vol 9: 1686-1703. 
2 
Divrei Haknesset Vol 13: 868-876. 
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this step was taken to further the interests of the imperialist 
powers rather than to answer Israel's security needs. On another 
occasion Mapam had tried to incite soldiers against Israeli support 
for the West in the Korean War. 
The extremist view that all party"activity should be prohibited was 
reflected in several laws. In 1958, for example, a more stringent 
interpretation was placed on the provision that officers could stand 
for the Knesset. Until then, the Law had stated that senior officers 
'of rank or position to be determined by Law' could not be candidates. 
An amendment in the same year determined that 'a senior army officer, ' 
refers to an officer on regular service of whatsoever rank'. A proposal 
that the ban apply only to officers from the rank of major upward was 
rejected and officers are now obliged by law to resign from service at 
least 100 days before the elections. 
) 
To the extent that Ben Gurion received the full support of his party 
for his legal reforms and had only to overcome resistance from oppos- 
ition parties, so he received no support from his Mapai colleagues for 
his encouragement to the military to participate in civil. -spheres. 
The demand to isolate certain spheres of-activity from 'the party 
leaders influence and to entrust them to Ben Gurion's hands 
alone was contrary to the traditional political practices. Hence, from 
the establishment of the state, a struggle was waged as to 
where the boundaries of the security sphere should be located, as to 
what should be contained within them, and which would therefore become 
depoliticized, and as tb what should remain outside. 
1 Divrei Haknesset Vol 25: 151, Vol 26: 1191-1195,1225-1228. 
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One of the first battles in the struggle was over the army's 
activities in the maabarot. The opposition parties' objections to 
this, especially Mapam's, was consistent both for ideological 
reasons and as a result of the fear that Ben Gurion would restrict 
the political movements' activities, using the army instead. This, 
in turn, would attract immigrant support to the dominant party only. 
There was resistance within his own party too. At the turn of 1950 
fierce criticism was voiced in Mapai's Central Committee and was 
published in its bulletins. A young member of the Central Committee 
wrote: 
'The army is a body appropriate (only) in the role for 
which it was established, the security of the state... 
it'should be confined td. security. matters...: there-is. 
no greater change to our democracy than in the way- we 
are now going. '1 
But the solid foundation which Mapai enjoyed in the coalition, together 
with Ben Gurion's authoritative position in Mapai's leadership made 
his decisions final. 
THE HIGH COMMAND AFTER THE WAR - LOYALTY TO MAPAI 
Ben Gurion had absolute control is another field too, the 
appointment of commanders. In this way he was able to establish his 
dual control pattern and to manipulate the Party's arm without outside 
interference. Ben Gurion's first task after the War of Independence 
was to rid the army of commanders whom he had failed to dispose of 
during the war. Almost no Lehi people were left in the army and 
towards the very few IZL veterans who remained, Ben Gurion adopted 
an unequivocal policy of blocking their advancement. Throughout the 
fifties none of these officers was promoted beyond the rank of 
See Avraham Offer, Ashmoret, 21 December 1950. Later in a meeting 
of the Party's Central Committee on 14 June 1951 he said: 
'When dealing with security matters we simply turn over the page 
and pass on to the next item... the Party gave this matter in 
toto to one comrade... but comrades I see in that a dangerous 
development to the state's democracy. ' (Protocol of the meeting). 
colonel and in the sixties very few crossed this barrier. 
l 
The main struggle was directed against Mapam officers and here 
too the fight was easier than in the previous two rounds. First, 
their strongholds in the army, the Palmah brigades, were dissolved. 
The three Palmah brigades, having been demobilized, were not like 
other brigades made into reserve untis, but were disbanded. Yitzhak 
Rabin described the period: 
... Anti-Palmah 
bias (was) displayed by Israelis-political 
leaders. Palmah officers began to leave the army, not 
really of their own free will, but. out of a reluctance to 
contend with the hostility they encountered. 2 _ 
-; In April 1950 many Mapam members had to decide whether to continue 
their service in the standing army for a few more years. Mapam's 
political committee dealt with this question. Some committee members 
warned that the army might become 'purged of Mapam members'. 
Galili argued that: 'We have to force our commander tobe the 
emissaries of the party inside the army'. However the majority of 
Mapam's leaders thought that they had better not stay in Ben Gurion's 
'private army' and should, therefore, leave it. 
3 
1 
2 
3 
Among the exceptional men were Brig. -Gen. Mordehai Zippori, 
demobilized in 1977, who was appointed Deputy Chief of 
Operations in 1974; Col. Meir Shamgar. whp served in the 
Military Prosecutors Office, was appointed Chief Military 
Attorney in 1967 and retired after the Six Day War; Col. 
Yisrael Ben Amitai, appointed Chief Artillery Officer in 
1961, retired in 1968 (brother of Zippori). Maj. -Gen. 
Kalman Magen who died of a heart attack in 1974 when about 
to take command of armoured forces in Sinai. 
Rabin, Yitzhak (1979: 84) , 
Memoirs (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Maariv. 
Interview with Israel Galili, 27 July 1977. 
Two of the four Command commanders, six of the twelve brigade 
commanders and many other ex-Palmah officers were among those who 
resigned. Allon, -who emerged from the War of Independence with 
the reputation of the most talented combat officer and who anticipated 
being appointed Chief of Staff or at least Deputy Chief of Staff, 
learned indirectly while on tour with the French Army in North 
Africa, that Ben Gurion had replaced him as commander of the Southern 
Command, without earmarking another post for him and had appointed 
Dayan to replace him.. This was a clear hint that Ben Gurion wanted 
Allon to resign and this in fact he did. Thus, Ben Gurion contrived 
to dispose of a popular figure, a potential leader of the younger 
generations and his future political rival. 
After the resignation of the senior Mapam officers, other officers 
were promoted to the higher ranks. They were professionals whose 
loyalty to Ben Gurion's political authority was guaranteed because of 
their training in the British Army, and others who were loyal to Mapai. 
The new army corps established or expanded, during and after the war, 
were manned by members of these two groups, even if their professional 
standard was not always very high. 
l 
Those Mapam members who stayed in 
the IDF, like Yitzhak Rabin, Haim Barley, David Elazar, Amos Horev and 
others, were mostly appointed in the first few years of statehood to 
staff and training posts, and only gradually received command over 
fighting units. 
1 
More than 90% of artillery officers and Engineer Corps 
officers were British Army veterans. See Banko Adar, Hotam, 
10 May 1974. In the navy, for example, Mapai members, some 
with little experience, including Gershon Zack, Avraham Offer 
and Lova Eliav played a major role. 
Although Mapam's strength inside the army was broken Ben 
Gurion's apprehensions did not diminish. Mapam's wholehearted 
identification with Stalin's Soviet Union, exemplified by the party 
conference declaration that Mapam belonged to the Soviet bloc, 
caused warning lights to flash in Mapai's Headquarters. At the 
beginning of 1951 Ben Gurion assessed that Mapam had an underground 
inside the security services and might establish one inside the 
army. At the end of that year he even held the opinion that 'there 
is a dangerous movement afoot inside Mapam to seize power by force'. 
He was particularly alarmed at the concentration of Mapam members 
in the naval commando unit. Ben Gurion did not hesitate to use the 
security services for surveillance over the Mapam leaders. Indeed 
in early 1953 a hidden microphone was found in the desk of Mapam 
leader, Meir Yaari. 
l 
Under such conditions the advancement of many 
Mapam officers was predictably slowed down. 
2 
1 
2 
See evidence of Maj. -Gen. Elazar that he himself was subjected to 
surveillance and wiretapping. Zeev Sheef Haaretz, 2 March 
1979. 
Two examples are: after Makleff was appointed Chief of 
Staff in 1953, Dayan was transferred from his post as Head 
of Northern Command to serve as Chief of Operations. It 
seemed only natural that Barley, then second in command of the 
Northern Command, should be appointed Commander of Northern 
Command. But Asaf Simhoni of Mapai got the post. According 
to Barley, Dayan hinted quite clearly that party background 
was the issue. Interview with Barley 21 July 1977. 
When Chief Officer of Training Command wanted-to appoint 
Elazar as Head of the Combat Theory Department, the Chief 
of Staff Dayan objected because of Elazar's political views. 
See Bartov, Hanoch (1978: 79) Dado Tel Aviv. Maariv. 
(Dado was Elazar's nickname). 
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As in previous cases Ben Gurion's activity in the early fifties 
was conducted under the guise of an ostensibly professional approach. 
He advocated the_British model in preference to the Haganah's. 
But his preferential treatment of ex-Palmah Mapai officers, and 
even of Haganah veterans, who had not distinguished themselves 
greatly during the war, attested to Ben Gurion's hidden intentions. 
These were fortified when the Mapam leaders did not desist from 
preaching the need to establish a militia with both social and class 
characteristics and roles.. 
The effectiveness of the IDF, while still based on the British model, 
was very poor; consequently it failed to respond appropriately to 
increasing infiltration from the Arab countries, or 
to make preparations for a second round . of all-out warfare. In 1953, 
and particularly after Dayan was appointed Chief of Staff, both Dayan 
and Ben Gurion were forced to abandon the attempt to adopt British 
Army patterns and returned to the traditions of the Haganah and the 
Palmah. Consequently basic changes were introduced in structural 
approaches and operational conceptions. 
' 
. 
This change in conception called for alterations in the higher 
command. In the first half of 1953 1,920 regular officers left the 
service and 340 young men entered it. 
2 
But an even more significant 
change occurred in the military elite. In 1951 only three of the 12 
generals had been affiliated to the Labour Movement, the remainder 
coming from the bourgeois camp. In 1956 the former group accounted 
for seven of the generals. The modified social composition of the 
military elite is even more striking when the generals who resigned 
from service between 1951 and 1956 are considered. Of eight who left 
1 
2 
Luttwak, Edward and Horowitz, Dan, (1975: 73-74)'The Israeli Army 
London. Allen Lane. 
Tevet, Shabtai (1972: '374-410) Moshe Da an (Hebrew) 
Tel Aviv. Schocken. 
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the army in the period, only two were graduates of labour youth 
movements, while of the eight appointed to replace them six had been 
trained in the labour youth. 
1 
Because of this altered composition Ben Gurion was faced 
with the threat that the party balance attained in the high command 
might be undermined again. It was no longer possible to base civil 
control on non-political officers like the British. Army veterans. 
Neither could he use the method he had tried in June 1949, when he 
had informed the IDF Head of Manpower that in future he would 
personally vet all appointments above the rank of lieutenant. 
2 
The military had now expanded to such a degree that a different method 
was required. He was helped by the fact that a considerable 
percentage of the Mapam officers remaining in the army were no longer 
playing an active role in the party and maintained mostly social ties 
with it. Some had even moved from Mapam to Mapai. 
Ben Gurion granted a monopoly over certain key positions in the 
military to Mapai members and party loyalists. This policy continued 
throughout the. fifties and in certain cases into the sixties. 
3 
These 
positions. included the post of Head of Manpower (held by Generals 
Moshe Zadok, Shimon Mazeh, Zvi Zur, Meir Amit, Gideon Shocken, Haim 
Ben David, and Shmuel Eyal. The first non-Mapai officer appointed to 
the post was Shlomo Lahat, in 1970). Other such key positions were 
1 
2 
3 
The IDF Maj. -Gens. in 1951 were Avidar, Ayalon, Ben Arzi, Barnea, 
Dayan, Limon, Laskov, Mazeh, Maklef, Shamir, Yadin and Zadok. In 
1956: -Amit, Ayalon, Dayan, Harkavi, Ilan, Laskov, Rabin, Simhoni, 
Tenne, Tolkovsky, Zadok and Zur. 
Berko Adar, Hotam, 3 May 1974. 
According to Prof. Col. (Res. ) Yehuda Wallach, Dayan stated 
explicitly: 'We cannot agree to entrust these posts to non-loyal 
people'. See Per"i , Yoram 
(1973: 76) Process of crystallization 
of a New Elite of Senior Reserve Officers. in Israel. MA thesis 
(Hebrew) Unpublished. Hebrew University Jerusalem. See also the 
statement by Barley: 'Talented people could not develop along the 
paths of advancement they deserved because of their political 
views. Maariv, 31 December 1971. 
head of staff administration, responsible for planning allocation and 
promotion of officers, (held by Shmuel Eyal, Yosef Golan, Yosef Geva, 
and other Mapai officers, who after their retirement entered into full 
political activity); and chief education officer (Zeev Aharon until 
1965, and subsequently Mordechai Baron who had previously been 
head of Dayan's staff). As late as 1969, the Minister of Defence, 
Moshe Dayan, objected to the appointment of Meir Pail as Chief 
education officer, just as he had previously opposed the Chief of Staff 
Barley's proposal to appoint Pail Commander of the Staff School. 
' 
, Ben Gurion exercised particular care in making the most senior 
appointments, namely Chief of Staff and Head of Operations. 
2 Only in 
the first round of appointments after the war did he award these posts 
to officers who were not affiliated to Mapai, and then there were no 
doubts whatsoever as to their loyalty to the party leadership and in 
particular to Ben Gurion. As for the Chief of Staff Yadin, Ben 
Gurion proposed that he be appointed minister of Defence after his own 
retirement. He also earmarked him as the Mapai nomination for the post 
of prime Minister. 
3 Makleff's political affinity with the 
Mapai leadership. was also well known. 
After the change of policy in 1953, Ben Gurion appointed as Chiefs 
bf Staff only identified party members. The'sole'exception was the - 
appointment of the British Army veteran Haim Laskov whose deputy, Zvi 
1 
2 
3 
Interviews with Haim Barlev, _21 July 1977 and Meir Pail 15 July 1977. 
In several cases the Chief of Operations was also Deputy Chief of 
Staff. Only rarely did the post of Deputy Chief of Staff exist 
independently. 
Bar Zohar, M. (1977: 946). 
Zur, was a loyal Mapai member. 
l The tradition continued after Ben 
Gurion's resignation and only members of the Labour Party were 
appointed: Zur, Rabin, Barley, Elazar and Gur who all entered 
political life after retiring, apart from Elazar, who intended to 
but who died before he could. 
The favouring of Mapai loyalists was reflected for example in 
Ben Gurion's selection of Zur as Chief of Staff although Rabin was 
his senior. It was Rabin's decision in late 1949, to participate 
in the annual reunion of the Palmah, despite the ban on the 
attendance by army officers, which persuaded Ben Gurion to postpone 
his appointment as Chief of Staff. 
2 
The rapid promotion of Dayan 
from Major to Major-General and Chief of Staff within five years was 
also to a large extent the outcome of Ben Gurion's political- 
patronage. 
The political aspect was reflected more infrequently and less 
systematically in appointments at more junior levels. With the aid 
of the censorship which prohibited the publication of information on 
internal IDF affairs, including manning policy, the impression was 
created that the IDF was totally detached from the party system and 
that appointments were based solely on professional calculations. But 
within the political elite, as within the army's higher command, it 
1 
2 
3 
The terms of office of the two Chiefs of Staff who were not 
members of Mapai, Makleff and Laskov, were the briefest ever. 
The political context was significant. The background to 
the resignation of both was clashes on professional issues 
with IDF officers. However their rivalry with the Ministry of 
Defence and the Director-General Shimon Peres and-the fact 
that they were not Mapai-affiliated meant that they lacked a 
mediatory mechanism namely the party. 
Slater, Robert (1977: 90-93) Rabin of Israel A Biography 
London. Robson Books. 
Hashavia, Arieh (1969: 179) One Eye to Mars A Biography of 
Moshe Dayan Tel Aviv. Achiassaf. Also Tevet, S. (1972: 370). 
was well known that 'membership of the right party does no harm'. 
' 
This explains why when coalitionary negotiations were conducted 
between Mapam and Mapai in 1953, the Mapam leaders put the condition 
that the group of Mapam officers who had resigned from service after 
the War of Independence should be taken back into the IDF. 
2 
Ben Gurion's politically tainted appointments to the pinnacle of 
the IDF were only one measure in an overall policy aimed to ensure 
the party and personal loyalty of the IDF command. After the 
establishment of the state Mapai used to conduct systematic party 
activity within the army with Ben Gurion's knowledge and encouragement. 
This activity totally contravened his public statements about the 
depoliticization of the IDF, and was, therefore, conducted secretly 
and its existence denied. But it demonstrates that the policy which 
he claimed was designed to depoliticize the army, was in fact aimed 
to neutralize the influences of other parties so as to consolidate 
the loyalty of the military command to the ruling party. 
It was not integral boundaries between the army and the parties 
to which Ben Gurion aspired. He was in actual fact, deliberately 
trying to create fragmented boundaries, integral between the army and 
all parties, carried out, inter alia, by the 'Servicemen's Department', 
one of the departments of the Party Central Office. 
1 
2 
Danny Bloch, 'Dvar Hashavua, 30 April 1976. Also Maj. -Gen.: 
(Res. ) Mattityahu Peled: 'In the Ben Gurion era there was very 
intensive politicization of the army, which hampered talented 
officers... in that period gifted officers were forced to 
leave the army, and others, equally talented, were promoted 
rapidly because of their loyalty to Mapai'. Maariv, 10 March 1972. 
See; Sharett, M. (1978: 159) Personal Diary--entry for 17 October 1963. 
THE SERVICEMEN'S DEPARTMENT - MAPAI'S ARM INTO THE IDF 
The Department was set up in 1949 by Baruh Duodevani, who was 
active on Mapai; s behalf in the Haganah during the organization of 
the permanent apparatus for the Mapai Central Office in Tel Aviv. 
It was then known as the Liaison Bureau. In structure it resembled 
the other permanent departments of the Mapai Headquarters. It 
generally included a prominent party personality as elected 
chairman and a paid employee of the party as Director. It had 
patrons in the higher echelons of the defence establishment and the 
party apparatus, who knew of its activity and helped it, and a 
fluctuating number of active workers, volunteers or paid, in various 
parts of the country. Ben Gurion himself naturally knew about its 
activity, but did not intervene in the everyday running of the 
Department. ) On the other hand, Shimon Peres, then Director-General 
of the Ministry of Defence, was in close and constant contact with 
its personnel throughout his term of office until 1965. 
The basic pattern of activity was evolved by Shalom Chertenko 
who was active from 1950-1955.2 After the elections of 1955 Giora 
Yosephtal as Party Secretary was responsible for the organizational 
rejuvenation of the Party Central Office, inter alia, by bringing in 
younger men, some of them former officers, to take up senior 
positions. The emphasis on activity among the younger generation 
encouraged the activity of the Serviceman's Department, then headed by 
1 
2 
The general secretary of Mapai during the election campaign for 
the first Knesset. Zalman Aran approached Ben Gurion and asked 
him to retire Zeev Herring from the IDF, so that he could head 
the Servicemen's Department. Aran recalled his conversation 
with Ben Gurion on 12 February 1969. The Protocol of the 
Labour Party Bureau. 
Shalom Chertenko (Zur) was the uncle of the then Commander of 
the Central Command, later to be Chief of Staff. 
Lieutenant-Colonel (Res. ) Zvi Zafriri. 
1 
During election campaigns, which lasted one year or even more, 
larger numbers of active workers were recruited into the Department. 
Thus, for example, when during the elections to the fourth Knesset 
in 1959-. Mapai set up a special headquarters for the young generation, 
headed by Major-General (Res. ) Dayan, the latter also accepted the 
task of coordinating activity among servicemen. ". 
2 During the 1969 
elections the Department was handed over to Colonel (Res. ) Israel 
Granit. The revelation of the Department's existence at this 
time aroused a public storm and led to its abolition. 
The main activity of the Department was carried out in Tel Aviv 
where the IDF's General Staff Headquarters, ' the Ministry of Defence 
and the Mapai Central Office were also located. Activities among 
officers serving in Northern Command were centred in Haifa. There was 
also regular activity in Jerusalem and sporadic activity in Beersheba. 
The Tel Aviv Department also coordinated its activity within the Air 
Force Command and G. H. Q. 
1 He left this position in 1959, went to the Ministry of Defence 
and rose to become Deputy-Director General. 
2 Those who worked over the years in-the Department as Chairmen, 
Coordinators or other staff included Elhanan Yishai, Sasha Dafni, 
$zra Prat, Peretz Finkel, Beni Ilan and Yosef Shaked. Some of 
them were reserve officers. The last to work there in the first 
half of the sixties were Eliezer Shoshani, one of the leaders 
of the Mapai Kibbutz Movement who was chairman, and Israel Gat, a 
party employee, who acted as Coordinator. They held these roles-- 
Until 1969. 
The Department fulfilled several functions, the first was the- 
recruitment of army personnel into the Party. Membership of Mapai 
was organized through territorial branches which hampered the 
registration of military personnel. The concentration of recruitment 
in one department facilitated efficient organization: and, above all, 
the maintenance of secrecy and discretion with regard to the very 
fact that the officers were Party members. . The technical aid supplied 
by senior army officers or senior Ministry of Defence officials made 
it easier to observe this discretion. For example, instead of inviting 
officers to Party Headquarters, the staff of the Department would meet 
them in a specially allotted room in the Ministry of Defence. 
As in other party branches, activity in the Servicemen's Department 
mainly related to information activities and maintaining contact with 
members) These activities were carried out with varying frequency 
over the years. In periods when the Department operated in the most 
regular fashion conventions were held every few weeks, at which party 
leaders spoke, the Prime Minister, senior Ministers and other senior 
politicians. 
2 
These information activities, usually held in the Yahdav Club in 
Tel Aviv, were organized according to a regular pattern -a lecture 
on a political or security theme or some other topical subject, 
questions from the audience, and a general discussion. No formal 
decisions were reached. In addition to officers, other members connected 
with the Servicemen's Department were also invited, civilian employees 
1 
2 
Information about these activities was supplied by six former 
members of the Department. 
For Golda Meir's evidence about her appearances in such meetings 
with Ben Gurion's knowledge when she was Foreign Minister, see 
protocol of the Labour Party Bureau, 13 February 1969. 
of the Ministry of Defence, police officers and staff of the security 
services. The integration of these civilians in the Department was 
intended to extend the activity among the entire defence establishment, 
as well as to conceal the fact the Mapai was maintaining organized 
party activity within the IDF. For this reason most members of the 
group also came to meetings in civilian clothes. 
Sensitivity to political activity within the army increased during 
the Lavon Affair. After the elections to the Knesset in 1961, during 
which the question of the supervision of the defence establishment was 
one of the central issues, the General Staff Regulations regarding 
party political activity of servicemen were made more stringent. These 
Regulations permitted membership of political parties, but only 
passive. participation. The relevant clauses of General Staff 
Regulation 33.0116 stipulate: 
A serviceman is entitled to be a member of any legally 
existing organization or party in the state, but must 
refrain from activity in these bodies, with the follow- 
ing exceptions: (para. 3,3) a serviceman may be present 
at a meeting or convention of such an association or 
party but must not take an active part, as a speaker, " 
member of praesidium or in some other active role, at 
a meeting or convention or in preparations for them... 
(Para. a, 6) A serviceman may not take part in a milit- 
ary gathering or meeting of servicemen,, held by a body 
which is not military, or an unauthorized military. body. 
Nor may he discuss military matters at any convention or 
meeting without the permission of his superiors... 
(Para. b, l) A serviceman may not discuss in. public, 
orally or in writing, under conditions which gives the 
discussion a public nature, any political question (or 
such which may be interpreted as being of a political 
nature) except as stipulated above... 
The invitation of defence personnel who were not servicemen to 
meetings of the Servicemen's Department could offer a formal solution 
to the problem of para. a, 6 - servicemen's meetings organized by a 
non-military body - but there can be no doubt that the active nature 
of membership of the Department contravened the spirit of the General 
Staff Regulations. 
In addition to meetings classified as oral information activities 
the Department also engaged in 'written information activity'. This 
included the despatch of material to the private homes of Party members, 
such as the Party weekly 'Hapoel Hazair, and other publications. 
During the election campaign the Department enlisted the aid of 
Department workers to maintain information activity within the IDF. 
Written material was disseminated to servicemen on several occasions, 
until, -in the early sixties, 
following protests by other parties, it 
was suspended. 
In the early fifties posters were sometimes pasted up in IDF camps, 
showing photographs of senior officers who had won rapid promotion, with 
the explanation that talented officers were offered good chances of 
advancement in the IDF. The posters did not mention the fact, which 
was universally known, that the talented officers were all members of 
Mapai. 
1 
Department activists sent as election officers to army camps. -and' 
even unofficial co-ordinators were granted unrestricted entry into 
camps. The information activity of the Department was sometimes 
disguised by Nahal, whose close contact with the settlement- movement, enabled 
it to arrange social activities in which political activity was acceptable. 
One of the recruitment methods employed by Mapai in the fifties 
and sixties was providing personal services to Party members and 
supporters. such as assistance in housing, employment, health, welfare, 
and education.. The Servicemen's Department used the same methods 
with servicemen and its leaders devoted a great deal of time to 
dealing with the personal problems of group members. This'entailed, 
1 See Mati Peled; Maariv, 10 March 1972. 
above all, finding them civilian jobs after they retired from the army. 
The IDF, particularly until the end of the sixties, did not 
deal with the demobilization of officers in an institutionalized 
fashion, and help was mainly given through personal and social 
contacts. The Department made a considerable contribution and 
according to one witness dozens of officers were aided in this fashion: 
We paid particular attention to rehabilitation. As 
soon as it became known that a particular retired 
officer had been helped, there would be a wave ofl 
requests to join the Party from serving officers. 
The `rehabilitation' included not only finding employment but also, 
when necessary, loans, help with housing and other matters. 
The most sensitive activity by the Servicemen's Department 
concerned the promotion of officers. Because of their extreme 
sensitivity these activities were carried out most discreetly, never 
on a written basis, but in personal discussions between Party heads. .. 
and activists and the defence establishments leaders and the IDF's 
military commands. 
2 
The evidence suggests that it was not a 
systematic activity and was usually initiated after special requests 
or complaints by officers who sought a special post or promotion. 
In most"cases, those who lobbied for a certain officer made sure that 
the officer had no professional disqualification before urging the 
Party consideration. Being a Mapai member could be an advantage for 
an officer in competition with another officer who shared the same 
professional standing, it could hasten the promotion of an officer who 
would otherwise have eventually been promoted, and it could help an 
officer to get a post which he would not otherwise have got. At 
different times, the heads of departments received from the army officer 
1 
2 
Interview . with 
Zvi Zafriri, 24 August and 1 September 1977. 
Though no written evidence about these activities exists, a few 
people have testified that they took part in them. 
lists which named candidates for different courses and were asked for 
their knowledge of the candidates' party affiliation. 
When analyzing the control function of Mapai's Servicemen's 
Department a distinction must be made between that mechanism and 
those of party control in communist regimes, most particularly that 
of the political officers in the Soviet Army. Although'Mapai leaders 
learned from the Eastern European experience the principle of-p-drty control 
over the military, it underwent a genuine modification when applied in 
Israel. In the Soviet Union, the fear of threats to the regime's power 
monopoly, resulted inevitably in control of the military becoming a 
primary concern to the Party, control in its widest interpretation, 
that is as a modification of or limitation on behaviour. Political 
control is in this sense a modification of behaviour in. pursuit of 
the enIs. of an external organization or cause. 
' 
In Israel the. controllers had no desire to influence the officers' 
professional decisions. Since the military elite accepted the 
legitimacy of the civil authority the main function of the party 
arm was to elicit general support for the political leadership through 
participation and not through control. The Department was an 
instrument designed to create solidarity between those who wore 
uniform and those who did not. It was a regulator of tensions between 
the two groups, a mechanism which effected integration between the 
politicians and officers. The politicians wanted to exploit it to 
Colton, Timothy J. (1979: 4,39) Commissars, Commanders and 
Civilian Authority. The Structure of Soviet Military Politics 
Cambridge Massachusets and London. --Harvard University Press. 
gain political support and were willing to remunerate the officers 
by making them participators. It was this aspect which expressed 
the major weakness of the dual control pattern. It fostered a 
process of balance between the political and military elites and 
brought about a further interlocking of the latter with the former, 
both in state and party politics. 
_- ý- _ 
BEN GURION''S 'FAILURE "-'THE 'EMERGENCE 'OF -A -POLITICAL MILITARY 'PARTNERSHIP 
Mapai's influence over the army was exerted in other ways as well. 
In the early fifties after the laws prohibiting political activity by 
army personnel were passed, regular officers continued to be active in 
Mapai. For example, the editor of Ashmoret the magazine of the 
Party's young generation. was Ahuvia Malkin, a major in the regular 
army. The Air Force Commander Major-General Aharon Remez was also 
involved in the party's young generation and Moshe Dayan remained active 
for many years. 
His activities were not concealed. In 1951 he went to the meeting 
of 'the renewal of the party' organized by_Mapai's younger generation. 
This meeting was of more far reaching significance than the Palmah 
reunion which Rabin had attended,. because it concerned the future not 
the past. Yet Dayan was not -. censured by Ben Gurion for. attending'it. 
The common social background of the officers and Mapai leaders provided 
conditions which made it easy to exert informally party influence over 
the commanders. Tate ä tete or group meetings between officers associated 
with the Party and party leaders often took the form of social gatherings 
of an ostensibly non-political nature. 
The identification of the state sphere and the party sphere resulted 
in the formation of various state instruments which enabled Mapai to 
consolidate its influence over the military by taking advantage of the 
various state instruments. One of these was the press. Since most 
papers in the fifties were affiliated to parties, it was possible-by 
determining which papers could be distributed in the army, to exploit 
an additional channel for party indoctrination. It was ruled that the 
Knesset's Finance Committee should decide how many and which papers 
the army should buy. The Committee decided that the criterion should 
be the size of the party representation in the Knesset-for the quantity of 
newspapers purchased. As a result, Mapai's paper Davar, formally the 
Histadrut paper but practically the Party's-trumpet, was'distributed in 
a relatively much higher proportion than any other newspaper. Although its 
circulation was relatively lower, it enjoyed, therefore, a 
considerable advantage over other parties. As the number of non- 
party papers increased and their circulation far exceeded that of 
the party press, there was a striking discrepancy between the 
circulation of various papers in the civil sector and in the army. 
The extensive activities of the IDF's Chief Education Officer 
usually proved a convenient tool for Mapai's political indoctrination 
policies. Although efforts were made in the IDF's information and 
education activity to avoid dealing with political subjects, when 
topical problems were presented the Government view was usually given. 
But the identification of Mapai with the Government meant that servicemen 
were always presented with the Mapai or Labour Party viewpoint, rather 
than that of opposition parties. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that in periods of political 
tension the opposition parties displayed great sensitivity to this 
activity. At the height of the Lavon Affair. several parties submitted 
urgent motions for the agenda on the 'information guidelines for IDF 
officers on the occasion of the Knesset elections', published by the Chief 
Education Officer. The Knesset convened for a special session on 3 July 
1961 to discuss the matter. The Prime Minister, Ben Gurion, claimed that 
the statements made in the booklet were true, but pressure from other 
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factions was so strong that they prevailed and the booklet was shelved. 
' 
A similar case occurred during the Yom Kippur War when the IDF 
Chief Education Officer stepped up his oral information activities in 
reserve units. It then transpired that his staff of lecturers (serving 
in reserve units) included a disproportionate number of Labour Party 
supporters, including-some who-held Party office. In the light of the 
crisis in military-political relations in that period, even information 
activity within the army was the target of fierce public criticism, and 
the Chief Education Officer was forced to amend the rules for calling up 
lecturers. ' 
The legal restrictions and the public effort to stop party 
activities in the army did not bring about their cessation. At 
an early stage after the state's establishment it stopped being 
open and formal but continued in a more covert and informal manner, 
decreasing very gradually. Mapam continued with political 
activities among its members in the military command until the late 
fifties. In the early fifties some officers still took part in public 
meetings, which grated on the public ear, but at least it was clear 
that these activities were directed to the public at large and not 
confined to the army. 
3 
The kibbutz sector was the only one to be so organized and with 
such control over its members that it could present itself to the army 
as an, organizational'entity. Because of its voluntarist and 
pioneering nature, the army could ask the kibbutz sector to contribute 
a certain percentage of manpower to the standing army. In return for 
3 Interview with Meir Pail, 15 July 1977. 
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that special arrangement, the army, on its part, took into account 
the special kibbutz requirements. Thus the army agreed to preserve 
the Nahal army corps, which allowed conscripts to serve time in 
agricultural work instead of performing purely military functions. It 
also permitted social and political activities among the kibbutz 
members while they served in the army. 
The blurring of the social, ideological and party political 
aspects of these activities, because of the political nature of the 
kibbutz movement made the movements a channel of political influence 
for their members into the top army echelons. Agricultural 
settlement in Israel was mainly associated with the Labour Movement, 
therefore when Ben Gurion brought to the Knesset the Defence Service 
Law 1949 which required all conscripts to spend one year in an. 
agricultural settlement, it fostered the identification. of the army 
with the Labour Movement. During the Knesset debate it was predictable 
that other parties disagreed with compulsory service in agricultural 
settlements. After a short time. the army ceased to operate the Law, 
because the conscripts'ýprecious time was needed for strictly military 
work, but the fact that the Law has never been abrogated affirmed 
the army's identification with the dominant civil ethos, which is, to 
say with the dominant party in Israel. 
The semi-professional, highly political, 'revolutionary nation-in- 
arms' of the Yishuvperiöd did not experience a process of professionaliz- 
ation, : depoliticization and institutionalization, as Perlmutter has 
argued. 
' Through his desire to secure full control over the army and to 
isolate it from all other parties, Ben Gurion maintained the dual control 
pattern, which is an intermediate pattern between the instrumentalist 
1 Perlmutter, A (1969: 54) Military and Politics in Israel 
London. Cass. 
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'nation in arms' and the. . tpparat controls. But the result of Ben Gurion's 
pattern was that he failed to achieve either.. The IDF penetrated into 
national politics . and " party politics 
into the army. Civil 
control was not imposed, and officers 
became partners of the politicians. 
The authority of Ben Gurion, the national leader-, and the 
autonomization of the security sphere, helped to obscure that pattern. 
Under the blanket of-secrecy which covered security affairs Ben Gurion 
succeeded in consolidating the etatist, the instrumentalist image of 
the'IDE. It was not unexpected that on each occasion when he temporarily 
left the Cabinet, the revelation of the truth was accompanied by a 
crisis in political-military relations. During Ben Gurion's reign the 
boundaries between the IDF and Labour Movement were permeable, 
consequently processes in that Movement began to influence the military 
and political-military relations. In the same way that party control 
and the leaders authoritative position resulted in military 
acquiescence during the Yishuv period, so after statehood, party control 
coupled with nominal state control encouraged involvement by the 
military in politics. 
Ben Gurion erected integral boundaries between the army and all 
the parties except Mapai. The IDF as a citizens army did not develop a 
highly corporatist perception and for that reason it was protected against 
the danger either of. the alienation of the army or the militarization 
of politics. However, when Ben Gurion opened the boundaries he inevitably 
Initiated the politicization of the army, and'once he utilized 
the dual control he prepared the ground for a further penetration-by the 
army into politics. In as much as the political leadership's power and 
authority diminished during the sixties, so the generals' position 
improved. 
- 236 - 
An interesting and ironic illustration can be-observed in two -cases 
when the strategic approach of some senior military commanders and 
that of their civil . superiors 
differed. The first occasion was 
in the War of'Independence when some Mapam commanders led by Allon 
were highly critical of Ben Gurion's general strategy. They 
disputed with him and tried to persuade him to alter his commands. 
But because they were Haganah reared they acknowledged his authority 
even though they were members of a rival party. 
The second incident happened in 1954, when Ben Gurion's 
proteges headed by Chief of Staff Dayan rejected the Prime Minister 
Moshe Sharett's political defensive attitude. Sharett sought 
reconciliation with the Arab states, whereas Dayan advocated an active 
deterrent approach. How did those reared 'in Ben Gurion's school. 
1 
behaved They were not inhibited to act in opposition to the Prime 
Minister's policies, to practise deceit, to distort the truth and 
to profer falsehoods and even to erode the Government's authority. 
In Ben Gurion's absence the two control channels were weak and 
civil authority over the army collapsed. 
1 Sharett's diary contains abundant evidence for the period 
1953-1955. Dayan himself did not conceal it. See Dayan's 
evidence to the Olshan-Dori Committee. Haaretz, 21 February 1965. 
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6. PARTY POLITICS - THE DRIVING FORCE OF POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
THE RIVAL SUB ELITES - THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OVER SECURITY 6 
When Ben Gurion constructed the defence establishment, he tried 
in so doing to tackle the problem of the relationship between Mapai, 
the party he led,, and the other parties. It had in fact become clear 
since the IDF's formation that the main protagonists in political- 
military relations in Israel were not the officers and the civil: - 
leaders. The nature of that relationship was first and foremost the 
function of the political rivalries between different political groups. 
One of the main arenas for the rivalries was the security sphere. The 
centrality of defence in Israel rendered control over that sphere, 
possession of its secrets and identification with its symbolic 
significance the sine qua not for gaining power, while success in 
performing security functions became the requisite for remaining in 
1 
power. 
The political struggles revolved around the dual control system. 
As far as the state institutions were concerned the dispute centred 
around Ben Gurion's autonomist approach, the security sphere's expanding 
boundaries, whether exceptional controls for this sphere were legitimate, 
the nominal nature of the Knesset's and the Cabinet's control over the 
military and the weakness of the regulatory mechanisms, and primarily 
around the personal Ehärismatic nature of Ben Gurion's conduct of defence 
affairs. Where the parties were concerned, there was at first resistance 
to Mapai's political activities inside the army, when Mapai tried to 
mobilise the high command and to obstruct the. - advancement to key 
positions by officers who supported other parties. 
See an analysis of the social and political significance of the 
secrets of defence by Major-General Matityahu Peled, Maariv, 
22 April 1977. 
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enemy. 
Sectarian considerations in making appointments to 
top positions in the IDF is ä-lurking danger which 
cannot be ignored. It must be appreciated that a 
victory by a certain party or faction in 'purging' the 
army's1top ranks, is comparable to a victory by our 
I. 
The first dispute was fought openly as a part of the parliamentary 
struggle, the second one, the parties' dispute, was covert. The rival 
political groups tried to strengthen their influence within the army 
and to weaken the standing of their rivals by winning the hearts of the 
high command. In that way-the two main contending alliances of 
civilians and officers were crystallized. Inside each coalition 
civilian politicians were behind the political mobilization of generals. 
But the civilians had to pay a double price when fighting for the hearts 
and minds of the officers. First, they had to reward individuals by 
supporting their professional advancement, secondly, they granted to 
the army itself a large degree of operational freedom and the capacity 
to influence their civilian counterparts in the widest sphere of national 
security. Thus the standing of the officer corps was raised and rather than 
being a subordinate it became an equal partner with the political 
leadership. 
The description of the relationship between the military and 
political systems since the beginning of the fifties in Israel. 
requires an analysis of the main political struggle in the latter system. 
In spite of being only a sketch, it will facilitate the description of 
the power relationship between the most significant groups taking part 
in the struggle, whose result has affected the pattern of political- 
Allon, Yigal (1968: 214) A Curtain of Sand Tel Aviv. Häkibbutz 
Hameuhad Publicatipns. 
military relationships. 
) 
In this chapter the emphasis is placed on the 
party dimension, while the subsequent chapters will provide a detailed 
analysis of the repercussions of the contest on the relationship 
between the army and the Cabinet, the Knesset and the Defence Ministry. 
THE ' VETERANS V. THE 'YOUNG GUARD 
Mapai's dominant position meant that the political process within 
that party was the most significant in Israel's political system. Since 
the leaders of Ahdut Haavodä. had left Mapai in 1944 and established 
Mapam four years later, the leaders of Mapai and Mapam were the leading 
actors in the contest inside the Labour Movement. By the early fifties, 
the central motif of Israeli political life for the next twenty five 
years had surfaced - the struggle between the two rival. sub-elites 
within Mapai, later to become the Labour Party. 
2 
1 
2 
For a survey of this struggle see Medding, P. Y. (1972) Mapai 
in Israel: Political Organisation and Government in a New 
Society London. Cambridge University Press. See concise 
survey in Aronoff, M. (1974) Power and Ritual in the Israel 
Labour Party Van Gorcum, Assen/Amsterdam; Yanai', Nathan (11969)- 
A Split at the Top (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Lenin Epstein. 
Different names have been given to the two sub-elites none of 
which is correct. They have been called 'the young guard' 
contrasted with 'the veterans', 'the right wingers' opposed to 
'the left wingers', 'the new leadership' as against 'the second 
generation'. When'the young guard' first formed a new party, it 
was called Rafi, Israel's Workers' List. It opposed the other 
sub-elite which led the 'small alignment' (and included Mapai and 
Ahdut Haavodä).. For simplicity the terms Rafi or the young guard 
contrasted with the veteran leadership (which included other 
groups) will be used. Whatever labels are used, the conflict 
between the-two sub-elites within the Labour Movement is the 
thread which runs through all Israeli party history until 1977. 
FIGURE No. 2 
SPLITS AND MERGERS ' IN-THE-"ISRAEL LABOUR MOVEMENT 
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The Mapai leadership had two layers, the founding fathers or 
the nation-building elite, those who originated from the second 
Aliya, and the secondary leadership who came from the third Aliyah. 
There was a curious symbiotic relationship between the two groups. 
The elder ones held the national positions, they formulated national 
policies and were the nub of policy making. The younger generation 
controlled the party apparatus. The latter furnished the former with 
support for the party and mobilized voters, while the former 
sheltered the latter with-their authority and acted as their patrons. 
Hence the younger group held the power centres in the party, the 
Histadrut and the public sector economy. This mutual dependence enabled 
both the national leadership and the heads of the apparatus to safeguard 
their position in the power system. 
In the early 1940's a number of prominent people from. the secondary 
leadership, with others originating from the Fourth Aliyah, organised 
themselves in opposition to'Faction B'(Ahdut Haavoda) iri Tel Aviv.. 
The secondary leadership group later became the core of the'Gush, 
the skeleton which controlled Mapai's apparatus and power resources. 
After Ahdut Haavoda seceded, the secondary leadership faction improved 
its position inside Mapai, but the real change took place in the early 
fifties. During that period the remnants of the founding fathers left 
the stage. In 1952-3 the Cabinet Ministers Sprinzak, Kaplan and Remez 
died, and the time was ripe for the secondary leadership to be in the 
front line to become national leaders. 
1 
1 
On the Gush and the period see Madding, P. Y. (1972). -See also a vivid 
description of this matter in Yadlin, Asher (1980) Evidence (Hebrew) 
Jerusalem. Edanim. 
In the fifties the domination by the secondary' leadership, most of 
whom were in their fifties, faced a serious challenge from a group of 
younger men, most of whom, born in the twenties, were children of party 
activists and had been brought up within the party. They stood out-in the 
kibbutz and Mapai youth movements in the forties,, and supported the 
Mapai leadership when the rift with'Faction B'deepened. 
The group-included many War of Independence veteran commanders, 
or officers'on active service, and others who held positions in public 
administration. Government bureaucracy expanded in the early fifties 
and needed manpower with administrative and executive ability, thus 
offering young people the opportunities for advancement. This was 
particularly evident in the defence sphere,, where. a group of young men 
surfaced who worked with Ben Gurion. 
1 
As long as the mobility of these young men was confined to the 
bureaucratic and public sectors no problems arose in their relations 
with the veterans. But when they began working to increase their own 
political power within the Party, the two groups found themselves at 
loggerheads. In 1949 the young guard set up the 'Young Mapai Club' and 
tried, for the first time, to construct a significant party front to 
oppose the Party leadership. A meeting they organized at Hakfar 
Hayarok on 17 February was attended by army officers in mufti, 
headed by Moshe Dayan, and by employees of the Ministry of Defence. - 
From the first this group displayed a predilection for defence affairs. 
1 The. group included Nehemia Argov, Teddy Kollek, Shimon Peres, Elhanan 
Yishai. and Yitzhak Navon. 
The most important factor in the process of consolidation of the 
group and its political growth was the support it received from Ben 
Gurion after the leaders of second Aliyah, the founding fathers, had left 
the stage. In 1953 the 'party's secondary leadership warned'him against 
the young men emerging from the defence establishment who were liable 
to steal the thunder of'the political leadership, but Ben Gurion 
dismissed their fears.. Much later he did not hide his intention of 
bringing them into the nationalleaäership over the heads of the veterans. 
l 
And he did in fact begin to promote them within the party hierarchy. 
At the elections to the third Knesset in 1955 three of"them were 
given safe places on the list. 
2 When Dr Giora Yosephts. al, a young guard' 
was appointed secretary-general of Mapai in 1956, the central party 
institutions were opened up to the. younger generation for-the first time. 
After the Sinai Campaign and noticeably after Dayan had retired from the 
IDF in 1958, the group gained ground. 
The young guard was strongly represented for the first time in the 
1959 Government. Dayan was Minister of Agriculture, Peres Deputy 
-Defence Minister, YosephtLal- Minister of Labour and Abba Eban (not 
an integrated member. of the group, he had returned from diplomatic - 
service) Minister without Portfolio. Ben Gurion wanted to appoint 
Yigael. Yadin., as well, but the latter refused. Simultaneously there was 
a deterioration in the relationship between Ben Gurion and the secondary 
leadership: Levi Eshkol, (Zälmaz)kranne, Golda Meir, Mordehai Namir, 
Pinhas Sapir and Moshe Sharett, who was forced to resign from the 
Cabinet in. 1956. 
1 Ben Gurion's diary, entry for 2 May 1958. Talking to Yosephtal 
he revealed his plan to thrust on the young guard the leadership 
of the Movement and the state, and added that there would be 
resistance in the Party against it, but that one should stand 
firm. This contradicts Hagai Eshed, who asserts that Ben Gurion 
tried to bring the two groups together, and that it was the 
veteran leadership in fact which tried to dispose of Ben Gurion 
and his proteges. (1979) Who Gave the Order? Jerusalem. Edanim. 
Shlomo Hillel, Ehud Avriel and Maj. -Gen. (Res. ) Aharon Remez. 
2 
In 1957-59 the struggle between the two groups reached its height. 
Whereas in the early fifties the battle had raged only between the 
veterans and the young guard without Ben Gurion's direct involvement, 
the former now turned their lances against Ben Gurion himself, whom they 
accused of abandoning his veteran allies in favour of the young 
generation. Until then the issue had been about party control by 
Ben Gurion's faction, and the rules of the inheritance game (Ben. 
Gurion's right to name his own successors). From then on the fight 
focused-on the succession itself.. 
The party dispute between veterans and young guard was typically 
given ideological colouring and was depicted as a confrontation 
between voluntarism and etatist approaches, the socialism of the veterans- 
and the 'brass tacks' (bitzuism) approach of the young technocrats. 
) 
But the ideological argument provided some justification 
for the blatant power struggle to control the party. It was a typical 
example of a politically organized generation unit, not on the basis 
of a world view which differed from that of the earlier generation unit, 
but on another basis - the obstruction in the political-mobility channels. 
In this case the world view was shaped during and by the power struggle 
and was used to legitimize the demands of the younger unit. This is 
borne out by the affinity between the ideological approach and the 
location of each group in the power structure. The veterans, the 
proponents of the movement, voluntarist outlook, controlled the party's 
1 See Aaronov, M. (1974: 21) 'B itzuism' means doing"more and 
- talking less. The term is contrasted with the excessive 
ideological debates of the founding fathers. It imports a 
pragmatic, technocratic and anti-ideological concept of the era 
of the 'end of ideology'. 
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institutica--the movement and the Histadrut. Those who favoured 
Ben Gurionist etatism, the young ones, held positions in the 
Government and public apparatus. 
Yisrael Yishayahu. MK one of the heads.. of the Güsh, exposed 
the power struggle as the basis of the quasi-ideological struggle when 
he said to Ben Gurion in December 1959: 
The question is entirely that of the coat of many colours. 
All those present here are your sons, and you have chosen 
Josephs of your own, robed them in coats of many colours, 
and aroused thg great jealousy of those whom you have 
left coatless. 
TABLE 3 
THE PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION OF THE LABOUR MOVEMENT 
Year Knesset Mapam Ahdut Haavoda Mapai. Rafi 
1949 Ist 19 46 
1951 2nd 15 45 
1955 3rd 9 10 40 
1959 4th 97 47 
1961 5th 98 42 
1965 6th 8 
45- 
1969 7th * 
1973 8th 51 
1977 9th 33 
Notes 
10 
*: ". Mapai and Ahdut Haavoda parliamentary bloc was called the Alignment 
** 
*** 
and was composed of two independent parties which formed in the 
Knesset a united group. 
The list for the seventh Knesset was also named the Alignment, but 
it was composed of the Labour party (the unification of Rafi, Mapai 
and Ahdut Haavoda) and Mapam. 
Total Knesset seats 120. 
1 Interview with Yitzhak Navon, Maariv, 7 December 1973. 
AHDUT HAAVODA CHALLENGES BEN GURIONFS MONOPOLY 
The defence establishment had a prominent place in this 
political struggle. Ben Gurion continued to see the security sphere 
as his main field of operation, and once the Mapai leadership had 
accepted his autonomist concept almost nobody interfered-in his 
activities. He nurtured and nourished a group of young aides, who 
quickly became identified with the security establishment. They 
were politically ambitious, loyal to Ben Gurion and to a large extent 
politically dependent on him. While Ben Gurion and his young guard 
consolidated their position at the top of the security hierarchy, the 
Mapai veterans entrenched their power in the economic spheres. They 
held the economic ministries, in particular the Ministry of Finance. 
They also controlled the resources of economic mobilization in the Diaspora. 
through the Jewish Agency and the appeal fund organisations, and the 
Histadrut's economic institutions. 
So long as the veterans aimed their shafts only at the yöung 
guard they could not criticize what took place 
in the security sphere, 
but when Ben Gurion also became their target it became clear that 
they could challenge his position in the defence sphere as well. At 
first the veterans warned Ben Gurion about the dangers which the 
fortifying of the young guard with their military background posed to 
democracy. In 1958 the veteran leaders Ziama Aranne and Pinhas Lavon 
warned that Dayan was planning a military coup. The lyoung guard's 
style-of expression and political activities, especially Dayan's, 
aggravated the veterans' anxieties. At the end of that year Golda 
Meir advised Ben Gurion that Dayan intended to set up a military 
dictatorship. 
1 At the beginning of 1959, this suspicion grew when it was 
1 Ben Gurion's diary , entry for 31 December 1958. 
disclosed that sometime before the third election campaign in 1955 a 
proposal to make a putsch was put forward by some of Ben Gurion's 
proteges,: 'which would enable him really to seize power'. The story 
was published in Maariv on the 2 January '1959, and was debated in the 
Knesset five days later. Naturally Ben Gurion refuted the story_ and 
he also denied another allegation that two of the most brilliant former 
Chiefs of Staff were among those who put forward the proposal. However 
the opposition did not give up and Moshe Sneh MK. da med that', there 
was support for Ben Gurion's scheme not only among his civilian allies, 
but inside the army as well. Haaretz published an interview with Major- 
General (Res. ) Aharon Remez, 'who recommended a change in the electoral 
system without prior assent by the Knesset, and the formation of a 
government led by Ben Gurion which would be composed of experts, and 
not of party representatives. And Dayan said in an interview to Haaretz 
that the parties should not be a barrier between the leader, Ben Gurion, 
and the nation. 'There is a threat to Israeli democracy'', said Moshe 
Sneh. 1 Ben Gurion employed his usual diversionary tactics in the Knesset 
and also, mentioned -the Altalena affair, which invariably raised a storm, so 
the matter was forgotten. 
The veterans' fears of a blow to democracy had been'roused 
previously when Ben Gurion expressed his desire to change some of the 
basic planks in the Israeli political system. to alter the electoral 
system from national-proportional to constituency - first past the post 
on the British model, and to make Mapai into a non-socialist centre party. 
The young ones supported his plan in 055 as they had two years earlier, 
while the veterans bitterly opposed it. 
2 
Ben Gurion thought that the 
introduction of the British electoral system would solve what'he called the 
Divrei Ilaknesset 1959. Vol. 26. 
2 Bar Zohar, Michael (1977: 999-1017) Ben Gurion Tel Aviv. Am Oved. 
sickness of Israeli politics: party cleavages, a weak coalition 
Government, the necessary compromises' and bargaining, and the weakness 
of the executive branch brought about by its dependence on the parties. 
The veterans feared Ben Gurion's wish to enfeeble the party apparatus 
and to strengthen the executive branch to the detriment of the 
parliamentary party. It goes without saying that all the other parties 
opposed Ben Gurion's plan even more vehemently. Furthermore the veterans' 
real fear was that behind his plan lurked his intention to 
extend the rules applied to the security sphere to the entire political 
system. The adaptation of the latter to be like the security sphere, 
appeared to them to be the final liquidation of their political standing, 
and would effect, a fundamental change in the institutional bases which. 
helped them to acquire and to keep their positions. Ben Gurion's approach 
was furthermore' antagonistic to their perception of the proper 
democratic process. So long as the conflict between the veterans and 
the youngguard and Ben Gurion intensified so the former needed political 
allies. They found them in the Ahdut Haavoda leadership. They had 
broken away. from Mapam in 1954 and began to travel away from the left- 
wing pole towards the centre, closer to Mapai. 
As the tension between the groups grew. the veterans entered into a 
political alliance with the Ahdut Haavoda leadership. _The latter group 
was a convenient ally in the fight against the young guard and resembled 
it, being composed of native-born Israelis, some with exemplary military 
experience in the Palmah and the Haganah during the War of Independence. 
They shared the hardline defence attitude of the young ones., On the 
other hand. it was ideologically similär to the veterans, - 
having abandoned its Soviet and Marxist predilections, it had more 
affinity with the socialist and voluntarist concepts of the veterans, 
than with Ben Gurion's'etatism as expounded by the young guard. 
The Ahdut Haavoda leadership was particularly congenial to the 
veterans from the point of view of the power struggle, for in order to 
come in from the cold they were eager to cooperate, - whereas the 
young guard wanted to take over completely from the veterans. 
During 1960-1961 the Lavon affair became the arena where the 
political battle between the veterans and the young guard took place. 
It brought about a further pact between the veterans and the Ahdut 
Haavoda leaders. There were many facets to the Lavon affair, which had 
a considerable impact on Israeli politics as Chapter 13 will demonstrate. 
But it could have been predicted that it would devdlop against the background 
of the security sphere and so raise the basic problems'about°civil control 
over the army. 
The affair gave Ahdut Haavoda and the veterans the occasion to 
attack Ben Gurion and his young guard on that issue, for the mere 
disclosure to public scrutiny and debate of a defence issue was a 
novelty. For the first time Ben Gurion's autonomization concept was 
challenged openly, and for the first time the blanket of secrecy, which 
Ben Gurion had wrapped around this sphere was pulled back. When the 
public saw the weakness of the civil control, the extent of party 
involvement inside the military and the military intrusion into state 
politics, the shock-waves were palpable. 
Ben Gurion's power waned during the affair, while the veterans' power 
grew. This was shown dramatically when Ben Gurion resigned from the 
Cabinet in 1961, and elections were held in the middle of the Knesset term. 
Eshkol a veteran leader and aconciliatory figure in Mapai's leadership, 
was constrained to establish the new coalition on Ben Gurion's behalf. 1 
On Eshkol and that period see the memoirs of one of the Labour Party 
leaders Almogi, Yoseph (1980) Total Commitment (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Edanim. 
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However at the same time as Ben Gurion was wooing the liberals to 
augment the"rightwing and the-young guard, _the 
veterans were cementing a 
coalition with Ahdut Haavoda. The latter won the day. 
Ahdut Haavoda's leaders made their"entry. into-the coalition conditional 
on the introduction of changes in certain fields, particularly in the 
security sphere, which had been the central issue in 'the surprise election 
campaign. Ahdut Haavoda, in spite of being a party with strong national- 
ist and hard-line views, opposed Ben Gurion's autonomist concept. Its 
opposition was directed toward the unlimited security sphere, its 
independent normative code, the effective neutralization of the power of 
the parties, Knesset and Cabinet, and above all the control arrangements 
that had been laid down by Ben Gurion and which gave him a unique position. 
The rule should be that whatever can be built up. by 
civilians should be when there are no battles as well as 
in emergency periods, there is no need for the army to do it. 
Allon explained the need to contract the security sphere. and with 
specific reference to the diplomatic sphere he said: 
It should not be said that the sole role of foreign policy 
is to serve the security needs of the country... it should 
also not be said that foreign policy rests on the military 
might alone... In Israel's unique situation military strength 
should be perceived as the first guarantee but not the only 
one *for its survival, therefore the interrelationship 
between foreign policy and security policy should be much 1 
tighter. than in normal conditions of international relations. 
After the elections Ahdut Haavoda was a partner in the formation 
of the Club of Four, a framework of four opposition parties designed to 
create a joint united front for the coalitionary negotiations with 
Mapai. Yisrael Galili (Ahdut Haavoda) the Club's spokesman on defence 
demanded that rules be laid down to change Ben Gurion's practical 
Allon, Yigal (1959: 83)" A Curtain'of Sand Tel-Aviv. Hakibbutz 
Hameuhad. 
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monopoly. The Cabinet and Knesset should play a greater röle in 
decisions on foreign affairs and defence and supervision of the army 
and the defence establishment. ' In effect, his proposals to transfer 
powers held by the P time Minister and Minister of Defence'-to-the 
Ministerial Committee on Defence, as well as his demands to give the 
Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee greater supervisory 
powers over defence, were intended to achieve a greater democratization 
of the defence sphere. These measures would in effect fetter the 
political power both of Ben Guriön and his young guard. At the same time 
Galili was careful to point out that his proposals 
could be implemented without affecting the secrecy of 
-defence matters, or the procedure and discipline within 
the `IDF, and without introducing party dissension into 
the defence system. 1 
Thus Galili paid lip service to the hallowed principle of the depolitici- 
zation of the. defence sphere. 
Ben Gurion naturally objected to these demands and countered them 
with his traditional arguments that their fulfilment would lead to 
politicization of defence affairs. But the difficulties in forming a 
coalitionforced Eshkol to accede to several of the demands. In the 
end only a few were accepted, but this in itself spelled the beginning 
of Ben LGurion's loss of control over the defence sphere. This 
situation was an indicator of the changes taking place in the power 
relations within the Mapai leadership in the early fifties, Ben Gurion's 
status had been somewhat. weakened and the young guard who had not yet 
succeeded in consolidating their standing in the party suffered thereby. 
1 
Haaretz, 22 September 1961. See also deliberations of the Club 
of Four in the papers of that period. 
The veterans in contrast. gained strength and their alliance with 
Ahdut Haavoda was consolidated. 
These trends, which were already discernible in 1961 at the 
time of Ben Gurion's first tactical resignation, accelerated when he 
finally resigned in 1963. The veterans' power was augmented again 
when Levi Eshkol took over the Minister of Defence and Prime Minister 
portfolios. In the next two years the battle between the veterans and 
the young guard intensified and reached a total confrontation in 1965. 
After the Mapai party conference, which decided among other things, to 
establish an alignment with Ahdut Haavoda, Ben Gurion and-his followers 
seceded from Mapai on November 29th 1965 and formed a new party - Rafi - 
Israel-workers List. 
The elections to the Knesset in the same year strengthened the 
cooperation between the veterans (led by the troika Golda Meir, 
Zalman Aranne, Pinhas Sapir - and the Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defence Levi Eshkol) and the Ahdut Haavoda leadership. They now 
evolved the Alignment ,a joint party list for the elections to the 
Knesset, Histadrut and local authorities. 
2 
In contrast, Rafi's 
hopes to exploit Ben Gurion's public standing., together with the 
defence reputation of its own leadership with an election slogan 
'change', were dashed when it won only eleven seats in the Knesset. 
1 
2 
For an authentic description cf the split and. establishment of 
the new party, see Yanai, Nathan (1969) (Hebrew)A Split at the Top Tel 
Aviv. Levin Epstein. 
The term 'the veterans' hereafter means the sub-elite which 
included Mapai's second generation together with the Ahdut 
Haavoda leaders. 
LEVI ESHKOL- THE DE-BEN GURIONIZATION OF"SECURITY- 
Ahdut Haavoda's traditional demand for the democratization of 
civil control over the defence establishment, complemented the Mapai 
veterans' operative code and the personality and leadership instincts 
of Levi Eshkol, the new Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Under 
his baton the security sphere began to experience a process of de- 
Ben Gurionization. In a slow but clear process Eshkol began to 
modify the autonomist pattern of political-military relations imposed 
by Ben Gurion. He tried to alter the integrity of the boundaries 
between the army and the state institutions, the Cabinet, the 
Ministerial Committee of Defence, the Knesset and the Knesset Committee 
on Defence and Foreign Affairs. He increasingly exposed the army to 
these institutions and multiplied the contacts between them. He 
uncovered the security sphere and secularized and demystified security 
issues by, among other ways, enlarging the circle of those privy to - 
security secrets, thus terminating the monopoly over these 
secrets previously enjoyed by the"-cmall, -xclu-+-ve circle. 
He stopped the authoritative pattern of decision making in the 
security sphere and introduced the same pattern used by Mapai veterans in 
all other spheres, that is negotiations between leaders, a majority 
decision and the crystallization of an acceptable standpoint. 
Most of Eshkol's innovations in the relationship between the 
political institutions and the military were in the state channel and are 
considered in later chapters. What needs to be appreciated now is 
Eshkol's misconception that the changes introduced to transform the 
integral boundaries into permeable ones would necessarily strengthen 
civil control. The level of control is largely a function of the 
regulatory mechanisms between 
the two spheres, and Eshkol had no 
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opportunity to tackle that aspect. Being an authentic representative of 
the Mapai veterans, Eshkol rejected the attitude which wanted to anchor 
the political norms in a rigid institutional framework and relied more on 
the party arm than on the state arm. He preferred a flexible, non-. 
institutionalized structure which would enable him to, adapt the rules 
according to the situation. It is probable that in fact he had 
insufficient time to make those changes, because in the summer of 1967 
an entirely new situation existed, less than two years after the elections 
which had brought Eshkol to office. 
In the first half of the sixties two processes began to illuminate 
the flaws in Ben Gurion's pattern. The Lavon affair exposed the chasm 
between the imagined and the real pattern of civil control. For the first 
time since 1954 conflicts within the defence establishment were-visible, 
and it became known. that rival groups existed even within the military. 
Both members of the Knesset and the public were aware of-what happened in 
the security sphere, and accusations that civil control was too weak were 
heard to come not only from the opposition parties, but also from Mapai 
leaders themselves, notably from the former Minister of Defence and 
General-Secretary of the Histadrut Pinhas Lavon. Such a ferocious 
challenge to Ben Gurion's conduct in the security field had not been 
delivered since the Greenbaum Committee's report submitted during the 
-'fir -6f-1'tidependance: ' ---- 
After Rafi seceded from Mapai, the next step in the de-Ben 
Curionization of the security sphere was taken by Ben Gurion himself. 
In selecting that sphere as the main issue for his assault against 
Eshkol and his Government, Ben Gurion went against his own sermon 
delivered throughout the years that there must be national consensus 
in the security sphere. His attack on Eshkol's Government was partly 
made in public, and knowing that he could not go too far he limited 
his assault. He referred publicly without being specific to the 
major security blunder and the minor security blunder-. But among the 
political elite he left no doubt as to what he meant. Eshkol's 
readiness to slow down the pace of Israel's nuclear development and to 
move away from the programme designed to bring Israel into'the nuclear age, 
and to adopt a plan to develop a nuclear option. This, coupled with a 
willingness to grant the United States partial inspection rights over 
Israel's nuclear reactor in Dimona. in return for a massive conventional 
arms deal, constituted the major blunder. 
l The minor blunder concerned 
the clandestine activities of the Mossad in connection with the Ben 
Barka affair. 
2 
However the challenge which Rafi posed after the elections to the 
veteran Mapai leadership and its allies, was not so much based on its 
public prestige but more on" its power in the defence establishment. 
As in the case of the secession of Ahdut Haavoda in 1944, the main 
danger to Mapai now was loss of influence over the defence sphere, but 
with one basic difference. The Haganah of 1944, a voluntary organization 
based on the movement, had now been replaced by the 'IDF, a state army 
required by law to be disconnected from party politics. 
1 
2 
Aronson, Shlomo (1978: 45-55) Conflict and Bargaining in the , 
Middle East Baltimore and London. The John Hopkins University 
Press. 
See the Ben Barka affair in chapter 13. 
Eshkol did not have the image of an experienced defence 
politician, rather of someone experienced in economic development; 
and his aides and advisers whom he brought into the Ministry with 
him. shared the same background. His pleasant disposition, his 
willingness to compromise and his working style were diametrically 
opposed to Ben Gurion's autocratic and authoritarian manner. These 
attributes and his calculated actions to demystify- the security field 
all weakened the authority of Eshkol's government in the security 
sphere. In addition, a-sustained hostile campaign of criticism by 
Rafi's leaders, especially by Dayan and Peres who, were considered very 
knowledgeable on defence matters, could not fail to influence public 
opinion. In order to strengthen its position in the defence establishment, 
the veteran elite led by Eshkol used mainly the party channel. 
A group of Eshkol's loyalists was brought in at the pinnacle 
of the Ministry and Dr Zvi Dinstein MK the group's leader was 
appointed Deputy Defence Minister instead of Peres. 
' 
Rafi supporters 
felt pushed aside from prestigious and influential positions, while 
the veterans' supporters held their heads high. The Servicemens 
Department accelerated its activity inside the army, while the Party's 
leaders intensified their contacts and meetings with senior officers. 
A campaign to win hearts and minds was launched. Some retired officers 
close to the veterans took part in this campaign. In corps where there 
was more extensive support for Rafi a special effort was made, while 
the composition of the senior high command was altered so that the 
preponderance of veteran supporting officers overtook those who 
supported Rafi. 
The group also included the Director-General Moshe Kashti, and 
several people known as the 'Eshkol boys', including Yosef Sharon 
and Baruch Barak. 
k, 
However, this process did not continue for long enough to succeed, 
because external factors produced a political revolution and as a 
consequence a dramatic shift in the civil control pattern over the 
military. During the political crisis iqhich preceded the Six Day War in 
May 1967, known as the 'waiting period', the legitimacy of 
Eshkol's Cabinet in the security sphere disintegrated. There were 
increasing demands to establish a national unity coalition, to deprive 
Eshkol of the defence portfolio and later on, to bring Dayan into the 
Cabinet as Defence Minister. 
1 The veterans tried to obstruct Rafi's entry into 
power by modifying the structure of the defence establishment, but they failed. 
On 1 June a new structure in political-military relations was formed, 
when the two sub-elites shared control over the security sphere by 
having their-respective leading representatives appointed to the 
positions of prime minister and defence minister. 
Had Eshkol gone to war at the outbreak of the crisis, and assuming 
that the outcome had been similar to that of the June War, he would 
have secured his personal position in the defence sphere. Furthermore 
it might have damaged irreparably Rafi's traditional effort to 
consolidate itself as the most authoritative group in the security 
sphere. Had this happened Eshkol could have pursued his process of 
reform of civil control over the military, and'might perhaps eventually 
have been able to dispense with the party arm. Rafi's political power 
would have sustained a real blow, which might even have relegated it to 
the sidelines of Israeli politics. But Eshkol did not go to war 
immediately for which he paid a high price politically. Dayan became 
Minister of Defence and his party Rafi reaped the political fruits of 
the victory and reinforced its own defence image at the veterans' 
and Ahdut Haavoda's expense. 
1 See details of the 'waiting period' crisis in Chapter 13. 
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RAFI 'AND 'THE 1ETERANS JOINT 'CONTROL 
A new and much more complex pattern of control over defence 
was set up. For the first time defence was not the exclusive 
preserve of only one of the two sub-elites. In the absence of an 
institutionalized and clearly defined structure of relations between 
the military and political echelons, the conduct of defence affairs 
became the focus of the rivalry between them. 
I 
The characteristic expression of the joint control was the 
separation of the posts of Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, which 
were then held by leaders of the rival groups, Eshkol,, the Prime Minister 
and Dayan the Minister of Defence. The struggle revolved around the 
definition of the powers of the two ministers, and began as soon as 
Dayan joined the Cabinet. 
At dawn on the 9 June . l967 Dayan 'phoned directly to the 
Commanding Officer of the Northern Command. Major-General David Elazar; 
and ordered him to attack the Syrian Heights. He'had neither 
informed the Prime Minister nor received his approval and he did not 
attempt to transmit the order through the normal channels of military 
command via the Chief of Staff. Eshkol regarded this action as the 
onset of an attempt by Dayan to challenge his own authority in the 
security sphere, and the incident had a lasting effect on relations 
between them. 
1 
But the questions raised by Dayan: s'entry into the Ministry of 
Defence did not relate only to division of powers, hierarchical 
structure of political authority and the nature of the army's link 
with the civil sector. An even more fundamental issue was the very 
1 
Interview with Eshkol's then military secretary, Col. Israel 
Lior, l August 1977. The affair is described by Dayan in his diary 
(1976: 475) Milestones (Hebrew). Edanim. Jerusalem. 
location of the boundaries of the defence sphere. One controversial 
issue in that respect was the administration of the territories 
captured by the IDF during the war. Thg Government had to decide 
how to manage them. The Rafi leadership claimed that since these 
areas were under military occupation. the Ministry of Defence should 
administer them. The leaders of the old guard, and particularly the 
Prime Minister'and the Labour party Secretary-General. Pinhas Sapir, 
wanted to prevent Rafi from gaining more power and therefore 
endeavoured to hold on to the management of the territories. - 
The debate focused on the character of the military administration 
in the territories and the degree of subordination of the various 
governmental offices -through the Military Administration, tti the Minister 
of Defence . The power acquired by Rafi during the Six Day War was 
reflected'in the solution devised for that problem. - In summer 1967 a 
compromise was achieved and a military governor was appointed, 
subordinate to the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defence, with a 
general staff composed of functionaries appointed by Ministries and 
professionally answerable to them. 
But while on-the-spot the influence of the army and the Ministry 
of Defence was naturally"improving, in Jerusalem the Cabinet established 
a supreme ministerial Committee on the Occupied'Territories, headed by 
Pinhas Sapir. The Prime minister also took certain powers for himself, 
for example the conduct of political negotiations with the inhabitants 
of the territories. 'The Ministerial Committees were stumbling blocks 
to the Minister of Defence', and the issue preoccupied the political 
l 
leadership for some time. 
1 Tevet, Shabtai (1969: 70-73) The Curse of the Blessing (Hebrew) 
Tel Aviv. Shocken. Mapam, as Rafi's sworn rival, went so far as to 
propose that the administration of the territories should not be 
assigned to the Minister of Defence at all. See Rafi Kotzer, Hotam 
25 January 1974. 
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The unique situation which had prevailed since May 1967 whereby 
the two rival sub-elites of the Labour Party divided control of the 
defence sphere, became the decisive factor which determined political- 
military relations in Israel for the next decade. 
The events of the 'waiting period' and the war itself bolstered 
the position of those in Rafi who believed that,, given the concentric 
pattern of Israeli politics, it was preferable to fight for power from 
within rather than from without. For this reason Rafi did not-content 
itself with remaining in the Cabinet after the war, but joined the 
" talks on the merging of the Labour parties. On 21 January 1968'. 
the two groups which had broken away from Mapai, (Ahdut-Haavoda in 
1944 and Rafi in 1965)returned to the Mapai fold. and together they 
established the Israel Labour Party. 
The establishment of the new party did not at all imply 
recönciliation of the sub-elites. When Dayan expressed his 
support for the merger, he argued that his objective was 'to ensure 
that Eshkol will not be Prime Minister and Sapir. not Minister o. f Finance 
Under these conditions it was clear that the alliance between the 
veterans and Ahdut Haavoda would be strengthened. 
When Prime Minister Eshkol died in 1969 the old guard leadership 
tried to avert competition between the contenders for the throne, Dayan 
and Allon, consequently despite her advanced age, ill health, and 
partial retirement from politics, they chose Golda Meir. 
1 Dayan, M. (1976: 552)" 
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On the eve of the 1969 elections the tension between the two 
rival groups reached a new peak.. Rafi tried to exploit its post war 
public opinion gains to bolster its status within the Labour Party, 
anticipating the time when the premiership would eventually be handed 
on to the younger generation. They did this in two ways, by 
threatening to secede again if their demands were not met - and. by 
fostering a non-party movement on behalf of Dayan for the premiership. 
The veterans' response was to strengthen their relations with 
Mapam, whose leaders had over the previous decade moved away from 
their traditional position towards the centre. They were eager to 
cooperate with Mapai veterans to prevent Rafi's advancement. In 1969 
the alignment between the Labour Party and Mapam was forged on. 
the model of the alignment made with Ahdut Haavoda in 1965. 
Such activities however. were not confined to the overt party 
level. As in the past, the struggle was also waged inside the defence 
establishment. On the 10 February 1969 the Secretary-General of 
the Labour Party Pinhas Sapir received a letter from Aharon Tofler, 
who worked in the trade unions department at the Party's headquarters, 
dealing with labour relations in the Ministry of Defence. (Tofler was 
formerly the secretary of Mapai's branch in the Ministry of Defence. ) 
In his letter he asserted that since the changeover in the head of the 
Ministry, the contacts between the Director-General of the Ministry and 
the branch executive, where Mapai members were in control, had ceased 
and that 
they have begun to weed out senior officers associated 
with Mapai from the ministry. Arieh Sarig, Avraham Ben- 
Yoseph, Avraham Nivi, Mocka Limon, Zvi Zafriri, Hdim 
Carmon (all Rafi associates) have already received or 
will receive kgy positions at the expense of the ousted 
Mapai members. 
1 
Tofler's letter in the Labour Party's archives. 
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The substance of the letter was leaked to the press and was the issue 
for a question put to Dayan in the Knesset. His reply was predictable: 
The accusation of ostensible favouritism is groundless. 
But for the Minister's assistant, Zvi Zur and the 
Ministry's spokesman, all the other appointments were 
made in accordance with the usual procedures and were based on the qualifications of the candidates. l 
THE ' CLOSURE : OF ' THE ' SERVICEMEN'S ' DEPARTMENT 
As fears of a Rafi secession increased, the old guard stepped up 
its activity within the military command, under the nose of the 
Minister of Defence Dayan. This time the activities of the 
'Information Circles', the new title for the Servicemen's Department 
were exposed by Rafi against wh6m they were directed. 
2 
The revelation aroused a public storm. and Rafi led an onslaught on 
the old guard, levelling at them accusations of unprecedented gravity, 
namely that they were encouraging politicization of the army. 
On 23 January the Party bureau convened to discuss the matter, 
Rafi representatives fiercely condemning the establishment of the circle 
which had been taken without a decision by any authorized party forum. 
The circle contravenes the traditional separation between 
politics and army, and could lead to the involvement of 
officers on regular service in the internal struggle 
within the Labour Party 
said Gad Yaakobi, one of Rafi's leaders. Shimon Peres MK dwelt 
only on the procedural aspect, although he was deputy Secretary General 
he had never heard of the matter, was not a partner to discussion 
about-it, and was surprised by the revelation of its existence. He 
demanded that the bureau disassociate itself from the establishment of 
the circle and itnediately proclaim that its activities were suspended. 
3 
1 
2 
3 
See Haaretz, l2 March 1969. 
The circles were arranged by Col. (Res. ) Israel Granit who retired 
from the army on 31 October . and began to work as a special aide to 
the Party Secretary General Sapir. See the exposure of the affair by 
Shlomo Nakdimorl, Yediot Aharonot, 21 January 1969. 
The Labour Party had a Secretary- General. a Mapai representative, and 
two deputy secretaries from Rafi and Ahdut Haavoda. 
In the absence of the Party Secretary General Sapir, who was abroad, 
his deputy (Ahdut Haavoda) Avraham Givelber responded to the- 
criticism: 
The purpose. öf these circles is to engage in social 
activity, the clarification of social and political 
problems. These are not exclusive circles of servicemen, 
and they will operate accordingly and withii the frame- 
work accepted and permitted lby the 
*IDF. for membership 
in public and party bodies. 
The bureau decided to postpone further debate until after Sapir's 
return from abroad. 
Discussion in the bureau ostensibly revolved around the question 
of whether the activity had been granted, official party authorization 
and whether it was desirable for the Party to operate within the armed 
forces. But what really concerned the leadership of the Labour Party 
was another matter entirely. Why were the circles set up? The 
background was of course the internal struggle. The Mapai leaders, who 
had suffered in 1965 and 1967 because they lacked a 'defence image' 
unlike the Rafi leadership, wanted to insure themselves in the event of 
another split in party ranks. They therefore needed to improve their 
standing among demobilized officers, and particularly within the high 
command of the. 'IDF. 
2 
And, in fact, the attitude of the Labour Party to the revelation 
was directly related to the affiliation to the Party's two sub-elites. 
Whereas Rafi members denounced the circle, Mapai and Ahdut Haavoda 
argued that there were no grounds for criticism. The. critics of the 
circle based their arguments mainly on Para. A, 9 of the General Staff 
Regulations 33.0116. They claimed that this was a military gathering 
convened by a non-military authority and hence participation by 
servicemen was forbidden. 
3 
1 
2 
3 
Protocol of the Labour Party Bureau 23 January 1969. 
Yigal Allon, for example, was an active partner in the planning 
meeting of the circle. 
See e. g. Haaretz 27 January 1969. 
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The answer was simple, the circle was not merely a military 
gathering since it also encompassed reserve servicemen, like the 
Servicemen's Department of Mapai in its day. Anyone desirous of 
banning the existence of the circle would first have to amend the 
General Staff Regulations. 
l 
When they launched their campaign against the circle the Rafi 
leaders thought that they would be able to attack the party's 
veteran guard with this weapon, and Ben Gurion did, in fact, mention 
the regulations on several occasions. He said at one meeting inter 
alia: 
While I was Prime Minister and Minister of Defence the 
armed forces were never exploited, nor was any attempt 
made to exploit them for election purposes. 
But it very soon transpired that the Rafi sword was two-edged. When 
Sapir returned from abroad, he arranged for a member of the Bureau 
to ask a question to which he replied at a special Bureau session. 
For twenty years, he said, and throughout the terms of 
office of all Governments and all Ministers of Defence, 
Mapai maintained information circles within the frame- 
work of the Servicemen's Department and nobody questioned 
this... The information circle is not a function which 
was non-existent in the Party in the past, and it is not 
innovation. On the contrary, in Ben Gurion's fifteen 
years in office as Minister of Defence, there was a 
regular staff in the party apparatus dealing with 
servicemen. 
He recalled Dayan's role in the 1959 election campaign and mocked 
the fact that in the past those engaged in the task had received wages, 
while now Colonel (Res. ) Granit was 'doing the job on a voluntary basis. 
Golda Meir related that she herself had appeared. as foreign 
minister at such gatherings. When Peres claimed that Ben Gurion had 
objected, 'she replied firmly that if she had known that her appearances 
1 
2 
For the Mapai leaders' reply see Maariv. 27 January 1969 and Davar 
28 January 1969. 
Protocol of the Labour party Bureau, 23 January 1969. 
were anathema to Ben Curion she would not have attended. Golda Meir 
and Sapir were supported by the Minister of Education Zalman Aranne 
who said that opposition to the circles was hypocrisy. He was himself 
Party Secretary General during the first and-second Knessets and 
discussed activity among servicemen with Ben Gurion in order to ensure 
that they voted for the Party. 
Interesting light was thrown on the. affair by "- one- of- the. 
leader's of 
Rafi., Aharon Harel., in a letter sent at the end of January to Sapir. 
The Servicemen's Department was regarded, during the negotiations to 
allocate the party departments among the three uniting parties, as part 
of the trade unions : department. 
When I took up my post as 'director of the trade Unions 
department I wanted to activate the Department 
for Servicemen. I held talks with Kalderon, who told 
me that there was no interest in activating the circle 
which cold cause complications in internal party 
matters. Out of a desire to. maintain Party unity, 
I stopped dealing with the subject. I know that the 
Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan as against party 
activity within the armed forces. 
Harel went on to criticise the fact that, nonetheless, Granit 
had gone ahead and operated the circle, and added that Sapir. as 
Secretary General, should have 'brought such a sensitive matter up 
for discussion by the party institutions'. In any event, he, Harel, 
saw himself as responsible for the Servicemens' Department - as 
director of the trade lions department - and asked Sapir to instruct 
Granit to cease his activities. 'If not - there will be two information 
circles'. Sapir did not reply to that letter. 
1 David Kalderon was one of the Gush leaders, who had been chairman 
of the party's organisation department during Golda Meir's term 
as Secretary-General. 
2 Harel's letter to Sapir. Private archive of Shlomo Nakdimon. 
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The internal struggle which led to the revelations of activity 
within the army aroused angry reactions in all parties. On 23 January 
representatives of Gahal in the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee 
sent a cable to the Prime Minister. Levi Eshkol and several other 
Ministers in which they wrote: 
We have read with concern of the attempt. to manipulate 
army officers for political and party objectives. The 
legalistic interpretations to justify such activity are 
purely artificial. What matters is the very attempt to 
bring officers into the inter-party debate. The 
affection of the entire people is given to our army. 
It is a supreme value. It must not be undermined by 
factional pressures of any kind. We call on you to 
prevent this negative trend, which can endanger the great 
principle of the non-party character of the : IDF. We 
hereby inform you that we will raise this1grave problem 
for discussion by all state institutions. 
Violent criticism was directed against the Labour party in the 
last week of January. both in the Cabinet and the Knesset. On 
2 
15 February Yitzhak Klinghoffer, (Independent Liberal) submitted a motion to 
discussion 'the examination of party affiliations among IDF 
officers in order to activate them within a party framework'. He drew 
the attention of the House to the fact that the circle consisted 
exclusively of officers, and that it was significant that the man 
organizing the circle had once been the commanding officer in the IDF 
Officers' Training School: 
It is hard to believe that the role of officers in the 
circle will be solely to accept passively information on 
topical political problems which concern the leaders of 
the state. For this purpose there was no need to create 
an exclusive organizational framework for officers. Is 
there not room for apprehension that the circle could be 
exploited to supply information in the opposite direction, 
and that the Labour Party might be interested in obtaining 
information from. officers. on soldiers' political views 
and their party affiliation? What will be the feelings of 
officers who do not cooperate with'the circle. ' 
1 
2 
Press release by Gahal spokesman, 23 January 1969. 
See Defence Minister Dayan's words in the Knesset, 27 January 1969 
and also Justice Minister Yaacov Shimshon Shapira on 15 February 1969. 
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Will they not fear that their non-identification with the 
circle might lead to discrimination against them in matters 
of professional military advancement and promotion... Could 
this not tempt them to link their chances of success in their 
military career with attendance at this party information 
circle? 
He went on to describe how the Soviet Communist Party ensures the 
army's loyalty to the party apparatus by setting up party cells in 
each unit: 
I know that this is an extreme example.. But in-several other 
countries there are basically similar phenomena, although' 
perhaps less far-reaching. Is it our aspiration to enter 
into the family of these nations by approaching this 
pattern of relations between party and army? 
At the same session, an additional motion was submitted by Moshe 
Unna of the National Religious Party on the 'Preservation of the non- 
party nature of the IDF' . The Minister of 'Justice replied to both 
motions and reiterated the P"rime. I`Unister's statement at the Cabinet 
session of 26 January that it was a legal activity but recommended 
that the activities stop until Sapir'returned from abroad to clarify 
the matter. He proposed that the motions should not be discussed by 
the Knesset but should be transferred to the Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Committee. 
After Sapir's return the party leadership decided to suspend the 
activities of the circle and the debate died down. The discussion was 
buried in committee.. This 
was also the fate of a private member's bill 
submitted by Avraham Shostak (Free Centre) He wanted legislation 
to stipulate that: 
No soldier on active service may take part in any way in a 
public party activity, and no officer above the rank of 
lieutenant may, while on regular service, participate in any 
way in party activity even of a non-public nature. 
The proposal was never discussed. 
I 
1 See Haaretz, 13 February 1969. 
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How did the Labour Party leaders conclude the information circles 
affair? An unsigned editorial (written by the editor of Davar Yehuda 
Gothelf) and an article by Ysrael7Yishayaliu MK (under a pseudonym 
A. Yadid) clarified that. 
l 
According to the editorial: 
... Even in the future it will be desirable to strengthen 
the ideological affinity of officers to the Labour 
Movement. It is desirable for the popular character of 
the IDF and. is vital for Israeli democracy. But we 
must not create special political patterns for servicemen. 
We must avoid any shadow of suspicion that party 
politicization is being introduced into the army. It-is 
incumbent upon us to expand and deepen information among 
servicemen, but it is preferable to use accepted patterns 
for this purpose. 
What is. implied by 'strengthening ideological affinity'? How can 
so specifically a party activity be carried out without allowing other 
parties to do the same? And what is meant by 'accepted patterns'? 
After all the'activities of the Servicemen's Department were not 
easily reconciled with the literal letter of the law. 
Yishayahu took an even simpler view of matters. He saw the 
entire affair as a rightwing onslaught against the-Labour Party and 
its values: 
The concentrated onslaught by certain papers against 
the information circle is an alien, uninvited, 
tendentious intervention in the internal affairs of 
the Labour Party... The-truth is that there are no 
grounds for the 'patriotic' argument of 'danger of 
politicization' to the IDF from the information 
circle of the Labour Party, which is. merely reviving 
old activities. On the other hand there does exist a 
danger in the transparent political intentions wrapped 
up in the vociferous campaign against the Labour Party 
about the 'circle'.. This is the true danger and we 
must denounce it and return the fire. For in its 
campaign against the 'Granit circle' the anti-labour 
and revisionist right wing is trying to blacken the 
name of the present leadership of the Labour Party, to 
discredit it in the eyes of the public, and to cancel 
its historic achievements and practical success in 
uniting the Israeli Labour Movement for the coming 
elections. To our regret the rightwing is being supplied 
with ammunition by certain elements within the Labour 
Party itself, who spare no effort to undermine the 
unity won by great effort, step by step by the present 
leadership. 
1 Davar, 26 January and 4 February 1969. 
GOLDA 14 DAYAN AND RABIN V. PERES - RIVAL JOINT CONTROL 
Before the 1969 elections not only had the relationship between 
Rafi and the veterans deteriorated, but there had also been a decline 
in the harmony between the two groups comprising the veterans. The 
Ahdut Haavoda leadership, whose status had been severely undermined 
by Rafi's entry into the Cabinet, also tried to improve its position 
in anticipation of the coming power struggle. This exacerbated strains 
in the relations between the two partners in the political alliance and 
the Ahdut Haavoda representative in the Cabinet,. Yigal Allon. resigned 
from several Ministerial Committees, in protest against his exclusion 
from the inner defence forum of the-Cabinet. 
The need to placate their partners led the Mapai veterans once 
again to attempt to change the structure of the defence system and to 
establish institutions, frameworks and new bodies without connection 
to any imminent need in this sphere. One measure was an effort to set 
up a limited Ministerial Committee on national defence, to be composed of 
. the 
Prime Minister, his Deputy and the Defence and Foreign Ministers. 
This initiative failed because the coalitionary partners who were not 
included in the new committee objected. * 
A more farreaching proposal was made to operate a new ministry, to 
be known as the Ministry for I? ternal Security, incorporating some of 
the functions of defence, such as responsibility for the security 
services, the police and border police. This attempt to erode the 
powers of the Ministry of Defence, which was under Rafi control, also 
failed. The crisis was eventually settled without structural changes by 
fortifying the political partnership between Ahdut Haavoda and Mapai 
and granting higher status to Allan in the defence sphere. He was 
given access to confidential material from the Mossad and Military 
Intelligence, and was made a party to the-Prime Minister's 
consultations on defence. 
l 
The murder of the Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympics 
in September 1972 presented yet another opportunity for the two 
sub-elites to concentrate their continuing power struggle on an 
issue involved with control over the security sphere. On this 
occasion the debate centred around the control over the anti- 
terrorist activities of the-Shin Bet and the Mos'sad, two bodies 
which fell under the Prime Minister's supervision. 
The Palestinian attack in Munich provoked Prime Minister Golda Meir 
to appoint a committee to examine the incident. However the discussion 
inside the political and military establishments was quickly diverted 
to the rivalry of the two sub-elites, for whom the overriding question 
was, who should control the anti-terrorist campaign? As in the past. 
Dayan and Rafi's supporters found plenty of ammunition as to why his 
Ministry should have the overall responsibility. The veterans' 
supporters, on the other hand, maintained that to transfer responsibility 
over Shin Bet and the Mossad from the Prime Minister's office to the 
Defence Ministry would concentrate such power in Dayan's hands that it 
would threaten Israeli democracy. 'The concentration of anti-terrorist 
means in the hands of the defence minister... has nothing to do with 
injuring democracy',, A. Schweitzer wrote in Haaretz. 
In the same way that his control over a system incorporating 
300,000 people and swallowing more than one fifth of our 
economic resources does not endanger democracy, sq the 
addition of new functions will not endanger it... 
1 
2 
" 
Interview with Yigal Allon, 29 September 1977. See"also Haaretz, 26, 
9. ' 
. 
27,30,31 January 1969 and 2 February, 1969 and 12 October -f9-69. * 
Avraham, Schweitzer; 'Hääretz, 6 October 1972. 
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suggestions ostensibly for anti-terrorist operations. 
At the end of the sixties the composition of the old guard changed 
as the last of the leaders of the Second and Third Aliyot departed 
whereas the Rafi leadership remained almost the same. Levi Eshkol died 
in 1969, and Aranne, Namir and others resigned. Golda Meir, who was 
then Prime Minister, and the younger Pinhas Sapir were the last of the 
veterans. 
As the seats were vacated the preponderance of leaders from the 
three other groups in this sub-elite increased: they were the younger 
leaders of the Gush, the heads of the intermediate generation, and 
senior officers who had retired from the army and were brought into 
the leadership by the old guard to strengthen its authority on defence. 
The lesson of the 'waiting period' had been learned and this time the 
old guard bolstered its position by calling in defence experts with 
considerable public prestige, the former Chiefs of Staff Barley and 
Rabin. 
The Yom Kippur War partially confirmed forecasts. The failure of 
the political-defence leadership to-anticipate the outbreak of 
hostilities and the political outcome of_the war itself, seemed liable 
to bring about not only Dayan's personal downfall as minister of 
defence, but also to end Rafi's control of the defence portfolio. 
Paradoxically the person who prevented this was Golda Meir. 
of the debate about thinly veiled accusations and 
His newspaper colleague summarised the affair when he said that: 
The Munich tragedy and the battle against terrorism have 
been. dragged, to out sorrow and disgust, into the arena 
of the war of succession. The competition between the 
leading Government personalities dictates the substance 
1 Zeev Shiff, Haaretz, 3 October 1972. 
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She feared that Dayan's resignation might ignite a chain reaction 
which could lead to her own demise, and she therefore supported him 
vehemently and neutralized many of the pressures against him. 
1 
The 
Knesset elections were too close to the war to be affected by it. 
However the political crisis was too acute to enable the new 
government to remain in power with a similar format to the outgoing 
Cabinet. As opposition from within and outside the Labour Party 
grew, Golda Meir was forced'to resign and Dayan with her. The 
political blow fell on the two elites, both suffering equally. 
When the party came to select a candidate to replace Golda Meir, 
the two camps again confronted one another, though with somewhat altered 
compositions. Dayan was replaced by Shimon Peres as number one in the 
Rafi leadership, while the old guard and Ahdut Haavoda selected Yitzhak 
Rabin, formerly the chief of staff and ambassador in Washington, as their 
candidate. The latter had made a wise choice in selecting an army man 
" with considerable authority in his sphere to contest the battle which 
they finally won. 
The balance of power between the two groups, however, had shifted. 
In the elections held by the Labour Party central committee (this was 
the first time that the party had voted for a premier in internal 
elections when two candidates were standing) Rabin won 298 votes and 
Peres 254. In the past the veterans had always enjoyed an absolute 
majority in the central committee. 
2 
1 
2 
See details in Margalit, Dan (1971) Message from the White 
House (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Otpaz. The Minister of Justice, Y. S. 
Shapira, who had demanded that Golda Meir fire Dayan, was himself 
forced to resign. 
According to the merger agreement, Mapai was allocated 56% in 
party central institutions and Rafi and Ahdut Haavoda 21.5% each. 
This new balance surfaced again immediately after these elections 
in the renewed fight for control over defence. 'Shimon Peres and Rafi made 
-their membership of the Government conditional on the receipt. of the defence 
portfolio. Rabin opposed this and tried to prevent it, but it became 
the thorniest issue"in the coalitionary negotiations. 
When it transpired that Peres' condition was an ultimatum, Rabin 
had to concede. Rafi remained in the defence establishment-and-the 'pattern of 
divided authority created in 1967 endured, though it was now even more 
complex. First, because the two sub-elites had almost equal power, 
secondly because the new Prime Minister was a'former army man and the new 
Minister of Defence a civilian. 
In this situation the power struggle again focused on the defence 
sphere and imposed real constraints on the upper echelons of national 
defence policy, making reminiscent of the 1954 crisis between Sharett, 
Lavon and Dayan. Decisions taken on other structural matters during the 
term of Rabin's government, such as the Basic Law: The Army (1975), which 
determined, inter alia. the method of appointing the Chief of Staff, 
problems concerning the establishment of a war cabinet and other operative 
matters (from the defence budget and arms purchase policy, to military 
operations like Entebbe), were made in the shadow of the confrontation 
between Rabin and Peres. ' 
That incident, examined in depth in Chapter 9, demonstrates 
yet again that the two rivals manipulated the structure of the 
defence system. At no time during the Government's term were they 
deterred by the disfunctional implications of their efforts to 
introduce structural changes in the system and to alter the pattern 
of political-military relations. 
The extraordinary innovation was the creation of the new post of 
Military Adviser to the ? rime minister -a position especially tailored 
by Prime. Minister Rabin for Major-General (Res. ) Arik Sharon. It 
caused a political storm, a constitutional tangle, and severely disrupted 
the relationship between the military and political establishments. 
Sharon's resignation after about a year in office. was not surprising, 
after which the post was discontinued. 
As a prominent member- of the Prime Ministerts staff, the Adviser' 
. was the long arm reaching into the army hierarchy, which included the 
Minister of Defence, the Chief of Staff and the G. H. Q. `-" 
The Chief of staff recognised that the new appointment in effect 
cancelled his role as the Cabinet's sole military adviser. The Minister 
of Defence interpreted the new post as a means for the Prime Minister 
to by-pass him, and constituted the opening of a direct channel into the 
army. An additional complication was the fact that Sharon had a 
reserve post as. a Corps Commander, and was consequently responsible to 
the Ghief of Staff. He was, therefore, at one and the same time a 
subordinate to the Chief of Staff, and. politically an informal 
superior. In addition, Sharon was a political personality, one of the 
leaders of the major opposition party Likud, and he had been an MK. 
He resigned from the Knesset after the Cabinet had decided on the Ist 
December 1974 to forbid a member of the Knesset, ranked colonel or 
above, to have any active role in the IDF. His appointment as Adviser 
to the Prime Minister did not contravene any law, but it was manifestly 
contrary to the spirit of the Government's decision to prevent active 
politicians from occupying senior army posts. 
On the eve of the 1977 Knesset elections. Rabin resigned his post. 
This was triggered off by the scandal about his and his wife's violation of 
the foreign currency regulations by maintaining a bank account in 
Washington.. but he was, by this time, already aware that he was losing 
the power struggle and that even more bitter fights with Peres and'his 
followers awaited him in the future. In March the Party central 
dommittee again selected-him as their candidate for premier, but his 
majority was greatly reduced, to 41 out of 2,849 voters. The vote was 
taken at the Party's conference 'and not by the=central committee. 
Rabin was succeeded by Peres as party candidate for the 
premiership, and as head of the old guard by his former deputy 
Allon. But as in 1974 the candidate could not guarantee the joint- 
appearance in the elections of the two party sections without . 
bestowing the defence portfolio on the rival group. Despite violent 
opposition by the Rafi leadership to relinquish their traditional 
status on defence, Peres was obliged to come to an agreement with Allon 
and to promise him the portfolio. The one thing not taken into 
consideration when they drew up the agreement was that the party might 
lose the elections, which they did. 
l 
The struggle between the LabourýMovement 't two sub-elites for control 
over defence was not a conflict between two different-schools about 
foreign affairs and security issues. Contained within the Mapai 
veterans' elite there were Ministers such as Zalman Aranne and Pinhas 
Sapir who supported the conciliatory approach with the Arabs, adopted 
in Sharett's day. Coexisting with them were those like Golda Meir, 
1 See an interview with Allon, Migvan, 25 July 1977-- '"In the first 
stage of the negotiations (between Allon and Peres) I sensed a 
desire to slam the gates of the Defence Ministry and I stood my 
ground that the Ministry of Defence will not be out of bounds. 
It was, an attempt to establish a monopoly in a very important 
office... ' 
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who showed Ben Gurion's real politik approach. At the pinnacle of 
Ahdut Haavoda were leaders like Galili who shared with their rivals in 
Rafi, such as Diyan, the same. attitudes towards the territorial 
problems. These attitudes opposed those of their allies in Mapai. 
In the early 1960's the two sub-elites confronted each other over the 
question of the realization'of a nuclear capacity. However, the 
decision in 1963 to make the IDF a conventional army, coupled with 
an intention-to create a nuclear option, (and the decision in 1967 to 
accelerate these developments) reduced the topicality of that issue to 
a secondary level. 
I 
The lack of congruence between the lines dividing 
the sub-elites on the one hand, and their views on security and 
foreign affairs on the other became-outstanding after 1967, and 
reached bizarre proportions when in 1971 the 'hardliner' Dayan urged 
an Israeli-Egyptian disengagement of forces agreement, which. would 
involve Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal, while at the same time 
the Ahdut Haavoda 'doves' opposed it. 
2 
The need for a common 
identification together with the power struggle, guided the policies of 
the sub-elites to a greater degree than genuine foreign policy and 
defence considerations. In as much as the power struggle influenced the 
policies of the Labour Movement, so did it affect the pattern of the 
relationship between the political system and the military. 
The most refined manifestation of the competition between the two. 
sub-elites was the composition of the IDF's. upper levels. 
2 
Aronson asserts the existence of two fundamental and conflicting 
strategic concepts held by Rafi and Ahdut Haavoda, a proposition 
which should be treated cautiously. Aronson, Shlomo (1978). 
Interview with Abba Eban, 17 July 1977. 
THE 'HIGH COMMAND STRUCTURE REFLECTS" THE'PARTY'"'POLITICAL`BALANCE 
If the IDFchad been- a genuine instrumental army, the changes in 
the balance of power between the sub-elites of the Labour Party might 
have been reflected largely in the governmental control of defence and 
perhaps, to a lesser degree, in the two top civil posts of the defence 
establishment. But, in practice, parallel significant political. changes 
also took place in the military command. 
Ben Gurion's measures to decrease the number of Mapam officers and 
supporters of other parties in the 'IDF ranks, and to promote those, 
who were loyal to his own party line have already been recounted. Key 
positions'were earmarked in the fifties for party loyalists. Out of 44 
top rank holders - Chiefs of Staff, Chiefs of Operations, Intelligence 
and Manpower Branches - during the years 1949-1977 about 70% were identified 
members of Mapai, 15% non-active supporters of Mapai, and only about 15% 
were neither members of noir associated with Mapai. But the connection 
between the Labour movement and the political composition of the senior 
officer group continued throughout the sixties and reflected the state 
of the struggle between the two elites. Concomitantly with the change 
in the balance of political power there also occurred a change in the rel- 
ative weight of officers affiliated to, or associated with each of these 
groups. The seventy six generals who held positions in the General Staff 
from 1951 to 1977 can be classified into three categories according to 
party identification. At one end of the spectrum are 29 officers of an 
irrefutably political character, at the other 31 apolitical officers, and 
midway between are 16 with partial party association. 
' 
1 The number includes several cols. whose Postings *entailed. 
appointment to the General Staff. In later years these posts were of 
maj. -gen. rank. The criteria for degree of party identification 
was formal party affiliation, party activity during military service 
and the testimony of the candidate or others. 
The political officers can be divided into four groups. The first 
contained officers'who were members of Mapai even before statehood, most 
reaching the higher echelons of military command while still in the 
Haganah, together with some younger men who achieved senior positions 
after the War of Independence. The second comprised members of Mapai, 
who were particularly closely associated with Ben Gurion and even more 
so with Moshe Dayan. (Affiliated to them were junior officers who 
retired in the early fifties and were among the founders of the young 
guard of Mapai. led by Dayan. ) 
The third group consisted both of members of Mapam and more 
particularly of Ahdut Haavoda. The great majority were former Palmah 
members who stayed in the IDF and maintained contact with the Ahdut 
Haavoda party leadership. The last group included officers associated 
with Ahdut Haavoda, who had moved away from it after the establishment 
of the state and gradually gave their support to the Mapai old guard. 
The strengthening of political ties between the old guard and Abdut 
Haavoda was also demonstrated in relations between the two latter 
groups to the point when it became difficult to differentiate between 
them. 
l 
Examination of the balance of power between the three categories 
constituting the military elite, as classified by party identification 
reveals an interesting process. Immediately after statehood there was a 
relatively high number of non-party officers in the IDF. The 
proportion decreased in the second half of the fifties and throughout 
the sixties, but xoge again 
in the aeventjea when non, rparty 
officers account for the great majority of the General Staff. The 
1 Typical examples of members of the four groups are respectively: 
Maj. Gens. Avidar and Zadok, Col. Shadri and the younger Maj. -Gens. 
Doron and Geva; Lieut. -Gen. Zur, Maj. -Gens. Simhoni, Herzog and 
Gavish; Lieut. -Gens. Rabin and Elazar and Maj. -Gen. Zamir; Lieut. 
Gen. Barlev and Maj. -Gen. Yaffe. 
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difference is that in the early fifties, these officers were mainly 
British Army veterans promoted by Ben Gurion, whereas in recent years they 
have been officers who have received most, if not all, of their military 
training in the IDF, 'and who had served"in"the Haganah of Palmah Only 
in junior positions. 
A more interesting phenomenon is the ratio between the three groups 
of the twenty-nine political officers. At the beginning of the 
fifties veteran Mapai supporters had considerable weight in the military 
command. Within a short period most of them retired from service and the 
Mapai group associated with Moshe Dayan and Rafi gained power.. In contrast, 
during the sixties, this group forfeited importance significantly and the 
number of the supporters of the old guard and Ahdut Haavöda increased 
dramatically. The change in the balance between the various groups was 
particularly striking in the senior staff positions. 
Is the parallel between the shift of the power relations of the 
officers who supported the sub-elites and the changing power relations 
between the two sub-elites coincidental? There appears to be 
congruence between this process and another process which affected the 
military elite in that period: a change in the balance of power between 
officers with different pre-IDF, backgrounds: Palmah, Haganah and 
British Army. After statehood former Palmah members were a small 
minority in the IDF senior'staff. Their weight increased from the 
early sixties and reached its peak in the late sixties and early 
seventies. Veterans of the British Army, on the other hand, were quite 
a large group in the fifties, but became a very minor factor in the 
sixties. Haganah veterans were in a dominant position in the early 
fifties, on the decrease in the mid-fifties to the early seventies, and 
have since then been on the rise. 
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The change in the ratio between the group of officers by pre- 
IDF career appears to explain the-change-in the political 
constitution of the military elite, since there is a connection 
between the pre-IDF career and party affiliation: supporters of 
Ahdut Haavoda and the old guard were mostly from the Palmah, the 
majority of non-political officers are British Army veterans; Haganah 
veterans are the most variegated group, though the proportion of 
veteran Mapai supporters among them is higher than in the other two 
groups. 
What is the cause and what the effect? 
Is the changed composition of the military elite the outcome of their 
political affiliation or of the variation'in the pre-IDF backgrounä. 
The patterns of advancement of IDF commanders seem to pbint'to this 
"latter connection. 
The procedure for promotion of IDF officers does not involve 
objective tests of achievement. Promotion is not dependent on the 
opinion of bodies- outside the military, fulfilment of external 
criteria or even the recommendation of army committees. What 
determines it, in the last analysis, is the opinion of the immediate 
superiors based on the officer's conduct. 
This resulted in the evolution of groups of officers in therIDF 
who*were associated both professionally and socially. Senior officers 
usually headed these groups and enjoyed a privileged position, and 
they pulled along with them a cluster of more junior officers. In the IDF slang 
the senior officers were named 
'horses' and the clusters 'courts'. 
Clusters originating in the paratroops for example, or the two opposing 
groups within the armoured corps - Barley's and Tal's groups - illustrate 
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the phenomena of officer cliques. 
' 
The entry of several 'horses" into the high command explains the 
subsequent increase in the number of officers of similar background or 
"courts'. 2 Furthermore, although the 'allocation committee's 
determines appointments from the rank of colonel up, and the. Minister 
of Defence must approve them, it is actually the Chief of Staff- who 
plays the decisive part, and can 
extent as he chooses. 
3 
shape the general Staff to as great an 
However a careful scrutiny of many appointments demonstrates that 
in cases where there were two candidates with the same pre-DF 
background, one was preferred to the other bacause of the political 
ingredient. The conclusion is inescapable that, side by side with 
professional and social considerations, the composition. of the senior 
command in the IDF was also affected by party political criteria. 
These considerations not only ensured that the high -command would be 
virtually free of officers who did not support the Labour Movement, but 
they also influenced the power relations between the officers who 
belonged to the two rival sub-elites inside the Labour movement. 
1 During David Elazar's term as Chief of Staff the key positions in 
the G. H. Q. were held by commanders originating in the Armoured 
Corps 
_, e. g. 
his deputy Maj-Gen. Tal, the Commander 
of the Southern Command. Shmuel Gonen. During- the term. of-. the ex- 
paratrooper Mota Gur many more paratrooper graduates reached 
key positions, among them, the Commander of the Southern Command 
Dan Shomron andof'the. Central. Command Moshe Levi. 
2 This problem preoccupied the IDF in the wake of the Yom 
Kippur War. See Bartov, H. (1978) and Col. (Res. ) Hasdai, Yaakov 
(1978), Truth in the Shadow of War-(Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Zmora 
Bitan Modan. 
3 During 1975-7 discussions were conducted with the Minister of 
Defence Shimon Peres on this issue and it was proposed that 
procedures be amended in order to counter the influence of one 
man, the Chief of Staff in the sphere of appointments. Inter alia, 
it was proposed that the powers of the Allocation Committee, composed 
of Major-Generals, be expanded, but this was not approved. 
In 1952 Chief of Staff Mordehai Makleff wanted to appoint 
Yitzhak Rabin his deputy, but Ben Gurion vetoed the proposal 
preferring Moshe Dayan with whom he had a stronger political 
affinity. 
l 
Rabin was probably a more proficient officer, but he had 
maintained his relations with Mapam leaders. Meir Amit too was 
appointed Chief of Operations Branch in preference to Rabin, because 
of his political loyalty and in spite of Rabin's seniority and 
experience. 
2 
On the other hand, when in 1963 Chief of Staff Rabin 
had to appoint a new head for the Manpower Branch, Prime Minister 
Eshkol told him unambiguously: 'I don't care whom you are going to 
appoint, just as long as he is a true Mapai man'. 
3 
The competition between the Major-Generals Haim Barley and Ezer 
Weizman for the post of Chief of Staff were more complex, having an 
overt and a covert level. Weizman, formerly Chief of Operations 
Branch under Chief of Staff Rabin and as such second in the IDF 
hierarchy, sustained a blow during the 'waiting period' in 1967 when 
Barley was called back to active service from Europe. 
On the 1st June Eshkol appointed Barley to the vacant post of 
deputy Chief of Staff. He had, in effect reduced Weizman to number 
three in the hierarchy, thus decreasing his chances to succeed Rabin. 
The reason for Barley's appointment was no secret. On the same day 
Eshkol had to surrender to political pressures to bring Rafi into the 
Cabinet and to relinquish the defence portfolio to Dayan. The appointment 
of Barley, who was-formerly a Mapam member, but who had-drawn 
closer to the Mapai veterans, was intended to augment Eshkol's 
loyalists in the army senior command on the very day that Dayan 
became Defence Minister. It also indicated his intentions about the 
successor to Rabin. 
1 
2 
3 
See Hashavia, Arieh (1969: 178) One Eye to Mars, Biography of 
Moshe Dayan (Hebrew) Tel Aviv, Ahiasaf. 
Interview with Maj. -Gen. Aharon Yariv, 13 July 1977. 
Interview with Yitzhak Rabin, 4 May 1979. 
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On the'eve of Rabin's last days in office Eshkol did'not conceal 
his preference for Barleu to Weizman. Unlike Barleu, Weizman did not 
share Eshkol's political views. Throughout his military service 
he did not hide his activist hardline inclinations and he even 
advocated openly inside the army the need to initiate a war to conquer 
the West Bank. 
l 
When the Mayor of Haifa Abba Hushi, an active leader of Mapai, 
proposed to Eshkol that he appoint Weizman Chief of-Staff, Eshkol replied: 
ft- 
Why must Ezer be the next Chief of Staff? What's wrong 
with Barley? Ezer set up the Air Force and deserves 
respect for that. But his views are close to those of Gahal. 
Why are you pressuring me for Ezer? 
2 
But Eshkol had not told Hushi the whole truth. What persuaded 
Eshkol not to choose Weizman was not so much his affinity to Gahal or 
his activist policies, but his position concerning the two sub-elites 
within the Labour P-arty. Since the fifties Weizman had been a personal 
friend and political ally of the then Director-General of the Defence 
Ministry Shimon Peres. During Rabin's term as Chief of Staff, 
Weizman cooperated . with Peres on many 
issues, even behind the back of 
his superior Rabin. 
3 
The climax of the Weizman-Peres collaboration was 
during the 'waiting period', when Weizman was one of the dominant officers 
who lobbied strenuously for Rafi's inclusion in the Cabinet and Dayan's 
transfer to the Ministry of Defence. This, more than anything else, 
sealed his fate and prevented his receiving the Chief of Staff's baton 
from a Cabinet led by a Mapai veteran. Eshkol spoke to Hushi as a party 
colleague against Gahal supporters, and in so doing he concealed his real 
motive, which was not to appoint someone from the rival sub-elite to 
which Hushi inclined. 
I 
2 
3 
See Weizman, Ezer (1975: 120-125) On Eagles Wings (Hebrew) 
Tel Aviv. Maariv. 
Shlomo Nakdimon Yediot Aharonot, 19 December 1969. 
Rabin, Yitzhak (1979: 420) Memoirs . 
(Hebrew) Tel Aviv- Naariv. 
The struggle between the Labour Party's two sub-elites took a 
more acute form vis-a-vis staff appointments after control of defence 
was divided -'in 1967, and the case of Barley was only one example. 
A similar case occurred in 1969 when Yishayahu Gavish and David Elazar 
contended for the post of Chief of Operations Branch. The former was closely 
associated with Dayan-and the latter, who was affiliated to Ahdut Haavoda, 
enjoyed the support of the Chief of Staff Barley and the Premier Golda 
Moir. Elazar got the job. and was in fact appointed Chief of Staff 
several years later, while Gavish resigned from the IDF. 
1 
These confrontations of which the public was unaware at the time, 
became generally known after the Yom Kippur War. When the Government 
was about to decide on the appointment of a new Chief of Staff after 
Elazar's 1974 resignation, Allon supported former Palmah member 
Yitzhak Hofi, who was associated with the Ahdut Haavoda leadership, while 
Dayan favoured Mordehai Gur, Haganah veteran and his own disciple in 
the IDF. Gur had the advantage of having been absent from. Israel 
during the October War and was hence untainted by the'war of the generals. 
that preceded it, and so it was. he who won the day. Hofi resigned from 
the army and was later appointed Director of the Mossad. 
Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the assertion that the 
changes in the power relationship between the sub-elites are reflected in 
the army is as follows: out of five Chiefs of Staff appointed under 
Ben Guriön three joined Rafi after their retirement and were Rafi 
candidates for the Knesset and for public posts (Dayan, Zvi Zur and 
Yaakov Dori). Of the three Chiefs of Staff appointed under Eshkol and 
Meir two (Rabin and Barley) joined the Cabinet as supporters of the old 
guard, and a third would have joined the veterans group had he not died 
prematurely. 
2 
1 Interview with Haim Barlev021 July 1977. On the other hand, Moshe 
Dayan as Minister of Defence preferred to appoint one of his close 
associates Maj. -Gen. Eliyahu Zeira as Chief of Intelligence, and the 
relations between Dayan, Elazar and Zeira had an impact on 
developments on the eve of the Yom Kippur War and during its course. 
See Bartov, H. (1978: 313). 
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THE IDF -A MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
The division of control between the two sub-elites over the 
defence establishment was not the only effect which the Six Day War had 
on political-military relations. It also reawakened the question 
of the collective identity of Israeli society and the significance of 
security in its definition, and made the IDF an army of occupation. 
These two elements gave-a new-, dimension-to the'IDV's, political 
involvement and enhanced the political-military partnership. 
When the June War ended the IDF was in control of four areas: 
the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, Sinai and the West Bank. Together 
those territories comprised about 70,000 sq. kms, compared with the 
26,000 sq. kms within Israel's pre-1967 boundaries. Living within the 
captured territories were almost one million Arabs, compared with 
2.8 million Israeli citizens. The problems of the Occupied Territories 
were focused in the West Bank -Judea and Samaria- not only because 
the largest Arab population was concentrated there but because that 
region was an integral part of 'Eretz Israel'. to which the Zionist 
movement asserted a claim of patrimony based on historical, religious, 
security, legal and moral arguments. 
Although Israel disputed the legal status of the West Bank, 
challenging the legitimacy of Jordan's annexation in 1950, Israel was 
recognized as the 'lawful belligerent occupant' of the territories. 
l 
Consequently the Government agreed to comply de facto with the relevant 
See Gerson, Allan (1978) Israel, the West Bank and International 
Law London. Cass. 
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provisions' contained in the Hague and Geneva Conventions of 1907 
and 1979. The Government's de facto acceptance of the Conventions 
meant'that there was no automatic transfer of sovereignty over the 
Occupied Territories to the State of Israel, hence their administration 
was left in the hands of the military. After June 1967 the IDF, which 
is part of the executive, confronted a novel situation when'it acquired 
through the Military Government of the Occupied Territories, 
administrative, legislative and judicial powers over civilians. 
The fact that the army had civil, administrative functions and 
a policing role had an impact throughout the IDF and not only, on the 
units of the Military Government. The IDF became ä political factor 
not only vis-S-vis the inhabitants in the territories, but also in 
relation to the political system in Israel. Even if Israel had, seen 
itself as a 'temporary' Trustee- Occupant for the territories and as 
such had not wanted to change their character, it would have been difficult 
for the IDF, an army of occupation, not to become actively engaged in 
political issues centred on the territories. 
However, contrary to the International Conventions which prohibit 
a''lawful belligerent occupant' from effecting any legal or institutional 
changes in occupied territories, beyond what is necessary to restore 
public order, or for the. -welfare of the population or military necessities, 
the Government of Israel has adopted a policy of changing the status quo 
in the territories to influence their future. That policy was 
implemented primarily by "the Military Government, hence the IDF also 
became involved with the political debate inside'Israel as to the wisdom 
and purpose of that policy. 
l 
See Drori, Moshe (1975) The Legislation in Judea and Samaria 
(Hebrew) The Institute for Research. Hebrew University, Jerusalem. 
Since June 1967 the Military Government has operated in three areas, 
security, administration and institutional change. First, the IDF 
had to guard and secure the cease-fire lines against belligerent actions 
either by the standing armies of the Arab states, or by irregular groups. 
It had also to secure law and order inside the Occupied Territories and to 
protect the State of Israel from terrorist sabotage actions which 
originated in the territories. 
Secondly, the Military Government had to perform administrative 
functions for the local population at either national or local levels. 
Israel did not perceive that role as static, but acted dynamically to 
develop the territories and the municipal services. And finally 
institutional changes implemented by the IDF were made not for the 
welfare of the local inhabitants, but to consolidate Israeli interests 
in the territories. The-transfer of land, connecting the territories 
to the Israeli infrastructure, and establishing Jewish settlements became 
in fact a creeping annexation of the territories. 
From the beginning of the occupation Defence Minister Dayan 
pursued the principle of non-intervention as the-basis for Israeli conduct 
in the territories. It implied a maximum limitation of the Israeli 
Military Government's involvement in local affairs, and in 
seventies only 650 out of 160,000 local officials were Israelis. 
Dayan's policy was intended to minimize the points of friction 
between the IDF and the local populace. 
l It was also designed to 
decrease the political nature of the activities of the IDF and to 
depoliticize the Military Government, both in its relationship with the 
local Arabs and with Israel. That was one reason why Dayan placed 
the Military Government directly under his authority and constructed an 
organizational framework which gave the Minister full and direct control 
1 See Tevet, Shabtai (1969). 
over the Military Government. 
It was foreseeable that Dayan's efforts to neutralize the 
IDF politically would fail. The territories and their population - 
were at the centre of the natiotial discordan&_the Military 
Government had to implement institutional changes there. For that 
reason,.. the IDF's involvement with the most significant political 
debate in Israel went beyond what it would have been, had the army 
functioned purely as an administrator. 
Decision making on occupational matters became subject to 
the authority of three different levels of Israeli government: 
the cabinel level, the ministry level and that of-the regional 
and district military commands. The Cabinet Committee, headed 
by the Prime Minister, assumed responsibility for formulating 
major policies. The Inter-Ministerial Committee for the 
Coordination of Activities in the Territories dealt with political 
and security problems. The Director-Genreal's Committee for 
Economic Affairs was in charge of economic issues, and the Unit 
for Coordination Activities in the Territories, a section of the 
Ministry of Defence, became responsible for coordination of all 
non-military operations in the territories. The Military 
Commander of the West rank assumed full legislative and executive 
authority in the area. 
The formal description does not reflect the power structure of the 
Military Government. Each of the four occupied regions has a Military 
Governor who is 'at the apex of the Military Government in that 
particular district and operates under the law virtually as a head of 
state'. 
2 
The Military Governor has a command and staff structure similar 
to all other IDF units, and in addition has a staff arm which represents 
1 
2 
Gerson, A. (1978: 112-113). 
See an article published by the former Coordinator of the Activities 
in the Occupied Territories Brig. -Gen. Shlomo Gazit (1970: 27) 'The 
Administered Territories: Policy and Action'(Hebrew) Maarahot Vol. 204. 
the different Israeli civil Ministries. However, even that is 
headed by an officer, and though the professional attachment of 
the staff officers is to their-parent Ministry, they are also 
subject to the command authority of the IDF's district military 
commander. 
The most important function in the Military Government is the 
Coordinator, who is a Major-General responsible for the Military 
Government. He heads the Military Government Division in the General 
Staff, and as such participates in General Staff meetings and is the 
Chief of Staff's senior adviser on issues relating to the Occupied 
Territories. At the same time he is the Defence Minister's assistant 
as head of the Ministry's unit for the coordination of the activities 
in the West Bank. 
The administrative definition looks simple: 
The unit in the Ministry of Defence decides the actual 
instructions to be carried out in the civil-economic 
sphere and the Division in the General Staff in the 
military-security sphere. 1 
In fact the dividing lines are blurred. The Coordinator is a 
professional officer at a particular stage in his army career, and 
the same is true of the Military Governors. The Military Government is 
I 
a military unit and even when the Defence Minister took considerable 
interest in its activities (Dayan did, Peres took less) the'PMinistry's 
unit was very small and served more as a personal staff unit for the 
Minister, than as a department integrated into the Ministry. In contrast, 
the size and influence of the General Staff Division was greater. 
The result was that in spite of the distinction drawn between 
civil and military spheres of operation, the army, and not the civil 
factors, became the dominant power in the Military Government. The` 
1. Gazit, S. (1970). 
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Coordinator, who is the chairman of the Inter-Ministerial Committee 
and whose sole responsibility is the administration of the Occupied 
Territories, became the strongest member in that Committee., Thus, 
the army acquired a role vis-a-vis the civil Ministeries in political 
matters which were outside the limited security sphere. 
THE 'POLITICAT'ROLES 'OF 'AN 'OCCUPYING ARMY 
When serving as the Government in the territories the IDF 
performed various political roles , related to the public, parties 
and Government in Israel, the inhabitants in the territories, and 
to Arab states and organizations. 
The renewed encounter with the West Bank, the consequence of 
the Six Day War, has caused radical changes in Israeli Society. It 
has. precipitated cleavages and conflicts in the central symbolic 
sphere and made necessary both a redefinition of the Israeli 
collective identity and the foundations of the political order. New 
answers were put forward by different groups to the existential questions 
for Israeli society: the relationship between Israel and the Jewish 
nation, the nature of the State of Israel as a Jewish or bi-national 
state, the significance of territory in the national definition; 
and the gravity of the nationalist-religious element in the national 
identity and the social and political system. While until 1967 
the transformed Israeli identity could withstand tensions aroused by 
the establishment'of the state, and by rapid immigration and development 
processes, after June in that year an opposite trend of deepening 
cleavages in society became apparent. 
The renewed debate over the basic ingredients of the collective 
and the shattering of the national consensus in the security sphere 
was also expressed by a change in the political system. The 
demarcation lines between the revived ideological perceptions did 
not match the traditional party divisions. There was considerable 
blurring between the two main blocs, the Likud and Labour Movement. 
1 
New political bodies sprang up, among them the Greater Israel movement 
and Gush Emunim on one hand, and bodies like the Peace and Security 
movement on the other. 
2 
The influence of extra-parliamentary 
groups and methods on the political system grew and the political 
establishment went through a process of disintegration, while the basis 
3 
of. its legitimacy weakened. 
Between 1967 and 1977 attitudes to the territories centred 
around three specific policies. The first called for their annexation and 
the establishment of Jewish settlements to make them an integral part 
of the State of Israel. The main arguments used to support that policy 
were historical and religious. The second policy was based on the 
premise that the territories were a political bargaining card, which 
would be given to the. Arab states in exchange for peace. The third 
policy advocated territorial compromise in return for peace treaties with 
the Arab states, which would contain border modifications to satisfy 
Israel's defence needs. 
The third approach was at the crux of the formal policies adopted 
by Israeli Cabinets from 1967 to 1977. Security needs were a critical 
ingredient. in: that policyý, -hence the army, the professional body which 
had to determine what those needs were, obtained. a decisive position in 
the policy making process inside Israel and in the diplomatic. negotiations. 
1 
2 
3 
Gahal which comprised Herut and the Liberals was joined by other 
groups in 1973 to form the Likud. 
See Isaac, Rael Jean (1976) Israel Divided: Ideological Politics 
-in the Jewish State -Baltimore and London. The John Hopkins 
University Press. 
See Gal-Nor, Yitzhak (1977: 5-25) 'Changes in the Israeli Political 
System Since the Yom Kippur War' (Hebrew) State, Government and 
Tnt rn t'on 1 Relations Nn_ ii 
conducted by Government with Arab states, the United States 
and other international bodies. By virtue of being appointed to 
determine the fate of the territories the army became engaged-in-the 
depths of the political dispute,, when politicians holding different 
views sought to justify them by bringing evidence from officers in 
uniform or in reserve. - 
Hence, Ben Gurion's attempt to make defence issues professional 
and apolitical by transferring them from the civilians to the army 
for professional judgements, an attempt whose success was doubtful 
even before 1967, was completely shattered in the aftermath of the 
Six Day War. When the consensus in the security spheres collapsed 
and Israeli society confronted the security-component in its 
collective identity it became abundantly clear that it was impossible 
to neutralize security perceptions from political beliefs. And when the 
army was granted authority to deal with security, it became, twenty 
years after statehood, a dominant political factor which discussed and 
formulated opinions in the central political issues, although the 
civil institutions still retained their formal authority to decide. 
Furthermore, because of the 'waiting period' and the results 
of the Six Day War, the Government perceived itself as inferior to the 
General Staff, not only in military issues but also in political ones. 
While the generals for their part felt that they had the right to 
determine such matters. 
The war put the generals in a different light in the eyes 
of the civilian public... of those who had something 
to say and the public wants to know their opinion... 
it also gave the IDF the felling that it contributed 
in the political sphere.... 
As soon as the June War ended political discussion began in 
the General Staff as to what policies Israel should adopt to further 
the political-diplomatic processes. In December 1967, for example, 
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1 Lieut. -Gen. (Res. ) Haim Barleu in M. aariv}_29.. December 1972. 
Foreign Minister Abba Eban was invited to a General Staff meeting 
and among other proposals was one to restore the Suez Canal to make 
it navigable. Discussions of 
.a 
political nature have been held 
regularly since 1967. At General Staff. meetings held on 14 and 
21 May 1973 the intertwining of political and military considerations 
was expressed in the discussion on the annual National Assessment. 
The Chief of Operations Branch Major-General Israel Tal argued that 
whether Israel or the Arab states started a war, and however great a 
victory Israel had, the war would not bring Israel any political gains. 
On the contrary, he asserted the territorial status quo and Israel's 
international standing would be shaken and the war would have a 
deleterious influence on Israeli society. In such conditions, insisted 
Tal, Israel should make an effort to avert another war by initiating 
a positive political-diplomatic process even if that involved making 
territorial concessions. 
If in the period immediately after the capture of the territories 
it was assumed that IDF officers would' make an effort to treat 
professionally the questions put to them, it rapidly became apparent 
that that was improbable. It soon emerged that for'many politicians 
the security argument was a justification for. approaches which derived 
from other considerations, among which were religious and economic 
interests. Furthermore, when disputes erupted on military questions 
even between security experts, many professional opinions were 
predetermined ultimately by value judgements and defence issues 
became ineluctably influenced-by the officers ideological and political 
background. 
After 1977 officers began to express opinions on the territorial 
problem explicitly from political and ideological viewpoints., That 
1 Interview with Maj. -Gen. Israel Tal, 16 September 1977. 
has created the possibility of a radical change in civil-military 
-relations in Israel. When the national cleavages have`-deepened, 'the 
identification of the army with one group of the disputants might 
alienate others-from the army, and to the extent that the 
military identifies with either extreme, so the number of alienated 
groups may increase. 
l" 
THE IDF BECOMES A POLITICAL ISSUE 
Even conventional professional armies which are occupying 
powers might respond to the conditions which confront them and 
develop a professional political doctrine that would lead them into 
domestic politics. The case of the French. la guerre revolutionnaire 
2 is one example. Hypothetically the IDF is -fäcing. that"situation. 
However the pressures to make it a political army are even stronger" 
because in the territories themselves it has direct political 
involvement. This was manifested primarily in two aspects, first, in 
relation to the Arab population, secondly, with Israelis who were 
either settlers under the Military Governmant's authority, or who 
entered the territories to carry out political activities. Regarding 
the Arabs, the involvement, was not only because the Military Government, 
was the supreme legal authority, but even more so because it was the 
Israeli Government's tool to implement instutional changes. 
1 
2 
In 1978 Chief of Staff Eytanbthe senior representative of 
the IDFiidentified publicly with one political group, 
Although that misrepresented the variety of political 
-opinion within the General Staff he thus became the hero 
of the Gush Emunim groups. When it became apparent that 
the Chief of Staff was not apolitical and made 
professional judgements which were intertwined with 
ideological consideration is provoked a public outrage and 
demands for his dismissal. 
Luckham, A. R. (1971: 19) 'A Comparative Typology of Civil- 
Military Relations'. In Government and Opposition Vol. 6. No. 1. 
The political activities of the Military Government were 
expressed mainly in the settlement sphere. Although overall settlement 
policy and the location of settlements, were decided by senior civil 
echelons, the Military Government was very much involved in that 
function and its political involvement became greater when settlements 
were established for political rather than for military reasons. 
The army became an active and dynamic factor in confiscating 
and acquiring land. That began when the army requested land 
confiscation in the territoires for military bases or for training 
facilities, and later it confiscated land for purely political purposes. 
These actions were severly criticized by the State Comptroller in his 
annual reports in the late seventies. He argued that land transactions 
should be carried out by the civil authorities, 'but publication of 
those sections of his reports were banned by the defence establishment. 
In the field of land acquisition and settlements the army acted 
in a wide variety of ways. It was the executive arm which carried 
out policy decided by the top political echelons such as the Cabinet 
. 
and its Committees. But it was also an influential pressure group 
on the Cabinet and precipitated actions. Some commanders and Military 
Governors prepared on their own initiative plans for land confiscation 
for military and civilian settlements. They acted in fact as instigators 
of settlements while the Government and other civil authorities, like 
the Jewish Agency, were pulled behind them. Major-General Rehavam 
Zeevi submitted to the Chief of Staff on 20 September 1973 a detailed 
plan for settlement in the territories, which was influenced by 
the general's" belief that Israel should settle the entire West 
Bank for ideological and political reasons, as well"as for security 
needs. 
l 
The army even operated without prior Cabinet approval, 
although it reflected the spirit of Government policy. One -- 
example occurred in the Rafiah approaches in January and February 
1972. The IDF units, commanded by the Chief-of-Southern Command 
Major-General Arik Sharon, evicted 6,000 Bedouins and fenced off 
about 60,000 dunams of land in the Rafiah salient. The action was 
carried out in a brutal and illegal way by destroying their shelters, 
filling in wells, spoiling -groves and driving the Bedouin out. The 
exercise was publicized by a few reserve soldiers and by members of 
local kibbutzim aid provoked a prolonged public scandal. During that 
period one of the columnists wrote: 
Controlling veteran commanders who are admired by 
everyone for their combat achievements is not a 
simple thing. -.. - but it is one by which the ability 
of the elected people to conduct policies in the 
name of their voters is judged... Moshe Dayan wrote 
in his diary of Sinai campaign... that he prefers 
galloping horses who have to be reined in, to those 
who have to be goaded forward - perhaps he was 
right from a military point of view but it is 
doubtful whether this preference is compatible with 
political matters and particularly for the behaviour 
of an army towards a civilian population. 2 
Because of the public criticism, Chief of Staff Elazar appointed 
a committee of enquiry headed by Major-General Aharon Yariv. The results 
of the enquiry were given to the Defence Minister in March of that year 
and in its wake two senior officers, including Major-General Sharon 
were reprimanded, while another officer and a civilian official were 
reprimanded and transferred. The committee found that the method of 
1 
2 
Interview with Maj. -Gen. (Res. ) Rehavam Zeevi. 7 June 1977. 
Nahum Barnea, Davar, 21 April 1974. 
expulsion was not in accordance with the usual procedure, and 
that-plans for the enclosure of land and destruction of shelters had 
not been approved by the General Staff. Sharon, on the other hand, 
argued that the Defence Minister knew about all his actions. 
l 
More than its attitude to the Arab population, the IDF's 
approach to the Jewish settlers made it a political factor-in the 
central political dispute in Israel. After the IDF had to adjust 
itself to performing-police-functions vis-a-vis the _Arabs, a process 
that precipitated a crisis-in its self-perception, it realized 
that it had also to combat illegal activities by Israelis, primarily by 
the settlers of Gush Emunim. When the IDF was ordered to prevent the 
establishment of illegal settlements and had to use force to evict the 
settlers, for the first time in the army's history it stood opposed to 
Israeli citizens whose actions, though , 
illegal, had support and 
legitimacy from a substantial minority of the population. 
The first time that Gush Emunim settlers decided to challenge 
the Government's policies and to establish a settlement in the heart 
of an Arab populated area near Nablus was . on-25-July 1974. on the 29 
July Prime Minister Rabin ordered the Chief of Staff to evacuate the 
settlement by force if necessary. The Cabinet's hesitation for three 
days exposed the grave reservations it had before the decision was 
taken to order IDF soldiers to stand against Israeli citizens. 
After the Sebastia affair, when the IDF enraged Gush Emunim and 
other supporters of settlements in the West Bank, their political 
opponents expressed their dissatisfaction with the military. That 
happened in April 1976 when the Military Government approved a request by 
1 Between 1978 and 1980 the number of cases when IDF officers in the 
Occupied Territories acted contrary to the policy of the Minister 
of Defence and even distorted their reports to him. increased. 
The great number of cases during that period when officers in the 
Military Government were transferred by the Minister from their 
positions was indicative of that. 
Gush Emunim to march through the West Bank and even allocated troops 
to protect -them. - The Military, Government"s«-consent to the - 
march, in spite of earlier refusals when other political groups had 
sought permission to demonstrate in a similar way, provoked protests 
from dovish groups. 
Dr Amnon Rafaeli, one of the Democratic Movement for Change 
leaders, articulated public sentiment in an article published in 
Yediot Aharonot on 12 April 1976: 
The IDF - the state institution whose purpose is to secure 
our borders - is protecting a group of people who 
have raised a'hand against the IDF soldiers... (it) 
neglects its real purpose and tasks to become a hidden 
partner to a political demonstration which contradicts 
Government policy. 
But it, was not only their police functions which caused military 
involvement in political disputes with Jews in the territories, but also 
the Military Government's legal jurisdiction. The trial of Rabbi 
Levinger, a Gush Emunim leader, was an outstanding illustration of that. 
Following clashes between Jews and Arabs in Hebron in March 1976, 
and after a long sequence of illegal activities in the territories by 
members of Gush Emunim, the Attorney General decided in the summer of 
that year to charge Rabbi Levinger with incitement and for attacking 
IDF soldiers. It was a bold decision because until then legal 
measures had never been taken against- Gush Emunim, members, - and, therefore 
the decision was made after a protracted discussion between Prime 
Minister Rabin and Justice Minister Zadok. 
However, in order to limit the scope of the trial Rabbi Levinger 
was indicted only for a breach of public order and for insulting an 
army officer. It was also decided to hold the trial in a military 
court rather than a civil one. That was possible because Rabbi Levinger 
lived in Kiryat Arbah near Hebron, and, therefore, came within the 
military jurisdiction. The Prime Minister and his advisers thought that 
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trying Rabbi Levinger before a military court would limit the public 
reaction and would avert it from developing into a political trial. 
But that was a groundless calculation, for the trial precipitated 
a public outcry and was even debated in the, Knesset. The_ fact that 
it was held in a military court did not diminish its political nature, 
but, on the contrary, caused the IDF to be a full-partner in a 
complicated and highly emotional political affair. 
Towards the end of the seventies the IDF's image and standing 
as a national body aloof from sectorial and party coloured disputes 
was further eroded, and different groups in the population accused 
it of having political opinions and of being identified with particular 
political groups. That happendd, inter alia, because, of the weakness 
of the Government which tried'to-compromise with extra-parliamentary 
groups on the settlements issue. When Gush Emunim members 
initiated illegal settlements the Government opposed the illegality 
of their actions, but did not want to evict them, and in one instance a 
compromise was reached whereby the settlers were transferred to an IDF 
camp in the area. Initially it was an ad hoc remedy, but later it 
became a"regular practice and there was even an agreement which 
allowed groups of-the Gush to stay for periods of training to be 
settlers in military camps. The consequent identification between 
the army and the Gush was predictable, as was the criticism directed 
against the army by the Gush's opponents. 
In October 1977 there was an occurrence which symbolized the 
peak of*the politicization of the security issue in the territories. 
Although it concerned a unit of the Border Guards, which belongs formally 
to the police, because of the unit's special functions and location in 
the territories it was identified with the Military Government. .A 
special unit of the Border Guard exclusively comprising students of 
the religious college in Kiryat Arbah was established. 
The basis -of, -recruitment-to the. unit: was ostensibly territorial, all 
were. residents there, "but because-all members., were., Gush. Emunim 
adherents the-unit-became-in-fact a : `private army'. 
The disclosure of the units-existence provoked another public 
storm and was discussed in the Knesset on 26 October 1977. However, 
although the opposition parties lost the. debate, even the Cabinet 
recognized the dangers posed to the police and-the army by such a 
-political military unit. The unit was therefore disbanded. It is 
not easy to resist seeing the closing of a'circle which began in 1948 
when Ben Gurion dissolved the Ezel, Lehi a-id Palmah units. 
The rise of Palestinian nationalism in the territories also 
brought a deterioration in the relations between Israeli Arabs and 
the-Israeli authorities. On 30 May 1976 large-scale demonstrations under 
the banner of 'The Day of the Land' were organized by Israeli Arabs 
to express opposition to compulsory land purchase in the Galilee region. 
It was the fiercest demonstration by Israeli Arabs since statehood. 
Army units were brought in to contain the demonstrators and the IDF 
had to perform policing functions against Israeli Arab citizens. 
The more the political dispute about the fate of the West Bank 
intensified, the more complicated the IDF's position became. The main 
criticism was that it aided and abetted Gush Emunim, but at the same 
time the Gush members argued that the army operated against them. In 
several evictions of illegal settlers Gush members urged the soldiers 
and officers to disobey their orders. Soldiers were subjected to more 
than verbal pressure, but restrained themselves from reacting to 
violent provocations. In the late seventies West Bank Jewish settlers 
criticized the army for not protecting them from Arab attacks. Their 
relationship with the army worsened and they decided to take measures to 
defend themselves even in defiance of the army. By the end of the decade 
a semi-political militia composed of the Gush members came into existence. 
Criticism of the IDF did not remain confined to its conduct 
in the territories, and in the late seventies it spread to its other 
functions. It could have been foreseen that the military's 
involvement with political disputes about the territories would 
eventually lead to a decline in the supreme values accorded to the 
army. 
THE 'REPERCUSSIONS OF THE BREAKDOWN 'OF 'CONSENSUS 
The army's involvement in the administration of the Occupied 
Territories made it a partner in the decisions concerning their 
future political status, and hence a very important factor in the 
political process of the Government. Although even prior to 1967 
the army had reached direct agreements with Jordan, mainly 
involving military issues, the mutual interests of Jordan and Israel 
concerning the West Bank (the dominant one being to prevent the 
strengthening of the PLO's supporters) brought about a positive 
political dialogue between the military and the Jordanians. 
That was done either indirectly through the traditional West Bank Arab 
notables who went as emissaries of the Military Government, or sometimes 
directly in meetings with Jordanian officers. 
In those meetings such matters as the principles of the 'Open 
Bridges' policy, the transfer of people and goods between Jordan, the 
West Bank and Israel, and the arrangements for continuing payment by 
the Jordanians of officials in the West Bank were determined. Though 
there were meetings of the highest political echelons involving King 
Husain and the Israeli Prime Minister, Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Ministers and others, on practical aspects the military officers met 
with Jordanians and were given a free hand in routine matters. 
Since 1974 the officers in the Military Government have 
become more involved in political contacts with Arab leaders in the 
Occupied Territories. Until then Defence Minister Dayan restricted 
political activity, and particularly political meetings and 
organization., in the territories. Meetings of leaders, political 
assemblies and national conferences were proscribed. After the Yom 
Kippur War the diplomatic process in the Middle East gained momentum, 
and noteably after the 1975 local elections political developments 
in the, West Bank accelerated and local leaders were more active. 
Officers in the Military Government partnered local Arab leaders in 
discussions about the future of the territories. 
Once the IDF had=become an-'eccupying army and. was, increasingly 
identified with a particular political position regarding the 
Occupied Territories, there were ramifications extending beyond the 
immediate political-military relationship into civil-military relations. 
The most prominent is the growing manifestation of the alienation of 
certain groups from the army, who refuse to serve in the territories, 
or who are unwilling to extend their conscript service to become 
officers. These phenomena, coupled in the seventies with a lessening 
of the commitment by certain social groups to the national collective, 
threaten the basic principles of civil-military relations which 
obtained until the seventies. 
Finer has already asserted that it is not only the absence of a 
highly developed civil culture which is a pre-condition for military 
intervention into politics. Another possibility is that the army will 
leave its barracks and take over the civil Ministries, in-a society - 
that lacks strong and extensive organization of consensus. 
l.. 
1 LFiner, S. E. (1978: 70-72) 'The Military and Politics in the Third 
World. Iri The Third World: Premises of US Policy Institute for 
Contemporary Studies. California. 
Since its establishment Israel has had a highly mature 
political culture, but from 1967 the national consensus on the 
central aspects of its existence has-collapsed. The breaking of the 
consensus is manifested inter älia by the growing alienation 
of social groups from the army, while the rivalry within the 
political elite is weakening the Government's ability to impose its 
authority Over illegal extra-parliamentary groups. This may enhance 
the possibility of a military response to a demand to exert an iron 
hand in the national interest. 
Furthermore, the IDF's'Military Government is different. from 
those which were established by colonial powers. in countries far from 
the motherland. In the latter case the geographic distance was 
a buffer between the'army's roles in the Military Government and at 
home. In Israel there is contiguity between the state and the Occupied 
Territories. That in itself might cause the military'to move' from 
policing roles.. in the territories to police functions inside Israel, as 
the events during 'The Day of the Lands' have demontrated, a step 
which might make *easier a further direct seizure of power. 
Have such conditions developed already? ' Before presenting a 
detailed anaysis another element peculiar to Israel is examined. It 
is the phenomonen of generals-turned-politicians. 
7::. TOWARDS MILITARY DEMOCRACY 
THE IDF AS A REPOSITORY OF NATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
In contrast to its prevailing image, the IDF has never been 
detached from party politics, particularly not from the Labour Party. 
Thus far this analysis has shown. that power rivalries within that 
party have influenced the structure of the military elite. However 
there was a complementary influence by the military on politics. 
The army's role as a repository for recruitment of political 
leadership is a universal phenomenon. It is manifested in the civil- 
ianization of military elites, particularly in countries where 
military coups have taken place. 
1 
But the military also serves as a 
channel of mobility into politics in developed societies in which, in 
the words of almond and Coleman, it constitutes one of the sub-cultures 
from which political recruitment is carried out, i. e. 'the transfer 
of members of various sub-cultures and their introduction into specific 
roles in the political system'. 
2 
The Israeli case, however, is unique. In contrast to the 
developing countries, political activity here serves as a kind of second 
career for officers who have concluded the full cycle of their military 
careers. And whereas in the developed countries we find relatively 
3 
infrequent transfers of isolated individuals are found, in Israel the transfer 
of-large groups is carried out systematically. Thus a-regular pattern-is 
established whereby the army serves as a decisive channel of mobility 
See penetrating analysis and detailed survey in Finer, S. (1976: 
173-186) The Man on Horseback Harmondsworth, England. Penguin Books. 
2 
Seligman, Lester G. (1964: 7) Leadership in a New Nation: Political 
Development in Israel New York. Atherton Press. 
3 The closest example to Israel is that of South Korea but there too 
generals, led by Park, set up a new civilian party. 
to the civilian elite and particularly to the national leadership. 
) 
Civilianization of the military elite and its entry into the 
higher echelons of political life is a recognized phenomenon in those 
cases in which the army has played a part in the struggle for national 
liberation. It also occurs in cases where a national liberation 
movement which did not differentiate between civil and military functions, 
wins independence, and in the subsequent process of differentiation and 
functional specialization part of the leadership leaves the army to 
specialize in civil functions In other words, when the process of 
building a national centre is combined with the struggle against external 
colonial forces the need is created for experts in the conduct and 
utilization of force. Hence those possessed of-these qualifications play 
a central role in organizing the power system. 
2 
But this distinction serves to clarify even further the unique 
character of the Israeli case. In the above-cited instances, the 
civilianization occurred only once, immediately after the achievement 
of independence and through the establishment of the new political 
institutions. In Israel, on the other hand, a protracted process has 
taken place whereby retired officers were recruited into politics 
through the existing party frameworks, and the status of the parties as 
the main political recruitment agencies is unchanged. 
3 
Before the 
Israeli phenomenon is analyzed it requires a quantitative description. 
1 
2 
3 
In order to avoid the complex problem of formal political definitions, 
the term 'national leadership' is used to denote a small group 
within the political elite, the holders of senior political posts 
in national security. See Guttman and Landau (1977: 192) 'The 
Political Elite in Israel' (Hebrew) in Lissak, Moshe and Guttman Emmanual 
Israeli Political System Tel Aviv. Am Oved. 
The American Revolution is a typical example. 
In that sense Israel is different from Yugoslavia. See for example 
Remington, Robin Alison (1978: 250-264) 'Civil-military Relations in 
Yugoslavia' In Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. XI, No. 3. 
Officers as Politicians: The Knesset 
The election law for the first Knesset permitted soldiers in 
uniform to be on the parties' lists. Consequently the number of soldiers 
and officers on the different lists were quite high for that election 
which was held soon after the War of Independence. The two secessionist 
organisations, the IZL. and Lehi, disbanded, and-. IZL. was transformed 
into a political party, most of its senior officers appearing 
on the Herut list. 
1 
The small Lehi underground movement also contested 
these elections, appearing as the 'Fighters List', and its commander 
Nathan Yelin-Mor was elected to the first Knesset. However the movement 
itself faded away within a short time. 
Mapam included both demobilized soldiers and those still on the 
active list among its candidates, hoping thereby to gain electoral 
advantage from the military glory earned by its generals in the War of 
Independence. This worried the Mapai leaders who therefore adopted 
similar measures. 
I 
1 
2 
Including Menahem Begin, Shmuel Meridor, Haim Landau, Yohanan 
Bader and Esther Raziel Naor. 
See Weiss, Shevah (1973: 27). 'Generals and Politics' (Hebrew) 
Social Research Review No. 4. Haifa University. 
TABLE 4 
NO. OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN PARTIES' LISTS 
OF THE FIRST KNESSET 1949 
Party No. of seats No. of soldiers Place on list 
on list 
Mapam 
, 
19 11 57 to 67 
Mapai 46 6 10 to 13,27,100 
Herut 14 5 12,14,22,44,112 
Progressives 515 
Religious Front 16 1 18 
Other parties 20 
Total 120 24 
Source: Official Gazette No. 43,19 January 1949. 
In the wake of the first elections a law was passed banning the 
nomination of serving officers as candidates to the Knesset. Since 
then party lists have included only reserve or retired officers. The 
number of senior officers among them from colonel upward has increased 
steadily from nil in the'elections to the second Knesset in 1951 to 10 
(out of 120 Knesset members) in elections to the ninth Knesset in 1977. 
Reference is to those in realistic positions on the list, -. and who did therefore 
enter the Knesset. The following table does not include officers below 
the rank of colonel, or senior officers low down on the party lists. If 
those in borderlind positions are taken into consideration the number will 
be even greater. 
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TABLE 5" 
RESERVE OFFICERS BY KNESSET PARTY 
Knesset Year Rafi Mapai Ahdut Mapam Herut DMC Others Total 
Haavoda 
1 "1949 -4--4 
2 1951 ---- 
3 1955 11--2 
4 1959 12--3 
5 1961 12--3 
6 1965 23--5 
7 1969 44 
8 1973 5 (Gahä1)2 (Moked) 18 
9 1977 4 (Likud) 33 10. 
Notes: 
A. The table refers to results of elections to each Knesset as 
officially published immediately after elections, and does not 
reflect changes during a Knesset term, by resignation (Zvi Zur, 
Rafi from sixth Knesset), or transfer to another faction 
(Moshe Dayan from Labour Party to one-man faction in ninth 
Knesset). 
B. It encompasses only those parties which had reserve officers on 
. 
their lists. 
C. Empty columns mean party did not exist in that year. 
Officers as Politicians: The Cabinet 
The rate of increase in the proportion of senior officers in the 
Cabinet was considerably higher than in the Knesset, as the following 
table shows, but their accumulated strength grew as the years went by. 
Out of 66 Cabinet Ministers who joined the several Cabinets since 1955, 
10 of them, 15%, were professional officers. (The total number of 
Cabinet Ministers from 1949 to 1977 was 87) 
TABLE 6 
RESERVE OFFICERS IN THE CABINET 
Cabinet 
1-6 
Year Mapai Ahdut'Haavoda. Others Total 
1949-1955 - 
7 1955-1958 
8 1958-1959 
9 1959-1961 
10 1961-1963 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
1963-1964 
1964-1966 
1966-1967 
1967-1969 
1969-1969 
1969-1974 
1974-1974 
1974-1977 
1977- 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Raf i13 
2 Raf i13 
Align. 3 Gahal 14 
(with 55 
Mapam) 44 
Gahal 25 
Dmc 2 
. Dayan 1 
Notes: Cabinets were not always equal in size. From the seventh to the 
most recent Cabinet, the number of ministers has fluctuated 
between 15 and 18, apart from the cabinet of National Unity which 
had 22 ministers. See a list of all cabinets, their composition 
and list of all Cabinet Ministers. Yaacobi, Gad (1978: 335-389) 
The Government (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Am Oved, 'Zmora Bitan Modan. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
11 
11 
11 
Align. 2 
2 
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The relative proportion of officers increased in the higher 
echelons of the political elite, not only in a comparison of Knesset 
and täbinet, but also in the distribution of portfolios within the 
latter. Out of 20 people who held the senior posts in the Cabinet, 
Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Minister, seven of them, 35%, were professional officers. In this 
respect their preponderance grew as the years passed. Until the 14th 
Cabinet in 1967, former officers filled second-rank posts: Transport, 
Tourism, Labour and Education. In that year Moshe Dayan was given the 
Defence portfolio for the first time and since then the number of 
officers in central ministerial posts has risen gradually. In 1969, 
Yigal Allon was Deputy Premier and Moshe Dayan, Minister of Defence. 
In 1974, Yitzhak Rabin was Premier and Allon, Deputy Premier and Foreign 
Minister. (In 1977 Yadin was Deputy Premier, Dayan Foreign Minister and 
Ezer Weizmann. Minister of Defence. ) 
Furthermore, in that Cabinet yet another officer was given a 
political-security position. Major-General Arik Sharon was originally 
appointed as Minister of Agriculture, but. took on responsibility for 
settlement in the occupied Territories, and. in this capacity was 
Chairman of the Ministerial Committee on Settlement, a post which gave 
him greater power in the political and security sphere than other 
Ministers, who were members of the Ministerial Committee on Defence. 
And finally, in 1977, for the first time, a reserve army officer, 
Brigadier-General Mordehai Zippori, M'K (Likud-Herut), was appointed 
Deputy Defence Minister. 
Officers as Politicians: Non-Governmental 
There are other indicators of the significant increase in the 
number of reserve officers in the political system. Until 1969"no 
senior reserve officer headed party lists in local elections. In that 
year the Labour party nominated Colonel'-(Res. ) Yosef Nevo-for mayor of 
Herzliyah. Before the 1973 elections the Labour.. 'Party conducted 
negotiations with 10 officers and several of them-finally stood as 
candidates in municipal elections. 
1 
Gahal also chose a major-caneral 
as their candidate for Mayor of Tel-Aviv and he won the election, and 
in other towns several other more junior officers were on the Gahal list. 
2 
In the 1977 municipal eleciion'campaign (the elections were held' 
only on 7 December 197.7) there was a rise in the number of officers with 
whom negotiations. were conducted, and in the number elected. This 
3 
campaign also witnessed the penetration by . former officers. 
into election 
headquarters, which until then had been considered the almost exclusive 
domain of professional politicians. Most were not only staffed, but also 
1 
2 
3 
Col. Gershon Rivlin (Ramat Gan) and Col. Shmuel Eyal (Rishon 
Lezion) ran and lost. Negotiations were conducted with Maj. -Gen. 
Uzi Narkis in Jerusalem. There were also two retired colonels 
in Haifa. 
Maj. -Gen. Shlomo Lahat. Gahal nominated Lieut. -Col. Yitzhak, 
Zilker in Ramat Gan, and a Lieut. -Col. at the head of its list 
in Herzliya. So did the Alignment in Ramleh, and the Religious 
Front in Bnei Berak. 
They included Maj. -Gen. Shlomo Erel - Likud in Haifa; Brig. -Gen. 
. Mordehai Zippori - 
Likud Petach Tikva; Lieut. -Gen. Mordehai Guru 
Maj. -Gens. Haim Herzog, Meir. Amit, Rehavam . Zeevi-Alignment, 
Tel Aviv; Maj. -Gen. Elad Peled - Alignment, Jerusalem; Col. - 
Simha Maoz - Alignment, Hod-Hasharon; Col. Menahem Sherman - 
Alignment, Ramat Hasharon. Brig. -Gen. Beni Imbar - Alignment, - 
Kiriyat-Tiveon. Col. Asher Dar - Likud, Kiryat Ono. In Ashkelon 
there were two Brig. -Gens heading the Likud list (Natan Nir) and 
a local list affiliated to the Alignment (Arie Keren). 
I 
headed, by generals. 
l 
To sum up, between the War of Independence-and 1977, nine 
Lieutenant-generals, some 80 major-generals, a similar number of brigadier- 
generals- g. (the rank was introduced only in 1968) and more than 400 
colonels retired from the IDF. Of the lieutenant-generals and 
najor-generals, no less than one, -third took up full-time political. 
careers. Other officers from these ranks took part in political 
activity on a less regular and part-time basis. Approximately 20% of all 
the former senior officers from colonel upward chose a political career, 
if the term is interpreted-in the widest possible way. 
2 
These officers can be classified into three categories. The first 
consists'of those for whom politics is the main occupation and whose 
civilian position, usually elected, is specifically political: 
Ministers, M K. 's or elected officials in local authorities, and the 
Jewish Agency. The second group comprises officers whose second professional 
career is not of a political nature, but who are engaged in part-time 
political activity. The third group includes the holders of certain 
administrative public posts which; in Israel, are political in nature, 
whose appointments are influenced by political considerations (. ambassadors 
The head of the Alignment's election HQ was Lieut. -Gen. Haim 
Barlev-and. the Coordinator was Maj. -Gen. Yosef Geva. The 
head of the Likud HQ was Maj. -Gen. Ezer Weizmannr The 
head of 
the DMC HQ was'Lie ut. -Gen. Yigel Yadin and Maj. -Gen. Meir Zorea 
was responsible for organization. The chairman of 
Schlomzion's 
election HQ was Maj. -Gen. Arik Sharon and the spokesman 
Brig. - 
Gen. Yishayahu Bareket. The coordinator of the Free Centre's 
HQ was Maj. -Gen. Asaf Yaguri. 
For further indicators, such as the number of senior reserve 
officers in the higher 
institutions of the Labour Party see Peri, 
Yoram (1973) Processes of Crystallization of a New Elite of Senior 
Reserve Officers in Israel, MA thesis (Hebrew) Unpublished 
Hebrew University Jerusalem. 
2 See Shevach Weiss, Davar Hashavua, 11 August 1978. 
to certäin countries, Ilirectors-ceneralof"Ministries, heads of Jewish 
Agency departments, senior Histadrut officials etc. ). In these semi- 
political spheres there has also been a constant-increase in the number 
of senior officers. Thus., for example, until 1961 there were no former 
officers among the Directors-General of Ministries. By 1962 there were 
two, In 1968 three,. and-1-t- incrpased-'gradually. to, more. than five by the 
late 1970's. 
l 
THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ELITES - SOME SOCIOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS 
An analysis of movement by the military elite-into the political 
elite, and in particular into the national leadership, calls for prior 
scrutiny of the political elite, its patterns of recruitment and-channels 
of mobility. From the early thirties to the late sixties, this elite was 
characterized by a high degree of continuity and stability. The founding 
fathers of Mapai, figures from the Second and Third Aliyot, were the 
pivot of this elite, and until the establishment of the 13th Cabinet in 1966, 
they still held the most significant portfolios in the Government, 
followed by the Fourth Aliyah leaders. 
Various reasons have been cited for this continuity and stability. 
Duverger's concept of the dominant party represents one explanation. 
2 
Another analysis emphasises the fact that the elite could supply more resources 
Former officers were appointed in recent years to be the director 
of institutions which are in the grey area, contiguous to the 
security sphere, the Mossad, the Police, Magen David Adom 
(the 
Israeli Red Cross) airport authorities etc. In the past directors 
were drawn from civilian life. 
2 See Duverger, Maurice (1954) Political Parties London.. Methuen. 
and rewards-to the periphery than it drew from them because it could mobilize 
such resources from outside. 
' 
Other scholard have stressed the fact that 
the elite passed the test of the central tasks of the society, most particularly 
military victory and a high'rate of economic growth. 
2 
But all these explanations are partial. The decisive factor is 
connected to the way in which the Israeli power structure was fashioned. 
The nation-building elite did not take over an existing system but 
rather created one, and in doing so gave clear priority to the political 
factor over any other social factor. The political elite also awarded 
preferential status to itself over the other elites. Furthermore, the 
founding fathers succeeded in building up an institutional system which 
maintained in their own hands a monopoly over the apparatuses of 
recruitment and political advancement. 
3 
The deliberate exclusion of other groups was one of the 
strongest expressions of the power elite. The blocking of 
the channels of mobility into that elite meant that as the demographic 
composition of the population changed, the representative character of 
the elite was distorted, and the disparity between the attributes of 
4 
the elected and the electors widened. The differences in origin, 
ethnicity, length of time in the country, occupational background and 
age were only some expressions of the elite's non-representativeness. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Horowitz and Lissak employ this explanation. See Horowitz, Dan 
and Lissak, Moshe (1977) The Origins of the Israeli Polity 
(Hebrew) Tel-Aviv. Am Oved. 
See Brichta, A. and Ben Dor, G, (1974: 234-252). 'Representation 
and Misrepresentation of Political Elites: The case of Israel' 
Jewish Social Studies Vol. 36, No. 3-4. 
See analysis of techniques and mechanisms for achieving this aim 
in Shapiro, Yonathan (1977: 63-66) Israel Democracy (Hebrew) 
Ramat Gan. Masada. 
See details in Zohar, David M. (1971: 20-24) Political Parties 
in Israel. The Evolution of Israeli Democracy New York. Praeger. 
In'1948, for example, the population of Israel was divided as 
follows: 54.8% of European and American origin, 9.8% of Asian-African 
origin and 35.4% native-born. In 1970 the corresponding figures were 
29.7%, 27.5% and 42.8%. But no parallel changes occurred in the 
political elite and it then overrepresented the first group-and gravely 
under-represented the second. Out of all the 'Ministers in the Israeli 
Cabinets between 1948 and 1973, only about 10% were of Asian-African 
origin and a similar figure of native-born. The discrepancy between the 
age distribution of the population and of the elite also increased over 
the years, when the average age of Ministers during 1948-1969 was 58 and 
that of the senior Ministers. 62. Furthermore, occupational analysis 
reveals that between. 1948-1971 close to 70%*of Cabinet Ministers could 
be categorized as 'professional politicians'. 
) 
In essence the Israeli 
political elite is atypical. `Before independence it enjoyed power" 
without independence, and after statehood, legitimacy without representation. 
2 
What characterizes the military elite? Are there factors which make 
the senior officers corps an elite group, in spite of the fact that the 
Yishuv society lacked an aristocratic tradition and that the IDF wA 
a 'nation in arms'? Mobilization from a limited stratum, common 
socialization patterns, " similarity in perception, values and 
aspirations, together with a web of relationships all contributed to the 
emergence of a military elite, notwithstanding the two former adverse 
conditions. 
3 
Furthermore, a close scrutiny of this elite's qualities 
reveals great similarity with the social background of-the political elite. 
1 
2 
3 
Torgovnik, Efraim (1975: 244) 'Israel: The Persistent Elite'. 
In Tachan, Frank (ed). Political Elites and Political Development 
in the Middle East Cambridge, Mass. Schenkman Publications. 
Brichta, A. and Ben-Dor, G. (1974: 252). 
Zamir, Dani (1979: 81-101) 'Where Were the Generals Reared? The 
Social Origins and Socialization Patterns of the 1948 Generation of 
the Political Elite in Israel' (Hebrew) Megamot Vol. 25 No. 1. - 
This is particularly striking where ethnic origin is concerned. 
Like the political elite, the majority in the military elite is 
composed of persons born in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland and 
Russia. Those born in Western Europe and'America constitute a small 
minority, and there is a striking absence of officers born in Asia or 
Africa. The military elite, like its civilian counterpart, were old 
timers in the country. ' The similarity between the various components 
of the two elites intensifies when they are compared with economic or 
administrative elites. The latter are characterized, inter alia, by a 
higher proportion of persons of Nestern origin and groups who 
immigrated later, even after statehood 
1 
The political elite was reared during the'Yishuv period and 
reflected the sectorial, federative nature of the society, which had 
parallel socialization channels. However, both officers who travelled 
along the Labour channel and those who travelled along the bourgeois 
channel originated in the upper social strata of the two sectors and 
underwent socialization in the prestigious socialization frameworks: 
celebrated schools (the old gymnasium the agricultural schools), 
pioneering youth movements, or academic institutions. 
.... the majority of those educated 
in the bourgeois_. _... indeed came from the b ourgeoms aristocracy of the Yishuv, 
which was prestigious.... because of its vetek, economic and 
professional position and public status. Most. of those who 
emerged through the Labour channel came from the Labour 
sector's prestigious groups. This was the veterans' group 
which included workers, Histadrut activists and members of 
the settlement movements, 2 (i. e. the political and social 
leadership, politicians and officials in the national 
institutions). 
However, two main differences are discernible when comparing 
the political and military elites. The latter is younger and has a 
much higher preponderance of Israeli-born members. The military elite 
1 
2 
See details on the'social background of the military elite in 
Peri, Yoram (1973). 
Zamir, D. (1979: 96). 
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was drawn from the same social strata as the political elite, but it 
comprised a complementary generation. Furthermore, in quite a few cases, 
there is not only a common social origin, but also strong family ties. 
About one-third of the 66 Major-Generals and Lieutenant-Generals who left 
the army between 1952-1977 are the sons, or sons-in-law of families 
belonging to the Yishuv leadership. 
l 
A considerable proportion, of the members of the military elite had 
undergone socialization as a preparation for social and political leader- 
ship roles even before they became active in professional military activity. 
This is particularly striking among the officers coming from the Labour 
camp, whose educational environment had nurtured the self-image of a 
select group, having a mission to fulfil and which had provided the 
necessary conditions to experience leadership roles. 
In actual fact those who were members of the Palmah, the Haganah 
or the Irgun, even without the additional background of a youth 
movement or party, have a party ideological background from the 
Yishuv period... in underground organizations (and'even) in the 
Jewish Brigade, before the establishment of the state, active 
members underwent political indoctrination in their youth. 2 
It is not surprising, therefore, that in the light of the social 
proximity, family ties and similar socialization patterns, there was also 
similarity between the political inclinations of the military and political 
elites. The voting patterns of the former differed significantly from 
those of the population in general and reveal an affinity with the Mapai 
leadership, as the following table shows: 
1 
2 
The striking examples are: Moshe Dayan, son of Shmuel Dayan; Meir 
'Emit, son of, Haya Slutzky; Yitzhak Rabin, son of Nehemia Rabin and 
Rosa Cohen; Aharon Remez, son of David Remez. Also such officers 
as Yigal Yädin, Ezer Weizmann, Dan Tolkovsky, Yehoshafat Harkabi, 
Gideon Shocken, Avraham Yoffe, Uzi Narkis, Amos Horev, Motti Hod, 
Aharon Yariv, Asaf Simhoni and to a certain extent Mordehai 
Makleff. There are also inter-generational relations between some 
of the officers in this group, such as Yadin, Rabin and Narkis, 
through David Hacohen; Yoffe, Rabin and Gidron through the Hoz 
family; the brothers-in-law Dayan and Simhoni, and Dayan and 
Weizmann. 
Weiss, Shevach (1973: 31) 'Retired Generals and Politics' (Hebrew) 
Social Research Quarterly Haifa University, No. 4. 
TABLE 7 
" t-- 
ýýý--ý`-ýý 
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VOTING PATTERNS OF MILITARY ELITE AND GENERAL PUBLIC (%) 
National Gahal Liberals Rafi Align. Mapam Abst., N-° Others Tot. Religious Ans. 
Officers 3 1.5 1.5 17 54 33 17 - 100 
General 
21.3 8.9 7.9 7.9 36.7 6.6 -- 10.7 100 population 
Source: Peri, Yoram (1973: 93). The figures refer to the 1965 Knesset 
election. 
The similarity between the political and military elites and their 
complementary nature on the one hand, and the blocking of the channels 
of mobility on the other, strengthen the argument that choice of a 
military career on the part of the young generation was in effect an 
alternative to a political career, a way of reaching the focal point' 
of decision making in the central communal spheres of Israeli society. 
What made it easier for members of the native-born generation to 
choose a military career was the effort by the political leadership, 
and of Ben Gurion in particular, to endow the army with an aura of 
pioneering as the supporters of national values. They depicted this 
elite group almost as the inheritor of previous pioneering values, and 
the warrior as the heir to the image of the pioneer which was the 
political ideal of the Yishuv period. 
1 
But-what induced the sabra 
officers to enter politics twenty-five years after their retirement from 
the army, and why was the previously desired opportunity suddenly given 
to them? 
1 
Eisenstadt, S. N. (1967: 269) Israeli Society (Hebrew) 
Jerusalem; Magnes. 
WHY OFFICERS'TURN POLITICIANS: THE' STRUCTURAL. EXPLANATION 
The entry by senior officers into the political arena can be 
explained from several viewpoints. The first explanation is basically 
structural. Schlesinger and Seligman argue that 'political opportunities 
expand or contract with changes in the supply of eligibles and changes in 
the demand for people to fill political roles'. 
' 
By 1977 the I. D.. F had released more than 600 lieutenant-generals, 
major-generals, brigadier-generals and colonels, and an even larger 
number of middle ranking officers. These constituted a significant 
resource at the senior levels in all sectors of the civil labour 
market including the political. The origins of this structure are in 
the Israeli concept of the 'second career', which is a basic principle 
in the I. D F 's operational concept. 
The main progenitor of this principle was the fourth Chief of Staff,. 
Moshe Dayan. In February 1957, when-he first broached this idea to the 
high command, he said 
The youthfulness of the high command of the IDF is its 
main advantage over other armies, and is a pre-condition 
for the fighting spirit, the constant renewal and non- 
stagnation of conceptions. 
The question was how to maintain the youthfulness, how to enable 
rotation and advancement for junior officers and to ensure constant 
selectivity. The solution was a 'dual career', i. e. to leave military 
service at the age of 40-50 with a partial pension in order to start a' 
2 
new career. 
1 
2 
See analysis of Marvick, Dumaine (1976: 31) 'Continuities in 
Recruitment Theory and Research: Towards a New Model'. In Eulau, 
Heinz and Czudnowski, Moshe M. (eds. ) Elite Recruitment in 
Democratic Politics New York. Sage Publications. 
Dayan, Moshe (1976: 332-357). Milestones (Hebrew) Jerusalem, 
Edanim. 
This proposal was greeted critically and hostilely by, the high 
command as well as by the Minister of Defence. Ben-Gurion, but was 
eventually enthusiastically adopted by the ID F. Later, the rapid 
turnover of manpower in the high command even became a source of pride 
to Chiefs of Staff. The outcome is that the average length of 
service in any post is three years, that most Chiefs of Staff have served 
only three years (two served eighteen months. and two for four years) and 
that the senior command is totally replaced every few years. It is 
therefore relatively young. Five of. the Chiefs of Staff were under forty 
when appointed, and until the mid-sixties the average age of major- 
generals was 40-44, colonels 35-40 and lieutenant-colonels 30-35.1 
This situation has since changed because, of the expansion of the 
army and the need for longer-periods, of training in more complex 
professions. In the seventies the average age of senior officers was 
some fifteen years higher than in the early years of the I. D. F , but 
2 
the principle of rapid turnover remains. 
1 
2 
There were those who attributed the omissions of the Yom Kippur 
War, inter alia, to the too rapid changeover of the High Command 
carried out by the Chief of Staff Elazar shortly before the war, 
which placed young officers with meagre experience in key positions. 
In the two years preceding the war some 40 senior officers left the 
IDF and in all some 30% of officers from the rank of lieutenant- 
colonel upward.. See Yaakov Erez, Maariv, 29 March 1973 and Eitan 
Haber, Yediot Aharonot, l0 May 1974. 
See interview with Haim Barleu, Davar, 18 January 1974. 
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The structural explanation is borne out-by the fact that the entry 
of officers into political life has occurred in waves whenever-there 
has been a surge of demobilizations, particularly in post-war periods. 
The first wave entered politics (mostly joining Mapam) after'the War of 
Independence. Another group constituted the nucleus of the younger circle 
in Mapai. After the Sinai Campaign, a second surge of demobilization 
occurred, headed by the victorious, laurel crowned Chief-of Staff Moshe 
Dayan, fresh from his military triumph. His entry into full political 
activity in Mapai-ushered in a new era in the organization of the Mapai 
younger generation, which-the 1959-Knesset and Government lists 
reflected. 
The group which left the IDF after the Six Day War began to make 
itself felt politically in 1969, and reached the peak of"its political 
l 
expression in-the 1973 elections. This group made a significant entry 
into the higher echelons of the Histadrut industries where political 
considerations are interwoven with professional and administrative" 
criteria. In 1964, the last year in which a member of the veteran elite 
served as general secretary of Hevrat Haovdim, the Histadrut industry still 
had 25 directors aged between 65-70, who were members of the Histadrut-' 
founder generation. In the late sixties this group was replaced and 
about half the new directors were retired army officers. Between 1964 
and the end of 1972, the Histadrut-owned Koor industry absorbed no 
less than 68 retired officers of lieutenant-colonel rank and above. 
2 
1 
2 
Yitzhak Rabin was appointed Israel Ambassador to the US. "in 1969. 
In the same year Col. Yosef Nevo was elected Mayor of Herzliya. 
Haim Barley became a Minister in 1972 and Aharon Yariv was 
appointed PM's Advisor on Special Affairs-in the same year. 
Peri, Y. (1973). 
A similar revolution occurred in the public sector. In early 1972, 
of 219 managing directors and chairmen of government companies (posts 
which are not divorced from political considerations) some 10% were 
officers with the rank of lieutenant-colonel and above, the great 
majority of whom took office in the second half of the sixties. 
The last wave of demobilized officers to enter politics was after 
the 1973 October war, and it differed from its predecessors. 
1 The 
new politicians were not newly-retired officers. After that war the 
IDF was under severe public attack and the prestige of its officers, 
for the first time in Israel's history, was low. The 'wars of 'the 
generals' which raged in the post-war months particularly affected the 
senior officers who had conducted the war, but also had implications for 
officers who had already entered politics. 
2 
However, as the political crisis intensified during 1974-. 1977, the 
public's willingness to absorb retired officers in political life 
revived and they became increasingly active across the political spectrum. 
This time they were not the recently retired officers of the most recent 
-war, but rather those who had left the army many years before, in some 
cases in the fifties. 
1 
2 
The eighth Knesset elections which should have taken place in 
October 1973 were postponed until December because of the war. 
But the lists were closed before the war and were not reopened. 
Hence the placing. of the officers-in party lists did not reflect 
the-outcome of the war, it was, however, subsequently reflected 
in the May 1977 elections. 
The senior command suffered a shock as a result of the war. Lieut. - 
Gen. David Elazar and Maj. -Gens. Israel Tal and Yitzhak Hofi left 
the army, as did Maj. -Gens. Shmuel Gonen and Eli Zeira. 
Maj. -Gens. Kalman Magen and Albert Mandler died. A new generation 
of brigadiers replaced them. 
The mass recruitment of retired officers into the political sphere 
in this period reached its peak with the establishment of the Democratic 
Party for Change. Former military men were the central component of 
most of the groups which set up the new party. It was led by 
Lieutenant-General 
_(Res. 
) Yigael Yadin, and was supported by a group of 
officers with a common military background; by another group previously 
associated for years with the Labour Movement and Mapai headed by 
Major-General (Res. ) Meii Amit, and by a group of officers wfio'had spearheaded 
the post October War protest movements or who had never been identified 
with political activity. Seven of the 20 members of the DMC secretariat 
and the first political committee were reserve officers. 
1 
The late entry of these groups of officers into political activity 
illustrates the weakness of the structural explanation. It explains how 
the supply of eligible candidates for political posts was created, but 
does not elucidate how and why they succeeded'in infiltrating the 
political elite. The explanation is particularly unconvincing if 
the nature of this elite, its relative exclusivity and the almost 
total control over the paths of political recruitment are taken into 
consideration. The structural theory-may be avpropriate to analyse 
the entry of officers into the administrative, technocratic and 
economic elites, but by itself it cannot clarify the political 
phenomenon. 
They were Lieut. -Gen. Yigael Yadin, Maj. -Gens Avraham Botzer, 
Meir Zorea, Zvi Zamir, Dan Tolkovsky, Meir Amit, and 
Brig. -Gen. Menahem Aviram. 
WHY OFFICERS TURN' POLITICIANS: THE 'FUNCTIONALIST 'EXPLANATION 
Can the political functionalist approach, the circulation of 
elites, provide the answer? Lasswell proposed that: 
Elites will be recruited from those skill groups whose 
expertise is in special demand at a pfrticular time in 
order to face society's predicaments. 
This is a mörn precise definition of Mosca-Is statement about the social 
force. According to Mosca, when certain 
(characteristics, 
which are 
possessed by members of a certain class, are seen to be necessary for the 
performance of certain political roles, then the class would become 
dominant. 2 
This concept has been applied in-elite research studies in 
developing countries, when the emphasis was placed on administrative and 
technical capacity. According to Seligman: - 
Politicians are generalists and amateurs 
approaching politics ideologically rather than in a 
problem-solving manner. In new states, recognition 
that technicians and experts are necessary in the 
political elites comes tardily. 
In the same spirit, Fein has characterized the change in the structure of 
the Israeli elite as transition 'from natural elite to elected elite' 
3 
There are two propositions based on the functionalist viewpoint 
concerning the entry of officers into the political elite. According to 
one approach officers can be regarded as part of a wider group of 
persons with vocational and technocratic skills and the administrative 
qualifications needed by Israeli society in a process of rapid 
Laswell, H. D. (1948: 133-145) 'Skill politics and skill revolution' 
in The Analysis of Political Behavior New York. Oxford University Press. 
See also Eulau, Heinz (1976: 11) 'Elite Analysis and Democratic Theory: 
The Contribution of Harold D. Laswell' In Eulau, H. and Czudnowski, M. 
(eds. ). 
Mose a, Gaetano (1939: 144-5) The Ruling Class New York. McGrew Hill. 
3 Seligman, Lester G. (1964: 14) Fein, Leonard J. (1967). Politics in 
Israel Boston, Little Brown. 
expansion. As Weber puts it, professional bureaucrats are being added 
to the dilettantism of politicians. 
' 
This is claimed by Guttman and 
Landau. The other asserts that the state of war in which Israel is 
2 
involved demands an increase in the number of persons with military 
qualifications in the higher political echelons,. -. with emphasis on the 
strategic-political nature of the'military profession and not the 
administrative aspects. So for example claims Arian-. 
3 
Golda Meir, as Premier, gave vivid expression to this explanation 
when she said: 
For a Prime Minister without d military past and experience, 
it was very important to have around the Cabinet table men 
like Dayan, Allon and Barley, with a glorious military past. 
The functionalist explanation inevitably raises the question of 
the convertibility of military skills into political ones. Is a 
successful general necessarily a good politician? Without going into 
the complexities of the problem, which requires an analysis of the- 
attributes required for both kinds of rdles, it suffices to'say that 
the existence of processes of convergence between-the military and 
civil sectors in Israel could facilitate this convertibility. The 
definite political functions which 'IDF officers and the 
nature of the heroic. leader, which developed in a , besieged state 
undergoing a protracted war, are only two such factors which facilitate 
1 
2 
See Crew, Ivor (1974: 28) 'Studying Elites in Britain. ' in Crew, 
Ivor (ed. ) British Political Sociology Yearbook Vol. 1 London. 
Croom Helm. 
Guttman, Emmanuel and Landau, Y. M. (1977: 203-4) The political 
elite absorbed people with these skills over the years, particularly 
from public administration. Pinhas Sapir, Zeev Sherf, Y. S. Shapiro 
are only a few examples. 
Arian--, Asher (1979: 296-7) In Penniman, Howard R. (ed) Israel at 
the Polls. The Knesset Elections of 1977 American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington D. C. 
Interview with Golda Meir, Yediot Ahronot, 12 September 1977. 
the transferability of the military professional to the civil elite. 
But even if there is such a high degree of convertibility, there is 
still a flaw in the functionalist explanation, which assumes that since 
v 
in Israel professional military know how is needed for purposes of 
formulating national security policy, those equipped with such knowledge 
should enter into the formal political leadership. There is another 
possibility for it would be quite possible that military considerations and 
even "the-army itself would have great-influence on the decision'making 
process without the generals becoming members-of-the-Cabinet. 
Several historical facts contradict the functionalist approach. Those 
premiers who were authoritative in the defence sphere were not 
necessarily endowed with professional military experience. Ben Gurion 
had no military or strategic experience until 1946_-when'he took over 
the Defence Department of the Jewish Agency. He later said: 
I accepted this portfolio not because I was a general or an 
expert in military science, but because in military matters, 
as in all other practical affairs, it is not the military 
experts who are knowledgeable in techniques... but those 
with open eyes and common sense who determine things... 
And such qualifies, more or less, are possessed by any 
normal person. 
Like Ben Gurion, Golda Meir enjoyed supreme authority in defence 
matters. She, the civilian- who lacked military knowledge, was asked 
to decide and indeed did decide between contradictory advice from her 
Defence Minister Dayan and her Chief of Staff Elazar. 
3 
1 
2 
3 
Many of the senior officers who reached the national leadership 
level are of this type: Yigal Allon, Moshe Dayan, Arik Sharon, 
Ezer Weizmann. 
See Bar Zohar, Michael (1977: 643-665) Ben Gurion Tel Aviv. Am 
Oved. 
The most dramatic example was the October War in 1973, from the 
morning on the day when hostilities broke out. See discussion of 
deliberations on this day in diaries of Dayan, Golda Meir and 
Elazar. Dayan, Moshe (1976: 757-8); Meir, Golda M Life (1975: 
357-9) Lordon. Weidenfeld & Nicolson; Bartov, Hanöch'(197 8: 9127) 
Dado_ Vol. 2, Tel Aviv. Maariv.. 
In contrast, in the period of office of a premier who was a military 
expert, namely Yitzhak Rabin, the authoritative basis of senior 
civil 'control over the army was greatly disrupted. This flowed 
from the political struggle in the top hierarchy of the Labour'Party 
And finally, the functionalist approach like the structural 
theory, disregards the high degree of control which political leaders 
exert over the channels of mobility and entry into them. It assumes, 
without justification, that given the needs of society almost 
deterministic forces prevail over calculated tactics adopted by the 
leadership anxious to maintain its power. 
An interesting appendix to this latter explanation is based on the 
representative character of Israeli democracy. Despite the 
'oligarchic impermeability' of the political elite, the Mapai leaders 
possessed sufficiently sensitive political 
'instincts' to assess when the 
pressures of various groups might become so great that failure to 
respond to them might undermine the basis of their supremacy. As a result 
there developed in Israel a system of recruitment into the elite which 
may be denoted 'complementary recruitment'. Guttman and Landau define 
it as: 
The gradual,. slow and creeping addition of new forces to 
the elite class. It is possible, therefore, to say that 
the system is oligarchic, lmitigated by democratic- 
representative elements. 
An important element in this system is that the selection is 
conducted from above, by the political leadership itself, by means of 
co-option- or sponsored mobility. 
1 Guttman, E. and Landau, Y. M. (1977: 205). 
According to this approach, it may be claimed that the entry of 
officers into politics. offers opportunity for expression to a group 
with political-electoral potential, in order to ensure the loyalty of 
this group to the political leadership. This was in fact implied by 
Lieutenant-General Haim Barley when he explained the Mapai leadership's 
decision to appoint Moshe Dayan Minister of Defence on the eve of the 
Six Day War. Although he was Dayan's political rival, Barley admitted 
that the army, which was critical and suspicious of the Government 
headed by Eshkol, was pleased with the decision and felt that it now 
had a representative in the Government. 'Army affairs were now properly 
represented in the Cabinet'. 
1 
WHY OFFICERS TURN POLITICIANS: THE EXCHANGE*OF POWER AND PRESTIGE 
Perusal of the common background of officers who went into politics, 
and an examination of the retirement patterns of the veteran leadership, 
inevitably cast light on another reason for the entry of officers into 
politics. Although the process lasted some twenty years and was most 
significant in the ten years until 1977, the same age-group and the 
same sociological generation is involved. 
2 
Since many of the sabra generation chose a military career as a 
substitute for a political career, maybe their late entry into politics 
ensued from a twenty-year moratorium? 
1 
2 
. See Haim Barleu; 
Ot, 31 May 1973. 
In the first demobilization surge in 1948-1951 some 867 of the 
retiring senior officers were aged 35-44, and only 7% 45-54. 
The size of the first group decreased steadily to 50% at the 
end of the sixties, while the second group came to account for 
more than one third of the retiring officers. Since the end of 
the fifties, the number of retiring officers aged over 55 has 
increased and they accounted for more than 10% at the end of the 
sixties. Peri, Y. (1973). 
This argument is strengthened by the fact that concomitantly 
with the entry of officers into politics, the veteran leaders began 
to disappear from the political map, having vanquished rivals but 
succumbed to the weight of years. In as much as the impregnability 
of the veteran elite continued, although more and more of its members 
had departed the stage, so that sub-elite weakened'and Rafi"gained 
relative strength. The blood transfusion supplied by the Ahdut 
Haavoda leaders was not adequate. Unlike the regimes in traditional 
societies, in contemporary regimes the representativeness of the elite 
is an important factor in its legitimacy both symbolically and 
practically, a further factor is its capability to act. As the elite 
became more and more unrepresentative, particularly of the young 
generation and those of Asian-African origin. who gradually became the 
majority in society, its base of legitimacy weakened too. 
To reinforce it, the veteran elite had to coopt public figures 
who enjoyed special prestige in those strata: army officers who were 
representative of the young generation and its values, and particularly 
commanders of the heroic type, provided the optimal solution. The 
entry of senior officers into politics was therefore a reciprocal 
operation whereby the veteran leadership traded resources of political 
power for resources of social prestige supplied by the officers. 
This trade had two outstanding advantages. First, the pattern of 
relations existing between the veteran political leadership and the 
military elite was such that the latter received-its authority from 
the former and therefore did not constitute a potential threat to their 
rule. Secondly, the senior officers lacked organized political power 
bases.. They enjoyed great public prestige, but in the Israeli political 
system it is the bureaucratic bases within the party and not the 
support of unorganized public opinion which are the main source of 
1 
power. 
The nature of the authoritative relations between the veteran 
leadership and the officers was from the leaders' point of view a 
relative advantage over the intermediate generation of Mapai 
activists. The latter, in the same age group as the officers, also 
strengthened the veteran leadership, but while a political partner 
their power inside the party apparatus increased. and they constituted 
a potential threat. The veterans therefore checked its advancement 
during the sixties and retired I. D F. officers were given priority for 
senior posts. 
2 
This type of cooption" of former generals, given the Hebrew'_ 
slang 'parachuting in', made the officers, with very few exceptions, 
dependent on their political patrons. But it was very rewarding for 
officers who were unwilling to try to climb the political slope by 
other means. 
3 
The rate of exchange in the deals between the retired officers and 
the power-brokers for the veteran leadership was a function of the 
market. The introduction of the new rank of brigadier-general, lowered' 
the status of the colonels. The proliferation of retiring officers 
reduced their political value and they were obliged to content them- 
selves with positions of marginal importance. Saturation in the 
1 
3 
See Shapiro, Yonathan (1976: 82) The Formative Years of the 
Israeli Labour Party. London.. Sage. He uses Brzezinski and 
Huntington's phrase: 'In bureaucratic politics organizational 
positions are what votes are to the electoral politicians'. 
Later characteristic expressions of the attitude of the old guard 
were its opposition to candidacy of members of the intermediate 
generations for the position of party secretary (Arie Eliav in 
1969 and Aharon Yadlin in 1970). Golda Meir objected to their 
entry into the Government in 1969 and even, in the case of 
Avraham Ofer, in 1974. 
A vivid illustration of this patronage occurred when Rabin completed 
his tour of duty as Ambassador to the U. S. Kissinger told Golda 
Meir that he thought that Rabin should be in the Cabinet. Golda 
replied to the effect: we'll see. If he behaves himself we might 
take him. See Shlomo Nakdimon.. Yediot. Aharonot, 4 February 1977. 
Patronage also existed between Pinhas Sapir, strong man of the 
Mapai veterans and Haim Barlev4 also parachuted from Chief of Staff 
to Cabinet minister in 1972. 
number of officers in any political institution caused a steep rise in 
the prices which officers subsequently wishing to join the institution 
were obliged to pay. Failure by retired officers depreciated the value 
of all officers and made it difficult for them to gain high posts. 
The exchange relationship between the retired officers and the 
political parties gave a considerable advantage to the ruling party, 
since it had more resources and rewards to offer. This was particularly 
striking because of the officers' preference for executive posts 
which are naturally more available to the ruling party. Hence only the 
Labour Party could woo the officers'of highest value, namely chiefs of 
staff. When the opposition parties began to offer executive posts in 
local government they too succeeded in recruiting senior officers. The 
main opposition party attracted more senior officers, including 
major-generals, and the smaller parties only colonels. 
These reciprocal relations between the political elite and the 
retiring military elite were of decisive importance 
in the struggle 
between the two sub-elites in the Labour Party, the struggle which 
explains military-political relations in Israel. 
The nomination of"a group of Mapai officers for the first Knesset, 
to combat the electoral threat posed by Mapam which had included 
officers in its own list, has been described. The fact that the 
Mapai officers were listed in close proximity and with the intention 
1 Reserve officers tended to use their ranks after leaving the 
I D. F. and this was prohibited on 7 August 1964 in regulations 
which banned use of military rank to promote a business or 
engage in party activity. Officers are now careful to add 
'(Res. )' even though this is till against the law. See article 
by former CO Military Police, Lieut. -Col. (Res. ) Yoram Fried 
Maariv, 10 July 1973. 
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that they would resign from the Knesset immediately after being 
elected, only serves to demonstrate the manipulatory motives behind 
their inclusion. I 
The second grouping of officers encouraged by Ben Gurion in the 
fifties antagonized the veteran elite.. And the greater the threat 
which Rafi posed to the veteran elite in the sixties, the stronger the 
need of the latter to bolster its image by cöopting military men. 
The paucity of leaders in Mapai adorned with a defence image was so 
critical that when Prime Minister and Defence Minister: Levi Eshkol 
fell ill in 1965, and party leaders discussed possible successors, a 
proposal was-put forward to appoint as Defence Minister Lieutenant- 
General (Res. ) Yigael Yadin, a professor of archaeology for the 
previous 14 years. After Rafi's achievements in the June 1967 war, 
l 
the veterans' need to augment themselves with defence experts 
increased.. - In the second half of the sixties, supporters of the 
veteran elite of Mapai and Ahdut Haavoda accounted for a high 
proportion of the third wave of officer recruitment. It was an open 
secret that the outgoing Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin appointed Amb- 
assador to the United States. was earmarked'by the Premier Golda Meir 
to serve as Minister of Defence, in the event of a split and confront- 
ation with Rafi and Dayan. A similar task'was earmarked for Haim 
Barley, who followed Rabin as Chief of Staff, but who had joined the' 
Cabinet before him. ' 
1 Interview with David Hacohen; 7 July 1977. 
The shock to the Labour Party leadership caused by the Yom 
Kippur-War damaged the veterans most. This enabled the intermediate 
generation, waiting in the wings for so long, to seize the opportunity 
and capture the senior political posts. Indeed the intermediate 
generation's leaders played an important role, perhaps even the 
decisive one, in the internal party pressure to force Golda Meir's 
Cabinet to resign. 
In this constellation -the generals-turned-politicians shifted 
their loyalties, and for the first time a coalition was created 
between them and the intermediate generation, with the shared object- 
ive of inheriting the mantle of the veteran leaders. A meeting of 
representatives of the two groups, held at the home of the Director of 
Koor Major-General Amit in March 1974, was even denoted by 
2 
journalists 'night of the generals'. 
Golda Meir's reaction to the generals-turned-politicians' activity 
was interesting. 'I brought Rabin and Yariv into the Cabinet'in 
order to strengthen it after-the undermining of its credibility, and 
1 
2 
When Golda Meir resigned, people of her generation such as Zeev 
Sherf, Haim Gvati and Pinhas Sapir left, the Government and 
were replaced by members of the intermediate generation: Avraham 
Ofer and Aharon Yadlin. This occurred in other institutions as 
well. 
Maj. -Gen. Meir'Amit, a member of the Labour Party was Head of 
Operations Branch (1954), Intelligence Branch-(1961), the Mossad (1963), 
Director-General of Koor (1968), the Histadrut's industrial concern. 
Before the 1977 elections he joined the DMC and became a MK and 
Minister. 
they came in and contributed to the process of undermining". 
' 
But 
the composition of this coalition was too heterogeneous and it cut 
across both sub-elites, for which reasons it could not function as 
an effective political group. Its activities helped to overthrow 
the Golda Meir Government, but not to reshape relations between 
the two " sub-elites within the Labour Party. And after a short 
interval, the two camps again began to battle over the inheritance 
of the post of -Premier, the retired officers joining the fray-once more. 
The theory that the late entry of officers into politics was 
the result of a moratorium by a political group is of great importance. 
If it is true, then this pattern of transforming a military elite 
into a political one, although lasting several years, is however 
basically an isolated phenomenon and not a permanent pattern. The 
question now is whether the officer generation which evolved in the 
IDF after the War of Independence - which had no pre-military 
political training and chose a military career for different reasons 
from the previous generation - will also enter political life 
after their retirement in the-eighties and nineties. In other words, 
will the IDF continue to serve as the definitive channel of mobility 
to the political elite and not merely one of several channels? 
I 
See Shlomo Nakdimon Yediot Aharonot, 29 March 1974. The meeting was 
attended by Cabinet Ministers Yariv, Rabin and Barley, and other 
senior reserve officers in key positions in the Labour Party such 
as. Col. . 
(Res. ). Israel. Granit. There were also representatives 
of the intermediate generation such as Asher Yadlin, Shlomo Hillel, 
Uzi Feinerman, Meir Zarmi and Nahman Raz, David Golomb, and 
Histadrut economic personalities such as Yaakov Levinson and 
others. This was the stratum of native-born leaders who held 
key positions in government bureaucracy, the public and Histadrut 
sectors, but only secondary positions in the Labour Party 
hierarchy and political sphere. 
THE TRANSITION TO MASS POLITICS 
The answer to this question is affirmative. Not only does 
the moratorium explanation complement previous ones, but the style 
of political mobilization for-retired officers expressed 
changes withing the political system. Whereas in the early days of 
statehood officers were brought into the struggle by Mapai against 
Mapam, and in the fifties and sixties into Rafi's conflict with the 
veterans in the seventies their integration reflected a change in the 
nature of party politics in Israel. Israel, an outstanding example of 
'parteinstaat' has a political system whose parties were more than a 
mechanism of articulation and aggregation of interests.. However over 
the years a fundamental change took place in this aspect, a change 
which happened simultaneously with modifications in the elite at the 
end of the'founding fathers' era. There were those who saw this move 
as the 'transition from ideological spokesman to representatives of 
groups', but it was a more profound structural change. 
' The parties 
began to lose their ideological distinctiveness, and ideology diminished 
in importance as a factor in party support. 
2 
After the Six Day War this phenomenon was accentuated. The 
demarcation between the various parties' ideologies, especially the 
two main blocs - the Labour Alignment and the 'rightwing Gahal, later 
1 
2 
Seligman, Lester (1964: 56). 
Horowitz, Dan and Lissak, Moshe (1977: 298)"-The'Origins'of'the 
Israeli Polity (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Am Oved. 
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the Likud - became blurred. Even more important was the incongruence 
between the traditional inter-party dividing lines and the central 
societal idiological issues. Prior to this, as well as subsequently, 
there had been a steady reduction in the extent of party politicization 
of spheres of social activity, and various public spheres had begun to 
liberate themselves from the influence of party blocs. The public 
demanded vociferously that this process should continue. 
l 
The parties did not lose their centrality in the political system, 
but the nature of their roles had changed. The Labour party had 
forfeited more and more of its status as a'"coordinating`agency and 
channel of communication, and it was characterized by processes of 
internal disintegration. The former nature of the-organizational 
structure had been destroyed and the status and manipulatory ability 
of its apparatus had been considerably weakened. As a result the 
heads of the apparatus and party leaders had. lost control even of 
those organizational instruments which ensured control of the 
Histadrut, the new immigrant settlements and numerous social groups. 
The decline in internal party cohesion, particularly in the Labour 
Party, and the changes in the rules of the game affected the stability 
of traditional loyalties and created a. fluid situation of tactical 
organization on an ad'hoc basis, This changed the Labour Party (other 
parties too) from its characteristic pattern of an apparatus party which 
inter alia, had furnished it with power since the end of the twenties. 
1 
. See Gal-Nor, Izhak (1977: -5-25) . 
*"Changes in the Israeli Political 
System since the Yom Kippur-War' (Hebrew) in State,. Government and International'Relations No 11. 
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Similar processes occurred not only within the parties but also 
between them. For the first time since the party map had been drawn, 
splits and amalgamations occurred not only within the political blocs, 
labour, bourgeois and religious, but also between them. 
l 
Proposals 
for reorganization of the political map were granted a legitimacy 
which they had never had previously. 
In. this system, which had been close to the ideal type of the 
partienstaat and' which'began, tb acquire ingredients of mass politics, the 
importance of the mass communication media increased greatly. This 
was particularly true of television, which first played a role in the 
election campaign of 1969. With the decline in the weight of party 
apparatuses, with the weakening of the public's commitment to parties 
and the rise in the number of floating voters, the ability to approach 
the public directly without the mediation of the party apparatuses 
increased. The senior officers enjoyed decisive advantage in this 
new situation over other groups of political recruits, or veteran 
party activists. 
The style of officer recruitment from the end of the sixties, 
and particularly in the seventies, showed signs of mass politics. 
Until then officers had only joined the Labour Party. At the end of 
1969 Arik Sharon for one was conducting negotiations with the 
Liberal Party. At the same time another major-general, Ezer Weizman, 
left the army and became a Cabinet Minister on the following day, 
representing Gahal. 
1 In the past there have been a few cases of individuals transferring 
from one camp to another, but only with the merger of the State 
List (a group which split from 'Rafi' when Rafi rejoined its parent 
party to form the Labour Party in 1969) and the rightwing" Likud 
did a political group move from the leftwing to the rightwing 
camp. 
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It was not only the right of the political spectrum which began 
to absorb retired officers. Colonel Meir Pail left the army in 1971 
and became active in the leftwing circles which eventually established 
Moked and Sheli. 
1 Another major-general', Matityahu Peled, commenced 
his non-party political activity in'dovish'circles and later joined 
Shelf and the Israeli-Palestine Council. 
2 
Between 1967 and 1973 retiring officers were dispersed throughout 
the political spectrum, although the great majority joined the Labour 
Party. Since 1973, on the other hand, officers have begun to lead 
extra-parliamentary political groups, such as protest movements. But 
the transition to a new type of political activity was reflected above 
all in the fact that several-of them conducted negotiations simultan- 
eously with several parties, joining the one which offered the 
highest rewards. This was an innovation in Israeli politics, where 
party affiliation had always been an expression of 'loyalty to the 
movement'. 
3 
In 1977 a group of officers, including some who were active and 
even held positions in various parties, including the Labour Party, 
constituted the main nucleus for the establishment-of the first new 
Israeli party, the Democratic Movement for Change. 
4 
I 
2 
3 
4 
Moked, a left-wing Zionist movement, participated in the elections 
to the eighth Knesset. Col. Meir Pail was elected. Before the 
ninth Knesset elections, Moked with other groups established Sheli. 
The council was set up in 1975 by'dovish'circles, but most of its 
members came from Sheli. Its platform is negotiations with 
moderate Palestinians and support for a Palestinian state 
adjacent to Israel. 
Dan Margalit. Haaretz, 20 July 1973 wrote in this context: 
'The generals are introducing a new and non-positive dimension 
into Israeli politics: lack of an entry on ideology in their 
political identity card-from the extremism of doctrinarian 
ideological parties to the opposite extreme - no convictions at 
all. I 
Until the DMC was set up in 1977 all parties represented in the 
various Knessets were the outcome of splits, or amalgamations of 
existing parties. 
The change in Israeli politics could be crucial in the future 
for the entry by retired officers into political life. If in the 
future the dominant feature in the nature of Israeli politics - the 
political parties - continues to decline, the former officers, who 
enjoy an image as national leaders who stand above party politics, 
will have an advantage over other-professional politicians and the army 
will be reinforced as a permanent source for the power elite, a stable 
channel to the national leadership. 
A CHANGE IN THE RULES OF THE POLITICAL GAME 
The influence of officer-politicians on the nature of the political 
decisions of the political elite is not dealt with here. That complex 
subject merits a separate study which must be carried out through an 
analysis of a series of political decisions, which has not yet been 
undertaken in Israel. The present analysis is more concerned with the 
structural operational aspects of entry of officers into politics, and 
therefore considers the influence of-the officers on the 
structure of the political system, rules of the political game, and 
on political-military relations. 
On joining the political system. the officers were obliged to 
accept the rules of the political game and to conduct themselves in 
accordance with accepted civil-'norms. Eisenstadt has noted that 
When they wanted to enter the political sphere they 
were generally obliged to pass through the normal channels 
of political activity and to reformulate their arguments 
in civilian terms. This obliged them to face the test 
according to civil and party criteria, although they 
continued to a certain degree to benefit from their 
previous aura and toldepict themselves as the bearers 
of security values. 
1 
Eisenstadt, S. N. (1967: 269). 
But although most of the officers did not change the rules of 
the game, several incidents occurred over twenty-years which suggest 
that this assumption should be regarded with reservation. The 
strength of the political system prevented'the success of attempts 
to change the rules of the game but it should not hide the fact that 
such attempts were made. 
When Moshe Dayan took up full-time political activity after his 
demobilization, supported by a group of reserve officers, there was 
considerable apprehension in Mapai as to the possibility of a 
military coup. And although Ben Gurion dismissed the fears, he 
warned his protege that 'in politics one cannot behave As in the 
1. 
army. 
It is hard to assess whether there was a real foundation for these 
fears about Dayan. It should be assumed that they served as the 
veteransl, weapon in their power struggle with the newcomers. 
2. 
But 
it is interesting to note one argument voiced by Moshe Dayan in his 
campaign against the old-timers. Attacking the leaders of the 
Histadrut Executive, he said: 
1 
2 
Following several appearances by Dayan and particularly a lecture 
delivered on 7 June 1958, Ben Gurion summoned him for a talk 
(on 15 June) and subsequently wrote in his diary: 'He discussed 
non-military matters as an army man. Outside the army things are 
not done on orders and by determining frameworks. Persuasion is 
needed. I advised Moshe to set aside the military mentality in '. non-military matters 
In one case, the details of which have not yet been conclusively 
verified, the young Ben Gurionites contemplated changing the 
regime, but the initiative 'apparently came from the civilians 
rather than the military men among them. 
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Can it be said that Israeli youth who in the past 
fifteen years, have crawled among thorns and rocks 
with rifle in hand, fought in planes, and destroyers, 
in the War of Independence and the Sinai Campaign, 
understand the problems of the Jewish people less 
than those who have been sitting for twenty five 
years in the fifth story of the Histadrut offices? 
This was the first strong expression made by Dayan in which the 
military service was used as a justification for formulating demands 
for a-share in power. 
Dayan violated the customary rules once again when, in May 1967, 
he encouraged a non-party movement to foster his appointment as Minister 
of Defence. The Mapai veterans called it "a 'street putsch'-', but 'this 
phrase is not justified since'in the end it was the coalition 
negotiations and decisions of Mapai's authorized institutions which 
brought him to the cabinet table. However'the utilization of 
public opinion outside the'organised party frameworks was a novelty. 
The same populist expression was repeated even more strongly on the 
eve of the 1969 elections. - ` 
But the establishment of a 'Movement for Dayan-for Premier' in 
1969 was a true innovation. For the first time a non-party body was 
set up based on personal support for a candidate beyond the accepted 
party frameworks. The fact that this movement failed, and in the 
final analysis operated in'effect. only as a pressure group within 
the party, does not -lessen the 
importance of the phenomenon. 
2 
1 
2 
Haaretz, 28 December 1958. 
Golda Heir said of the movement: 'It is an undemocratic 
phenomenon. The Party and not the street will choose the 
Prime Minister'', and Pinhas Sapir elaborated this: 'The 
campaign of signatures is a dangerous phenomenon for Israeli 
democracy. No one-knows how many times each individual. signed, 
they are trying to depict it as something spontaneous but it is 
organized. This type of election does not exist in the Israeli 
constitution. The means of election is the polling booth and 
not the street, and therefore, it is undemocratic, non-public 
and immoral". See Haaretz, 8 February 1967, and Haaretz, 
6 March 1969. 
The same experiment was repeated after the Yom Kippur War by 
another military man, Arik Sharon. He even exploited the fact that 
he was on reserve duty-to solicit help from his men and thus reached 
an unprecedented peak of political involvement in the army. This 
attempt also failed, and Sharon was forced to comply with the rules,, 
and to establish a party. After winning only two seats at the-elections, 
he disbanded his party and joined the Herut Movement. 
A further instance of change in the accepted norms of political 
activity relates to a specific political organization of army officers, 
based on common military background. It-was the_Etgar circle of-the- 
Labour Party which began during 1971. It was recognized officially in 
1972 by the-Labour Party Bureau as an 'ideological circle'. According 
to Party regulations, such a circle must be open to all. Party members, 
but in effect, it was intended to be a group for reserve personnel and 
comprised some 300 members. 
The circle had no common ideological basis (it included both'hawks 
and doves', left- and rightwing' opinion). Its members were united by 
their shared past and their desire to exploit the 'circle' as a pressure 
group so as to increase their mobility within the party. The chairman, 
Colonel (Res.. ) Yosef Nevo, admitted this when he said: 
The circle was intended to facilitate the absorption of retired 
military personnel in the Party. Former army men who want to 
become active in the Party encounter serious integration 
problems. They are not welcomed cordially and are not allowed 
to speak or to act, and they do in fact have something to say. 
They are not at ease, and we have therefore come to the 1 
conclusion that they would need a permanent party framework... 
1 Interview by M. Mayzels Maariv, 25 September 1972. The founding 
committee included Nevo, Maj. - Gen. Yosef Geva, Lieut. -Cols. Aharon 
Dafni, Menahem Sherman and Amos Cinnamon. The forum chosen after 
the April 1971 Party conference consisted of Col. Israel Granit, 
Maj. -Gen. Geva, Cols. Almog, Sherman and Dafni and M. Gat and 
Maj. Chichik. 
At a meeting of representatives of the circle with the Party 
Secretary, Aharon Yadlin, on 20 August 1972, one of them said: 
Once retiring officers wanted to be company 
directors. Now they want real political activity, 
and influence and they are courting the parties. 
Objections to the organization on the basis of the members' 
military background brought the circle under attack several times 
from within and outside the Party. These attacks intensified when 
the circle joined forces with those groups demanding a change of 
leadership after the Yom Kippur War. The leaders of the circle 
were obliged to defend it against these accusations and claimed that 
the circle had not been intended to be a closed group of former 
officers, but rather an open ideological circle, encompassing. 
workers in industry, education, officials and 
public administrators... and aspires to renewal 
of the Labour Party through democratization of 
its internal structure, and the rgassessment of. 
its social and economic policies. 
This new interpretation, offered in response to public criticism, 
contradicts the original statements that were expressed earlier in an 
internal forum. 
Reserve officers sometimes expressed dissatisfaction with Israeli 
politics over the years. One of them described the political scene 
as a 'mouldy concoction' and another spoke of his 'revulsion from 
parties'. Officers who became Ministers often expressed their 
contempt for parliamentary procedure, and in general, officers taking 
up political careers have remained indifferent to parliamentary 
activity and prefer executive action. A relatively large number of 
Knesset members of military background have not succeeded in their 
1 
2 
Labour Party Archives, Tel-Aviv. 
Yosef Nevo Yediot Aharonot, 10 May 1974. 
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parliamentary role, and several have openly admitted this. 
I 
It is not surprising that when Meir Amit, in the wake of the 
political crisis in 1975, made several suggestions to Rabin to 
improve the situation, he did not propose the strengthening of the 
party structure, expansion of the base of government by creating open 
government or greater representation or changing the policies. What 
he suggested was the strengthening of the executive power of the 
Prime Minister. 
2 
The intensification of the political crisis exposed the loose 
foundations of the consensus on the traditional democratic rules of 
the game. In the last few months of 1975 more and more support was 
voiced for the concept of the 'strong arm', the establishment of a 
non-party government, the declaration of a state of emergency and even 
the dissolution of the Knesset for a limited period. 
3 
The most 
specific suggestion for a government of. experts, personalities, non- 
political people or a war cabinet - the terms were used interchangeably 
at the time - was made by Arik Sharon, and set out in a document he 
submitted to the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. 
1 
2 
3 
See Maj. -Gen. (Res. ) M. -. Pe1ed: Maariv, 21 September 1969 or 
Yoel Marcus. Haaretz, 16 June 1970. 
See interview with Maj. -Gen. (Res. ) Meir Amit 11 June 1976. 
For criticism of Israeli politics by officers, mainly directed 
against parties, the lack of authoritarian leadership and the 
weakness of the executive branch see interview with Arik Sharon, 
Maariv, 21 August 1973 and Meir Amit Haaretz, 11 June 1976. 
Articles on these subjects appeared in the Israeli, press 
between November 1975 and February 1976. See, inter alia, Yoel 
Marcus-. Haaretz, 25 February 1971 and Professor Amnon Rubinstein. 
Haaretz, 15 January 1976, including references to dissolution of 
Knesset, which was broached by Professor Benjamin Akzin. 
SHARONTROPOSES A'GOVERNMENT OF'GENERALS 
Sharon's proposal consisted of two parts - one tactical and 
the other fundamental. In the former he proposed that Rabin explain 
to his party (the Labour Party) the gravity of the situation and the 
need to adapt political instruments to the emergency in several ways: by 
cutting the number of Cabinet Ministers to half, extending the 
coalition basis to include all parties. Assuming that the Labour Party 
would object, Sharon went on to the second half of his proposal. Rabin 
should resign, thereby dissolving the Cabinet, and should go to the 
country as the head of a 'personal list', form a national redemption 
government. Who would his partners be? Sharon held negotiations with 
potential candidates for his proposed government. More than half were 
reserve officers (more than'double their number in the incumbent govenmerit)° 
and they would be allotted the key posts. 
This plan exposed Sharon's political conceptions. The weakness of 
the Rabin Government, according to Sharon, derived from its unwieldly 
size and its internal disputes. The 'tademption 'government' would 
provide representation for groups from all parts of the political 
spectrum and the ideological differences would be even greater than in 
the Rabin Government. (It would include Gush Emunim, which demanded 
annexation of territories, on the one hand, and the Israel-Palestine 
Council, supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state, on the 
other).. The ideological heterogeneity and profound political differences 
between the proposed Ministers only highlighted their common trait - 
their military background. Furthermore according to Sharon's blueprint 
the Prime Minister would also have been the IDF's Commander in Chief, it 
would therefore be logical to elect a military man and not a mere 
politician. 
) 
1 
See Yishayahu Ben-Porat. Yediot Aharonot., 25 September 1974. 
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Sharon's words, which are diametrically opposed'to a military 
man's duty to obey orders unless 'they are manifestly illegal', 
provoked an outcry. 
' The public storm was so ferocious that the 
Agranat Commission summoned Sharon to interview him about his views. 
Rabin rejected the proposal, although it won a certain degree of 
support in the press. -However, in 1975 a change in the rules of the 
political game was more feasible than in any previous era, -and 
had 
Rabin wished it he could have done so. The Prime Minister himself 
was a former soldier, and had he wished to do it, the political crisis 
had prepared the ground for its acceptance by the general public. 
Sharon's 1975 plan to effect a change in the nature of the 
Israeli regime required an election. However his past behaviour suggested 
that he might propose less democratic methods. In this context the 
affair which resulted from his exposition of the duties of an officer is 
very revealing. 
On the 25 January 1974, Sharon was interviewed-in Maariv: 
... Has it ever happened 
in the past that you disobeyed a 
superior's order? 
Oh,. that definitely happened. 
Even in the last war such a thing happened? 
Yes, even in the last war. 
What, for example? 
I tried not tocarry out instructions. First of all I will 
tell you my own belief in this connection. When I receive 
an order I treat it according to three values: 'the first, 
and most important is the good of the state. The state is 
the supreme thing. The second value is my obligation to 
my subordinates, and the third value is my obligation to my 
superiors. I wouldn't change the priority of these three 
values in any way. The need to decide between the 
obligation to my subordinates and to my superiors arises 
whenever there is a strong clash between them. Whenever I 
receive an instruction which I know is illogical and 
derives from a lack of knowledge of the situation and of the 
conditions on the spot, and could cause a loss of life, then 
my duty to my subordinates comes before my duty to my 
commanders. 
1 Military Law 1955, **Article 125 and also Article 19(b) in the 
1936 Criminal Code. 
Conscious of the public outrage, and knowing that his concept 
contradicted both the state law and IDF norms, Sharon denied what had 
been reported and claimed that his words were misrepresented. The 
Commission clutched at his denial and did not deal with his reported 
views, but the impact of the interview continued to'make waves for 
a long time. 
The editor of A1. -Hamishmar. Mark Gef en summarised the affair 
succinctly: 
..: From where does Arik Sharon get his pretension that 
he is the one to judge what is for the good of the state. 
How can he know. that the order given by the regional 
commander, or the Chief of Staff does not serve the 
good of the state? And if Sharon is allowed to behave 
like that why should his officers be prohibited from using 
the same scale of values and treat his commands by the 
same yardstick. Is Sharon really intimating to us and to 
the entire nation that Divine Providence has bestowed on 
him the unique capacity to determine what is for the good 
of the state. What an astonishing similarity to the 
famous dictum of Louis Quartorze 'I am the state'. 
1 
Since the affair of disobeying orders was only one scandal 
stirred up by Sharon when he provoked the 'war of the generals' in the 
aftermath of the October Jar, Gefen entitled his article, 'After the 
politicization of the IDF - danger of militarization of political life' 
and he concluded his article saying: 
.. there have been chapters in Israel's history when Israeli democracy was endangered by the movement in 
which Sharon is currently involved (he referred to the 
Herut attempt to use force when demonstrating in front of the 
Knesset during the debate about German reparations in 1955). 
But it is the first time even inside that 
movement that a man wants to emulate the examples of 
certain South American states - the involvement of the 
military in the power struggle. This is the danger, and 
one should see it without blinkers, and without self- 
deception, as though 'it cannot happen to us'. 
Mark Gefen Al-Hamishmar, l February 1974. On illegal commands 
see Legal Opinion No. 80, of Chief Military Advocate, 1 September 
1972, published in Collection of Legal Opinions. No. 3,1973. 
The democratic rules of the game had not basically changed since 
the state's establishment, and were in fact accepted by most of the 
retired officers who joined the political elite. However at several 
times an element surfaced which was prepared to modify the familiar 
democratic features of the Israeli political system. It is true that 
during thirty years no such indications appeared among the serving 
officers, but among civilian groups it frequently surfaced among 
officers-turned-politicians. 
The conditions that have emerged since 1967 might, if developed, 
be a foundation for such a change. If it becomes evident that the 
democratic system. will not be able to regulate conflicts over the basic 
issues of Israeli society then new mechanisms may evolve which will in 
their nature be less democratic. 
Since statehood there have been no explicit attempts by the 
military to change the democratic government in Israel, neither have 
there been any by civil elements. The more conditions arise which 
render likely this possibility the clearer it becomes that the group of 
retired officers, located in the political structure, have the requisite 
characteristics to give them a central role in that process. They enjoy 
wide public support, they have an image of a national leadership which 
seeks the good of the nation, they have influence and authority over the 
military command, which they led when they served in the IDF, and they 
operate as a link between the military and parts of the political elite. 
Because the political and military elites have the same social 
composition, people from both groups would participate in such a change 
of regime, and the officers-turned-politicians would then become the most 
important factor - the link between these two groups. 
Such a transformation in the nature of the government would not 
necessarily be contrary to the population's wishes. After all Sharon's 
proposal in 1975 was that the 'Personal List' would be presented to the 
public in the elections for the Knesset. It would, therefore, 
have the appearance of an election, or it could be'proposed in a 
referendum when the group of personalities would run on a manifesto 
to govern for an emergency period, which would necessitate, for a 
limited time, the suspension of constitutional guarantees. However, 
the possibility of the imposition of an emergency government, a 
declaration of martial law, an adjournment of the Knesset and the 
adoption of other similar measures cannot be dismissed. 
' 
PUBLIC APPROVAL FOR THE GENERALS ENTRY INTO'POLITICS 
Israeli public opinion takes a , highly positive view of the entry 
of officers into politics and accepts the-phenomenon. In a study 
conducted in October 1972 a representative sample of the-population was 
asked: 'Who, in your opinion,. will be the leaders of this country in 
100 years time? ' Of those who responded, 26% said politicians 12.6% 
officers, and 12.8%-scientists, with members of other professions 
lagging far behind. 
1 Ben-Dor rightly mentioned another possible way for retired 
officers to break the political rules of the game: 
Until now their readiness to play the political game 
according to the rules was not only because of their civic 
culture but also because the economic sphere and the 
political-administrative institutions had the capacity to 
provide them with adequate second careers. Considering the 
growing number of senior officers, which devalues their 
rank, an acute economic recession could create a serious 
shortage of second career opportunities. ' This in turn could 
deeply endanger the officers' political patterns of behaviour: 
reluctance for rapid rotation might develop and a strong and 
hostile pressure group might be organised. ' Ben-Dor, Gabriel 
(1977: 421-422). 'Politics and the Army in Israel in the 
Seventies' in Lissak, Moshe and Guttman, "EmanUel The Israeli 
Political System (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Am Ored. 
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An examination of the distribution of the respondents shows 
that those groups whose weight in the population is steadily 
increasing - the native-born and the young - gave officers an even 
higher rating than the total respondents - 157, and scientists only 
12%... 1 
The low degree of opposition to the significant entry of officers 
into political life is typical not only of unorganized public opinion 
but also civilian political parties. Only certain groups have voiced 
objections to officers, and they were the ones who objected when they 
saw it as a threat to their political status, while they supported 
officers who were their allies. 
In the fifties, for example, the Mapai veterans feared that IDF 
officers might lean towards Mapam, and later they feared the 
strengthening of the young generation. In the period which commenced 
with the Six Day War the prestige of the IDF soared skyhigh, and as 
Lieutenant-General Barley said: "the Generals were exposed to the 
public not only as proficient in their own field but also as people 
who find their way in a very convoluted political situation. .2 What 
followed became known as 'worship of generals', and their entry into 
political life was viewed with great approval. 
The only dissenters were two groups- whose chances of political 
mobility were thereby affected, namely the intermediate generation which 
supported the old guard and more particularly the Rafi group. The 
veterans, headed by Golda Meir, greeted the officers enthusiastically. 
1 See Glick, Edward Bernard (1977: 10-22) Israel and her Army: 
The Influence of the Soldiers on the State A Current Jewish 
Affairs Pamphlet. New York. Labour Zionist Alliance. 
2 
Interview in Davar, 3 August 1973. 
A study of critical articles which appeared in the press between 1968 
and 1972 reveals that the great majority were not opposed to the 
phenomenon as such, but differentiated between 'good' and 'bad' 
generals. 
l 
The attitude of other parties was based on similar reasoning. 
The National Religious Party criticised the coopting -of Haim Barley 
to the Government as an Alignment representative, -not for reasons 
touching military-political relations, but because this had a 
detrimental effect on its own strength in the Cabinet by increasing 
the number of Mapai ministers. Gahal condemned the entry of officers 
as long as they were confined to the Alignment, but stopped critizing 
the phenomenon when officers joined their own party. The same thing 
occurred in 1977 when the Democratic Movement for Change was set up. 
The new party's opponents attacked it for the central position of the 
generals who had created the party, while its supporters ignored this 
point. 
Those who objected to the move of officers into politics cited 
several arguments, but fear of the consolidation of a military clique 
was not one of them. The fear that militaristic values, might be. 
brought into the civil system was also marginal. A theme which was 
discussed more extensively claimed that the entry, of officers into 
politics harmed the political system by dissuading talented people 
from choosing a political career, knowing that they could never reach 
Journalists reflecting Rafi views attacked the entry of Barley and 
Rabin into political life. Shabtai Tevet, for example, noted that 
Golda Meir had objected. to the entry of the Ben Gurionite ex- 
officers into political life, but was now herself bringing Barley 
into the Government. Haaretz, 13 March 1972. The leftwing papers, 
on the other hand, attacked the-entry into politics of Maj. -Gens. 
Weizman and Sharon. Mark Gefen of Al Hamishmar criticized these 
t"op and Maj. -Gen. Lahat for joining Gahal and in the same breath 
welcomed Barley into the Government. See also Amnon Rubinstein, 
Haaretz, 16 July 1973. 
the top. ... 
'The belief has been created that one can only reach the 
Cabinet through the IDF and that is bad'', said M. K-, Avraham Ofer a 
member of Mapai's intermediate generation,. 
) 
- 
Another argument was that the officers lacked the necessary, 
qualifications for political posts. To this Ezer Weizman, Chairman 
of the Herut executive, replied: 
I think it is pointless, stupid and petty-minded to 
evaluate a man's ability to serve on the basis of the 
roles he has fulfilled before. I know several major 
and lieutenant-generals who are not fit to be 
ministers, and I know some who are... 
and referring to criticism of the entry of the retiring Chief of 
Staff, Haim Barley, into the Cabinet, he added: 
For four years the Chief of Staff deals with the basic 
problems of the'state. He takes part in more than 50% 
of Cabinet meetings, attends the Ministerial Committee 
on Security Mattes, receives more information than 
most ministers... 
The focal problem in the public debate on officers in politics 
was the interval between military service and entry into 
political activity. This was dramatized when the Chief of the 
Operations Branch Ezer Weizman: retired from the army on the 
morning of 14 December 1969, was nominated candidate for Minister by 
the Herut Central Committee on the same evening and joined the 
Cabinet on the following day. It was later revealed that Weizman 
had not joined the Herut, Party in the interval between his demobiliza- 
tion and the meeting. He had conducted lengthy negotiations with the 
Herut. leaders, and particularly with the faction headed by Yosef 
Kremerman. At one stage even the possibility that Weizman might be 
Gahal's 
discussed. 
1 
2 
candidate for the Knesset and for Tel Aviv Mayor was 
Interview in Maariv ,8 November 1971 and Haaretz, 14 November 1971. 
Shlomo Nakdimon, Yediot Aharonot, 19 December 1969. 
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When the coalition negotiations were about to reach a conclusion 
in December 1969, Kremerman suggested that Herut nominate Weizman as 
their ministerial candidate, and that he should consequently resign 
from the army. This proposal was turned down and a "tactical 
exercise' was then planned: Herut would nominate Kremerman as one 
of its three Ministers. Weizman would then resign from military service, 
Kremerman would resign from the post and propose Weizman in his stead. 
This in fact was done. 
Herut leader, Menahem Begin's position is revealing. . -It'was he 
who had opposed any discussion of Weizman's nomination. when it 
was broached at the Herut Central Committee and in its Knesset faction 
(which recommended candidates), so long as Weizman remained in 
uniform. In both institutions Begin cited the same reasons: 
Weizman is serving in the army. He is in uniform. 
Herut is a political body. The-principles of the 
Herut movement advocate a full apoliticization of 
the IDF. The discussion of a soldier on active 
service by a party institution violates this 
principle, from which we cannot deviate one iota. 
But this was not the true motive for Begin's conduct. Begin 
knew that Weizman's entry into Herut was designed to strengthen 
Kremerman's faction, which wanted to damage Begin's own leadership. 
And, in fact, shortly after he had joined the Party, Weizman became 
The fact that Begin's instrumentalist argument was only a 
pretdxt can be ascertained from the fact that he had known for two 
years that Weizman was in close contact with Herut leaders and that 
his candidacy had been discussed at numerous informal meetings. He 
had not objected to these and had in fact even attended some of them. 
1 Shlomo Nakdimon, Yediot Aharonct., 19 December 1969. 
The difference between them and the official discussion by, the Herut 
cyntral committee was merely formal. 
Furthermore, in a talk on the 7th of November with the President 
of the Industrialists Association; Mark Moshevitz, Begin gave other 
reasons for his objections to Weizman. Moshevitz suggested that 
Weizman be made Minister of*Transport. Begin praised Weizman but 
emphasized that he was vital to the IDF. "It was clear that Begin was 
not happy to be responsible for making an officer of Weizman's calibre 
leave the army'-. 
1 
It was not the first occasion when Begin used the argument of the 
need to protect the apoliticization of the IDF whenever it suited his 
political needs. On the 1 June 1967 it happened again in relation to 
Lieutenant-General (Fes. ) Moshe Dayan. It will be recalled that Eshkol 
tried to relieve the pressure to bring Dayan into the cabinet, by 
appointing him to be Commander of the southern front. The same morning 
a Ministerial committee headed by Eshkol met a delegation of the Gahal 
leadership, led by Begin, to discuss the possibility of enlarging the 
Government. Gahal's stance was: we will join the Cabinet on condition 
that Dayan is appointed Defence Minister. Eshkol replied: 'Dayan prefers 
the position as Commander of the southern front' to which Begin retorted: 
I beg you not to introduce any military problem into our 
conversation. A military appointment is the exclusive 
preserve of the Chief of Staff with the approval of the 
Defence Minilter, and not a subject for inter-party 
discussions. 
1 
2 
Shlomo Nakdimon, Yediot Aharonot, 19 December 1969. 
Nakdimon, S (1968: 221). 
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In the evening of the same day Eshkol told the members of Mapai, 's 
secretariat about Begin's words and explained that it was clear to him 
that Begin was trying to wriggle'away and not to discuss the possibil- 
ity of Dayan's mobilization. And. that in fact later in the discussion 
Begin and his-friends had bombarded him with questions about military 
matters, so he'told them:, 'I see that after all you are 
interested in 
military matters... '1 
' PARACHUTING ' IN' -NO } COOLING "OFF' -MECHANISM 
The problem surfaced again in March 1972 when Lieutenant-General 
Haim Barley left the army and was appointed Minister of Commerce and 
Industry on behalf of the Labour Party. The law places no restrictions 
on an officer resigning from the service to take up political activity, 
but public opinion distinguished between party appointments, or even 
administrative posts with political implications, and membership of 
the Cabinet. Criticism of this new case---of 'parachuting in' related 
to the latter. 
There was apprehension, not of the militarization of the Cabinet, 
but of the politicization of the army. It was feared that parties 
might start courting officers still in uniform, and that the latter 
might approach the parties in order to arrange political posts for 
themselves after their resignation from service. Thus party 
considerations might sway officers in the course of their military 
activities. 
2 
1 
2 
Protocol of Mapai secretariat, 1 June 1967. The 
reverse happened in 1977, when Arik Sharon MK expressed a 
wish to return to the army and to be appointed Chief of Staff, a 
suggestion which provoked great consternation ... Simcha Ehrlich' 
M K., the Liberal party leader in Likud, supported the idea, 
but his reason was to get rid of Sharon from political life, so 
as to remove Sharon's threat to his leadership. See Zeev Shiff, 
Haaretz, 27 May 1977. 
See for example, Professor Daniel Friedman, Haaretz, 14 June 1973. 
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It was proposed that a minimal period be prescribed between 
retirement from military service and entry into the government. 
Proposals ranged from a 'cooling-off period' of two years to 100 
days, in accordance with the Election Law, which obliges civil 
servants to resign from their posts 100 days before their 
candidacy for the Knesset is declared. 
On 10 November 1971 Knesset Member Reuven Arzi'(Mapam) submitted 
a Private Members Bill to amend the'Basic Law: Cabinet'under which 
judges and officers, retiring from regular service would not be 
eligible for office as ministers until one hundred days after-they 
left active service. His argument was that the purpose of the law 
was 
to emphasize, through this separation, the non-party 
nature of the legal system and of the IDF, to avoid 
undermining the unlimited confidence which the public 
has in these two systems, precisely because they are 
remote from political activity. 
The-Minister of Justice'Shapira, reserved his position. He_ 
did not oppose the amendment, although he had doiübts. about the necessity 
for aone hundred day period. Nor did he regard it as. improper for a judge 
or senior officer, while still in office, -to be offered a governmental 
post. There was no reason, he said, why a man should resign before the 
negotiations with him were concluded. It was after long deliberations 
in the Knesset Committee that Arzi's proposal passed through the second 
and third readings on the 22 July 1973.1 
It was not only the ruling party which took a sceptical view of 
the 'cooling off period'. When Barley's appointment to the Cabinet was 
brought before the Knesset it was approved by a majority of 57, with 
two against and 31 abstentions. The conclusion was plain to all; 
I 
1 
The Book of Laws 711,1973 amendment No. 236. 
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opposition parties usually voted against_the. Government on questions 
of its compositi=on. and their abstention on that occasion suggested 
support based on their esteem for the new Minister himself. 
The problem of 'parachuting in' was raised by only one speaker 
in the debate, who finally voted for Barley. Yehuda Shaari 
(Independent Liberals) said: 
I would like to point to an aesthetic flaw in the 
procedure. I favour this appointment, but cannot 
ignore the fact that it is desirable that the 
transition from the sphere of military activity to 
political civilian activity at the highest echelon 
should be linked to a certain period of waiting 
and interval. There are no clearly defined rules 
on this point. Perhaps the Knesset should pass a 
law. 
He too, reiterated the argument that there was no danger of militariza- 
tion of the Government but rather of politicization of the army. 
1 
The discrepancy between the public criticism of the lack of 
a cooling-off period and the acquiescence of the professional 
politicians can be attributed to lack of public knowledge about the 
nature of the relations between the army and the parties. The public 
regarded the formal definition of the cooling-off period as the 
solution to the problem. The politicians knew that formal restrict- 
ions would have no effect on the practical situation. They knew that 
for years officers had maintained party ties in order to prepare a 
second civil career for themselves. 
These contacts were sometimes directly with party leaders. 
Major-General Ezer Weizman, for example, had in 1965 already discussed 
with Dr Eliezer Rimalt M K. the Liberal Party leader the possibility 
of joining Gahal; but they could also be with public groups having 
Divrgi Haknesset, 6 March 1972. 
political influence. An example of this is the relationship formed by 
the-'then commander of the Northern'Cöffiand- Major-General--David Elazar 
with the Kibbutz movement in order to prepare himself a political 
power base which. he-wöuld later use on leaving the army. 
l 
Furthermore the politicians were even aware of some instances 
when it was done to further their military careers. Such information 
was kept from the general public by the military censor. - The more 
usual pattern was to become a member of Mapai and, to be active in the 
Serviceman's Department in order to gain credits for their personal 
file. But there were other cases where officers used more complicated 
methods. 
The striking example was Major-General Arik Sharon. In 1969 he 
demanded to be appointed head of Southern Command. When this demand 
was rejected by the then Chief of Staff.., Yitzhak Rabin, he contacted 
MK Eliezer Rimalt, the Liberal Party leader, with the intention of 
becoming that party's candidate for the Knesset. This was brought to 
the attention of Pinhas Sapir of Mapai who hastened to exert pressure 
on the Chief of Staff to grant Sharon's wish. 'It is better that 
Sharon remain in the army in the post he wants, than that he strengthen 
an opposition party'', he said. Sharon got what he wanted and stayed 
in the army. 
Within four years Sharon tried to employ the same technique to 
win the post of Chief of Staff. In the latter half of 1972 he 
threatened to resign from the army and to join an opposition party 
if he were not appointed either Deputy Chief of Staff, or Head of operations 
Branch, . and later 
Chief of Staff. On that occasion he negotiated 
with Begin to join Herut and asked some of his friends among the 
Mapai activists, Golda Meir, Defence Minister Dayan, and Pinhas Sapir 
1 
2 
Concerning Weinman see his evidence in Weizman, Ezer (1975: 244) 
and concerning Elazar see Bartov, Hanoch (1978) Dado Tel Aviv. 
Maariv. 
See evidence of Yaacob Halfon, Sharon's supporter, in Yediot 
Aharonot, 5 September 1975. 
to grant his request. But the price he demanded, the most senior post 
in the IDF, was too high for the Labour party, and it preferred to 
allow Sharon to appear on the Herut list rather than'to appoint him 
Chief of Staff. 
1 
1 1, 
Such hard bargaining can be conducted only by a military man 
who also enjoys such public standing that he can constitute an 
electoral threat to the ruling party. A similar case was that of 
Major-General Israel Tal, who was courted by several'parties, 
particularly by those on the'left, when he contended for the post in 
1973.2" ' 
0 
THE OCTOBER WAR - GENERALS-TURNED-POLITICIANS-TURN-GENERALS 
Movement between the military and political arenas was usually 
from the army towards the political bodies, but from 1973 on it flowed 
both ways, although isolated attempts to move from politics into the 
army had been made before. In 1953 Mapam demanded that officers 
affiliated to, them be returned to military service as one of the 
conditions for the party's entry into the coalition led by Mapai. 3 
1956 it was proposed as part of an arrangement with Ahdut Haavoda in 
return for its support for Ben Gurion's war plans in Egypt, that 
Major-General (Res. ) Yigal Allon be returned to the IDF as Commander 
of Southern Command. In the 1967 'waiting period' Moshe Dayan's 
wish to return to active service was approved by Mapai's leadership. 
1 
2 
3 
Yediot Aharonot, 5 September 1975. 
See Maariv, 22 March 1974. 
Sharett, Moshe (1978: 159) Personal Diary (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 
Maariv. 11 
In all three cases the attempts failed, but it does not follow that the 
political elite was reluctant to solve problems by remobilijing 
politicians to active service. The Yom Kippur War caused a dramatic 
change in the direction of the current, which opened up the boundaries 
which had hitherto blocked movement from politics into the ranks of 
the military. 
The war caught the IDF with a relatively new high command, most 
of them in office for less than a year and relatively young in age, 
the senior commanders lacking the experience of waging war which their 
predecessors had had. 
l 
The surprise nature of the onslaught meant that 
in the first few days of the war. the IDF was caught off balance. As 
a result, officers from the reserve who had won professional 
recognition and renown in the Six Day War returned to service to aid 
the High Command, not through the customary reserve schemes and 
emergency appointments but by informal means: they came in most. cases 
on their own initiative, or at the request of military commanders, or 
at the invitation of politicians. 
The number of reserve officers who had taken up political careers, 
and returned during the war to active service, was unprecedently. high 
2 
and caused several shocks to the high command. chains. First, on the 
purely military level, high-ranking officers took up positions under 
officers who had, shortly before, been their own juniors. Thus, for 
example, Major-General Arik Sharon was appointed Divisional Commander 
1 
2 
The new major-generals appointed in summer 1973 were the first 
officers of this rank who had not participated in the War of 
Independence, having joined up in the early fifties. 
The outstanding figures among them were Leiut. -Gen. Barlev, Mai. -Dens. 
Meir Amit, Shmuel Eyal, Yosef Geva, Uzi Narkis, Aharon Yariv, Arik 
Sharon, Shlomo Lahat, Ezer Weizman; Cols. Yisrael Granit 
Mordechai Bar-On. See Weiss, Shevach (1973) 'Army and Politics in 
Israel 1973' (Hebrew) Social Research-Review No. 5. 
under the Commander of the Southern Command, Shmuel Gonen; Haim 
Barley was appointed Commander Southern Front under his former deputy, 
the Chief of Staff, David Elazar, and the former Commander of the Air 
Force, Major-General Mordechai Hod, became an adviser to the then 
Commander, Major-General Benjamin Peled. The gap between the new formal 
hierarchy and the authority patterns and personal relations which 
had prevailed for decades sometimesdisrupted the functioning of the 
w-ý 
military hierarchy. 
More complex was the disruption of relations between the military 
and political levels. The most striking case was that of the Minister of 
Commerce and Industry Barley. On the second day of the war he was 
asked by the Prime Minister to tour Northern Command and to assist the 
command to stem the Syrian Advance. This he did. Barley held 
the highest military rank in the Command, but was never formally 
mobilized and remained a civilian in status. His military authority 
was basically personal and informal. After the front was stabilized 
he was asked by the Chief of Staff and the Prime Minister to move to 
Southern Command. This time it was necessary to define his role 
formally, and it was decided that he would serve as acting Commander 
of the Southern Front, above the existing Commander of the Southern 
Command, Gonen. 
This appointment raised a constitutional problem. Could he 
continue to serve as a Cabinet Minister? The Justice Minister Shapiro 
thought that Barley should resign from the cabinet. before being appointed 
to his military post. But the Attorney General had another opinion. 
He ruled that Barley could continue in his civil post while carrying 
out his army tasks. Prime Minister Meir was very angry at Shapira's 
opinion which she thought too pedantic: 
I had an outburst against him and I said, 
'I don't care if it is not compatible that a Minister 
is also a front commander. Am I interestd in 
constitutional matters at this time? Let them hang 
me later in Dizengoff Square, what do I care now... 
I received the reports from the south... and I knew 
that it was a disasters.. and that Barley was the 
only one to save us... 
And thus an abnormal. situation was created whereby the Commander of 
the Front, Lieutenant-General Barlev, was subordinate to the Chief of 
Staff and was simultaneously a senior member in the Cabinet to which 
the Chief of Staff was answerable. 
2 
The picture was further complicated by the fact that not only 
did senior politicians take up senior command positions, but this 
1 
2 
See Gutman, Yehiel (1980) The Attorney General a forthcoming book 
Tel Aviv. Edanim. 
See also interview with Haim Barleu, Maariv, 2 November 1973. 
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occurred very soon before the general election. It was evident that 
the activities and omissions of the politician-commanders would be a 
burning issue in the election campaign. 
The problem was particularly acute on the southern, -front 
because 
of a combination of three factors. First, the battle was longer than 
that in the north, 'engaging much bigger armies. Secondly, conflicts 
occurred there between officers with different and sometimes diametrically 
opposed professional concepts. The striking example was the clash 
between Sharon and Barley. The former, trained in the commando school, 
preferred improvisation, speed and surprise. The latter, with lengthy 
experience of armoured warfare, advocated meticulous planning at the 
expense of speed, and preferred deployment of mass to commando-like 
activity. 
. In addition to the professional disputes and the undermining of 
the chains of authority, many personal conflicts erupted between Generals 
Sharon and Gonen, Gonen and Adan and others. All these conflicts adversely 
affected the conduct of the war and served to provoke the 'war of the 
generals' which erupted during the war and continued. through the' 
seventies. 
Several of the senior officers at the front. were also high-ranking 
politicians. Barley was commander of the front; Sharon was one of the 
three divisions commanding officers, supported by colleagues such as 
Major-General Shlomo Lahat, Likud candidate for mayor of Tel Aviv. 
Another divisional commander was Avraham Adan, former Palmah man and 
associate of Ahdut Haavoda leaders. Other officers with political 
connections and commitments served in various posts in the Southern 
Command. This resulted in references being made within-the IDF to the 
'Alignment division' and the 'Likud division', at first with 
humorous intent, later as an established fact, accusations being 
made'that party considerations were woven into the conduct of the 
war. When the distribution of functions among the various divisions 
was discussed, and particularly the crossing of the Suez Canal - 
which held out the promise of military glory for the act which would 
alter the course of the war - Arik Sharon accused the Command of 
discriminating against him because of party political considerations. 
This was after his proposal to bring forward the date of the crossing 
had been rejected and when the distribution of tasks and the dimension 
of the operation were being debated. 
The Chief of Staff, some. southern front commanders and other 
senior officers accused Sharon of trying to reap political fruits from 
professional decisions. They could even cite a case when Barley agreed 
to a move which was a military compromise, only in order to deny Sharon's 
allegation that he was discriminated against. However the Chief of Staff 
opposed Barlev's decision. 
1 
A factor which intensified the political debate was the disclosure 
of the war to the media, and particularly of relations within the high 
command. In contrast to previous wars this one was extensively covered 
by military correspondents mobilized for the purpose, and by civilian. 
journalists who were posted to command headquarter and attended 
1 See Maj. -Gen. Adan, Avraham (1979: 218) On Both Banks of the 
Suez Tel Aviv. Edanim and also Bartov, H. (1978: 259). The 
question was which of the divisions should secure the bridge- 
head over the Canal, and which should advance westwards. 
Barley suggested that units from both Sharon's and Adan's 
divisions take part in both tasks, whereas the Chief of Staff 
ruled that Sharon should perform the former and Adan the latter 
task. 
confidential meetings. Groups of journalists, some of them with party 
affiliation, who volunteered or were -'recruited'- to support various 
commanders, exacerbated the internal struggles through their reports, 
and prepared the ground for the 'generals war' which continued after 
hostilities ended. ' 
The entry of politicians to the military command caused a break- 
down in the chain of authority both inside the army and between the army 
and the political echelon. Once again Sharon called the tune. On 5th 
October he realized that the senior command of southern front was not 
accepting his advice on the conduct of the war. He telephoned from his 
field headquarters to the home of the leader of the Opposition and 
Herut leader Men-ahem-Begin MK- and told him about the dispute. Sharon 
asked Begin to contact the Prime Minister and persuade her-to exert 
influence in order to alter the decisions. 
On another occasion, on 21 October, Sharon did not agree with a 
task. when he realised that the front Commander insisted he should do it, 
he called the Minister of Defence directly and asked him to intercede and 
to reverse the command, which Dayan did. 
1 
The problem of reserve service for politicians was not-solved 
when the war ended. Barley was demobilized from service but Sharon was 
not anxious to take the same step. Sharon started to engage in extensive 
political activity and, while still in uniform, held talks with politicians 
and others on the negotiaticns'for disengagement between Israel and Egypt; 
2 
1 See Adan, A. (1979: 268-9). 
2 
Editorial in Haaretz, 8 January 1974 criticizing 'violations of 
the law' by Sharon for serving in reserves while a candidate for 
the Knesset, and conducting party negotiations on behalf-of-his 
Knesset list while a divisional CO. 
here, he was totally at odds with the Government and his fellow officers of 
the General Staff.. Angry. reactions by politicians and leader writers in 
non-party newspapers did not deter him. - Two other senior officers were 
appointed to central posts in the army: Major-General Aharon Yariv, 
Alignment candidate for the Knesset, was appointed to conduct negotiations 
with Egypt at Kilometer 101 and Major-General Shmuel Eyal, Alignment 
candidate for mayor of Rishon Lezion was made responsible for prisoners of 
war and casualties. 
POLITICIANS'AS"COMMANDERS: 'THE 1973*CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 
When the Knesset decided to postpone the elections,, from 30 October 
to 31 December, the continuing military service by politicians who were 
candidates for the Knesset raised a constitutional problem. Para. 7 of 
the Election Law, dealing with candidacy for the Knesset, stated (clause 8) 
that 'senior civil servants and senior army officers or officers in certain 
positions, tobe determined by law, cannot become candidates for the 
Knesset'. This law, which complements the country's Basic Laws and their 
operative aspects, defines 'army officers' as 'army officers of any rank 
in IDF regular service'. It goes on to state that persons in these 
categories can be candidates only if they resign from their posts at least 
100 days before the elections. 
Furthermore, Para 56 (3) states that a candidate for the Knesset 
cannot be called for reserve duty. The legislator's intention was to 
prevent a situation whereby the officers commanding Knesset candidates on 
active service could exert pressure on them, or whereby the candidates 
themselves could influence their subordinates. As regards reserve duty, 
the intention was to preclude a situation whereby a candidate could be 
called up to prevent him from taking part in an election campaign, or" 
conversely, to preclude exploitation of military status for electoral 
purposes. 
Before the Yom Kippur War, when the elections were scheduled for 
30 October, several officers and civil servants, including Yariv, Sharon 
and Eyal, acted in accordance with the law and resigned from their posts 
more than 100 days before the election date,. When the war broke out and 
many candidates were mobilized the legal implications were ignored and 
this was true as long as hostilities continued. 
When the war ended the question was raised as to whether Knesset 
candidates should be obliged to resign from the army. Sharon refused, 
unequivocally, arguing that there was an emergency situation and that 
his national duty called on him to remain on active service. 
The leaders of the Alignment were divided on the question. On the 
one hand `it was felt that the law should be observed to prevent Sharon 
from exploiting his popularity as the man in charge of the crossing of 
the Suez Canal. On the other hand it was feared that if he were forced 
to resign he would accuse the Government of putting party considerations 
before security needs. 
Furthermore, the Alignment was able to exploit its officers, and 
particularly Major-General Yariv, for similar political ends, so that it 
had no vested interest in insisting on the resignation of Knesset 
candidates from the army. Hence, once again it was not legal considera- 
tions but political interests, not the observance of principles'but the 
immediate needs of party leaders which determined issues in the sphere 
of military-political relations. 
In the course of the intense public debate on this question there 
were experts who claimed that by remaining in the army candidates were 
not breaking the law. The law stated that candidates should not be 
called up for reserve duty, but did not specify that if they were already 
serving on reserve duty they should be demobilized. However, the Attorney 
General to the Government and also the Chairman of the Central Election 
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Committee, Justice Haim Cohen., took issue with this view and stated 
emphatically that the officers must resign. Sharon, however, did not do 
so, nor did Alignment officers. 
In an attempt to solve'the constitutional crisis Herut proposed 
an amendment to the law whereby candidates would be permitted to take 
up reserve posts, but this proposal-did. not win-a majority in the 
Knesset. The Alignment-and the Likud therefore proposed another 
compromise whereby the candidates would be permitted to serve in 
the army until 21 days before the 'elections, 
, 
In Israel, where the election campaign is waged for many months, the 
significance of this compromise proposal was that the officers. would 
serve in the army throughout the election campaign. The 21-day interval 
was a formal measure. But even this proposal was never implemented in 
law. On the initiative of the large parties. it was submitted to the 
Knesset Legal Committee for deliberations, and it aroused strong-public 
reaction. 
The philosophical essence of a law is that it must be 
comprehensive and respond to general problems. A law 
aimed at arranging matters ad hoc or ad personem, in 
other words aimed at overcoming a personal difficulty, 
is essentially invalid, since it contravenes the mean- 
ing of the term law 
wrote a Davar journalist. 
1 
The large parties,. who found it convenient for officers to remain 
in the army, ignored the criticism and the draft bill was buried in 
committee. One description of Sharon's conduct after he left the army 
is noteworthy: 
1 
Teddy Preuss, Davar, 22 November 1973. 
He, left the army one day before he began to serve as 
a Knesset member. Two hours later he convened a press 
conference and later took part in a demonstration against 
the Government. On both occasions he attacked Government 
policy and the conditions of the disengagement agreement 
(under which his division was scheduled to evacuate the 
west bank of the Canal. ) Lastºbut not least, on the last 
day of his military service he published an Order of the 
Day to his men,, in which he stressed the achievements of 
the. division, despite 'errors" committed by people or 
institutions whose names he did not specify. He was 
officially reprimanded by the Chief of Staff, who also 
cancelled his emergency appointment as divisional comm- 
ander. Sharon again Paimed that there was a political 
motive for this move. 
The crisis passed and a new Government was formed; but this 
problem remained unsolved. Until the Yom Kippur War it was accepted 
that in every case where a Knesset member was a member of the reserves, 
the Minister of Defence would discuss the matter with the Knesset 
Committee; but the problem had never arisen, since senior reserve 
officers were not appointed to reserve duties. 
The increasing number of MK 's who were reserve duty'officers 
necessitated legal action. At the end of December 1974 the matter 
became the subject of public discussion and reached the'Cabinet table. 
The Cabinet preferred not to submit a draft bill to the Knesset and' 
contented'itself with a more flexible norm, a Cabinet decision. On 
Ist December the Government approved the Minister of Justice's 
formula according to which 'Knesset members will not be appointed in the 
IDF reserve system to posts of the rank of colonel and above'. The 
Cabinet Secretary, in reporting the decision, ' noted that it had been 
''passed as a general instruction to the Minister of Defence concerning 
all members of the Knesset, and will therefore naturally also apply to 
the case of Arik Sharon MK'. The Cabinet statement noted that 
See Ben-Dor, G. (1977: 425) 'Politics and Army in Israel in the 
Seventies' in Lissak, Moshe, and Guttman, -Eimnanuel, "The Israeli 
Political System (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Am Oved. 
members of the Cabinet were unanimous in the view that 
membership of the Government and holding of senior 
command posts in the reserves are not compatible. 
For this reason there was no opposition to the proposal of the 
Minister of Justice, Haim Zadok. 
l 
Ostensibly a solution had been reached. In an editorial headed 
'Against Politicization of Defence', Davar wrote* on the following day 
that the Government decision was 
of great basic importance, even if it means that the IDF will 
be deprived of the contribution of the M. K 's Haim Barley and 
Ariel Sharon. We do not believe that the State of Israel has 
the right to violate the normal democratic procedure in order 
to enjoy the military services in the senior ranks of people 
involved deeply in political. decisions in the country. The 
fundamental need for clear separation in this matter was 
-clearly demonstrated during the Yom Kippur War, where several 
cases of the confusion2of authorities caused disruption in 
the command channels. 
Had the Government devised a real solution? When the Cabinet 
passed this decision the only Knesset member with an emergency 
appointment in the reserves, was Arik Sharon. It was not difficult to 
argue that the decision was 'tailored' for him alone, and this was 
. indeed claimed by his supporters. Furthermore, the decision displayed 
several other flaws: it was restricted to MK 's, and excluded other 
politicians, including Ministers; it was restricted to command posts 
and disregarded others, such as advisory appointments; it paid scant 
attention to the problems of officers who were Knesset candidates. As 
a result of these omissions, it was claimed by some, even by those who 
approved it that the Government had not intended to preclude totally 
the possibility of military service for politicians who were reserve 
officers. 
3 
1 
2 
3 
Only the National Religious Party Ministers and Shlomo Hillel 
(Labour Party) abstained. See Davar, -2 December 1974. 
Davar, 3 December 1974. 
See for example, the decision of the Shinui Movement, one of the 
political groups which later established the Democratic Movement 
for change, headed by Professor of Constitutional Law, Amnon 
Rubinstein, Haaretz, 6 December 1974. 
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This was demonstrated shortly afterwards, when the Minister of 
Justice, Haim Zadok (Labour Party)_ who headed a Party committee 
discussing a general law on the politicization of the IDF, submitted 
the committee's proposals to the chairman of the Alignment parliamentary 
group. It recommended that Ministers be banned from serving in 
reserves at any time, including wartime, and that a Minister who 
wanted to participate in the reserves be required to resign previously 
from the Cabinet. 
As regards the service of Knesset members, the Zadok Committee 
proposed two alternatives: 
(a) Knesset members, irrespective of rank or position, should not be 
permitted to serve in the reserves. 
(b) Knesset members should be permitted to serve in the reserves only 
in wartime on condition that they joined up of their own accord, 
at the request of the Chief of Staff and with the approval of the 
Minister of Defence. This solution did not restrict the-service 
of an MK as regards rank or position. 
(c) Candidates for the Knesset should be prohibited from serving in 
the reserves from the day on which candidate lists were published 
until the elections. 
The striking fact about Zadok's Committee's recommendation was 
the intention to create a general law, and not an-arrangement which 
could be exploited to further party aims. Hence the fate of his 
initiative was foreseeable - it was buried in the files of the Align- 
ment parliamentary group chairman and forgotten there. 
Zadok's initiative did not match the pattern of military-politi- 
cal relations established in the wake of the war. On the contrary, 
after the resignation of the Chief of Staff Elazar on 2 April 1974 
1 
Recommendation of Zadok Committee 24 January 1975. Labour 
Parliamentary'Group archive. 
for the first time in the annals of the IDF, the possibility was 
contemplated of appointing an officer who had recently completed his 
active service and who had even entered political life. 
' 
The selection 
of these officers was preferred not only because of their professional 
skills and their ability to rehabilitate the IDF after the 1973 war, but 
also as a result of quite blatant political factors. The National 
Religious party, 
_for 
example, supported the nomination of Arik Sharon 
because of his firm opposition to any territorial compromise. 
Moreover, a reserve officer who was a candidate for the eighth 
Knesset (on behalf of the Free Centre), Lieutenant-Colonel Asaf 
Yaguri, was promoted on the eve of the elections. This was a vivid 
-illustration cif the dangers. foreseen three years previously, and of the. 
possibility of exploiting military service for political needs in the 
course of the election campaign. 
2 
Following the Yom Kippur War party politicization of the army 
came full circle. Not only were rival political sub-elites enlisting 
the aid of army officers in their struggles, and not only were retiring 
officers entering the higher political echelons, politicians were also 
returning-to military command. No direct and full political electoral 
use was made of the military units which politicians had commanded, but 
the first signs of the mobilization of electoral support inside the army 
for politician-generals were already apparent. Sharon in his Order of 
the Day upon his retirement from the army, used the terms 'my men', and 
'errors were committed by others', both of which are foreign to Israeli 
army terminology, to distinguish between the men of his own unit and 
other soldiers. 
1 
2 
Lieut. -Gen. Elaaar resigned on 2 April 1974, the day on which the 
Agranat Commission submitted its conclusions to the Prime 
Minister, casting blame on him.. 
In July 1977 Defence Minister Ezer Weizman announced that Asaf Yaguri 
M K. could continue to serve in his reserve unit, in spite of 
his rank of Colonel. 
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Furthermore, during the post-war election campaign. senior reserve 
officers remained on active service despite the fact that they were 
Knesset candidates. They thus explicitly broke the law. These trans- 
gressions which had been denigrated by the Attorney General and Chair- 
man of the Central Elections Committee were encouraged by the main coal- 
ition and opposition parties, and hence were not challenged in the courts. 
In the first stages of the development of military-political 
relations in Israel. after the state's establishment, Ben Gurion's dual 
control pattern, set against the background of the centrality of defence, 
caused the politicization of the IDF. From the second half of the 
sixties, the interaction developed in a complementary direction, when 
the entry by retired officers-into the pinnacle of the political elite 
expressed the militarization of political life. 
A separate research is required to examine in what way the 
militarization of political life has introduced militarism into the 
substance of decisions taken by the political elite once it was opened 
to reserve officers. Such a study of policy analysis has still to be 
made. Whatever the research reveals it can already be appreciated that 
the mere fact that officers moved into politics created institutional 
conditions tending to the militarization of party politics, I. t enables 
the officers to transfer military disputes both professional and. personal 
into the political sphere and increases the pressures to utilise military 
units for electoral needs. 
1 
l 
Examples of professional and personal disputes between Generals 
Barleu and Sharon, or between Generals Tal and Gur from 1974-1980. 
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IS A MILITARY COUP POSSIBLE? 
The entry of reserve officers into the Cabinet and other national 
political institutions was relatively easy. The common social background 
of the military and political elites made this transition a transition 
by one elite into another within the same ruling stratum. It moreover 
evidences the acceleration of the processes of convergence which continue 
to occur in Israel between the military and political systems. 
So long as the process of entry by officers into politics continues, 
so do the boundaries between the army and party systems open. - Although 
in the past only the Mapai boundaries were permeable and all the other 
parties boundaries integral, since 1967 and noteably since 1973, all the 
others were burst open. The pattern of political-military relations in 
Israel further moved away from the civil control ideal type towards a 
pattern of civil-military collaboration. 
In the past the civil elite enjoyed relative strength over 
the military and recruited reserve officers as their patron. When 
the civilian elite weakened, so did the strength of the generals- 
turned politicans grow. If in former times the coopting of 
officers was aimed to enhance the veterans' sub-elite, in the 
future the flow from the military might continue even contrary 
to the wishes of the professional politicians. Then the first genera- 
tion of officers-turned-politicians would pull in its wake a younger 
generation from the military which would be a link to further groups 
of officers. This phenomenon which occurred in the Histadrut in the 
late 19601s had already begun in-the seventies in the political sphere. 
The declining ideological inclinations of the parties might accel- 
erate this process. Many of the officers who chose politics as a second 
career were those who, before statehood, were channeled military serv- 
ice by a political movement to which they belonged. To these officers, who 
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started their political activities before their military service, were 
added other officers with ideological convictions who chose political 
activities in order to express their beliefs. However the force of 
thcse convictions weakened in the late seventies and in the future the 
numbers of officers with a different character might multiply. There 
are those wh6 will opt for politics because it enables them to direct 
large public enterprises and organisations, or those who will move from 
the army into politics for the same reason - to gain personal power. 
For so long as the prolonged war continues, the security sphere 
will be central and the IDF will enjoy the same status that it has had 
in the first 30 years of statehood, so the army will continue to serve 
as the manpower pool for the Israeli power elite. Just as long as rival 
groups inside the political elite remain, so they will increasingly 
involve the army in the national decision making process beyond the 
limited scope of security issues, and the construct of what can. be 
called 'military democracy' will continue to evolve. 
The accepted assumption by students of civil-military relations is 
that military involvement in politics is synonymous with the undermining 
of the democratic nature of the political system. 'In Western Europe, 
the armed forces do not operate as partners of the political leadership, 
but as a pressure group', argues Janowitz. 
l 
Although this is indeed the 
most common outcome.. since the army is not an elected body, it is not 
necessarily the only one. The term 'military democracy' implies a 
situation in which the army operates as the partner of politicians, and 
not as a force replacing them. but is also- more than a mere pressure 
1 
Janowitz, Morris and Little, R. W. (1974: 140) Sociology of the 
Military Establishment Beverly Hills and London. Sage. 
group. The civil establishment bears the formal constitutional 
responsibility. -but this is a nominal pattern only, and a high degree 
of legitimacy is accorded to the army to take an important role within 
the political system. 
However this pattern will not necessarily remain static. A blow 
to corporate self-interest is a salient motive to act against the 
Government of the day but the likelihood of such a situation in 
Israel is not high 
1 what is much more probable is not the development 
of conditions within the army, but of social conditions which in many 
past cases have brought about direct military intervention: the 
fragmentation and polari zition of public opinion, the deepening of 
social and political cleavages and the-inability of the*Government to 
resist political groups which deny both the rule of law. and the abiding 
nature of the Government's decisions. 
2 All these factors might create a 
situation where there will be somebody who will prefer to keep law and 
order at the expense of the liberties that democracy presently grants. 
In that case the IDF could be found, not as the initiator of the first 
step, but as a collaborator for the good of the nation, with a group of 
civilian leaders. led by Qenerals-turned-politicians. 
1 
2 
Finer, S. E. (1978: 76-77) 
The most striking example is of course the latest coup in Turkey 
in September 1980. 
8. CABINET-MILITARY RELATIONS 
THE NOMINAL PATTERN - IMAGE V. REALITY 
The authority of the political echelon in Israel, a 
democratic state, is comprehensive and indisputable. 
It has the authority and responsibility to determine 
goals to allocate resources, to take all decisions 
pertaining to war. In other words, only the 
Government can decide the operation-of the military 
forces, or empower the Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defence, with or without other Ministers, 'to take 
decisions pertaining to the operation of the armed 
forces. 
In Israel there exist , for example, rules for 
appointments. The Chief of Staff is appointed by 
the entire Cabinet, on the recommendation of the 
Minister of Defence and with the knowledge of the 
Prime Minister. Generals are appointed on the 
recommendation-of the Chief of Staff, with the 
approval of the political echelon, namely the Min- 
ister of Defence. The allocation of resources for the 
construction of the military force is determined by 
the Cabinet as a whole. The operation of the armed 
forces, from the smallest detail, depends on the 
approved of the political'echelon, either through a 
priori standing orders, to save time (but with the 
approval of the political echelon) to decisions and 
approval by the entire Cabinet or Ministerial Committee 
on Security. Therefore the degree of control by the 
political echelon is high. 
Thus Yitzhak Rabin former Chief of Staff and Prime Minister 
described the normative aspect of the pattern of relationships between 
the Government and the military. 
' 
But are practice and theory 
synonymous? 
The political echelon enjoys the authority and responsibility to 
determine goals and to take decisions on war. But does it in fact do 
so? Major-General (Res. ) Matti Peled: 'After the Six Day War the IDF 
2 
did not receive instructions about the strategic national goal. ' 
1 
2 
From a lecture delivered in memory of the Chief of Staff David 
Elazar. 9 June 1978. 
Maariv, 24 April 1974. 
Major-General (Res. ) Israel Tal: 'Instead of military strategy being 
tailored out of policy, operative thinking from strategy, and tactics 
from operative thinking, there has been confusion and the process has 
sometimes taken the opposite direction. '1 
Theoretically, only the Cabinet can decide on the operation of 
military forces. But-is this always so? Prime Minister Moshe Sharett: 
'Things occur which do not come to my knowledge. *I hear announcements 
(about military actions) over Kol Israel, and later read about them in 
the press, without knowing their true nature. '2 The Chief of Staff 
Lieutenant-General Mordechai Gur: 'Several times I gave orders to open 
fire on Lebanese villages without the political echelon's approval. '3 
The Minister of Defence must approve the appointments of 
generals, but to what extent does the Minister influence these 
appointments? Chief of Staff Haim Barley: 'Appointments are a matter 
between the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defence and the 
opinion of the Chief'of Staff is decisive. 
4 
The Military Secretary 
of the Minister of Defence Shimon Peres: 'In 99% of the cases the 
Minister accepted the Chief of Staff's recommendation. '5 
The allocation of resources to the military force is determined 
by the entire Cabinet. But on what are its decisions based? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Al Hamishmar, 31 December 1976. 
Sharett's entry for 25 May 1954. Sharett, M. (1978: 514)Personal 
-Diary (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Maariv. 
Interview in Hotam, l0 May 1978. 
Interview in Maariv, 20 December 1975. 
Interviewed on 25 October 1978. 
Former Minister of Justice Haim Zadok 
Cabinet supervision of the budget is tenuous, since the 
Cabinet lacks the instruments for examining the budget. 
When there are no differences of opinion between the 
Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence the Cabinet 
serves, in effect, as the1rubber stamp for the 
proposal submitted to it. 
It is the duty of the political echelon to determine goals and 
to take decisions. But does it possess the necessary tools to do so, 
or are its decisions an inevitable function of its dependence on the 
military? The report of the Agranat Commission stated that 
During a period of many years there was only one body in the 
intelligence network, namely the General Staff Intelligence 
Division which dealt with intelligence evaluations, 
analysis and the assessment of information. This intell- 
igence assessment, therefore, was the only one brought 
before the Chief of Staff, Minister of Defence, Prime 
Minister and Cabinet. This. structure had grave implica- 
tions for the assessment of intelligence data2by govern- 
ment bodies on the eve of the (October) War. . 
The instrumentalist pattern relationship between the military and 
Cabinet in Israel is nominal. There is, in fact, a wide, gap between the 
normative aspects and the actual arrangements, the latter being based, not 
on civil supervision of the army, but on their mutual involvement. 
The three previous chapters have elucidated the proposition. that, 
notwithstanding the army's apolitical image, civil control over the IDF 
was exercised through the party channel. And that the fragmented or 
permeable boundaries between the army and party, especially the Labour 
Party, gave rise to a high level of politicization in the army, and also 
of the militarization of politics. The following chapters examine the 
other control channel, the state. In this context it is evident that, 
1 
2 
Interview with Haim Zodok, 16 July 1977. 
Para. 22 of interim report of Agranat Commission of Enquiry on the 
Yom Kippur War, Davar, 3 April 1974. 
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in contrast to the IDF's image, the state control channel has many defects. 
The weak control mechanisms have fed the meshing- processbetween the army 
and the state political institutions and accelerated the-evolution of 
military democracy. 
Because of the lack of an institutionalized and stable structure 
the analysis of the relationship between the army and the Government should 
not be restricted to a formal-structure description. It has to be 
historical and must take into account the peculiar conditions of each 
period. It must also, to a large extent, take into account the factors 
which have influenced the personality and conduct of-and interaction 
between those involved, together with their motives, aspirations, 
perceptions and aims. 
THE GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY OVER THE MILITARY 
In the first 28 years of statehood there was no clear unequivocal 
legal definition of the Cabinet's civil authority over the military. 
When the Provisional State Council passed its first law, it 
stipulated in Para. 18 of the Order of Government and Legal Arrangements, 
that ' the Provisional Government is empowered to set up*armed forces 
on land, sea and air, which. will be authorized to carry out all necessary 
and legal actions for the defence of the country'. 
In accordance with that order Ben Gurion published, on the 26 May 1948 
on behalf of the Provisional Government, the Israel Defence Forces 
Ordinance No. 4 for 1948. It was one of the first. orders published in 
the Official Gazette and it founded the IDF. 
1 
Actually that Ordinance was illegal. The establishment of an army is 
an act which must be carried out by a legislative institution and not by-the 
executive. When this became evident, the omission was corrected when the 
Provisional State Council, on 7 July 1948 passed the Government and Legal 
Procedure order (additional instructions) No. 13 for 1948, ratifying the 
legislation retroactively. In Para. 4 of the Order it was stated: 'We 
1 Official Gazette, (1948: 9) Appendix A. 
retroactively approve the Order of the Israel Defence Forces 1948 as 
if it had been an order of the Provisional State Council'. 
Was this merely an error, deriving from a lack of attention to the 
niceties of the law at the height of the War of Independence, or was it a 
deeper reflection of Ben Gurion's basic etatist approach which'sought to 
give the Cabinet decisive strength over the Knesset, because the Cabinet 
exemplified national unity whereas the Knesset was the -arena of national 
disunity.. 
In any event, the Order itself was relatively brief and phrased in 
vague terms. It ordered the establishment of the IDF, conscription, the 
obligation of taking an oath of allegiance, and prohibited the 
establishment of any armed force apart from the IDF. The Minister of 
Defence was empowered to carry out the Order: 
In accordance with Section 18 of the Law and Administration Ordinance 
No. 1-1948 the following Ordinance is issued: 
1. Herewith are established the Israel Defence Forces, consisting 
of ground, air and naval units. 
2. In times of emergency, conscription will be enacted for all 
formations and services of the IDF, with ages of those liable for 
conscription to be determined by the Provisional Government. 
3. Every person serving in the ranks of the IDF will take an oath of 
allegiance to the State of Israel, its laws, and its lawful 
authorities. 
1 
4. The establishment of maintenance of any other armed force outside 
the IDF is hereby prohibited. 
5. All orders, declarations, and regulations in regard to national 
service promulgated between November 29 1947 and the date of this 
Ordinance by the Jewish Agency, the National Council for Palestinian 
Jews, the National Administration, the Provisional Government or one 
of its departments, will remain in effect until such time as they 
are changed, amended, or cancelled. 
6. All actions carried out in accordance with this Ordinance will be 
considered lega, even if they are in conflict with another section 
of an existing law. 
7. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for carrying out this Ordinanc 
8. This will be known as the Israel Defence Forces Ordinance - 1948. 
The army was set up on 31 May 1948 and officers swore allegiance 
later, in June of that year. 
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It should be recalled under what conditions the Ordinance was issued. 
This was a time of hostilities when several rival underground movements 
still existed. There was no doubt that the largest of them, the Haganah, 
was subservient to the representative institutions of the new state. Of 
the two tasks which then faced the new Government - to transform an 
underground movement into a state army and to abolish separatist 
military organizations - the second was the more difficult and complicated, 
which -was- re£TecCed in the Ordinance. Whereas the complex problem was 
dealt with explicitly and unequivocally, banning the establishment or 
existence of any armed force apart from the IDF, the subservience of 
the army to the political echelon was not explicitly defined, but only- 
obliquely, by empowering the Defence Minister to carry out the Ordinance 
Hence the-Order left certain problems unresolved. First, the 
distribution of defence functions and powers among the various components 
of the-civil echelon: the status of the Prime Minister, the Minister 
of Defence, the Cabinet, as a collective body, and other bodies. Secondly, 
the distribution of functions and powers within the General Staff; who is 
the supreme commander; what are the, functions of the Chief of Staff; what 
is the authority of the General Staff or the authority for military 
orders? Third 
,,, 
the Order did not clarify the essence of civil 
authority over the army and in particular how it was to be expressed. 
The absence of legislation did not prevent the crystallization of 
norms in all three areas. The Labour Party elite's reluctance to 
determine political arrangements precluded any legislative initiatives, 
even after failures had made this very necessary. It was only after the 
crisis which erupted after the October War, and the partial publication 
of the Agranat Commission's findings, that the Cabinet prepared the 
Basic Law: The Army (1975). But the chasm between the norms and the 
Law was not eliminated. 
Regarding this aspect the main preoccupation of the Agranat 
Commission related to the status of the Minister of Defence vis-a-vis 
the army. But it also exposed the general obscurity surrounding the 
political echelon's status and its report observed 
We have discovered that there is a lack of clear 
definitions for the distribution of functions, 
obligations and responsibility for defence among 
the three authorities dealing with these matters, 
i. e. the Government and Prime Minister, the Minister 
of Defence and the Chief of Staff, who heads the IDF, 
and the determination of the reciprocal relations 
between the political leadership and the IDF High 
Command... 
... We do not regard it as our task to enter into 
the problem of the coordination of functions among 
the three above-mentioned frameworks, and we content 
ourselves with pointing out the need for the 
Government and Knesset to take note of this problem 
in order to solve it. We assume that. it is not 
possible to arrive at rigid definitions which can 
supply an a priorisolution to any situation which may 
arise, but even definitions of wide legal character, 
are preferable to the absence of any definition. 
On what grounds did the Agranat Commission state that there 
existed the principle of civil Cabinet authority over the army? 
It did not base this remark on the Ordinance which established the IDF, 
but on para. 29 of the Basic Law: The Cabinet(1968. )That- paragraph 
stipulates that 'the Cabinet is authorized to carry out, on behalf of 
the State, and subject to law, any action which is not imposed by law 
on another authority. ' 
In its interim report, the Commission stated, after quoting this 
paragraph: 
It transpires that even the conduct of the security affairs 
of the State is entrusted to the Cabinet, to the extent 
that another law does not impose activity in the defence 
sphere on another authority: i. e. the powers of. the 
Minister of Defence with regard to those laws whose 
implementation is explicitly entrusted to him. ' 2 
1 
2 
Interim report of Agranat Commission. Chapter 3: Conclusions 
and Recommendations on Institutional plane. Para. 17. The full 
report was published in the Israeli press on 3 April 1974. 
Para. 16 of interim report. 
The fact that Cabinet responsibility was grounded on such a 
weak base, i. e. of residual authority alone, aroused the criticism of 
many legal experts. They claimed that there were instructions in the 
law which state explicitly that the Minister of Defence expresses 
Cabinet responsibility for the army. The Minister of Justice Haim 
Zadok stated on the basis of Para. 6 of the IDF Order ('The Minister 
of Defence is responsible for the imp. lementation of the Order'), 
The principal of civil authority over the IDF was 
determined in the Order of Government and Legal 
Procedure 1968, which constitutes a kind of 
constitution in miniature... Over the years the 
IDF Order 1948 was regarded not-only as the legal 
basis for the establishment of the army, as a one- 
time act, but also as the determination of 
continuous authority on behalf of the entity 
appointed to implemelt the Order, namely the 
Minister of Defence. 
Professor Amnon Rubinstein rejected the Commission's findings 
and argued that since the Cabinet residual authority for its 
responsibility over the army was defined in the Basic Law: The Cabinet, 
it could be concluded, according to the logic of the Agranat Commission, 
that not only, in 1968 but for twenty years 
there was no civil authority, neither minister nor 
Cabinet, capable of giving instructions to the IDF 
and the Chief of Staff. According to the Commission's 
interpretation, the previous Chiefs of Staff were all 
free of control and at liberty to do as they chose 
within the IDF. 
' 
The Commission's report sparked off a controversy on the 
Cabinet's legal authority, which in turn exposed the gap between the 
instrumental norm and its legal expression. Therefore, when the 
Ministry of Justice prepared the draft Basic Law: The Army, it wanted 
1 Divrei Haknesset, Vol. 38: 4002,30 July 1975 
2 Amon Rubinstein, Haaretz, 2 February 1975. 
to clarify explicitly the Cabinet's authority. The first two clauses 
stipulate.: ' (1) 
' The IDF is the army of the State. (2) (a) The T, DF is 
under the authority of the C$binet. '1 
Since the principle was not in dispute there was no argument 
over the phrasing of this part of the law. This was not true of its 
other aspects, i. e. the definition of relations between the Prime 
Minister, Minister of Defence, the Ministerial Committee on Defence 
and other government bodies dealing with defence, on the one hand, and 
the High Command- the General Staff and the Chief of Staff -on the 
other. The varying attitudes to these issues were a function of the 
diverse views about the nature of political power. 
THE HIGH COMMAND AND THE"SUPRENE*CONMANDER 
The IDF has no High Command, although the term itself is employed 
and appears in the Military Jurisdiction Law (Para. 1 is headed: 
'Army Orders - High Command Instructions and General Staff Orders') 
and in the General Staff camp there is a unit entitled 'High Command 
Secretariat'. Nor does the IDF have a supreme commander, although 
some scholars have claimed that it does. 
2 How did this come about? 
The term ' High Command' is taken from the Haganah's concepts. 
It -efered to'the combined body of the General-Staff which is the 
military echelon, and to the National Command which is the political 
echelon. At that time it was determined that this joint forum would 
be called 'The High Command', whose orders were signed by 
representatives of the two bodies. 
3 
1 
2 
3 
Bill 1177,1975,9 July 1975. Passed by the Knesset on 
31 March 1976 with amendment (a): The army is subject to the 
authority of the Cabinet. 
See for example Perlmutter, A. (1967). Military and Politics in 
Israel London. Cass. 
See remarks of Col. Meir Pail in Knesset debate, 30 July 1975 
Divrei Haknesset, Vol. 38: 4021. 
The term High Command would have vanished like the institution 
itself, had it not been introduced into the Military Jurisdiction Order 
1955. That law determined which bodies are authorized to issue instructions 
and orders which are binding on the army and it defines two codes of 
laws. The first is the basis for organization, management and government 
of the army and is issued by the Chief of. Staff under special authority 
delegated by the Minister of Defence. It is therefore known as 'High 
Command Instructions'. The second defines procedure for army bodies and 
individual soldiers, in accordance with the principles laid down in the 
High -Command Instructions. It is issued by the Chief of Staff and 
called 'General Staff Orders' 
When Haim Zadok presented the draft Basic Law: The Army to the 
Knesset on 30 July 1975 and was asked the meaning of these terms, he 
said explicitly: 
I want to clarify that the terms 'High Command Instructions' 
and 'General Staff Orders' are merely descriptions of. types 
of orders and instructions, remaining from the Haganah days. 
Today this is merely a question of terminology, -now anchored in the Military Jurisdiction Law which employs these terms. 
What matters today is who is authorised to give these two 
types of orders or instructions... We could call them by 
another name without changing their. validity and authority... 
I propose that we preserve the terms surviving from the pre- 
state period. 2 
Although the institution no longer exists and is not even defined 
in the 1948 Army Order, Supreme Command Regulation No. 2.0603 stipulates 
that: 
the Secretary of the High Command (a)-serves as secretary of 
the supreme command and the General Staff (b) calls meetings 
of these bodies on the instructions of the Chief of Staff and 
invites standing member3... 3 
1 See Compilation of Legal Opinions No. 3,1973, Opinion No. 69 
Chief Military Advocate's Office. 
2 Divrei Haknesset Vol. 38; 4026. 
3 Legal Opinions No. 3,1973, Opinion No. 69 
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In practice the holder of this office fulfils only those duties 
relating to the General Staff. 
Immediately after the establishment of the ý tate, Ben Gurion was 
responsible for another constitutional error, this time not related to 
confusion between the legislative and executive authorities, but to 
confusion between the civil authority and the General Staff. Official 
Gazette No. 12,. published'during the war, and proclaiming IDF rule over 
Jerusalem, stated: 'Therefore I, David Ben Gurion, Minister of. Defence, 
hereby declare, in the name of the High Conmand of"=the' IDF...... 
How could the head of the civil authority, in chärge, of the 
army, speak on behalf of the High Command? This may have been a 
lapse, stemming from the habits of the Yishuv period. But it may 
also have been that Ben Gurion did, in fact, * want 'to be.. the 
supreme commander. And since that term did not exist in the IDF, he had 
to adopt the guise of the High-Command. 
The very notion of a supreme commander was alien to the Haganah, 
nor was it accepted by the IDF. In the first years of statehood the 
question of the identity of the supreme commander was raised in the 
Knesset. On 20 February 1950 following the installation of the new 
Chief of Staff by the Prime Minister and Minister of. Defence, Yaakov 
Meridor (Herut) criticized the fact that the Minister of Defence 
performed the role of supreme commander, since he actually performed 
the installation ceremony. Meridor added that the situation was 
undefined and that the Chief of Staff's installation should be made 
by the President. 
2 
1 
2 
Official Gazette No. 12. Proclamation 1, Vol. A. 
Divrei Haknesset, Vol. 4: 821-823. 
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Two-years later the Minister was again asked whether the IDF had 
a supreme commander, and if so who he was and would he fulfil the same 
role in peace as in war, and what-his legal authorization was. Ben 
Gurion replied that there was no such post in the IDF. The Chief of 
Staff was subject to the instructions of the Minister of, Defence, who 
in his turn, answered to the Cabinet. The legal authorization was 
Para. 18 of the Government and Legal Procedure Order 1948, passed by 
the Provisional State Council on 16 May 1948, ordering the head of the 
Provisional Government to set up an army on 26 May 1948.1 
Since Israel does not have a presidential regime, the President 
cannot serve as supreme commander. But what body fulfils this position 
in practice? The Defence Minister? The Prime Minister? The'Cabinet as 
a whole? This is not stated explicitly in the law. When the Basic Law: 
The Army(1975)was being prepared the Minister of Justice Zadok wanted 
to stipulate that the Chief of-Staff was the supreme commander of the 
IDF. When he discovered that this term pertained to the senior civil 
echelon he changed his view, and when he submitted the draft bill to 
the Knesset he said: 'The Chief of the General Staff is the senior 
commanding rank in the IDF', emphasizing this term 'senior command rank' 
rather than 'supreme commander', and underlining 'in' the army and not 
'of' the army. 'We do not consider the Chief of Staff to be the 
supreme commander of the IDF 
', he said. 
2 
1 
2 
Divrei Haknesset, Vol. 11 . 
(1952: '2070) . 
Divrei H. *nesset, Vol. 38; 4027. 
The Cabinet's intricate nature and the complexity of its relations 
with the IDF inhibited a-simple solution to the problem of a supreme 
commander. The coalitionary nature of the Cabinet precluded it at the 
same time both from being a collective supreme commander and from' 
allowing any one of its members to have the role, not even the Minister of 
Defence or Prime Minister. Ben' Gurion was well aware of that, so that 
when he struggled to consolidate the autonomist pattern for the security 
sphere he acted at the normative level. Consequently he arrogated to 
himself a wider and wider mandate over security matters, but did not try 
to acquire for himself such a formal title nor'to liberate himself 
entirely from the supervision of the Cabinet's collective binding 
decisions. During the Knesset debate on the bill Basic Law: The Army, 
Yosef Sarid MK, (Labour ) interjected: 'Who is supreme commander? ' 
and Zadok, then Minister of Justice, replied 
The army is a hierarchical body and the Chief'of Staff 
stands at the top of the command echelon. But this 
entire organization, the IDF and the Chief of Staff 
within it, as the head of the command echelon, is 
subject to the civil authority of the Cabinet, which 1 imposes its authority through the Minister of Defence. 
1 Divrei Haknesset, Vol-38: 4002-4029. 
THE PRIME MINISTER'S AUTHORITY IN THE SECURITY SPHERE 
Since the 22nd Zionist Congress held in Basle in 1946, Ben 
Gurion, the national leader of the independence struggle, had bestowed 
on himself authority over the military sphere. His autonomist 
pattern brought about the fusion of his two roles 
as Prime Minister and Defence Minister. Furthermore, Ben Gurion's 
inclination to foster a regime in which the Prime Minister was not 
primus inter pares but rather a Prime Ministerial regime would have rendered 
his pattern a permanent feature, had not the power struggle between the 
two sub-elites taken place. 
1 
The relationship between the two offices served as an accurate 
gauge of the-current relationship between the two sub-elites. From, 
the end of 1946 until 1977, the two positions were in the hands of 
one man for 19 years, and were split between two Cabinet members for 
12 years. 
The first split was temporary. It was made on Ben Curion's 
initiative in 1953 when, to prevent the concentration of too much 
power in the hands of just one of the contenders-for his throne, an 
inheritance he did not intend to yield up so soon, he decided to take 
a long vacation at kibbutz Sde Boker. The two posts were split between 
Sharett Prime Minister, and Lavon Defence Minister, who had 
contrasting political perceptions, together with the appointment of 
Dayan as Chief of Staff and Peres as the Director-General of the 
Defence Ministry, the latter being two of Ben Gurion's young disciples 
with vaulting ambition. The split led to the political-security 
1 On prime ministerial Government see Crossman, Richard (1963) 
Introduction tOBagehotvs The English Constitution London. Fontana. 
On factors which strengthen the status and extend the roles of 
the Prime Minister in Israel and create a prime ministerial 
government instead of a Cabinet regime, see Dror, Yehezkel (1978: 
124-145)-"'The amelioration of the Premiership', in-State, 
Government and International Relations No. 12. 
crisis of 1954, which sowed the seeds of the Lavon affair and 
eventually to Ben Gurion's return to'power about a 'year later, first as 
Minister of Defence and then as Premier. 
The events of that year illustrated the strength of the factors 
operating to preserve both positions in the hands of one man. It was, 
therefore, predictable that once the veteran sub-elite had won the 
battle, Eshkol succeeded Ben Gurion at the beginning of the sixties, 'and 
took over not only the Prime Minister's desk but also the defence 
portfolio. He did so in spite of the fact that he lacked the image of 
a security leader, and in contrast to his self-confessed reluctance 
a few years earlier that: 'I don't want to become a laughing stock in 
the eyes of the army, In May 1967, Eshkol resisted the pressure 
to have the defence portfolio taken from him, and its eventual transfer 
to Dayan expressed not only the lack of confidence in Eshkol, but also 
the shifting power balance between the two sub-elites. 
Since 1967, the division of the two positions has reflected the 
new situation within the Labour Party. No longer is one sub-elite in 
power leaving the other in opposition, but the two groups share as 
partners in the Government, the stronger not able to dissolve the 
partnership because of the pivotal position of its rival. 
It is an enforced partnership because neither elite has sufficient 
electoral support to stand on its own, and the governing elite has to 
pay a price for the partnership by sharing control over the security 
1 Sharett, Moshe (1978: 709) -Fersonäl'Diary (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 
Maariv. 
sphere. 
l 
Whenever one of the two sub-elites had to relinquish the 
4 
defence portfolio it was done against the wishes of his group, and 
under the pressure of a new party crisis. Only under such pressure 
was Eshkol induced to end the battle on 1 June 1967 to give up 
his post as, Defence Minister and to invite Dayan to join the Cabinet. 
Only similar pressures exerted on the prime ministerial nominee, 
Rabin in 1974, forced him to agree that Shimon Peres should be the Def- 
ence Minister. This was the background to the Peres-Allon agreement of 
1977, when the Premier and the political group he represented were 
forced to hand over the position of Minister of Defence to a 
representative of the second group to prevent a rift in the party. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that in the seventies as well, 
ten years after the positions were separated, that there were still strong 
political pressures in favour of entrusting the defence portfolio to 
the Prime Minister. 
2 Only the coalitionary structure of the Cabinet, 
and of the main party in it, prevented a return to Ben Gurion's ways, 
and preserved the division pattern. 
But the importance and sanctity of security matters in a 
prolonged war, and their prominence in the Cabinet agenda, brought 
about the situation that although the defence portfolio was allotted 
to a particular Minister, the Prime Minister retained a special 
standing in that sphere, unlike his standing in all other spheres. 
1 
2 
This argument turns on its feet Yaacobi's contention that 
'whenever 2 people serve as Prime Minister and Defence 
Minister, there is a tendency to disputes and power struggles 
which sometimes become political struggles'. The causal 
drive is in fact the reverse, it is the power struggle which 
brings about the division of the jobs. Yaacobi, Gad (1980: 
157) The Government (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Am Oved, Zmora Bitan 
Modan. 
Rabin for example hinted heavily at his wishes. 
4 
The allocation of both positions to Ben Gurion made it unnecessary 
to define. the powers, responsibilities, duties and spheres of action 
of the two posts. As a result of the strained relations between the 
Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defence Minister and Chief of Staff 
in 1954 which rocked the entire defence and foreign affairs system, 
Pinhas Lavon submitted to the Premier several proposals regarding the 
formalization of tasks-between the two. But they implied an extensive 
strengthening of the Minister of Defence's status, and in particular 
the consolidation of defined patterns at an immeasurably higher level of 
institutionalization than before. 
This approach was quite unlike Ben Gurion's. The nominal pattern 
of authority, the dual control structure, the partnership nature of the 
army's role in the political decision making process and the autonomi- 
zation of the security sphere which he forged, could only survive in 
conditions of non-institutionalization and non-formalization. The fixing 
of political-military relations in law would have exposed and thenbridged 
the chasm between appearance and reality, and would inevitably have 
destroyed the edifice erected by Ben Gurion. Therefore he ignored the 
latter and-did not even answer Lavon. 
l 
But the memories of this period weighed heavily on Eshkol and 
Dayan, who-when appointed Minister of Defence on 1-June. 1967 
wrote in his diary 
1 Letter from Lavon to Ben Gurion, 24 February 1955, Private archive of 
Levi Yitzhak Hayerushalmi. 
So far no procedures and clear definitions of functions 
regarding the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence 
have been formulated. This time it was particularly 
" necessary. for two reasons: the first was that the sep- 
aration occurred in wartime; the second - that I was 
appointed Minister of Defence against the wishes of 
Eshkol and, in any event, there were no close and 
informal relations between us, as there had been -"-or 
had been assumed to have been - between Ben Gurion, 
Sharett and Lavon. 
The procedure was determined in a talk between Yadin 
and myself and later approved by the Prime Minister: 
(a) the Minister of Defence will not act without the 
approval of the Prime Minister in all matters 
relating: 
1. to the commencement of general. hostilities of 
war against any country; 
2. to military action in wartime deviating from 
the principle fixed guidelines; 
3. to commencement of military action against-any country 
which has not taken part, up to that moment, in 
hostile action; 
4. to bombing of central towns in enemy territory if 
this was not preceded by bombing of Israeli towns 
by that enemy; 
5. to retaliatory action in the defence sphere in response 
to incidents. 
(b) The Prime Minister can, with the knowledge of the 
Minister of Defence, invite the Chief of Staff, the Director 
of Intelligence Branchthe Director General of the 
Ministry of Defence or the assistant Minister of 
Defence to give information. 
This framework formulated on 1 June 1967 also related to the 
operative, sphere. But it did not prevent the eruption of the first 
crisis in relations between the Minister of Defence and Prime Minister 
within less than four days, when Dayan instructed Elazar directly to 
capture the Golan Heights. After the war, it was necessary, therefore, 
to determine the distribution of functions beyond the operative spheres. 
1 Dayan, Moshe (1976: 422-423) Milestones (Hebrew) Jerusalem. Edanim. 
There was no argument as to the location of defence bodies and 
functions which were not linked to the army itself. Whereas military 
intelligence services (Ama"n) is a branch of the General Staff, the 
civil. - 
'"institution for intelligence (Mossad) and the secret services 
(Shin Bet) remained subject- to the Prime Minister. 
' 
In the same way 
he also retained responsibility for nuclear affairs through the Atomic 
Energy Commission and the science city in Dimona, although in 
Ben Gurion's time these matters had been the day to day responsibility 
of the Deputy Defence Minister Shimon Peres. 
Nor could the Minister of Defence dispute the fact that the Prime 
Minister was Chairman of-the Ministerial Committee on Defence. On the 
other hand, there was a protracted struggle to determine the authority 
of the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence in the Occupied Territories 
as already recounted. 
Much more complex was the issue of the Prime Minister's authority 
over the army, and particularly over its operation aspects. After 
hostilities ended, the Prime Minister and Defence Minister's military 
advisers, Israel Lior and Yehoshua Raviv drew up a document intended 
to clarify this problem. It was finally formulated by the Minister without 
Portfolio Israel Galili and presented to the Minister and the 
Prime Minister for approval. Galili called the document 'the constitution', 
and this unofficial and internal term has been adopted. 
2 
The internal security services are usually subordinate to the 
Minister of the Interior. In Israel, since the Ministry is the 
domain of the religious parties, Ben G'_irion ensured that the 
services were linked from the first to the PM's office. 
2 Interviews with Israel Galili, 27 July 1977, Brig. - Gens. Yehoshua 
Raviv, 17 July 1977 and Israel Lior, 1 August 1977. 
The document stipulated three levels of operational activity 
within the IDF, each one calling for a different type of approval 
by the political echelon. The first comprised activities which the Defence 
Minister was authorized to decide alone e. g. to instruct the IDF to 
react to fire from across the border, or to pursue an enemy 'plane 
which penetrated Israel's air space even after it had returned to its 
own territory. The second type of activity required the Minister to 
bring his decision to the knowledge of the Prime Minister, but did not 
require his prior approval. An example is the infiltration of enemy 
territory for intelligence purposes. The Minister can order the third 
type of activity only after receiving the Prime Minister's approval. 
that category included operational action across the border. 
There were in practice two additional types of approval. At 
the lowest level were actions which the Chief of Staff could order 
without'prior approval from the Minister. A basic general consent 
suffices in these cases, which include low-arc return of fire to targets 
across the border. On the other hand, steep-range fire across the 
border or escalation of shooting incidents called for explicit. prior approval 
by the Minister. 
An additional distinction existed at the highest level between 
operations which the Prime Minister alone could approve and those which 
he submitted to. the Cabinet or Ministerial Committee on Defence. 
' The 
main criteria for distinction was the scope of the military operation, 
the size of the force deployed, the likely number of casualties, or the 
expected amount of damage to the enemy, the nature of the objective 
(civilian or military) and the political implications. 
1 In 1975 the Foreign Minister Yigal Allon demanded that, within the 
framework of the constitution, he be informed of certain actions 
not brought to the knowledge of the entire Cabinet but approved by 
the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. His proposal was 
accepted. 
Since the first 'constitution' was drawn up, it has become an 
accepted custom for each Cabinet to discuss the document at one of its 
first sessions and to approve it. But despite the existence of a 
written document the method of approving operational activity in the 
IDF has changed over the years. The changes derive from the security 
situation in each period and the personal and political relations 
between the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Chief of Staff and 
their mode of operation. During the border incidents, as at the end 
of the sixties, the Chief Qf-Staff was empowerdd to implement operations 
at a higher level, such as shelling or other operations across the 
border, without the need for prior approval. At times of relative quiet 
even the routine firing incidents along the border were approved At the 
political level. After the Six Day War -when there was-unrest along the 
borders it was necessary to give a freer hand to the lower echelons 
along the front to act-without awaiting prior consent. 
The logic entailed in adapting the constitution to the current 
security situation is self-evident. Of greater interest are the political 
and personal considerations which led to changes in the constitution. 
But first the question of the authority. and responsibility of the Minister 
of Defence towards the army is examined. 
THE LACK OF CLARITY OF THE'DEFENCE MINISTER'S RESPONSIBILITIES 
Israeli Cabinets'-found- the issue of ministerial 
responsibility complicated. ' Because of their coalitionary nature, 
the first Cabinets, and especially their heads, were perplexed as 
to how to ensure the acceptance of the Cabinet's decisions by those 
members not representing the dominant party, and most particularly 
when any member opposed a Cabinet-decision. This difficulty caused 
several Prime Ministers to accept a series of legislative proposals 
which identified the Cabinet's collective responsibility. 
I 
The 
absolute necessity to achieve a minimal consensus in a coalition based 
Cabinet resulted in a strict interpretation of 'collective responsibil- 
ity', so much so that not only were members of the Cabinet'required to 
support its decisions, but so were their respective parliamentary groups, 
unless, they were given special permission to abstain. 
In contrast to the strict attitude towards collective responsibility, 
the rules were lenient for the other side of the coin, that is the 
individual ministerial responsibility of the Minister for his own Ministry. 
This responsibility forms part of the Israeli constitutional perception 
of the interrelationship between the Cabinet and the Ministry and it- 
complements the principle of Cabinet collective responsibility. - 
However there is a fundamental difference between the two. 
Whereas the principle of-collective responsibility is 
anchored explicitly in the written law - A. rticle 4 of 
Basic Law: The Cabinet (the Cabinet has a collective 
responsibility to the Knesset) and the legal sanction 
is the passing of a ho confidence' motion in the Cabinet 
by the Knesset, the principle of ministerial respons- 
ibility is an outcome of tradition and legal custom 
for which there is no legal sanction of 'no confidence' 
in a certain minister by the Knesset. 2 
1 
2 
See Yaacobi, G (1980: 110-134). 
Zadok, Haim (1975: 161)'Ministerial Responsibility without 
Legal Sanctions' State, Government and International Relations 
No. S. 
t 
When he appeared before the Knesset on 25 December 1974 Justice 
Minister Zadok explained 
... the collective responsibility has a legal, constitutional 
sanction of 'no confidence' and the dismissal of the Cabinet, 
while the sanction for individual ministerial responsibility 
is a political, public sanction and not a legal one. The 
Minister-is 'answerable' in the English sense, which is to 
say that he is required to account for his actions to the 
Knesset. This responsibility arises when he reports to the 
Knesset, when he answers questions, when he responds to 
motions - this is his public political responsibility... 1 
but in Israel there is no personal vote of 'no confidence'. 
The need to protect the complex structure of the Cabinet coalition with 
its delicate balance between its several segments, and even between the 
factions within parties, whose representatives are chosen without the 
Prime Minister's approval, inhibits the subjection of any Minister to a 
Knesset 'no confidence' vote, because a 'no confidence' motion could 
demolish the entire structure. 
In the security sphere the question of the Defence Minister's 
individual ministerial responsibility was even more complicated, while 
the formal legal basis of the Government's authority over the military 
was dubious and an issue for debate, the Minister of Defence's authority 
was even more suspect. Does he shoulder the responsibility, or maybe it's 
the Prime Minister, or perhaps the entire Cabinet? Although there was a 
lack of clarity, the question mark over the actual ministerial responsib- 
ility of the Minister of Defence enabled the Agranat Commission to distinguis 
sharply between the military and political echelons, to attribute blame 
for the omissions of the war. to the former and to absolve the latter of 
Divrei Haknesset, 25 December 1974, No attempt was made 
to clarify the issue and only after the Yom Kippur 1973 crisis, 
was it discussed at length by the Agranat Commission and later 
by the Government and the public. 
blame. Whereas the Commission recommended that the Chief of Staff, the 
Director of='Ama"ii and other senior officers be removed from'their' 
posts, it found the Minister of Defence free of personal responsibility 
for the omissions while in the sphere of his parliamentary responsibility 
it stated that it was outside its mandate. 
I 
One thing is clear at least from the constitutional. 
aspect: it was never determined that the Minister of 
Defence was a kind of. 'super-Chief of Staff, obliged 
to guide the IDF in the latter's sphere of responsib- 
ility in operational matters, or that he was a kind 
of supreme commander of the IDF by virtue of being 
Minister of Defence. The lack. of definition of 
powers prevailing under the existing situation in 
defence, so vital a sphere, hampers the effectiveness 
of activities, makes it difficult to focus legal 
responsibility and causes 2lack. of clarity and 
confusion in the public. 
According to the Agranat Commission the political. echelon's 
authority for operating the-IDF was vaguely defined. The passing of 
the Basic Law: The Cabinet(1968)gave-it that power as"a 
residual authority. according to Para. 29 of the law, but gave no such 
powers to the Minister of Defence. And, in fact, in its final report 
the Commission reiterated this point, stating that 
In. short this legislation does not provide the answer, 
and in any event does not provide an unequivocal solution, 
although according to Israeli law the power to guide the 
IDF as regards operational activity, and deployment of 
forces - is invested directly in one of the Ministers, 
apart from the residual and general authority invested 
. 
in the Cabinet according to Para. 29 of Basic Law: The 
Cabinet. As we noted in Para. 16 of our first partial 
report, this power too, according to Para. 29, 'can be 
delegated from the Cabinet to a Minister, according to 
31(a) of the Basic Law. The Cabinet can also implement 
this authority through the Ministerial Committee, 
-according to Para. 27 of the Basic Law. We have found 
no indication in the material available that the Cabinet 
has utilized its formal authority under para. 31 (a), in 
order to delegate its authority on defence to one of its 
Ministers. 
I 
2 
3 
Para. 30 of interim report. 
Para. 17 of interim report. 
Para. 300 of appendices chapter in the Commission's final report. 
The unclassified sections of the report were published in the' 
press on 31 January 1975. 
In discussing the question of the Minister's authority over the 
army, the Commission went so far as to determine that there was a 
precarious basis even for the authority of military orders, since they 
derive from the Minister of Defence whose authority is disputable. 
The Military Jurisdiction Law 1955 defines in Para. 1 the term 
'military orders', which appears. in Para. 133 of the same law, 
Instructions of the Supreme Command which the Chief of Staff 
has been authorized by the Minister of Defence to implement; 
General Staff orders; Air Force and Naval Staff orders. The 
legislator assumed here that High Command orders were 
implemented by the Chief of Staff under the authority 
invested in him by the Minister of Defence, and that all other 
orders mentioned in that paragraph (General Staff, Air Force 
and Navy) did not require approval by the Minister of Defence. 
But the source of the authority of the Minister himself, as 
regards issuing of General Staff orders - is in doubt. The 
instruction for execution in para. 7 of the IDF Order provides 
a rather shaky foundation for granting such powers to the 
Minister. Nor is it clear by what legal authority the Chief 
of Staff implements General Staff orders. 1 
The Commission's sharp distinction between the military and 
political echelons, and particularly the Defence Minister, was furiously 
received at all points on the political compass. It was accused of 
being partisan, even of trying to absolve the Minister of Defence for 
political considerations. 
Even those willing to accept the Commission's argument that 
formally the Defence Minister had no special standing vis-ä vis the 
military, making him more responsible than the other Cabinet -Ministers, 
found it difficult to accept the distinction drawn between the military 
and political echelons, a distinction which contradicted the reality 
which had prevailed since statehood. 
1 Para. 299 (b) of the Agranat Commission final report. 
-Neither public opinion 
nor. large: sections of the Labour 
Party accepted the conclusions. - As the-pressures for the- 
resignation of Golda Meir's Cabinet- intensified from different' 
quarters- they led to her resignation. 
Among the IDF officers- there was resentment at the verdict, 
-and 
the feeling that politicians were using the army as a scapegoat, led 
for the first time in the history of the state to the alienation of 
senior officers from the political leadership. Brigadier-General Menahem 
Aviram defined the situation as 'breaking-up of a partnership on the 
part of the Minister of Defence'. 
' 
Criticism of'the conclusions focused on two main points. Were 
Ministers of Defence historically also super-Chiefs of Staff, i. e. 
responsible for the operational activities of the IDF? Constitutionally, 
did the Minister not in fact enjoy'legal command authority over the 
IDF? The Chief of Staff David Elazar, the main victim of the Agranat 
Commission, reacted to the first aspect in a memorandum which he sent in 
May 1975 to the Prime Minister: 
The Commission, in this matter, contented itself with 
a legal analysis and did not establish what the reality 
was since the establishment of the IDF. Such examina- 
tion would have confirmed that the Chief of Staff and 
all IDF factors acted on the basis of subservience of 
the Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence in all 
spheres of the responsibility and activity of the IDF, 
without excluding operational matters. In practice, the 
Minister of Defence intervened in operational and other 
matters. There was never any doubt that these matters 
were in its sphere of responsibility, so that there was 
never any question as to his authority.... All the above 
-mentioned factors (Prime Minister, Defence Minister 
and Chief of Staff) never had any doubts as to the 
distribution of functions between them both theoretically 
and in daily practice. 
2 
1 
2 
Zeev Schiff, Haaretz, 28 November 1975. 
Lieut-Gen. Elazar's memorandum published in'Davar, 20 April 1976. 
But even the central arguments Of the Agranat Commission concerning 
the Minister's lack of legal authority, as distinct from the historical 
question as to whether he was 'Super-Chief of Staff, aroused astonishment. 
On 20 September 1972, the Chief Military Advocate prepared his opinion 
in answer to a letter in which he was asked whether the President was the 
Commander of Israel's Defence Forces. He replied (in a document entitled 
'Subservience of the Chief of Staff and IDF - Legal Situation'): 
1. I refer to the quotation in the letter brought to my 
attention, "The Chief of Staff is subject to the Minister 
and, as in the United States, the President (of Israel) 
is commander of the defence forces 
2. It is clear that the situation with regard to the 
authority of the President, as quoted, is basically in 
error. 
0 
3. The President is not commander of the defence forces. 
The tasks and authority of the President were laid down 
in Para. 22 of Basic Law: The President (1964) and the 
responsibility and command over the defence forces were 
not determined within that framework... 
6. (a) By force of the IDF Ordinance Para. 7, which determines 
that the Minister is responsible for implementing the 
IDF Order, it may be learned that the Minister is also 
responsible for implementing military operations and 
hence-the Chief of Staff, as Head of the army, is subject 
to the Minister. 
(b) The subservience of the IDF to the Minister also derives 
from the fact that the IDF was set up, as noted, by 
the Cabinet and hence is subject to the authority which 
established it. Since the distribution of tasks among 
Ministers rendered the Minister responsible for defence, 
he represents the Cabinet vis a vis the IDF, and the army 
is therefore subject to his orders. 
7. Other specific laws dealing with the army state that the 
Minister of Defence is responsible for their implementation) 
and invest him with the special powers specifiedtherein.... 
Some four years later in June 1976 additional evidence was given by 
Colonel (Res. ) Dr. Hadar, Chief Military Advocate, of the Minister's respons- 
ibility. ' Major-General Shmuel Gonen described an incident he had with 
the Minister of Defence Dayan in the course of the Yom Kippur War. He 
said that the Minister had instructed him to send forces to Ismailia and to 
capture a site where an Egyptian division was camped. 
1 Opinion No. 85, Compilations of Legal Opinions No. 3,1973. Chief Military 
Advocate's Office. 
Gonen refused, saying that there was no justification and added 
'You cannot give me orders. You are not Chief of Staff. ' This occurred 
in the presence of many other people, and the Minister left in anger. 
l 
Colonel (Res. ) Dr. Zvi Hadar Military Advocate responded to this story in 
an article in which he wrote: 
... It seems that the Minister of Defence was entitled and authorised 
at that time to give binding orders to General Gonen, as to other 
generals and soldiers of the IDF, and thus to act as Chief of Staff 
or super-Chief of Staff of the IDF. This opinion contradicts the 
view of the Agranat Commission as to the command authority of the 
Minister vis-i-vis the IDF, which is-based mainly on Para. 32 of 
the Basic Law:. The Cabinet, according to which a Minister in charge 
of the implementation of a law was authorized to take to himself, 
on a certain matter, or for a certain period, any authority, apart 
from legal powers, granted under that law to a civil servant. The 
adoption of the power by the Minister is carried out by the actual 
act of implementation... 
Since the command authority of the Chief of Staff derives from the 
Military Jurisdiction Law-1955, the Minister of Defence being 
responsible for its implementation, the Minister was entitled to 
assume the authority of the Chief of Staff by implementing it 
himself. Therefore, the issuing of a command by the Minister to the 
General is essentially the same as the issuing of a command by the 
Chief-of Staff. 2 
In the wake of publication of the Agranat Commission Report, 
several legal experts responded forcefully to the recommendations on the 
Minister's ministerial responsibility. Professor Amnon Rubinstein wrote: 
It was always accepted by us that the'army and the Chief of Staff 
are not independent but subject to the civil authority, although 
the laws relating to this are outdated and clumsily formulated, 
we thought that the Minister of Defence - who acts in these 
matters by ministerial authority and as'a member of the Cabinet - 
had authority to instruct the IDF, to approve its plans and to 
take part in the appointment of senior officers... 
1 
2 
3 
See details of story in interview with Shmuel Gonen, Yediot 
Aharonot, 21 September 1977. This was not the only case. 
Col. (Res. ) Dr. Zvi Hadar, Yediot Aharonot, 29 June 1976. He 
elaborated his concept in a professional journal. See 
Hadar, Z. (1975: 219-235). 'The Command Authority of the 
Chief of Staff and Defence Minister over the IDF' in 
Hapraklit, (Hebrew). 
Rubinstein Amnon, Haaretz, 2 February 1975. 
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More specifically concerning the Minister himself, he added: 
He not only instructed the IDF, but sometimes even 
commanded it. In the case of the Sabena operation he 
took over command, any of us who had dared to question 
his authority to do so, would have been publicly stoned 
or crucified. 
This view was supported by the Attorney-General, Meir Shamgar 
and the Justice Minister Zadok. In the document submitted by the 
Minister to the Cabinet on 12 April, they stated that even a legal 
sanction of 'no confidence' by the Knesset in a particular 
Minister did not exist, no doubt the Minister has individual 
ministerial responsibility. 
The content of the principle of ministerial responsibility 
as accepted in Israel is similar in its content in the 
British constitutional regime, whence it reached üs. 
The meaning of ministerial responsibility: the Minister is 
responsible to the Knesset for all the activities of his 
Ministry, even if he knew nothing of them beforehand and 
was not privy to them. 1 
If legal arguments were insufficient to demolish the artificial 
distinction made by the Agranat Commission between the military and 
political echelons, another eventoccurred which demonstrated how much 
the two are meshed together. Before dawn on 15 May a PLO group 
penetrated to the border town of Maalot, took over a school where about 
one hundred children were sleeping and delivered an ultimatum for the 
release of twenty prisoners and a flight to Damascus. The Cabinet 
1 Opinion of Minister of Justice Haim Zadok submitted to Cabinet 
on 12 April 1974. Published in compilation Government in Israel 
collection of source material, ed. Emmanuel, Guttman and Yaakov Levi 
(1976: 161-164). Published by Kaplan School of Economics and 
Social Sciences, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. 
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hesitated whether to accede to their demands, and agreed to release 
the prisoners in exchange for the pupils' lives, but disagreed that the 
pupils would also be flown to Damascus. Finally, the Cabinet ordered 
the IDF to storm the school. The terrorists were killed, but so were 
21 pupils and another 70 were wounded. After the disaster the Prime 
Minister- Golda Meir appointed, on the 20. - May 1974, a committee of 
investigation headed by Major-General (Res. ) Amos Horev. 
The committee revealed many failings in security precautions, 
and also in the way the Cabinet and the security forces handled the 
matter. It also made a pertinent observation about the relationship 
between the Chief of Staff and the Defence Minister. The report 
explained that Dayan and Elazar held contradictory perceptions about 
the timing of the rescue operation. The former wanted to do it without 
delay, the latter preferred to postpone it. What did the Cabinet 
decide? 'They (the Defence Minister and Chief of Staff) are empowered 
to give the order to perform the storming of the building-to release 
1 
the hostages'. 
The cabinet's decision gave practically identical authority to two 
people in spite of the unequivocal hierarchical structure" gut who would 
prevail in a dispute? If the Defence Minister wants to advance the 
action, may the Chief of Staff postpone it? Or if-the Chief of Staff 
decides to storm the school and the Minister changes his mind, rejecting 
the idea, how will the army react? Such an ambiguous Cabinet decision 
appears even more odd when it is recognised that it was made only a 
few months after'the October war. 
1 The Report of the Horev Committee see Davar, ll July 1974. . 
BASIC LAW: THE ARMY 1975 DOES NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM 
.ý 
In the formal debate on responsibility for the Yom Kippur War, 
the Minister of Defence _Dayan was exonerated with 
the help of the 
Agranat Commission.. But public. opinion and the political establishment 
did not accept the verdict of the Commission on ministerial responsib- 
ility for the army. And therefore, when the Rabin Government began 
to draft the new legislation to regulate relations between the army and the 
political echelon, there was no disputing the fact that the law must, 
clarify the authority and responsibility of the Minister of Defence. 
The draft legislation stated: 
2 (a) The IDF is subject to the authority of the 
Cabinet. 
(b) The Minister of Defence is responsible for 
the IDF on behalf of the Cabinet. 
3 (a) The Chief of Staff is the. supreme 
command level of the IDF. 
(b) The Chief of Staff is subordinate to the 
civil, authority a, s determined in this law. 
The-sensitivity of-the question of the subservience of the 
Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence was responsible for the 
fact that the Knesset Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice 
which discussed the draft law, was not satisfied with the text prepared 
by the Cabinet and amended it. The Chairman of the sub-committee on 
Basic Laws, Yoram Aridor (Likud), who presented-the Committee's amended 
version to the House, explained that in the original version 
'there was no unequivocal clarification with regard to the type of 
subordination of the Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence. ' 
Para. 2(b) stated that. the Minister was responsible for the army on 
behalf of the Cabinet; but Para. 3(b), which dealt with the Chief of 
Staff, stated that he was subject to civil authority. 
1 Draft of Basic Law: The Army.. Book of bills (1975: 418) '9 July. 
The Committee reformulated these two clauses as follows: 
2 (a) The army is subject to the authority of the Cabinet. 
(b) The Minister responsible for the army on behalf of 
the Cabinet is the Minister of Defence. 
3 (a) The supreme command level in the army is the . Chief 
of Staff. 
(b)-The Chief of Staff is subject to the - authority of the Cabinet and subordinate to the 
Minister of Defence. 
' 
- 
Whereas the 1948 IDF"Qrdinance does not mention civil authority 
and the authority of the Minister, they appear twice in the 1976 Basic 
Law: The Army, as a result of the lessons of the Yom Kippur War. 
2 
But was the lesson truly learned? 
Although the Knesset passed the law defining the basic authority 
of the Minister of Defence, numerous questions pertaining to the 
implementation of this authority were not answered, and during the Knesset 
debate of 30 July 1975 many members proposed that the powers of Minister an 
Chief of Staff be more clearly delineated and in greater detail-Major- 
General (Res. ) Aharon Yariv (Alignment) for example, said that the 
law should define subjects in greater detail, as it has done in the 
case of orders and instructions, in such spheres as appointments, 
approval of operational activities or the formulation of strategy. 
To this the Minister of Justice replied that these matters did 
not pertain to a basic law, which should determine the civil 
authority of the Cabinet and of the Minister of Defence acting on 
its 
behalf. Other matters should be determined 'by the Cabinet and by the 
1 
2 
See Divrei Haknesset, Vo1.24:, - 2395-2397.31 March 1976. 
Together with the Basic Law: The Army, the Cabinet submitted an 
amendment to the Military Jurisdiction Law on the authority to 
issue binding orders and instructions in the IDF. The amendment 
stated explicitly that ' High ý Command Instructions' would be 
issued by the Chief of Staff with the approval of the Minister of 
Defence, and General Staff orders by the Chief of Staff. In order 
to remove doubts as to the past, a special section stipulated that 
'instructions and orders issued in the IDF before the commencement 
of this law, were issued legally'. Draft laws 1197 (1975: 419) 
9 July 1975. 
Minister of Defence as to the authority of those subordinate to them. 
The 1976 legislation gave formal expression to the normative 
principle of civil authority over the army and the status of the 
Minister of Defence as its representative. But despite the lessons of 
the Yom Kippur War, the sphere of duties, rights and interrelationships 
of the Minister, the Chief of Staff and the Prime Minister were left 
open, ambiguous, uninstitutionalized and vulnerable to fluctuating agreements; 
and the main protagonists retained room for manoeuvre. 
Why did this happen? Not even the gravity of the October. 1973 
crisis could halt or even weaken the ongoing struggle between the two sub- 
elites. The relationship between these two groups in the last period 
of the Labour Party Government 1974-1977 was very complicated. Power 
was almost balanced between them, they shared equally-the control of 
the security sphere, and the personal relationship between the two elites, 
which consequently affected the heads of the two Ministries, was very 
volatile. 
In this situation it was not comfortable for either side to fix 
institutional arrangements, preferring to keep them uninstitutionalized 
ill defined and without legal force. These afforded them a wider scope 
for manoeuvre, to shift responsibility to their opponents' shoulders in 
moments of disaster, and to claim it for themselves in moments of triumph. 
The absence of a decision.. on institutional issues were not only a 
consequence of the power balance between the political forces but also 
because it suited their own needs. This happened at the worst possible 
time after the October 1973 War when the army prestige had sustained a real 
blow and when more than ever before it was possible to limit the extent of 
the penetration by the military into the political sphere, to contract 
the boundaries of the security sphere, and to enforce the mechanisms of 
civil control over the military and to lessen the partnership style. 
But the power relations inside the Labour Party prevented that 
development and left the structure of political-military relations 
intact. The fact that even after the lesson of the Yom Kippur War, 
the Agranat Commission and the Horev Committee, no fundamental change 
was made in the nominal structure of the civil control, has made it 
possible that in the future the army will play an even more prominent 
role within the political system by cooperating with one of the two 
rival elites against the other. 
THE DEFENCE MINISTER' S' ROLE - AN' INTRODUCTION 
Defence matters were a permanent item on the Cabinet's agenda. 
The centrality and fatefulness of security in Israel, the 
constant threat to Israel by the Arab states, the wars, ' the 
hostilities, the degree of defence expenditure, the sensitiv- 
ity of the decisions in these fields and their political 
repercussions, all put security-at the centre of thought, 
policy and action, and therefore in the centre of the 
deliberations and the activities of the Cabinet. '. 
All these made the defence portfolio' the second most important in 
the Israeli Cabinet, even after it was divided from the Prime Minister 
and given to an independent Minister, and although no Defence Minister has 
attained the position of Prime Minister, unlike two Foreign Ministers who 
where selected to that position, the Defence Minister has always stood second 
to the Prime Minister in the hierarchy. 
1 Yaacobi, G. (1980 : 199). 
The extensive scope of the security sphere and its high level of 
autonomy resulted in the Defence Minister having control over a huge 
slice of the national cake. This control gave him considerable 
political power, reaching far beyond the political sphere. The Defence 
Minister could, for example, influence the fate of developing towns by 
deciding to transfer defence industries to them. 
Since Ben Gurion"s decision that Israelis foreign relations 
should serve defence policy, the Defence Minister! 's direct involvement 
in issues usually allocated to the Foreign Office was widened. The 
Defence Minister stole the Foreign Minister's thunder in all the following 
fields: on indirect contacts with Arab states; in very intricate arms 
purchases and, since the sixties, arms exports; in Israel activities in 
the third world particularly in Africa, and above all in the relations 
between Israel and the super-powers. The nature of the Defence Minister's 
activities added a special dimension to his position. It concerns a 
very sensitive sphere and attracts very, considerable public attention. 
The public relations mechanisms are greater than in all other Ministries 
including the Prime Minister's office. The Minister appears in. moments 
of crisis when questions of life and death are dealt with, and has the 
aura of one who deals with the most central issue of the collective, 
the veil over many of his activities added to that aura. The fact that 
the Defence Minister is also the leader of a party or an important 
faction in his party causes his public standing to be higher than most 
other Cabinet Ministers. 
Because of the Minister's wide scope for manoeuvre in interpreting 
his tasks, the various Ministers of Defence have differed greatly in 
their modus operandi. This was expressed in the different emphasis they 
attributed to each of the three main functions of the position. 
1. Political activity as representative of his party in the Cabinet. 
2. Political activity as part of the Cabinet collective. 
3. Specific responsibility for defence, because'of the distribution 
of functions within the Cabinet. 
Whereas the two former functions pertain to the civil sphere, the 
third relates more to the link between the civil and military sectors, 
and is therefore singled out for emphasis. The various conceptions of 
the Minister's role are expressed in the degree of emphasis on the 
components of-these functions which are: 
(a) The military aspect - construction of the army, command in 
wartime and current defence tasks, military doctrine training 
and operational plans, appointments, policy making etc. 
(b) The economic aspect - defence budget and its components, 
management of the Ministry, research and development and defence 
industries, in purchase and equipping forces. 
(c) The political aspect - strategic planning and participation in 
formulation of foreign and defence policy at the Cabinet level, 
and carrying out this policy either on its own or together with 
the Prime Minister and/or the Foreign Minister. Since 1967, the 
administration of the'territories'was added to this field, and 
also the operation of long-term policies with the Arab states 
and the residents in the territories. Strategic planning, in so 
far as it takes place, is also included in the political sphere 
of operations. 
Every Minister of Defence must deal with all these aspects, and 
also with party and political functions. This is particularly true of 
the political aspect when the Minister is also Prime Minister. But 
one can distinguish between the degrees of emphasis favöured by the 
different Ministers, as the following table shows (1 - primary 
emphasis, 2- medium level, 3- small degree). 
TABLE '8 
EMPHASES ON MINISTER'S SPHERES OF ACTIVITY 
Minister Spheres of Activity 
Military Economic Political 
Ben Gurion 231 
Lavon 121 
Eshkol 311 
Dayan 231 
Peres "221 
The decisive factor was the political-defence situation in each 
period. A state of war, or period of unrest like the proliferation of 
terror, increased the importance of the operational sphere. In 
periods of political negotiations, as during the disengagement talks 
and interim agreements, the political activity was of greater 
significance. 
But beyond external needs and the personal traits of the men who 
held the position, there was another set of factors, namely the personal 
and political relations between the Minister and the various components 
of the political-military leadership, and above all the Premier and 
Chief of Staff. 
THE POWER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF 
The task and status of the Chief of Staff derive primarily from 
two basic characteristics in the structure of the IDF. First, it has a 
unified General Staff which supervises all the armed forces on land, 
sea and air. The Chief of Staff is the administrative chief of the 
entire army, and the chairman of the General Staff. 
Secondly, the General Staff performs two functions. It 
administers the armed forces, trains and prepares them for battle 
, on the-one hand and commands them in war time on the other. 
1 
The, 
fact that the General Staff is unified and has two roles, and that 
the Chief of Staff is the only link with the political echelon, 
gives him exceptional power both inside the army and in its relationship 
with his civil superiors. 
The factors which led to this structure originated in the 
conditions of the arena, in the history of the Haganah and in the 
conceptions which guided those who fashioned the IDF. This structure 
has many advantages to offer to an army which, because of its size, 
needs to transfer forces rapidly - from one front to another. The 
classic distribution into three forces, and a separation of admin- 
istrative and command functions would hamper and slow down military 
operations. But beyond the military considerations, which led to the 
establishment of this structure, there was a political calculation. 
In the system as established there is one address bearing 
collective responsibility for the army, the Chief of Staff. 
If there were several, shall we say by branch, linked to 
separate Ministries, the areas of contact between the army 
and the civil system would be greater. Taking account of 
the heterogeneous nature of the party-political system in 
Israel (distribution of portfolios in the cabinet by 
coalition makeup for example) this would have opened up 
possibilities of a high level of politicization of the army, 
which would have significantly decreased its professional 
abilities. 2 
1 
2 
See Luttak, Edward and Dan Horowitz (1975: 94-98) 
The Israeli Army London. Allen Lane. 
Interview with Yitzhak Rabin, 11-August 1977. 
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This would, of course, have been in total conflict with the 
conception of the first Premier and Minister of Defence, who wanted 
to concentrate control over the army in his own hands and to block any 
possibility of involvement by other parties or even factions within 
his own party in the supervision of defence matters. 
Neither the 1948 IDF Ordenance, nor the Defence Service Law 1949 
mention the existence of the Chief of Staff. The command authority of 
the one who has the highest position in the army over his subordinates 
is based mainly on the Military Law 1955. However, even in this law the 
ambiguities are more numerous than the certainties. it is not-said that 
the Chief of Staff is the senior commander in the army. His title, 
Chief of the General Staff, does not make his position clear, because 
there is no definition in that law of the term 'the army's General Staff' 
'and neither is it said that he who stands at the head of the General Staff 
is the most senior commander. Furthermore, it is not stated in that law, 
or in any other, that the Chief of Staff must be the highest rank holder 
in the army. The authorities of the Chief of Staff are mentioned in 
other laws, but even then, and particularly in the 1945 regulations, they 
are mainly administrative and judicial, while his command authority is 
much more vague. This ambiguity, especially in a situation where the 
Chief of Staff enjoys such a high level of status and power, -inside and 
outside the army, demonstrates the nominal character of the 
instrumentalism of the IDF. 
Various laws, regulations and internal IDF orders invest the Chief 
1. 
of Staff with numerous powers in all spheres of military life. The fact' 
1 For details of his authority see Opinion No. 115 12, Compilation 
of Legal Opinions, No. 2, Chief Military Attorney's office, 1973. 
that he is the supreme authority in a hierarchical organization 
operating according to authoritative principles adds to his power 
beyond what the law grants. The IDF's working plans, deployment of 
forces, arms purchases, preparation of strategic and operational plans 
command over operations and appointment of officers - in all these 
spheres the Chief of Staff can leave his mark to a degree unparalleled 
in any other organization in Israel. The fact that Staff meetings, for 
example, are concluded not by democratic vote but by the Chief of Staff, 
enables him to take decisions which conflict with the majority view or 
even with the views of all the other members of the General Staff. 
The Chief of Staff's control of higher command appointments enables 
him-to maintain channels of personal influence within the army. All. 
appointments ranking colonel and above must have his approval, hence 
indirectly also of junior appointments. The fact that he is the gate 
keeper, the sole formal link between the army and the political 
echelon, strengthens his standing vis-a-vis the entire political 
establishment. 
But the power of the Chief of Staff, which is so great because he 
is the supreme authority within the army and the Cabinet's military 
expert, is made greater by the lack of clarity in the division of 
functions between him and the Minister of Defence. This can be seen 
from the following example. 
One of the principles of the instrumentalist army is that it does 
not, in Ben Gurion's words, 
decide its own structure, organization, laws or even 
methods of operation. The IDF does not determine the 
policy, regime, laws and rules of the Cabinet in the 
state. The army does not decide for 
-itself even 
its 
own structure, procedures and activities, and 
certainly. does not decide questions of peace and war. 
The army is only the implementory arm of the Israel 
Government for security and defence. The form of 
Government, guidelines of internal and foreign 
policy, declaration of war and making of peace, 
organization and shaping of the army and fashioning 
of its image - all these are the exclusive authority 
of the civil bodies .1 
These internal matters are determined in the High Command 
Instructions and in the words of the legislator: 
High Command Instructionsare the basis for organization, 
management and regime of the-army by: (a) defining... 
objectives, tasks and powers, structure and organiza- 
tion, including subordination and affiliation - of 
commands headquarters, corps and units; (b) definiti- 
tion of principles and organizational patterns in 
spheres of military activity: (c) publication of 
. orders, 
-appointments, approval, delegation of authority 
and other2instructions according to the instructions of 
the law. 
According to the instrumental army principle these instructions 
should be issued by civil authorities. And, in fact, Para. 1 of 
the Military Jurisdiction Law 1955 stipulates that High Command 
Instructions are military orders issued by the Chief of Staff by 
power of special authority invested in him by the Minister of 
3 
Defence. According to this law, various Chiefs of Staff have 
issued the numerous instructions and orders according to which the 
IDF operates. But were these instructions ever approved by the 
Minister? The answer. is negative. This fact has never been disguised 
and yet has aroused no adverse comment. The. legal dilemma was 
solved by the Chief Military Advocate on 11 August 1972 when he 
stated, in a legal judgement: 
1 
2 
3 
Ben Gurion, David (1971: 82) Singularity and Mission Tel Aviv. 
Maarahot. 
Para. 1.0105, High Command Instructions, 15 July 1956. 
See Final Report of Agranat Commission. Unclassified sections 
were published in the press, 31 January 1975. 
It seems that one should interpret the empowering of the 
Chief of Staff by the Minister to issue High Command 
Instructions, as stated in definition of the term 'army 
orders' in Para. l of the Military Jurisdiction Law, as 
a fact which was valid before the commencement of the 
Military Jurisdiction Law, and to which this law refers 
in passing and as a self-evident fact. 1 
But such approval was not given before the Military Jurisdiction 
Law was passed, in fact it was never given. It transpires therefore 
that from the purely legal point of view there is a very shaky foundation 
for the many hundreds of High Command Instructions which constitute the 
basis and infrastructure of the structure and activity of the IDF. 
The Agranat Commission reached this issue during its study of the 
status of the Minister of Defence, and it determined that the 'source 
of the authority of the Minister'of Defence himself, where the giving 
of High Command Instructions is concerned, is also in doubt. But even if 
the Commission'. s assumption is not accepted, and-the view of those who 
claim that the Minister had explicit legal authority over the 
army is endorsed, it is clear that there is no evidence of the fact that 
the Minister ever authorized the Chief of Staff to issue such orders. 
But what is more interesting, is not the fact that for 28 years 
no objection'was voiced at the absence of authorization, but the fact that 
in contrast to other instrumentalist armies, in the IDF the Chief of Staff 
issues High Command Instructions, even when this is done with civil 
authority which is senior to him. In other armies the civil echelon 
issues such orders, and thus fulfils the principle of which Ben Gurion- 
spoke, namely that 't'he army does not decide itself on its structures, 
procedures and guidelines for action'. 
1 Opinion No. 69, Compilation of Legal Opinions No. 3,1973, Chief 
Military Advocate's Office. 
I 
It is astonishing that the ranks of the IDF soldiers and the 
hierarchy were determined by. the army's interior regulations and 
not by regulations made under the law, hence the IDF determines for 
itself what rank the Chief of Staff shall hold, which means that he 
does in fact determine his own rank. 
It is for that reason-that the holder of the highest position 
in an instrumentalist army is known as the Chief of Staff and not 
as Commander. A staff officer receives his authority by virtue of 
the delegation of powers and has no authority deriving from himself. 
He therefore acts by order of his superiors. In the IDF the Chief of 
Staff serves, in practice, in a higher position than that which is 
understood from his formal title. 
When the Basic Law: the Army (1975) was passed, the Military 
Jurisdiction Law dealing with High Command Instructions was also amend- 
ed. It was'explicitly stated in Para. 2a (a) 'that High Command 
Instructions would be issued by the Chief of Staff with'the approval 
of the Ministry of Defence'. In order to consolidate the shaky basis 
of the past 28 years it was. also established in Para. 3 that 'in 
order to remove doubt it is hereby clarified that general orders and 
instructions. issued in the IDF before the commencement of this law, 
were issued legally. ' The problem of subordination of the Chief of 
Staff's instructions to a civil authority above the IDF was solved. 
But the possibility of removing them altogether from the hands of the 
Chief of Staff and handing them directly to the Minister of Defence 
was a farreaching one in Israeli circumstances, and did not accord with 
the power of the Chief of Staff vis-a-vis the civil authority above him. 
That this problem arose incidentally for the Agranat Commission 
while it was dealing with another matter, attests to the fact that the 
arrangement which had operated for 28 years did not appear irregular 
to either the army or the administration. The law that said that 
High Command Instructions were issued with the approval of the 
civil '. echelon was sufficient and gave cover to a totally different 
reality and since no-one disputed the fact that the army was actually 
determining its own organization, structure and the definition of its 
tasks and functions, nobody bothered to examine the legality of the 
arrangement, or the realization of the law. 
Can it be claimed that the distinction drawn here isalegal and 
formal and that, in practice - whether the Minister formally approved 
High Command Instructions or not - he was a partner to their 
formulation and was in effect the supreme authority to determine the 
organization, structure and operation of the army? The, grounds for 
this argument are shaky. The Agranat Commission revealed during its 
deliberations the difficulties which derived from the permeable 
boundaries between the Chief of Staff and the Defence Minister. But 
in its conclusions and recommendations it sharpened even more the 
problems between the military and political echelons and contributed 
nothing to their solution. 
'THE'FAILURE OF THE AGRANAT COMMISSION 
By separating the military and political echelons, attributing the 
blame for the omissions of the war on the former and refraining from 
dealing with the latter, it strengthened the status of the Chief of 
Staff. Since the Chief of Staff realized that the Minister of Defence, 
his full partner in the operation of the army, had been absolved of 
blame and that he himself bore the full brunt, he claimed more forcefully 
that if exclusive responsibility was demanded of him, he should also be 
invested with exclusive- authority, at least in practice. This feeling 
that he alone would, be required to take responsibility in the future as 
well, accompanied the Chief of Staff who was appointed after the Yom 
Kippur War and formed the basis of his demand for increased power. 
The criticism against the Agranat Commission's report united 
not only many in the army, but also civilians and Labour Ministers. 
Yitzhak Rabin expressed their view very trenchantly. 
I perceived in the report a strong and illicit attempt 
to introduce into the relationship between the military 
and political echelons new norms. which are not customary... 
The exclusive blame of the military and the exoneration 
of the political echelon does not cause immeasurable 
injustice to the military, but is wildly shaking the 
Government's authority over the military. There is. a 
real danger to the security of the state inherent in these 
norms... I saw in the report a very dangerous legal 
precedent. In the future each Chief of Staff will say 
to himself... I put all the information at my disposal 
on the Cabinet table with my recommendations. It was 
clear to me, beyond doubt that the moment the political 
echelon approved my recommendation and instructed me to 
act accordingly, it, the political echelon bears with me 
the responsibility... any other division of responsibility 
between the military and political echelons which convicts 
the first and exonerates the. second is impossible and 
contains acute dangers. If there is no shared responsibility... 
I, as the Chief of Staff having full responsibility for the 
army, will myself conduct the state's foreign and defence 
policies, because if there is no shared responsibility for the 
consequences, then there is no shared authority in the 
decision taking... 1 
1 Rabin, Yitzhak (1979: 413 - 414)Memoirs (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Maariv. 
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The Chief of Staff's powers were not diminished as a result of 
the passing of the Basic Law: The Army(1975) but rather the contrary. 
The law did not specify clearly the division of authority 
between the Minister and the Chief of Staff and the matter remained 
open to power games at the higher echelons. The-lack of clarity was. 
clearly illustrated by Lieutenant-General Gur when he said in an 
interview on retiring from the army two years after the enactment 
of law : 
Authority in the military-tactical sphere is clearly 
the Chief of Staff's. In the political spheres - it 
is equally clearly the Defence Ministers - the main 
problem in the relation between the General Staff and 
the Defence Minister is their cooperation in the 
strategic-political , sphere... 
there is a reciprocal 
influence between the strategic and'tactical-political 
spheres, andIhere misunderstandings and disagreements 
might occur. 
This was a strange statement. Since when had it been clear that 
in the tactical sphere. the Chief of Staff has authority? 'The 
operation of the armed forces from the smallest detail depends on the 
approval of the political echelon. '2 
If Gur's description was correct it contradicted the accepted 
customs of the IDF, for example, do army operations across the border 
which are tactical, not strategic, also need ministerial approval? 
Was it his own particular interpretation that allowed him to order 
military operations without civil approval? Furthermore, in his 
interview Gur described thei: strategic sphere as one in which the 
General Staff and the Defence Minister are two equal and balanced 
factors, which negotiate at the same level and have to reach an 
agreement and understanding? But is there any doubt at all whose 
authority is paramount? And how is the strategic sphere to be defined 
as an intermediate sphere between the political and tactical sphere, and 
by whom? 
1 
2 
Mordehai Gur in an interview Maariv, 14 April 1978. 
See Rabin Y, p. 378. 
But Gur did not believe these things in his heart. Although 
his position contradicted absolutely the formal model of civil control 
over 'the IDF, it does in fact reflect the pattern that existed in 
practice and the nominal character of the civil control. Further Gur's 
description did. not reveal the deep influence exerted by the army even 
in the political sphere. In spite of Prime Minister Rabin's desire to 
correct the defects in the relationship between the military and 
political exchelons, he could not succeed. 
_- 
In-addition to the factors which enabled the Chief of Staff to 
accumulate considerable power, the dynamics of the party system added 
a further dimension. And ironically, during Rabin's term as Prime Minister 
the struggle between the two sub-elites of the Labour Party, shaped in such 
a way that the political power of the Chief of Staff became even stronger 
than in the past. 
In the period in which the positions of Premier and Minister of 
Defence were held by the same man, the political influence of the Chief 
of Staff was primarily a function of the degree to which the Premier was 
willing to accept it: in Ben Gurion's day, to a small degree in the 
case of Laskov and Makleff and to a greater degree with Dayan. After the 
two posts were separated, the Chief of Staff became much more independent. 
Since the division between the two sub-elites was always done on a 
spoils basis it was only natural that they Prime Minister and Defence 
Minister fought for the allegiance of the Chief of Staff, while he could 
manoeuvre between them. For this reason Eshkol appointed Barley as a 
deputy Chief of Staff on the same day that Moshe Dayan entered. the 
Cabinet as Minister of Defence and, therefore, decided that only 
Barley should succeed Rabin. 
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When the Chief of Staff Barley disputed the opinion of the 
Defence Minister Moshe Dayan he demanded that the issue be brought 
before the Prime Minister. His affiliation to the Prime Minister's 
sub-elite almost automatically ensured that his viewpoint would be 
upheld. Dayan, aware of this, refrained from entering into disputes 
with Barley or from imposing his own view on him.. The result was 
inevitably, the strengthening of the status of Barlev and that of Elazar, who - 
succeeded him, at the expense of their superior, the Defence Minister. 
A different situation arose during Gur's term of office. When 
the power relations between the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister 
were almost balanced, the Chief of Staff's support for one of the two 
contestants could constitute a. significant additional strength, and 
Gur did in fact benefit from his support for Defence Minister Peres, 
as will be illustrated in Chapter 9. 
After Dayan's entry into the Cabinet in 1967, it was apparent that 
there were several consequences to the struggle between the three 
foci- of the triangle of forces - Prime Minister, Defence Minister and 
Chief of Staff. The Prime Minister enjoyed'the fact that the Minister 
of Defence's status was weakened. Dayan was no longer the sole military 
expert in the Cabinet, since he had a rival in the form of the Chief of 
Staff. For the Chief of Staff this changed the pattern of relations 
which had previously existed between him and the Minister. From a civil 
servant he became a political partner, and the gap between him and the 
Minister, in political power and authority, narrowed. 
But the Minister also enjoyed an advantage in this situation. 
First, since the Chief of Staff had greater authority, he could share 
responsibility with him. Thus Dayan safeguarded himself against 
criticism within the Cabinet. If criticism by the Mapai and Ahdut Haavoda 
veterans was also seen to be directed against the Chief of Staff, who was 
their political associate, then they would refrain altogether from 
criticism. This was an insurance policy for the Minister against 
his political rivals. 
Furthermore, the affiliation of the Chief of Staff to a rival 
group enabled the Minister to evade responsibility, since in certain 
cases he could claim that what had been done'did not reflect his 
opinion and was not decided on in accordance with his wishes. And, in 
fact, after publication of the Commission's report, several of Dayan's 
supporters claimed that two chiefs, "-of Staff were not appointed on Dayan's 
recommendation but were selected by the Prime Minister and his political 
group, and that this proved that the Minister was not responsible for the 
army, this responsibility being borne only by the political level, as 
the Commission had stated. Even if it could be claimed that the political 
level was responsible, then the target was the Prime Minister who had 
the decisive power over appointments to Chief of Staff and not the 
Minister-of Defence. 
I 
The physical expression of the change in the pattern of relations 
between the Chief of Staff and the political level, after the separation 
of the positions of"Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, was'the 
transformation of the Chief of Staff into a 'quasi-minister'. Since the 
Six Day War he had attended a considerable number of Cabinet sessions, 
and since the beginning of the War of Attrition almost all of them, 
and all meetings of the Ministerial Committee on Defence. 
2 
For about 
a year and a half all Cabinet meetings opened with a survey by the Chief 
1 
2 
Shabtai Tevet, Haaretz, 12 April 1974 and Kimche, John (1974: 29-40) 
'Politics and the Israel Defence Forces 1948-74' Midstream, 
Vol. 20, No. 6. 
During his four years in office, Barley attended 244 Cabinet meetings, 
an average of one per week. See interview with Barley, Ot, 9 March- 
1972. 
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of Staff and the custom that he attended all meetings on'defence'matters, 
and even purely political affairs, continued after"-the war. 
The status of the Chief of Staff vis-a-vis the Cabinet, and his 
problematic relations with the two sub-elites in the Labour Party were 
reflected in the draft Basic Law: The Army(1975) Of the various 
sections in the law -theonedealing with the method of appointment' of' 
the Chief of Staff involved the most protracted discussion in the" 
political echelon, and in the mass media'as well. 
THE CHIEF OF'STAFF'S APPOINTMENT REFLECTS THE POWER STRUGGLE 
Like many other aspects of military-political` relations the 
procedure to appoint the Chief of Staff was not'prescribed by law for 
the first 27 years of statehood. The way in which'the Chief of Staff 
was appointed was determined by procedures initiated by Ben Gurion. He 
tended to decide alone, after hearing the views of senior officers but 
without taking them into account. He presented his decision at a Cabinet 
session whose acceptance was unanimous. ' 
The first time that a vote took place in the Cabinet over Ben 
Gurion's nomination for Chief of Staff was on the 1st December 1953, 
when he proposed Dayan. At first there was no Cabinet majority. The 
then Chief of Staff Makleff: had only been one year in office and was 
highly regarded. More significantly some Ministers doubted Dayan's 
suitability for that responsible position, and even more than that the 
objection to his appointment served a political end. Dayan was an 
active Mapai member, while wearing uniform he did not conceal his 
political activities and took part in the rivalries within Mapai. 
Therefore, it was not only Ministers from coalition parties who were 
apprehensive about the appointment, but even some Mapai Ministers were 
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unenthusiastic. Because of the disapproval by the coalition partners 
in the Cabinet session on 29 November the matter was transferred to 
the Ministerial Committee for-Defence"änd Foreign Affairs. 
. -`". 
'fie 
caalition partners-(committee members were from the General 
Zionists--Peretz Bernstein and Pinhas Sapir, from the religious party 
HapoelHamizrachi -Moshe Haim Shapira) opposed the nomination. Foreign 
Minister., Moshe Sharett. also opposed it- but because of Ben Gurion's 
standing, voted together with the other Mapai representatives, Golda 
Meir and Levi Eshkol. Hence Dayan's nomination was approved by a 
majority of Mapai against the coalition partners. 
I 
The situation became more complex when the tasks of Prime Minister 
and Minister of Defence were separated in 1967. There were those who 
assumed that the Minister of Defence should be granted the authority to 
appoint and dismiss Chiefs of Staff, since he was responsible for 
implementing the 1948 IDF Order. On the other-hand it was also widely 
believed that this authority should be held by the Cabinet by virtue of 
its authority to carry out on behalf of the state any action not 
entrusted to any other body, according to Para. 29 of the Basic Law: The 
Cabinet. There was therefore no clearcut legal basis for the appointment 
of the Chief of Staff. 
But this did not prevent the ruling party from continuing to act 
according to a procedure appropriate to the split control of the two 
sub-elites in the Labour Party,. The Minister of Defence brought his 
recommendation for appointment of Chief of Staff to the Cabinet for 
approval, but with the foreknowledge and support of the Prime Minister, 
1 Sharett, M. (1978: 202 - 204). 
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and again the discussion in the Cabinet'was almost a formality. The 
custom that the subject be not discussed in public, as well as the 
fact that military censorship is imposed on it, meant that apart from 
certain people in the know at the heart of the establishment, the 
public at large knew nothing of the steps preceding the approval of the 
Chief of Staff. The appointment was presented to the public as if it 
were a unanimous decision of the Cabinet. The truth is, of course, 
that the consensual position was adopted only after political wrangling, 
and that the formal procedures for this appointment differed from the 
true decision making process. 
l 
This however did not prevent the 
Attorney-General, who when asked for his opinion about the proper way 
to appoint the Chief of Staff, recommended that the Cabinet should 
continue with the same procedure that was customary.? 
After publication of the Agran#t Commission recommendations, when 
the details of the draft Army Law were discussed, the question arose of 
who would appoint the Chief of Staff and how. The political problems 
involved can be ascertained from a perusal of a document presented by 
Professor Yehezkel Dror on 14 July 1974 to the Minister of Justice 
Haim Zadok. 
3 
1 
2 
3 
The Attorney-General's Guidance, Constitutional and Administrative 
Law, the Appointment of Chief of Staff - Authority 1 July 1974. 
Until the appointment of Mordehai. Gur in 1975, the Cabinet merely 
gave its 'approval'. Since then the Cabinet has done the 'appoint- 
ing'. The difference is more formal than practical but reflects 
the increasing role which the Cabinet demanded in decisions sub- 
mitted by the Minister of Defence and Prime Minister. The appoint- 
ment of Gur was the first in which differences of opinion among 
Ministers and the details of voting were published in the press. 
See Haaretz, 15 April 1975. 
'Distribution of Powers, Obligations and Responsibility for Defence 
between the Cabinet, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence 
and the Chief of Staff - Preliminary Analysis'. Ministry of 
Justice Archives. 
In Chapter 2 of. this document 'Appointment of the Chief of Staff' 
he describes (para. 7) the main alternatives with regard to the 
authority for the appointment of the Chief of Staff, and the various 
advantages and drawbacks of each. 
Alternative 1 Appointment by the Minister of Defence 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Increases the Chief of-Staff's Affects the special status and 
dependence on the Minister; autonomy of the Chief of Staff; 
increases the Minister's control overdependence on the Minister; 
of the IDF; accentuates the full undermines Cabinet authority on a 
responsibility of the Minister critical issue. 
for the IDF 
Alternative 2: Appointment by the Cabinet 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Strengthens status of Chief of Decreases ability of Minister to 
Staff; emphasizes collective control IDF; undermines Minister's 
responsibility of Cabinet on responsibility for defence. 
defence. 
Alternative 3: Appointment by Prime Minister 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Strengthens Prime Minister's Decreases Minister's ability to 
status; emphasizes special control IDF; undermines Minister's 
status of Chief of Staff. responsibility for defence; -- 
undermines collective responsib- 
ility of Cabinet for defence. 
'Alternative 4: Granting*Knesset status in appointment of Chief of Staff, 
for example by approval of appointment by Foreign Affairs and Defence 
Committee. 
Advantages 
Strengthens status of Chief of 
Staff; emphasizes his autonomy; 
increases Knesset's role in 
defence. 
Disadvantages 
Undermines Minister's and Cabinet's 
control of defence; and under- 
mines principle of parliamentary 
responsibility of Cabinet. 
Alternative 5: Granting ceremonial status to President in appointment of 
Chief of Staff, for example by formal appointment after decision by 
another body. 
Advantages 
Highlights special status of 
Chief of Staff. 
Disadvantages 
Psychologically may decrease ability 
of Minister to control IDF. 
The method of Chief of Staff's appointment was discussed 
in the 'Ministerial Committee for the Formulation of Conclusions . 
in the Institutional - Legislative Sphere' that was set tip after the 
Agranat Commission's report, during that committee's deliberations 
on the formulation of the Basic Law: The Army. In the preliminary 
stage of the discussion four alternatives were proposed 
A: The Chief of Staff to be appointed by the Cabinet. 
B: The Chief of Staff to be appointed by the Cabinet on the 
recommendation of the Minister of Defence. 
C: The Chief of Staff to be appointed by the Cabinet on the 
recommendation of the Minister, to be presented by the Prime 
Minister. 
D: The Cabinet to appoint the Chief of Staff from among the 
candidates proposed by the Minister. 
In the early stages of the debate, the Committee dropped the 
fourth alternative and only three were brought to the Cabinet meeting 
on 1 June 1975. Gideon Hausner the Liberal Minister Put the first 
alternative, Haim Zadok Justice Minister the second, and the third by 
Galili and Allon. The proposers of the second and third alternatives 
acknowledged that they reflected the formal customs and the third one the 
informal customs. According to Rabin's account only the first two were 
voted on, the second one being approved. 
In effect, the four alternatives differed in two points: how 
many candidates could be submitted to the Cabinet, and who should 
recommend them. On the first point, the deliberations were not 
lengthy. The procedure with regard to the appointment of senior 
officials, judges, directors-general of ministries or diplomats is that 
the relevant Minister- presents his proposal, and the Cabinet is not 
asked to select from among several candidates. This method is 
appropriate to the principles of coalitionary structure of the Cabinet, 
and it is not customary for a-'Minister to interfere in the appointment 
of officials to another Ministry.. representing another party.. The 
debate therefore focused- on the second point: who should submit the 
candidate to the Cabinet? , The Minister of Defence, the Prime Ministers 
or both. 
As anticipated, there were differences of opinion on this point, 
both in the earlier stages of discussions in the Cabinet Committee and 
in the Knesset debate, and not merely on the practical points most of 
which were raised by Professor Dror, but essentially on the basis of 
affiliation within, the Labour movement. The supporters of the Minister 
of Defence, headed by Peres himself, insisted that the Minister bring the 
recommendation before the Cabinet. Supporters of the Prime Minister. - 
Rabin . headed by the Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon. wanted to 
strengthen the weight of the Premier. Since they could not disregard 
the fact that the new draft law defined more clearly than in the. past 
the fact that the Minister of Defence was responsible for the IDF and 
that the Chief of Staff was subordinate to the Minister, they could not 
ignore the Minister's status on the question of appointing the Chief of 
Staff. They therefore proposed a compromise: the minister would 
recommend, but the Prime Minister would also play a part in the 
recommendation before it was presented to the Cabinet for approval. 
But what would the Prime Minister's role and status be in this 
respect? Allon proposed that-the Minister of Defence's recommendation 
be submitted 'with the concurrence of the Prime Minister'. Dov Zakin 
(Mapam) proposed, during the Knesset debate, that the Minister'and 
Prime Minister enjoy equal status, and. the Chief of Staff be appointed 
by the Cabinet 'on the joint recommendation of the Minister and Prime 
Minister'. Aharon Yariv and Yosi Sarid (Labour Party), both at that 
time more closely affiliated with Rabin than with Peres, proposed' 
'recommendation of the Minister after consultation with the Prime 
Minister'. 
1 
But the draft law which reached the Knesset made no mention of the 
Prime Minister. Rabin had himself opposed giving the Prime Minister 
a formal status over the appointment and was ready to accept a phrasing 
which accorded status only to. the Minister of Defence. His argument was 
borrowed from Israeli political practice, and was not related to legal 
considerations. It is hard to conceive that the Minister of Defence 
would recommend to the Cabinet a candidate not acceptable to the Prime 
Minister. In the event of such an unlikely situation the Prime Minister 
could by procedural measures block a Cabinet decision if he did not 
approve of the candidate. The Defence Minister would have to consult 
the Prime Minister before the. Cabinet session and to arrive at agreement 
with' him, - even 
if the bare bones. of- the i law= did not.. require him to. 
On the other had, by preventing his own formal participation in the 
process, the Prime"Minister can cast-the full weight of responsibility 
on the minister alone, while himself enjoying the power to exert influ- 
ence without taking responsibility. That was probably a valid consider- 
ation for Rabin when he agreed to the draft law. 
1 See Matty Golan, Haaretz 22 August 1974. 
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A fascinating compromise was reached, The new law was born 
out of the crisis in relations between the military and political 
echelons during the Yom Kippur War. Nevertheless, the law, 
ostensibly clear and unambiguous, left the central problems open 
and unsolved. The pattern of civil control over the military was 
once again left with no formal and institutionalized arrangements 
but dependent on practice and on the relations between the Prime 
Minister, Minister of Defence and the decisive groups in the political 
leadership. 
Once again the sub-elites of the Labour Party had preferred a 
flexible and open arrangement, facilitating adaptation to changing 
political conditions, to a clearly defined and unequivocal legal 
situation, which, even if preferable to ensuring civil control of 
the army and the consolidation of the instrumentalist model, restricted 
the political power and ability to manoeuvre in the struggle for power. 
1 
The political power advantage which the Prime Minister and 
Defence Minister could reap from this ambiguous arrangement was more 
important to them than the danger emanating from the Chief of Staff 
being left with a strong and extensive practical political authority. 
Did they not sense the fact that they had laid the foundation for an 
even higher level of participation by the Chief of Staff in politics, 
or did they know, but did not consider it such a bad thing? - 
1 The length of the Chief of Staff's term of office is not stipulated 
in the law. In the early years of statehood it was not fixed and 
was decided on by Ben Gurion and the wishes of the Chief of Staff 
himself. . Since,. Maj. -Gen.. Laskov completed. his term of office, the 
custom has evolved that the Chief of Staff serves for three years 
and any extension must be approved by the Cabinet. This has 
happened on three occasions, and each time the term was extended by 
one year. 
9. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER, DEFENCE 
MINISTER AND CHIEF OF STAFF 
I 
FOUR TYPES OF RELATIONSHIP 
The relations between the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence 
and the Chief of Staff serve as the best lense through which to 
observe and analyze the Israeli political-military relations pattern. 
They are not only a product of the interaction between the civil and 
military echelons, but also that of the interparty conflict which became 
more acute when the roles of Prime Minister and Defence Minister were 
separated. The following survey is concise and illuminates only the 
principal characteristics of the several periods. However, throughout 
the thirty years the emergence of'military democracy'can be discerned. 
TABLE 9 
PRIME MINISTER - MINISTER OF DEFENCE - CHIEF OF STAFF, 194$-1977 
Year Prime Minister 
1948 
1949 
1952 
Ben Gurion 
Minister 
of Defence 
1953 Moshe Sharett Pinhas Lavon 
1955 Moshe Sharett Ben Gurion 
1955 Ben Gurion 
1958 Ben Gurion 
1961 Ben Gurion 
1963 Levi Eshkol 
1964 Levi Eshkol 
1967 Levi Eshkol 
1968 Levi Eshkol 
1969 Golda Meir 
1972 Golda Meir 
1974 Golda Meir 
1974-7 Yitzhak Rabin 
Moshe Dayan 
Moshe Dayan 
Moshe Dayan 
Moshe Dayan 
Moshe Dayan 
Shimon Peres 
Chief of Staff 
Type of 
relations 
Yitzhak Dori A 
Yigael Yadin A 
1Kordehai Makleff A 
Moshe Dayan 
Moshe Dayan 
Moshe Dayan B 
Haim Laskov A 
Zvi Zur A 
Zvi Zur* - 
Yitzhak Rabin B 
Yitzhak Rabin C 
Haim Barleu C 
Haim Barleu C 
David Elazar c 
Mordehai Gur* 
Mordehai Gur D 
* For interim period of several months 
Four significant types-of relationship can be differentiated. 
(a) The Prime Minister serving. also as Minister of Defence, with a 
non-political Chief of Staff. Ten years altogether with Ben 
Gurion and Dori, Yadin, Makleff, Laskov, Zur. 
(b) Prime Minister serving as Minister of Defence, with a political 
Chief of Staff. Eight and a half years with Ben Gurion and 
Dayan, Eshkol and Rabin. 
(c) Prime Minister and Minister of Defence separated, the former held 
by a representative of the veterans and the latter by a Rafi 
member, Chief of Staff associated with the former. Some six 
years with Eshkol-Dayan-Rabin; Eshkol-Dayan-Barlev; Meir-Dayan- 
Barley; Meir-Dayan-Eläzar. 
(d) Prime Minister and Minister of Defence separated and split between 
the two groups. Chief of Staff does not belong to the Prime 
Minister's political group. Three and a half years with Rabin- 
Peres-Gur. 
All other periods were brief, insignificant and-transitional, apart 
from the Sharett-Lavon-Dayan period, a crisis year which did not fit 
precisely into the framework of the power relations in the Labour 
Movement, and calls for a separate analysis. 
1 
For an analysis of the influence of the status gap on Prime Minister- 
Defence Minister relations see Brecher, Michael (1972: 378-398) 
The Foreign Policy System of Israel, London. Oxford University Press. 
FIRST ' TYPE: ' BEN GURION'S'AUTHORITATIVE'POSTURE 
The widest gap in status and influence. between the head 
of the political echelon and the Chief of Staff occurred in the first 
pattern. The Chiefs of Staff accepted Ben Gurion's authority both as 
political and military leader, the formulator ofpolicy and supervisor-of its 
implementation, and as the father of the defence establishment. Zur too 
accepted Ben Gurion's party leadership, while Laskov emphasized his 
constitutional authority and Chief of Staff's standing as a civil 
servant. Makleff displayed personal weakness in his relations with 
Ben Gurion. 
The only Chief of. Staff in this group who sometimes. challenged 
Ben Gurion was Yigael Yadin, because he regarded Ben Gurion's intervention 
in military matters as an encroachment on his territory: operational 
instructions, the appointment and dismissal of officers and the deploy- 
ment of forces. The first aspect was the most significant during the 
War of Independence, the middle two in the years after the War, and the 
last precipitated Yadin's resignation. It occurred in September 1952, 
when Ben Gurion insisted on a cut 
in the. defence, budget. of 48 million- 
lirot, which entailed the dismissal from the IDF of 6,000 regular 
servicemen and civilian employees. Yadin disputed the contention that the 
IDF's budget and scope should be reduced, but the last straw was when Ben 
Gurion even dictated to him which units should be cut. 
1 
Ben Gurion frequently interfered in officer appointments. By law 
the Minister of Defence approves the Chief of Staff's appointments from 
the rank of colonel, but in the first few years, before the rank of 
brigadier was introduced and when the number of officers in the High 
Command was small, Ben Gurion was personally acquainted with almost all 
1 Bar Zohar, Michael (1977: 944-5) Ben Gurion (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 
Am Oved. 
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the colonels and with many other officers of lower rank. He took an 
interest in officer appointments, particularly to'certain key positions. 
He also promoted some officers and fired others' and in not a few cases 
imposed his own will. A striking example was his dispute with Makleff. 
Ben Gurion objected to Makleff's intention to"replace Dayan as Chief of 
Operations with Yitzhak Rabin. He did not allow him to'make personal 
changes among staff generals and opposed the Operations Branch reform 
which would have altered the status of certain officers. 
l 
Ben Gurion adopted an interesting policy with regard to the 
appointment of the second man in the hierarchy, the Chief of Operations 
or Deputy Chief of Staff whenever that position was occupied. Ben 
Gurion took good care to appoint to this post an officer differing 
greatly in military approach, experience, method of advancement and 
even in personal traits from the Chief of Staff. This was true of 
Yadin and Makleff, Makieff and Dayan, Dayan and Laskov, Laskov and Zur, 
Zur and Rabin. Ben Gurion's admirers saw in this an attempt to 
maintain fruitful tension, to ensure a fresh and critical approach and 
a dialogue between various military perceptions. 
2 
However, it is 
difficult not to construe that policy as an uninstitutionalized civil 
control mechanism. The IDF's strength, particularly the power'of 
its Head, coupled with the weak institutionalized civil control 
mechanisms, meant that his method of divide and rule led to the weakening 
of the army leadership and a consequent strengthening of the Minister. 
And, in fact, the tensions and rivalries resulted in at least two cases 
in the resignations of Makleff and Laskov. 
1 
2 
See documentation from Ben Gurion diaries and archives, in Bar 
Zohar, M. (1975: 947-948). 
See, for example, Shabtai, Teveth Haaretz, 8 February 1974. 
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Ben Gurion reserved to himself the possibility of intervening in 
IDF's operational running beyond general policy making, although he 
did not do so systematically, but intruded only when he thought 
it 
necessary. He was the final arbiter of disputes within the senior 
the 
staff, as for example, between the Chief of Staff Dayan and the Chief'of 
Operations Laskov about the doctrine of armoured warfare. Following 
his decision in September 1956 in favour of Laskov, the Armoured Corps 
was transformed from the infantry's auxiliary arm to be the spearhead of 
the land forces, and the IDF's character thereby changed. He also 
settled another dispute between the Chief of Staff Zur and the 
Chief of 
Operations Rabin about the strategy to build-up the IDF. 
1 
But Ben Gurion did not content himself with decisions at this level 
and sometimes even decided the fine details of tactical operations. He 
participated in the detailed planning of retaliatory raids, or determined 
the size and equipment of units patrolling the border. He approached the 
IDF with his own operational initiatives and ordered it to prepare 
operational schemes, such as the plan for capturing the Gaza strip in 
1953 or the capture of the Straits of Eilat in"bctober 1955? That 
should be-rememberedsince later the IDF, almost alone, 
initiated military action, especially retaliatory raids. In about 
95 percent of the cases it was the army which proposed such action to _ 
the politicians rather than the reverse. 
I 
1 
2 
See Yeshayahu'Ben Porat, Yediot Aharonot, 7 February 1975. 
See, inter alia, Dayan, Moshe (1976: 137-182) Milestones 
(Hebrew) 
Jerusalem, Edanim, and Dayan, Moshe (1965: 43) Sinai'Campäign 
Diary (Hebrew) Tel Avita. Am: Hasefßr... Also-Bat. Zohar, 
M. 
(1977: 1154). 
Throughout his term of office Ben Gurion adhered strictly to the 
precepts laid down by him when the IDF was established - the maximum 
separation between the army's top echelon and the political institutions. 
He, Prime Minister and Defence Minister, was the only conduit connecting 
the two sub-systems, the military and the political. Major-General 
Haim Herzog, who served as Chief of Intelligence for five years during 
Ben Gurion's term, testified that he 
made all possible efforts to prevent contacts between 
the military and civil-political echelons. He saw 
himself as solely responsible to the Cabinet and the 
Knesset in security matters and was not prepared to 
share that responsibility with the army commanders 
not even for reporting matters (to the Cabinet). 
Even in the late fifties and early sixties he preserved the 
integral boundaries between the army and the Cabinet, employing his 
familiar argument that the military should keep out of party politics. 
He prohibited military men from appearing before the Cabinet, addressing 
the Knesset and other Government bodies, and in;. so doing blocked all 
formal information channels from the military into the Cabinet, and 
controlled the only channel himself. He deflected all attempts to 
introduce a legal definition of the Cabinet's'authorities over the 
armyls day to dayactivities, and by limiting the Cabinet's involvement 
in practical control over the military. 
Ben Gurion's authoritative position among his Cabinet colleagues 
was manifested mainly in the security sphere. His decision-making 
was introspective; he'did not take many people-into his confidence: 
The subjects he"brought for discussion to Cabinet meetings Mere not- 
usually random tters"-but, rather, his pre-formulated proposals which the 
Cabinet was expected to approve. On foreign affairs and defence, even 
when they touched on the most fundamental strategic principles, 
he 
did not consult other Ministers even within his own party. Pinhas 
Rosen once said that Ben Gurion himself used to say 'The information 
I Haim Herzog, Haaretz, 21 December 1973. 
I give you is correct, but that does not mean that it is all the 
available information. ' On defence and foreign affairs matters Ben 
Gurion was the leader of the Cabinet rather than its chairman. 
1 
By camouflaging and concealing even some of his major political 
goals and by making crucial foreign and defence policy decisions in 
secret, Ben Gurion contributed to the mystification of Israeli politics 
in the security sphere. His-monopolizing of the defence sphere and 
his attempt to expand its boundaries to incorporate more-areas were 
reflected in his forceful objections to making the Foreign Ministry a 
partner in formulating policy on retaliatory acts and on the 
Armistice Commissions. These were almost-the only two areas 
of Israel-Arab contact-and it was, therefore, reasonable to expect that 
the Foreign Ministry should be involved in them. Ben Gurion stubbornly 
refused and insisted that they remain the domain of the Prime Minister 
and Minister of Defence. This was particularly evident in his'handling 
of several vitally important issues: his efforts to conclude a military 
alliance with the West, his decision on nuclear development and the 
nuclear option, and the political and military steps taken in con- 
junction with France and Britain which led to the Sinai-Campaign. 
2 
SECOND TYPE: *DAYAN 'AND 'RABIN THE POLITICAL 'CHIEFS ' OF STAFF 
The second pattern was when the two positions were held by one man, 
with the Chief of Staff as a political personality belonging to the Prime 
Minister's group. It existed when Dayan served under Ben Gurion and Rabin 
under Eshkol. The implications of the pattern prevailed in both periods, 
notwithstanding the widely different international and political 
circumstances and the contrasting personalities of the players. 
In both cases the Prime Minister was regarded by the Chief of 
Staff as the unshakeable political authority, whether the cause was 
mainly institutional (relations between Rabin and Eshkol) or based on 
1 
2 
An interview with Pinhas Rosen, 14 March 1975. 
See Bar Zohar, "M. (1977: 1205-1260) and Evron, Yosef (1968) 
On a Rainy Day. (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Otpaz. 
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professional and personal esteem (Dayan in relation to Ben Gurion). On 
the other hand both Chiefs of Staff were accorded a high degree of 
professional authority by their Premiers. This was reflected not merely 
on the tactical and operational levels, but also in the strategic and 
strictly political level of national defence policy and as Chiefs of 
Staff they were more active in this sphere than their predecessors. 
In the farewell letter which Ben Gurion sent to Dayan when the 
latter retired from the military, he praised him for two qualities: 
'supreme talents as a military commander and wide-ranging political 
wisdom'. 
' As for Rabin, in Eshkol's Cabinet he was nicknamed 'the real 
Minister of Defence'. 
2 
Dayan and Rabin played decisive roles in the central political 
decisions of their day, namely Israel's super power orientation. Their 
point was strongly affected by defence policy considerations, but its 
consequences went far beyond the defence sphere and influenced the entire 
international posture of the State of Israel and hence also the patterns 
of economic, social and political development. 
Dayan, together with Peres, was one of the formulators of the 
European orientation, military, political and economic cooperation with 
France and Germany which left its mark during the dedade between the 
Sinai Campaign and the Six Day War. Rabin was the main force who 
persuaded Eshkol to strengthen ties between Israel and the United States. 
The process of establishing these ties in the first half of the sixties 
was the dominant evidence that Israel's foreign policy was predicated on 
Israel's defence policy, one of whose more important facets was arms 
procurement. At the same time, Rabin's indefatigible pressure 
to forge links between Israel and the US, the West's leading 
manufacturer of modern weapons, rather than with Europe, ' 
persuaded Eshkol to 
initiate a novel understanding with the US. 
1 Bar Zohar, M. (1977: 1432). 
2 Eitan Heber, Yediot Aharonot, 2 December 1966. 
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Government. It was the. first, step . towards . 
the establishment. of- "a 
close political-association between Israel and the US. 
1 
In policy towards the Arab states- both Dayan and Rabin were 
active in-formulating the principle of controlled violence as the 
response to the problem of latent war, the evolution of the concept 
of retaliatory raids.. There was one difference. between them. Whereas Ben 
Gurion had no misgivings when: Dayan urged an 
i, ncrease. in the number of 
operations, their scale and scope, Rabin's recommendations-were some- 
times greeted by Eshkol with reserve and hesitation. In any event Ben 
Gurion demanded and initiated retaliatory action much more frequently 
than Eshkol. The military instrument, the retaliatory raids, served. 
different purposes for Dayan and Rabin. Rabin used it only to implement 
the Cabinet's proclaimed objective, namely as a deterrent, and to make 
it clear to the Arab states that Israel was not willing to return to 
the pre-Sinai Campaign situation. 
Dayan, on the other hand, occasionally used it to achieve different 
aims from those of the Cabinet. The Cabinet wanted to convince the Arabs 
that it was not worthwhile to attack _Israel's security and therefore 
to end hostilities., Dayan used retaliation in order to escalate Arab 
2 
aggression, so as to bring about a second round of all out warfare. 
Both Dayan and Rabin frequently made public. political 
statements-about defence and foreign affairs. Although they did not 
conflict with Government policy, the fact that they were made by military 
1 
2 
See Rabin, Yitzhak (1979: 105-130) Memoirs (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 
Maariv. Golda Meir the Foreign Minister was another factor who 
worked on Eshkol to incline to a pro-American orientation. See 
also Rabin's appreciation of Eshkol in Bamahane, 14 February 1973. 
See Hendel, Michael I. (1973: 47) Israel's Political Military Doctrine. 
Occasional Papers in International Affairs No. 30 Centre for 
International Affairs, Harvard University. 
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men sparked off criticism, which sometimes obliged the Minister of 
Defence to defend the Chief of Staff in the Knesset. Such statements 
characterized the political Chiefs of Staff in contrast to the non-political 
ones. Laskov, for example, made only one political speech in which he 
attacked the Soviet Union. According to Laskov himself the speech was 
, made at Ben 
Gurion's explicit request, the latter not wishing the 
statement to come from him as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. 
i 
Political statements made by Dayan and Rabin were sometimes so 
important that they had a major role in the diplomatic and military develop- 
ments in the region. Rabin's statement that Israel might be forced to 
strike a blow at the Syrian regime if Syria's aggression did not cease 
was one of the sparks which lit a chain reaction leading to the Six Day 
War. 
2 
Rabin's remarks in an interview published in the*IDF weekly 
Bamahaneh on 11 September 1966 greatly angered Eshkol, who reprimanded 
him in the most sharply worded letter he ever sent to his Chief of Staff. 
He expressed his displeasure at Rabin's remarks, at his 
disclosure of personal views and at his timing. He also wrote that Rabin 
as Chief of Staff was disqualified from making political_'statements: 
3 
Eshkol burned with anger and according to some of his associates, contem-' 
plated replacing Rabin as Chief of Staff. But because Weizmann 
was Rabin's heir designate and a close ally of Peres, and as a result of 
lobbying by Ahdut Haavoda leaders Galili and Allon, Eshkol's rage was 
modified. 
1 
2 
3 
'Interview with Haim Laskov 17 August 1977. 
See Gilboa, Moshe A'. (1968: 60) Six Years, Six Days. (Hebrew) 
Tel Aviv. Am Oved. 
Eshkol`s private archives. Jerusalem. 
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This letter, like Eshkol's conduct after the widescale retaliatory 
"f 
action at the Jordanian village of Samoa in November 1966, highlighted 
Ben Gurion's and Eshkol's disparate outlooks on the-Minister of 
Defence's role towards the IDF. Whereas outwardly Eshkol appeared to 
defend the IDF and the Chief of Staff against public criticism, he took 
a different line in private. He claimed that Ben Gurion always defended 
the army even when it-deserved censure. This attitude he felt was 
unjustified. A Prime Minister was not obliged to defend the IDF when 
it deserved to be-condemned. 'I am not the army's spokesman in the 
Cabinet' he wrote in his diary a few days after the Samoa raid. 
1 
This attitude was one component in his policy, to demystify defence. 
He also wanted to expose the IDF more to scrutiny by civil authorities. 
'Eshkol felt the lack of a consultative national authority which worried 
him because he lacked arguments at times when he rejected the military's 
recommendations'; for example, when he decided to abolish the Military 
Government despite the Chief of Staff's objections. 
2 
CHIEF OF STAFF RABIN-- ESHKOL'S DEFENCE MINISTER 
Eshkol's and Ben Gurion's decision making processes were antithetical. 
In contrast to Ben Gurion's introspection -sometimes he would even 
seclude himself in his office- Eshkol took the opposite path. Open and 
non-authoritative he consulted many people before taking decisions, which 
gave an impression of Vacillation. The Cabinet Ministerial 
1 
2 
Eshkol Diary, Eshkol Archives. These remarks contradict the 
accepted image of Eshkol's backing for the IDF. See, for 
example, Slater, Robert (1977: 114-115). Rabin of Israel 
London. Robson Books. 
Maj. -Gen. (Res. ) Mattityahu Peled, Maariv, 2 November 1973. 
From the time of the Armistice Agreements in 1949, until the 
mid-sixties, large parts of-Israel populated with Arabs were 
under Military Government, which was progressively reduced by 
Eshkol. 
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Committee on Defence and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset 
were very active during his term of office. There was a fascinating 
parallel between his personality and the policy pattern he adopted. 
Eshkol's--attitudes were not expressed only towards his civil 
partners but also towards the IDF. During his term of office, the 
Chief of Staff and senior staff officers began to attend Cabinet 
meetings. The boundaries. between the army and the Cabinet-were opened 
for two way traffic. To the same extent that officers had more rein in 
their contacts with the civil echelons, Eshkol dealt in detail with army 
matters, and to a , much greater extent than Ben Gurion. Weizman 
recorded one instance when Eshkol decided to allocate conscripts as 
personal drivers for colonels instead of regulars, whose cost to the 
army was ten times more: 
,-I 
Ben Gurion never took an interest in such small issues. 
If for any reason something like that attracted his 
attention he would have given a general directive... 
not so Eshkol. He gave an order to the Chief of Staff, 'I 
will show you how to carry it out', monitored the 
implementation of his instryctions and demanded a 
report on its completion... 
However, while in certain economic aspects the opening of the boundaries 
between the IDF and the Cabinet enhanced civil control, as far as 
political aspects in the security sphere were concerned, the opening 
resulted in the army's strengthening and its deep penetration into the 
Cabinet: 
As a former 'Finance Minister' in the Haganah, Eshkol had an 
interest in andunderstooä the problems of logistics and management. 
1 Weizman, Ezer (1975: 255) On Eagles Wings (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Maariv. 
Furthermore, while Ben Gurion could entrust to his Deputy Peres the 
management of the Ministry of ! efence, Eshkol chose to involve himself 
closely in it. This fact corroborates the assertion that the integral 
boundaries do not guarantee a high level of civil control. This. is 
achieved only when vigorous regulatory and jdiatory mechanisms operate 
between the two sub-systems. Whereas such mechanisms were reinforced in 
the economic field, inter alia because Eshkol introduced an economically 
% 
experienced team ' 
Eshkol's Boys, in the strategic field there was a 
deterioration in the civil authorities' position. While Ben Gurion was 
accustomed to act in the strategic field, Eshkol was not and did not 
establish civil mechanisms to deal with it. 'Thus Rabin, the political 
Chief of Staff, filled the vacuum at the top and served, in effect, 
to coordinate, -and-. integrate both military_and political 
considerations. While the politically-minded Dayan had confronted 
a Minister interested in the strategic sphere and active in 
operational matters, Rabin faced a Minister with very limited authority 
both within the army and in the public's eye. 
l 
1 Symptomatic of Eshkol's situation is the'following journalist's 
description of-how difficult it was for Eshkol to enter the 
defence establishment when it was still 'under the shadow of 
the giant Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion who built the IDF and whose 
name was synonymous with defence; a leader who was distinguished 
by the elitist approach; who endowed the IDF with new values 
and took upon himself, and by himself, difficult and bitter 
decisions; who introduced a note of sanctity into defence work; 
a leader head and shoulders above others, above the people. ' 
Eitan Haber, Yediot Aharonot, 2 December 1966. 
The iite2itabIý-äutýume was Eshkol's weak_*zeact'ian to Rabin. 
The relations between them have-been described by the then Deputy 
Minister of Defence, Dr Zvi"Dinstein: 
Eshkol had some sort of complex about army men and 
since he depended totally. on the data which the army 
supplied, and Rabin was the source of this data, the 
army and Rabin played a weighty part in policy making, 
even at the highest level. I recall many cases in' 
which Eshkol altered his original stand to Rabin's. 
For example, on one occasion when there was an 
operation on the Syrian border, we had to decide how 
to silence the sources of Syrian fire across the 
border: in the conventional manner by shelling, or 
by air action. Eshkol preferred artillery, fearing 
that air operations might arouse international 
reactions But Rabin insisted on planes and Eshkol 
gave in. 
Rabin was influential in many areas. When'he and Eshkol differed' 
as to the responsibility for the mobilization of reserves -Rabin wanted 
the army to be responsible and Eshkol favoured the Ministry -Rabin won 
the day. 
2 He enjoyed a formidable status not only in military matters 
but also on strategic and political issues, and was, in fact, even more 
influential than Dayan had been under Ben Gurion's premiership. Dayan's 
influence depended on Ben Gurion's acquiescence because of their 
ideological affinity, whereas Rabin's influence was a function of 
Eshkol's relative weakness. Thus Eshkol developed a complex attitude 
towards him. On the one hand he admired, trusted him and praised 
his advice. On the other, he was not happy about the disproportionate 
power accumulated by his Chief of Staff. He-particularly feared that 
this might further detract from his own public Image; 
1 
2 
Interview with Dr Zvi Dinstein, 30 September 1977. Reference is 
to an incident which occurred on 13 November 1964, on the first 
occasion when the IDF utilized aircraft as 'flying artillery'. 
See Slater, R. (1977: 116) Rabin of Israel. London. Robson Books. 
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Eshkol was, therefore, the first Defence Minister to extend the defence 
establishment's public relations network and to locate it in his own 
off ice. He appointed for the first time a professional Pes x, spokes . n. 
Previously only the army had had a spokesman, who-was-subordinate to the 
Chief of Intelligence. and through him to the Chief of Staff. 
I 
The problematic relations between Eshkol and Rabin culminated in 
the 'waiting period' crisis. The Chief of Staff's standing as the 
Minister in all but name , being - the man bearing responsibility, even 
though lacking supreme authority, for the outcome of war, made it 
difficult for him to decide to go to war. Rabin's vacillation did not 
make it easy for Eshkol, who was to begin with, reluctant to fight,. 
but was subject to General Staff pressure. Rabin's situation of bearing 
practical but not constitutional responsibility was so agonising that 
he eventually suffered a breakdown on the eve of 21 May 1967. He himself 
has described his state : 
I had the feeling, rightly or not, that I had been chosen 
as the one to bear the burden, but that I did not have the 
authority to take the decision, and I was torn between these 
two sensations. 
2 
And his close friend, Brigadier-General Yaakov Hefetz, who was 
Financial Adviser to the Chief of Staff, added: ' Such heavy responsibility 
was never before imposed on an officer, a military leader 
3 
Acceptance of the Prime Minister's and Defence Minister's 
institutional authority persuaded the army not to contravene Cabinet 
instructions; but Eshkol's lack of authority contributed to the 
1 
2 
3 
It is symptomatic that the result was that in the Defence Ministry 
one man worked in this task while in the IDF the department 
encompassed dozens of people. 
Rabin in an interview to Slater, R. (1977: 126). 
Hefetz in interview to Slater, R. (1977: 131). 
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crisis atmosphere, and transformed the army into the strongest pressure 
group in the political-system. The absence of effective mediatory 
and liaison mechanisms between the military and political systems at so 
critical a time led to a total breach of the IDF's boundaries and 
embroiled it in inter and intra-party conflicts. When officers 
dealt with strictly party issues and party institutions with strictly 
military matters, then coalitions of officers and politicians were 
contending with each other. What a different situation from that 
on the eve of the Sinai Campaign when Ben Gurion was at the helm. 
THIRD TYPE: DAYAN - THE GENERAL TURNED DEFENCE MINISTER 
The third pattern prevailing between 1967 when Dayan took over 
the Ministry of Defence until his resignation in 1974, differed greatly 
from previous ones. The posts of Prime Minister and Minister of Defence 
were separated and allotted to representatives of the two rival sub-elites 
in the Labour party. and the Chief of Stiff was a political personality 
affiliated to the Prime Minister's group. This was the situation with 
Eshkol-Dayan-Rabin; Eshkol-Dayan-Barlev; Golda-Dayan-Barlev, and Golda- 
Dayan-Elazar. 
This pattern-provoked three types of problems: those deriving from the 
splitting of the roles of Prime Minister and Minister of Defence; those 
relating to the political rivalry between them, and those connected with 
the fact that the Minister of Defence was himself a military man and 
former Chief of Staff. The last-problem is discussed first. 
The appointment of Dayan to the Ministry of Defence seriously 
undermined Eshkol's position. The fact that the new Minister had been a 
successful Chief of Staff gave him prestige among the military 
unlike Eshkol . Being exempt from the Prime Minister's duties he was 
naturally able to devote more time exclusively to the IDF. This 
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combination of factors was detrimental to Eshkol but should have 
encouraged an increased supervision of the IDF by the civil. sector 
represented by the Minister of Defence. But the reality was not so 
simple. Both because of Dayan's. idiosyncratic working methods- 
and the unique political constellation fashioned when Rafi joined the 
Government, a more complex picture emerged. 
Dayan's mode of operation.. was to reserve certain areas of activity 
for himself and to delegate authority to his assistants over those areas 
which did not interest him, to the point where he virtually ignored them. 
This was most clearly manifested in his attitude to economic subjects 
dealt with by the Ministry, logistics, arms and equipment purchase, 
production and military- industry. Unlike his predecessor Eshkol., he had 
almost nothing to do with these matters and left them to'the exclusive 
supervision of his assistant, the former Chief of Staff Zur, who held 
the status of Deputy Minister. 
l Dayan's inactivity was so pronounced that 
there were those who denoted Zur Minister of Defence and Dayan Minister of War. 
On the other hand, Dayan was closely involved in the higher levels 
of national defence policy formulation. He took decisions in economic- 
logistic aspects of that area. One instance occurred when in a discussion 
held in 1973 on the future equipping of the air force, the Chief of Staff 
Elazar proposed that in future all IDF aircraft be manufactured in Israel. 
This was supported by Zur who since the Six Day War had campaigned for 
the development of the Israeli military industry. Dayan objected and 
argued that Israel should aspire to manufacture in Israel only some 
aircraft and insisted that the US should supply the rest, on the 
political grounds that the American commitment to Israel with regard to arms 
should be fostered. 
The fact that he was not a member of the Knesset precluded him from 
holding the actual title of Deputy Minister. 
After taking up his post Dayan found himself dealing with a 
new sphere of activity, the Occupied Territories, and he devoted a great 
deal of his time to that. He did not limit himself to formulating 
the principles of their administration but also dealt with the lowest 
levels of implementation. He took part physically in various activities 
and in the hunting of terrorists. He dealt directly with problems 
of urban administration in the territories and took a personal interest 
in every officer's appointment. The .. centralist control and pre- 
occupation with detail helped to make him known in popular jargon as 
'The King of the Territories'. 
Because of his military'experience Dayan took an active interest in 
IDF operations. In his diary he wrote: 
Even (relationships) downwards things were not so simple. 
I could not and did not want to inhibit myself from expressing 
opinions on purely military issues. However, when the 
Chief of Staff did not want to accept my opinion and 
asked 'is that an order? ' ,I answered negatively, even 
when I had no doubt that he was mistaken. I preferred not 
to disturb the division of responsibility: to leave in my 
hands the 'what' but not the 'how'. The Defence Ministeris 
entitled in the-Government's name to order a military 
operation - capturing a certain area - but not to direct the 
professional aspect. The Chief of Staff and not him is 
authorized to decide whether it will be done by paratroops 
or armour, and where the defence line will be along the Suez. 
Things were not, therefore, smooth. The military men could 
not ignore my professional authority and I, who refrained 
from giving operational orders, could not conceal my ideas. 
From time to time disputes erupted and none of us concealed 
his irritation. ) 
These words written after the Yom Kippur War, when accusations 
were directed at Dayan for his responsibility for the omissions of the 
war, are not an accurate reflection of the principle on which the 
defence system operated during Dayan's term of office. They are an 
even lesser reflection of the reality. In reality Dayan, interfered 
not only with the 
'what' but also with the 'how'. In each operation 
1 Dayan, m. (1976: 493-494). 
conducted beyond the border he approved the composition of the 
combat units, their size, armaments and other operations) details. 
The 'constitution' gave the civil echelon full authority to 
decide even the details of such operations. 
Secondly, Dayan as Defence Minister did not refrain from 
giving operational orders in many cases directly to middle and 
lower rank officers. Soon after he entered the Defence Ministry 
in May 1967, he began to interfere in IDF operations, modifying 
plans, directing the battle for Jerusalem, choosing the time for 
the attack on the Golan Heights and determining the line on which the 
forces in Sinai should halt. 
After the war and during his entire term of office he used to 
give instructions from time to time, while his pragmatic view 
blinded him to organizational schemes and formal frameworks. 
' 
The Horev Commission which was mandated to draw lessons from 
the IDF's storming of the school in Maalot in May 1974, dealt inter 
alia with the way the Defence Minister took part, -together with 
the 
Chief of Staff, in directing the Israeli rescue operation. 
Dayan had done that on the spot where his mere presence interrupted 
the proper direction of the, operation, while his absence from the Cabinet 
handicapped its efficiency in decision making. 
2 
Dayan's intrusion into the IDF's operational activities broke, 
from time to time, the IDF hierachy. Although Dayan had as Chief of 
Staff in 1954 complained that Defence Minister Lavon had summoned 
senior officers directly and had interfered in details of army operations 
outside his jurisdiction, Dayan did not hesitate when Defence Minister 
himself to give orders directly to officers and not via the Chief of Staff. 
1 
2 
See Col. (Res. ) Professor Yuval Neeman on Dayan's mode of 
thinking and operation, Haaretz, 26 September 1969. 
See the report of the Horev Commission, Haaretz, 11 July 1974. 
Dayan was sometimes even involved with lower ranking officers. 
Once when he joined a search operation in the Shati refugee camp in 
the Gaza Strip he gave an order directly to a'Lieutenant-Colonel 
battalion commander. 
l 
After one of Dayan's visits to the Suez Canal front, the Chief of 
Staff Barley was informed that the Defence Minister had given a direct 
order to soldiers on the line to open fire without informing the Chief 
of Staff. As a result Barley insisted that in future the Defence Minister 
would not make visits to the army, either to bases or to the front lines, 
unless accompanied by him. Barley did that on most of Dayan's visits, 
even though it interrupted both his. own and the General Staff's schedules, 
both of whom had to adapt themselves to Dayan's spontaneous timetable. 
2 
Dayan's prestige, military experience and charismatic image enabled 
him to be a decisive authority to the military when he wanted. The fact 
that he exerted that authority in the operational field and in the 
administration of the Occupied Territories suggests that he could also 
have done so in other fields had he so desired. He was prevented from 
doing that not only by his mode of behaviour but also by the personal 
and political relationships in the Labour Party leadership. 
When Golda Meir was elected Prime MinisterýDayan used to inform her 
about his activities, pass on to her intelligence information, and seek 
her approval for operations, even when that was not required under the 
'constitution'. Dayan's supporters interpreted that as an expression of 
his loyalty to his Prime Minister, who shared his activist policies. His 
opponents, on the other hand, attributed it to his desire to cast the 
responsibility for his decisions onto Golda Meir's shoulders. 
On that event and others see Zeev Schiff, Haaretz, 28 November 1975 
and Yishayahu Ben Porat, Yediot Aharonot,. 7 February 1975. 
2 Interview with Haim Barley, 21 July 1977. 
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JOINT CONTROL - PRIME MINISTER AND CHIEF OF STAFF V. THE DEFENCE MINISTER 
But'the'cooperation between Dayan and Golda did not conceal 
the main problem of the relations between them. The separation of 
the functions of Minister of Defence and Prime Minister created a 
new authority above the Minister, and helped the Chief of Staff to 
reject the Minister's decisions, if he did not approve of them, by 
demanding the Prime Minister's intervention. No such situation 
existed between any other Minister and his senior civil servant, 
and it created greater equilibrium between the Minister and Chief of 
Staff, "by weakening the former and strengthening the military and 
political status of the latter. 
1 
There are abundant illustrations of the effect of these 
relations between 1968 and 1973. One of the most striking was 
the debate in 1971 about an interim agreement. In the wake of the 
breakdown of the negotiations in late 1970 and early 1971, Dayan 
submitted a proposal for an interim-agreement with Egypt. His 
initiative was aimed at a non-belligerency agreement, rather less 
than peace but more than a ceasefire, the normalization of the 
Suez Canal area by Israeli withdrawal, the reopening of the Canal 
and the rehabilitation of the Egyptian Canal towns. 
The innovatory proposal was that Israel would retreat from the 
proclaimed policy that 'no Israeli soldier will move from the 
cease-fire lines before a peace agreement is signed'. This posture 
had won the explicit approval of the-US Government. 
1 
2 
Dayan, who was aware of the special status which the Chief of 
Staff was accorded by the Prime Minister, knew how to exploit it. 
When he and the Chief of Staff concurred on a certain issue and 
the Prime Minister was reluctant to approve it, Dayan would send 
the Chief of Staff to intercede with the Prime Minister. 
Interview with Zvi Zur, 29 August 1977. 
See aescriptions of affair from Dayan's point of view in 
(1976: 520-529). 
Dayan was willing to negotiate a deep Israeli withdrawal, 30 
kilometres, to the entrances, of the Gidi and Mitla passes. 
was also prepared to permit limited Egyptian forces to move into 
the abandoned areas. These two aspects of Dayan's proposal 
provoked a dispute among Israel's. political and military leaders. 
When William Rogers, the US Secretary of State, visited Israel 
on 6th March 1971, the Government proposed an interim settlement 
which differed in some elements from Dayan's scheme. On the two 
key questions, the depth of withdrawal and the disposition of 
Egyptian forces, the official Israeli stand was more uncompromising 
than Dayan's.. Consequently the Americans judged that there was 
no likelihood of Egyptian support, and they, in fact, rejected it 
out of hand. 
Golda Meir was persuaded not to accept Dayan's view first and 
foremost by the Chief of Staff Barley. He expressed the General 
Staff's attitude that the Israeli forces should withdraw only 8-12 
kilometres and he agreed only to the entry of Egyptian, labourers 
and police but not to a military presence. 
The battle behind closed doors over the Prime Minister's 
decision highlights the essence of the relationship between the, 
supreme military command and the Cabinet, and the impact of the 
rivalry between the two Labour Party sub-elites on the politicization 
of the military. Ahdut Haavoda's Galili and Allon opposed Dayan's 
generous concessions. Galili's hawkish posture was consistent, 
but even Allon, a dove. who, one would have supposed, would endorse 
Dayan's scheme, opposed it. Foreign Minister Abba Eban, though 
belonging to the veteran sub-elite decided on'the merits and 
supported Dayan. Eban judged that it was the power struggle that 
provoked Allon's response and deflected him from reaching a 
logical conclusion. 
1 
Galili wanted-to mobilize the army in his support and was, 
therefore, dissatisfied with the Chief of Staff Barlev's position, 
who while supporting him and rejecting Dayan's proposal, insisted. 
that the General Staff's formal opinion be presented to the Cabinet. 
Dayan made a considerable effort to prevent this. But the 
General Staff did consider the matter and released it to the press. 
The political status of the Chief of Staff was augmented not 
only by the separation of the roles of Prime Minister and Minister 
of Defence, but also by the political struggle between the old 
guard and Rafi. None of the Chiefs of-Staff under Dayan were 
affiliated to Rafi. They were, rather, appointed with the 
deliberate intention of preventing the accumulation of power in 
Dayan's hands. 
When Dayan took office, Rabin was already Chief of Staff. 
Eshkol made sure that the Chief of Staff's successor would also be 
loyal to the old guard, by choosing Haim Barley. For the same 
reason David Elazar was appointed to be his successor. 
1 Interview with Abba Eban Mg, 17 July 1977. See a series of 
articles by Deputy Minister of Transport in that period, Gad 
Yaakobi, Yediot'Aharonot, from 9 September 1977. Also Zeev Schiff, 
Haaretz, 17 February 1972. 
Another example of serious political disputes between Dayan and 
Barley was their reaction to the activities of Soviet pilots and 
advisers in Egypt during the War of Attrition. Barley claimed 
that 'the air force will continue to attack the missile batteries 
without taking into account the nationality of the operators. ' 
Dayan said the opposite, and objected to continuing bombardments 
directed against Russians. See Margalit, D:. (1971: 99). 
i0, 
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This network of personal-political relations led to a deterioration 
in the Minister's status and to the enhancement of the Chief of Staff's 
position. The discussions between the Prime Minister, Minister of 
Defence and Chief of Staff were transformed into a debate which had 
a party political dimension. 
At the Friday meetings of the Minister's staff, the Chief of 
Staff was the chief spokesman on all matters of army organisation and 
structure. 
) The army enjoyed great independence and Dayan avoided 
confrontations with the Chief of Staff. One example was. when the 
introduction of a new rifle to replace the Belgian made FN was 
debated. The Israeli inventor of one. of the two new alternatives, 
Uzi Gal, demanded that a decision be taken by the Minister. 
However, Chief of Staff Barley opposed that course. and insisted that 
he should be the decision taker. Dayan accepted his judgement and 
it was implemented. Officers who attended these meetings record 
that they sometimes found Dayan's behaviour surprising. 
2 
Barley testifies that during his four years as Chief of Staff 
Dayan turned down only one of his appointment proposals and in two* 
cases objected to his viewpoint but eventually agreed to compromise. 
3 
1 
2 
3 
A forum which is convened every Friday in the Minister of 
Defence's office in Tel Aviv and includes the Deputy Minister or 
his assistant, the Director General of the Ministry and other 
senior officials or officers, according to the subject under 
discussion. 
Interview with Maj; Gen. (Res) Yariv, 13 July 1977. 
Interview with Haim Barley, 21 July 1977. 
During the changeover of Chiefs of Staff in October 1971, Zeev 
Schiff wrote of Barley (obliquely to satisfy the Military Censor): 
'He was marked by the independence he displayed, his readiness to 
insist on his own views even when he confronted his seniors ... 
he ran his kingdom like a true owner. ' Zeev Schiff, Haaretz, 
21 October 1971 
This situation was far removed from the pattern of relations between 
Ben Gurion and his non-political Chiefs of Staff. 
The political dimension introduced into relations between the 
Chief of Staff and-the Minister inevitably affected their working 
patterns and sometimes caused complications in IDF operations. David 
Elazar's war diary, begun on the morning when war broke out after the 
Minister had rejected his recommendations for a general mobilization 
and ending with the ceasefire, amply illustrated that. 
l 
THE CONCEPT -A REFLECTION OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY PARTNERSHIP 
The political strengthening; of the Chief of Staff was not 
only a consequence of the sub-elite rivalry , which made him a 
partner in the management of the defence: business. The prolonged 
War of Attrition, the intensive diplomatic negotiations, and the 
performing of civil. . functions in the Occupied Territories, 
meant that security matters preoccupied the Government to a very 
large extent, bringing about after June 1971 an intermingling of 
the army's top echelon with the Cabinet. 
The National Unity Government'scarcely-dealt with civil. ' 
matters which were not urgent.. Its main occupation was 
its constant, almost routine, approval of new acts of 
retaliation, and receiving reports of operations already 
carried out. Army maps and descriptions of battles 
increasingly characterized its weekly sessions, and 
meetings were almost always attended by uniformed officers. 
2 
In that period increasing numbers of officers attended 
Cabinet meetings or various ' civil committees, pertaining both' 
to the Cabinet and the Knesset. The Chief of Staff and the Chief 
of Intelligence even took part 
in informal consultations within 
1 
2 
Bartov, Hanoch (1978)'Dado Tel Aviv. _ 
Maariv. 
Margalit, D, (1971 : 46). 
the Labour Party. 
I Particularly active in the political sphere 
was the Director of Ama"n. Major-jeneral Aharon Yariv., 
The network of relations between the various branches of the 
intelligence community developed over the years in such a way 
that the Intelligence Branch became the central factor in collating, 
analyzing and evaluating intelligence data. In fact, it became 
the central-intelligence factor - political, strategic, operative 
and tactical - formulating the 'national estimate'. Within this 
Branch over the years, there was an increasing tendency , to neglect 
field intelligence at the expense of strategic information. 
These changes reflected the transition from purely military to more 
political activity. 
The accelerated military-political activity between 1968 and 
1973 made it vital for the Cabinet to have access to intelligence 
data and evaluations. But the Chief of Intelligence's prominent 
status was fortified not only by his weight within the intelligence 
community, but by the structure of the decision making process in 
the national security sphere. The absence of a permanent 
institution for national defence, an agency in which the political 
and military sectors could meet and coordinate activities at the 
level of civil servants and experts, made it"necessary to conduct 
this coordination at the ministerial level. The Cabinet, which 
lacked its own system for collating and evaluating data was obliged 
to utilize the services-of the military, and the Chief of Intelligence 
became a senior military-political adviser to the Cabinet. 
1 Interview with Aharon Yariv, 13 July 1977. 
Furthermore, because of the military's added prestige after 
the victory of the Six Day War, and because of the politicians' 
faith in Yariv personally, the Director of Ama"n found himself 
engaged in activities which even he regarded as ranging beyond the 
definition of his functions. Instead of being confined to 
intelligence activity, he was also concerned with operational 
activities of a strictly civil nature., Yariv has himself testified 
that he thought this situation unhealthy, since dealing with 
operational matters could affect the judgement of an intelligence 
expert. 
1 
Yariv assumed this attitude when Dayan requested Yariv 
to maintain direct contact with the US Ambassador in Israel not 
merely as a professional expert accompanying the Minister but as a 
representative of the political-security system. 
When Yariv was appointed a Minister in_ Rabin's Cabinet, the 
lesson of 1967-1973 led him to demand the establishment of a 
national defence organization to carry out the staff work at the 
professional expert level and-to enable the Cabinet to take 
decisions after examining alternatives. His resignation from the 
Cabinet in 1975 was caused, inter alia, by the fact that his 
recommendations were rejected. 
The transformation of the boundaries between the military and 
the political systems, both party and state, into permeable lines, 
and the absence of effective mediatory mechanisms between the two 
sectors, accelerated the evolution of the 'concept', the political- 
military concept which coloured the national leadership of Israel 
between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War. 
1 
Interview with Aharon Yariv, 13 July 1977. 
The term 'concept' became outworn after the Yom Kippur War 
when during an agonising period of collective introspection 
Israel asked itself , why -it had failed to appreciate the 
enemy's war preparations and was ill prepared, even though the 
defence establishment was well informed about events in Egypt 
and Syria. The most rational answer given in Israel and by 
scholars elsewhere was that the prevailing political and 
military elites' preconceptions disrupted their capacity to see 
the reality and distorted the possibility of a sound analysis. 
I 
The problem of the misconception and the political and 
military leaderships' consequent myopia has already been 
2 
extensively examined. Their present relevance is because they 
are the fruit of the structure of political-military relations 
that developed out of Ben Gurion's nominal pattern until its 
articulation in the seventies as a so-called military democracy. 
It was evolved through the reciprocal flow of military and 
political information and appreciations in the ruling elite 
stratum, when the boundaries between the military and civil elites' 
were becoming blurred. 
The military experts contributed the component that the 
borders realized by Israel in 1967 were the best possible for 
defence purposes, and that the Arab states knowing Israel's 
military superiority would not choose the military option. 
1 
2 
See, -for example, Perlmutter, Amos (1978: 62-100) 
politics and the Military in Israel 1967-1977 London, Cass. 
In most of the analyses reference has been made to the 
theoretical works of Jarvis, Robert (1968) 'Hypotheses on 
Misconceptions' in World Politics 20, No. 3 April and to 
Janis, Irving (1972) Victims of'Group Think Boston. Houghton 
Mifflin. 
The civil leadership contributed the assessment that the Arab 
states had turned their backs on peace, and some leaders added 
that even if there was a possibility of peace it was not worth the 
price of relinquishing territories. 
The amalgamation of these appreciations brought about the 
accepted policy that the status quo was the optimal situation 
for Israel for as long as the Arab states did not change their 
basic attitude to the conflict, or for as long as the military 
balance did not change significantly. Had the boundaries-between 
the civil and military sub-systems not been permeable, had the 
army not intruded into state politics and had the political echelon 
not been so dependent on the army and had there been, effective 
mediatory mechanisms between the army and the Cabinet, then the 
process of group thinking which created the concept would not 
have arisen so readily. 
THE FOURTH-TYPE: PERES - THE WEAKNESS OF A CIVILIAN MINISTER 
There is only one example of the fourth pattern of Prime 
Minister - Defence Minister - Chief of Staff relations, the- 
Rabin-Peres-Gur constellation. Whereas the Prime Minister and 
Defence Minister belonged to the two rival sub-elites of the Labour 
Party, the Chief of Staff. with his evident political orientation, 
was not a member of the Prime Minister's group. That was 
indicative of the Prime Minister's weakened position. Theoretically, 
that situation could have undermined the Chief of Staff's position, 
since he did not enjoy the Prime Minister's support. Moreover, 
the Prime Minister himself was a defence professional, a former 
Chief of Staff with minimal dependence on the Cabinet's senior 
military advisor, the Chief of Staff. 
It was anticipated that. Peres would exert more stringent 
civil control over the Chief of Staff, as he had done when he 
was Director--Veneral and Deputy Defence Minister. Then he was 
adamant in the `ace of the army's opposition. But after the 
Yom Kippur War the Labour Party's disintegration accelerated and 
between 1974 and 1977 it provoked a crisis of legitimacy in the 
political elite. Consequently, Peres did not act predictably. 
That process strengthened the Chief of Staff in his relations 
with both the Minister and the Prime Minister. Whereas. under 
the first pattern prevailing in the era of Ben Gurion and the non- 
political Chiefs of Staff, , the 
discrepancy in status and authority 
was widest, in the second half of the seventies the fourth 
pattern in the Rabin-Peres-Gur period displayed the narrowest gap. 
The-deterioration of the civil leaderships' authority resulted 
not only from the political crisis, but also from an additional 
factor. For whereas in the past the political elite was drawn 
from the generation of the immigrant pioneers and the military 
elite from the Sabra younger generation, in the 1970's both. elites - 
e. g. the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Chief of Staff - were 
drawn from the latter generation. Thus one of the mechanisms which 
had ensured the military's acceptance of the civil authority had 
vanished. 
l 
1 Rabin was born in 1922, Peres in 1923 and Gur in 1930. 
Soon after the formation of Rabin's Cabinet, the negotiations 
with Egypt and the US under the baton of US Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger resumed. The rapid diplomatic process continued throughout 
1974 and 1975, absorbing the Cabinet, particularly the Minister's 
team, Rabin, Peres and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 
Yigal Allon. 
Unlike his predecessor Dayan, Peres devoted a substantial part 
of his time to party business. Party considerations were a component 
in his ministerial decisions. Having decided to challenge Rabin for 
nomination as party leader in the 1978 elections, party matters 
assumed an even more crucial importance. 
In the fifties and sixties Peres contributed more than any other 
individual to the expansion of the Ministry. Unlike his predecessor 
Dayan he was interested in the main'spheres of activity of the Ministry 
and was responsive to the problems of modern administration. These 
qualities should have enabled him to exert influence and authority to 
improve Ministry - IDF relations and to augment civil control over the 
IDE, but when he became Defence Minister he preferred not to tackle such 
matters. Following Dayan's example he tried to appoint a man like Zur 
to deal with economic activities, but he failed and was obliged to 
continue dealing with the senior level of the economic administration of 
the defence establishment. 
Peres' most vulnerable point as Defence Minister was his 
contact with the army. He had followed a professional into the 
Ministry, and in spite of his long service in defence matters 
Peres had always belonged to the defence establishment's civil 
sector, towards which many army officers assumed a superior 
attitude. Hence, to overcome possible tension with the General 
Staff, Peres decided to spend a considerable amount of time 
learning about the IDF, holding tours, discussions and studying 
its day to day management, sometimes down to small details. 
He tried to be-present where security situations arose and to 
receive information directly from the lowest ranks, without 
restricting himself to the formal channels of command. 
There was also a public significance in his tours and visits. 
Peres had joined the Ministry when the IDF was at a low ebb after 
the October War and the Agranat Report. The necessity to 
rehabilitate the'army and to renew the people's confidence in it 
required strenuous efforts by the Minister. He regularly 
devoted Thursdays for special tours in the army, accompanied by the 
Press, as well as making spontaneous visits. 
The factor which affected working relations between the Prime 
Minister - Defence Minister - Chief of Staff more than any other 
stemmed from Peres' political and personal rivalry with Rabin and 
his desire to usurp him. Rabin enjoyed eminence because of his 
professional experience, whereas Peres lacked prestige and was 
under stress. Because of the complexity of his task he chose tö 
forge a political alliance with the Chief of Staff Cur. 
In the early days of Rabin's Cabinet, Cur's cooperation with 
Peres was hesitant, but it grew stronger when he began to regard 
Rabin's activities not only as hampering the Minister, but also 
as being directed against him as the Chief of Staff. Rabin's 
criticism of the IDF was in fact aimed at Peres, but it also 
touched Cur. When Rabin appointed Arik Sharon to be his 
Assistant, it was the final straw. That unprecedented appointment 
could only be regarded as designed to undermine the Chief of Staff's 
monopoly as the Cabinet's seniör military adviser. 
Peres and Gur fought the appointment. At first they tried to 
prevent it and then to restrict Sharon's powers. They made it 
difficult for him to carry out his duties even within the 
framework of the tasks allotted to him. The Chief of Staff, for 
example, forbade him to tour the IDF except when accompanying the 
Prime Minister. Ultimately within a year of his appointment 
Sharon was forced to resign, but the mere fact of his appointment 
cast a shadow over relations between Gur and Rabin for as long as 
they worked together and strengthened the former's alliance with 
Peres. 
Rabin did not intervene directly in IDF routine matters, 
0 
acting instead through the Minister of Defence, but he did take a 
greater interest than his predecessors in operational plans. 
when his rivalry with Peres became acute, he tried several times 
to 'go over his head. In one case he exploited Peres' absence on 
.a trip tothe 
US to convene the heads of the defence establishment 
in his office to discuss deployment in Sinai. The fact that he 
did-not await Peres' return and held so vital a discussion without 
the Minister for the first time in the annals ofthe defence 
establishment, was inevitably interpreted as a move against Peres. 
In 1975 the focus of the struggle between them was the 
defence budget. A deficit of more than a billion Israeli pounds 
had accumulated by the end of that year and the Prime Minister 
refused to_meet it, demanding that further allocations, particularly 
for the fortifications in Sinai, should be limited. He asserted 
that the financial problems of the defence establishment resulted 
from lack of ministerial control and because Peres had not 
determined clear priorities for the army. Therefore, Rabin 
claimed, the army was dictating defence expenditure without reference 
to the overall state budget and in excess of its allocation. 
RABIN AND PERES RIVALS - THE CHIEF OF STAFF A'QUASI-MINISTER 
Ministry officials, led by Peres, argued in their turn that 
the deficit was a consequence of rising costs and unforeseeable 
expenditure. Peres. treated Rabin's onslaught as a step in a 
political campaign aimed to discredit him as Minister. Rabin had 
attested that on the eve of forming his Cabinet he had hesitated 
to appoint Peres as Defence Minister for the precise reason that 
Peres' open handedness would lead to irresponsible expenditure, and 
that he was incapable of operating within 
budgetary constraints. 
It was argued that it was not adequate for Rabin to ask for 
budgetary cuts, but that he should also indicate what to cut. He 
responded that if in addition 'to the premiership the defence 
portfolio had been entrusted to him, he would have solved the problem. 
Since he was not Minister he could only turn off the tap. 
l 
The political struggle between Rabin and Peres encompassed. not 
only their bureaus' officials, but also their military advisers 
and other officers, to the point when several of them were, seen in 
uniform in the corridors of the Labour Party headquarters during 
the internal elections to the premiership, at the beginning of 1977. ' 
The opportunity to make an alliance with Peres suited Gurts 
short-term ambitions in the army and his longer term plans for his 
political second career. Gurts appointment as Chief of Staff was 
not as straightforward as his predecessors because he had never 
served as Chief of Operations and therefore lacked the experience 
of directing a war from the top. One-of his assets was his 
absence in Washington as military Attache during the October War. 
1 Zeev Schiff, Haaretz, 10 October 1975. 
Consequently he was not contaminated either by the 'blunder' or 
by the 'war of the generals'. For these reasons Gur had to 
consolidate his authority as Chief of Staff at a difficult time 
for the IDF, and he needed the Defence, Minister's support. He 
did not conceal the fact that he wanted to follow in the footsteps 
of Dayan and Rabin by turning his post into a political position, 
and he openly admitted that he intended to take up a political 
career after retirement, to become a Labour Party Minister, and 
ultimately the Prime Minister. 
I 
The constellation which 'emerged 
in the party and the Cabinet enabled him to further his ambitions 
to a large extent. 
In exchange for his support of Peres in his struggle with 
Rabin, Gur received two things which he wanted. First, he got the 
Minister's support to fortify his position in the army and secondly 
he gained a long term political ally. Between the years 1974-1977 
the Chief of Staff enjoyed a freedom of action and decision to an 
extent previously unknown. Whereas the norms of the Chief of 
Staff's subordination to the Minister were formally observed, in 
most cases the Minister endorsed decisions already taken by him. 
For his part, Gur, being conscious of the Minister's full 
support, presented to him many key matters, some of which would 
never:. in the past, have reached such a high level. The impression 
created thereby was thatthe Defence Minister exerted stringent 
On retiring from the IDF he formally joined the Labour Party, 
was elected to its bureau and declared his intention to stand 
for Premier. 
control, whereas in reality he shared in knowledge but paid for 
that by renouncing the power to decide. 
Cur's role expansion perception rendered him a real authority 
inside the defence establishment, not only in military matters. 
In almost all the cases in which the army took operational action, the 
initiative came from the Chief of Staff. Peres approved Gur's 
recommendations for command appointments, exerting minimal influence. 
He tried to win. the hearts of the senior command by rapidly promoting 
many of them. The Chief of Staff decided the defence budget and even 
influenced that part of it devoted to the civil: sectors of the 
Ministry , and whenever the Minister's civil advisers opposed the Chief 
of Staff the Minister's support for Cur was almost a foregone- 
conclusion. 
Cur participated extensively in the highest levels of Israeli 
diplomacy. He frequently made political statements, which sometimes 
aroused public criticism and on several occasions was reprimanded 
for that by the Prime Minister. He participated in the deliberations 
of. the Minister's team during negotiations with Egypt and Syria. 
not only in his capacity as military adviser. He was in effect a 
member of the team, an equal among equals with the status of a 
quasi-minister. 
' 
But he went further than previous Chiefs of Staff, even the most 
politically-minded among them, in extending the sphere of IDF 
involvement in civil matters. For the first time the army 
penetrated into public politics, in addition to party and state 
politics, and the military command behaved not like part of the 
government administration, bound by civil service rules, but like 
a pressure group trading openly in the political market. One 
1 For example when he announced the possibility of an Israeli pre- 
emptive strike against the Arab armies. See Yosef Harif, Maariv, 
2 August 1974. 
authentic example was when Gur and other officers,, the most notable 
of whom was Major-General Benny Peled, the commander of the Air 
Force, publicly criticised the economic reform introduced by the 
Cabinet in 1975. In an-interview to Yediot Aharonot, Gur said, 
inter alia: 
In my estimation the reform relating to the IDF 
about transportation, telephones and housing is 
totally unjust. We have submitted to the decision 
because we are the army. We fought as hard as we 
could, but law is law and an order is an order and 
we carry it out ... 
l 
The interview was not published in full. Parts were deleted 
by the Prime Minister and publication was delayed for two weeks 
because of his objections. Rabin even said of Gur's conduct and 
of other officers that 'in the 28 years of the IDF's existence, 
those responsible have seen tol. it that the IDF was not involved in 
political,. economic or social disputes. '2 At a Cabinet session 
on 5 October he reprimanded the Minister of Defence and the Chief 
of Staff very sharply. Rabin's reprimand was echoed by many 
Israeli leader writers. 
Despite the criticism of the Chief of Staff's public political 
activity, the IDF's involvement in civil". matters, under his 
leadership, did not slacken. There was another incident when the 
State Comptroller submitted his 1977 annual report on the defence 
1 
2 
Interview with Lieut. -Gen. Mbrdehai. Gur, Yediot Ahäronot, 3 
October 1975 
See, for example,. Moshe Zack, Maariv, 5 October 1975, and 
Matty Peled, 'Maariv, 10 October 1975. 
establishment, which recorded grave mismanagement and, maladministration. 
Each year the Comptroller presents his report to the Knesset together 
with a book which contains all the answers to his questions given by 
the Ministries and other state bodies and institutions. According 
to the State Comptroller Law the organizations prepare their 
answers, submit them to the Finance Minister, who prepares the book. 
In May 1977 the IDF broke this rule by distributing directly to 
Knesset members their replies to the Comptroller's criticisms. 
The material was also distributed to journalists and the Chief of 
Staff went so far as to criticize publicly the Comptroller) 
This unprecedented act enraged the Comptroller who saw in it an 
administrative, if not a legal deviation. But in the atmosphere 
aroused by the growing military intrusion into more and more fields, 
this issue was soon pushed aside by another unprecedented event in 
political-military-relations. It was when the IDF operated the 
civil airports because of a 'go slow' industrial action. 
GOVERNMENT ARMY RELATIONS - PARTNERSHIP ' NOT' CONTROL 
What does-the comparative analysis of the four patterns of 
relationship between the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and 
Chief of Staff reveal about the more effective way to impose civil 
control on the military? Is it preferable to have the defence 
portfolio in the Prime Minister's hands or in separate hands? 
Rabin gave one answer: 
The simplest situation is when there is personal 
unity of the two tasks, and in fact, the quietest 
periods from the point of view of the operation of 
the defence establishment were those in which such 
1 See the Israeli newspapers of 29 April 1977. 
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personal unity existed, under Ben Gurion and 
Eshkol. The Ministers of Defence who were not 
Premiers can be divided into two groups. 
Dayan, who was a military man, and Peres and 
Lavon who were not. The system worked better 
and will work better under military men, since 
they naturally possess the qualifications to 
understand the military subject and to deal with 
it. On the other hand, relations between the 
Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff, and 
between the Minister-of Defence and the Prime 
Minister are disrupted, when the Minister lacks 
military experience. Then, naturally enough, 
the Minister's spheres of interest are less 
military and more political, relating to foreign 
policy and defence. The result is that he 
clashes with the Chief of Staff, who becomes too 
strong, and that he clashes also with the Foreign 
Minister and Prime Minister as well. 
When there is personal unity the political 
echelon has more authority over the military. 
Agreement between the Prime Minister, who is also 
Minister of Defence, and the Chief of Staff is, 
in effect, agreement with the entire Cabinet and 
cannot be appealed to a higher level. 
When the roles are separate a decision taken by 
the Minister is not yet final so far as the 
military is concerned. The Chief of Staff can 
appeal to the Prime Minister. In this manner the 
army can become involved in political conflicts 
between the Minister and the Prime Minister. 
The classic example occurred under Lavon and to a 
certain extent also during my term of office. ' 
Is there another side*to the coin? Does the combination 
of the two posts not accord disproportionate. preference to the 
military arm over the political in formulating national defence 
policy? The military then had a direct line to the Prime Minister 
which the political arm, for example Foreign Ministry experts, 
didnot enjoy, being represented by the Minister alone. Is not the 
Prime Minister's judgement on the allocation of the national 
1 Interview with Rabin, 11 August 1977. 
budget among Ministries more balanced when he is not responsible 
for a specific portfolio and is.. thereby obliged to represent the 
interests of a particular sector? Does pluralism in civil- 
supervision inevitably weaken the control, or does it perhaps 
strengthen it? 
Perusal of the pattern of replacement of Ministers of Defence, 
as opposed to other senior Cabinet Ministers, -the Foreign Minister 
and Minister of Finance, reveals an interesting phenomenon. 
Over thirty years there have been four Foreign Ministers and four 
Finance Ministers. Some served very long periods and most lost 
their positions because the Government changed (Sapir, Rabinovitz, 
Allon and Eban), because they advanced to more senior positions 
(Eshkol, Golda Meir) or because of death (Kaplan). Only in one 
case did a Minister resign because of a personal or political 
crisis (Sharett). - 
0 
During the same period there were six Ministers of Defence 
(Ben Gurion, Lavon, Ben Gurion, Eshkol, Dayan and Peres). 
Three took up their posts against a background of political crisis 
(Lavon after Ben Gurion's resignation, Dayan during 'the waiting 
period' crisis, Peres because of the Yom Kippur War crisis). In 
four of the six cases resignation was also the outcome of the 
pressures of political crisis. (Lavon because of 'the mishap' 
events, Ben Gurion because of the "Lavon affair in 1963, Eshkol 
during the 'waiting period', and Dayan due to public pressure after 
the publication of the Agranat Commission Report). 
The replacement patterns are characterized by the fact that they 
were not based on crises in military-political relations but on 
crises within the civil:.. system, even if in isolated cases there"- 
were implications reaching beyond relations between the military 
and the Cabinet. From this point of view the'structure of role 
distribution within the Cabinet, the allotting of the defence 
portfolio to the Prime Minister or to a separate Minister, did not 
affect the efficiency of civil: supervision over the military. 
The decisive factor is the nature of relations within the power 
elite: political cooperation between the Minister of Defence and 
the Prime Minister can ensure effective control just as well as 
the allotting of the defence portfolio to the Prime Minister. 
Personal unity can be as ineffective and weak in exercising control. 
as the separation of the posts, if the Prime Minister and his 
political group are not strong. 
Rabin touched on another aspect connected to the question of 
the efficiency of civil control by the Defence Minister: is it 
preferable for the Defence Minister to have professional military 
experience? In spite of Ben Gurion's conviction that anyone with 
a brain could be a Defence Minister, there is a discernible 
tendency to appoint someone to the post who has experience in the 
security sphere, and who is preferably a former military man. 
It may be that this growing inclination results from the failure 
of the first militarily inexperienced Minister,. Lavon, in 1954. 
Were the pressures which forced the resignations the driving force, 
or only a reflection of another deeper process? The debate as to 
whether a civilian or a former military man-was a preferable 
Minister of Defence surfaced from time to time both in the 
establishment and among the general public. 
l 
But the debate itself was peculiar. In Israel there has 
never been a discussion as to whether the Education Minister should 
be a teacher, or the Minister of Health a medical doctor or an 
expert in medical administration. In all other spheres it was 
accepted that the Minister was the supreme political authority 
and not the professional authority. It was an expression of the 
high level of politicization in Israeli society. But only in one 
sphere - the security sphere - was the pressure in the name of 
professionalism nearly as strong as the political pressure. 
Why was this? It was-the outcome of the autonomist concept for 
the security sphere developed by Ben Gurion. The concept insisted 
that decisions in the security sphere will not be political but 
only professional, and thus gave legitimacy to the professionals' 
demand that the Minister should be one of them. This explanation 
is: more complex than the obvious one that perceives the appointment 
of a former general to be Minister as the direct representation of 
the army inside the Cabinet. It also refutes Perlmutter's 
assertion that the appointment of a general-turned-politician like 
Dayan, evidenced the strengthening of and control over the 
military in Israel. 
2 
If as Perlmutter argues 'only a strong and 
charismatic leader can properly assume the civil authority's functions', 
it is not evidence which supports his view, on the contrary it 
indicates the. weakness of the civil control mechanisms. The 
1 
2 
See a-summary of different opinions by Mordehai Kashtan, 
Haaretz, 12 June 1967. 
See Asg. s Perlmutter, Maariv, 19 December 1969. 
military elite's pressure for the appointment of someone from 
their own ranks to. be Minister of Defence is a natural expression 
of its wish to safeguard its institutional interests. 
What distinguishes the Israeli case is the fact that the 
appointment of a retired general to the defence portfolio 
indicates the. failure to depoliticize the army. The 
impossibility of stripping defence matters of their political 
aspects, and the raising of the depoliticization banner to prevent 
the party political system participating in defence decisions 
opened the gates wide for the army to enter into the political 
system. Legitimacy was accorded to its decisive involvement in 
the political process under the guise of professional actions. 
A worthwhile question is whether the quality of the decisions 
improves whenever the Minister is a professional, but it is not 
pertinent to this study. The appointment of an officer as 
Minister is another expression of the nature of political-military 
relations in Israel - relations which constitute a partnership 
rather than civil control. 
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10. THE WEAKNESS OF PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL 
THE DEFENCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE -A MINIATURE KNESSET 
The Knesset, Israel's representative legislative body, is the 
supreme authority of the state. Article 11(c) of the 1949 Transition 
Law stipulated that `the Cabinet will be collectively responsible 
for its actions to the Knesset and will report to the Knesset on 
these activities .... 
' This authority was later confirmed in the 
Basic Law: The Knesset and Basic Law: The Cabinet. 1 
All other official institutions are inferior to the Knesset. 
It is not only the legislative 'body, but also forms and dissolves, 
Cabinets, determines what powers and functions should be wielded by 
the institutions of the nation and is the supervisory authority. 
However, in practice, the Knesset has over the years become less 
important by allowing many of its powers to devolve to the Cabinet. 
In this it is no different from the parliaments of most other 
Western Democracies. But there are some particular reasons why 
1 See Weiss, Shevah (1977: 306) The Knesset, its Role and Functions 
(Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Ahiasaf. 
4 
, 
this has happened in Israel. 
I 
It has occurred both in the 
working of the Knesset itself, i. e. in the plenum, and in the ten 
Standing Committees, including the Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Committee. 
That Committee acts as a miniature Knesset in those two 
'areas. All the defence matters which come before the Knesset 
have been delegated to it, and it acts as the plenum of the Knesset 
when any defence related subject arises. Defence was the only 
subject treated in this way. Defence bills were referred 
immediately to the Committee, while bills on other subjects have 
their first and third reading debates on the floor of the House. 
The delegation of direct authority derived primarily from 
the need for secrecy, as illustrated by various regulations passed 
by the Knesset. ' According to Article 36 of the Knesset Procedure 
Code, a Knesset Member is entitled to submit a question to a 
Cabinet Minister on a factual matter relating to the Minister's 
functions. The Minister has the right to refuse to answer if 
'a public reply could, in his opinion, harm the interests of the 
state. '3 Equally, the Speaker might after consultation with the 
Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee, veto discussion of a 
proposal for the agenda and transfer it to the Committee, if he 
.1 
2 
3 
I 
See, inter alia, Zidon, Asher (1964) The'Knesset in Action 
(Hebrew) Jerusalem. Ahiasaf. See also Yaacobi, Gad (1979: 53-55,68) 
The Cabinet Tel Aviv. Am Oved. Zmora. Bitan Modan. He argues 
that in comparison to Britain, for example, the, amouzt of 
secondary legislation which does not need prior Knesset sanction 
is much higher. 
From first to eighth Knesset (1974) there were only nine 
standing committees. 
Knesset Procedural Code (Takanon Haknesset) (1965) Jerusalem. 
Government Printer. All articles of the Code quoted in this 
chapter are taken from that edition. 
believed public discussion would threaten national security. 
l 
But the delegation'of powers to the Committee for secret 
discussion was not the sole cause of the Knesset's inability to 
deal with defence issues. The Knesset has usually cooperated with 
the Cabinet in restricting the range, scope and power of its own 
activity on defence. The Knesset accepted the role imposed on it 
in Ben Gurion's scheme, designed to express the national. consensus 
on defence. And indeed until the seventies, Knesset debates 
focused on the general political aspects of Israel's defence policy, 
while all other aspects, and above all the supervision of the IDF 
and the Ministry of Defence, were kept within the-jurisdiction of 
2 
Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee. But does the Committee 
differ from.. the plenum in this respect? 
The rules of secrecy applied to the Defence Committee'are 
unique. Article 75(a) of Chapter 6 of the Knesset Procedural Code 
states that 'meetings of the Committee are not to be public, unless 
the Committee so decides. ' All Knesset Committees hold closed 
1 
2 
This addition was amended by the Knesset plenum in January 1968. 
See details of discussion in Knesset Committee, Haaretz, 
13 December 1967. 
The number'of cases in which the plenum discussed subjects 
pertaining to the IDF can be counted on one hand. In one case 
Herut demanded a debate on the resignation of Lieut. -Gen*. Laskov as 
Chief of Staff. The debate, held on 26 December 1960, was the 
only occasion when a Knesset session was held in camera. Ben 
Gurion claimed that Laskov had not resigned and that the 
retirement of the Chief of Staff was routine. By a majority of 
78 to 26 the item was removed from the agenda. See Cohen, Yona 
(1972) The Knesset, Debates and*Smiles (Hebrew) Jerusalem. 
At the beginning of July 1972 Shalom Cohen (Haolam Hazeh) 
requested a discussion of the Minister of Defence's decision to 
reduce military service for immigrants. He questioned both the decision itself and the procedure whereby it had been taken, 
without the approval of the Cabinet or knowledge of the Knesset. The Cabinet rejected the request, the Knesset concurred and no discussion was held. See Amnon Rubinstein, Haaretz, l2 July 1972. 
sessions, but the. meetings of the Defence Committee are in a 
different category. It is the only Committee whose members sign 
an undertaking to observe secrecy, and minutes of meetings are 
available only to committee members, the Prime Minister, the 
Minister of Defence and the Foreign Minister, and are classified 
as state secrets under the State Archives Law. 
l 
As far as the public is concerned, all it is permitted to know 
although not invariably is that a meeting has been held. At the end 
of each meeting the Committee decides whether or not to issue a 
, press 
statement that it has convened, and whether to reveal only 
the subject matter of-the discussion, or its content as well. 
In 80-90 percent of cases, the subject alone was announced in 
general terms. In most cases the actual deliberations were not 
published at all by the Committee. 
THE COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND ITS CHAIRMEN 
Secrecy is-adopted not only against hostile external elements, 
but also against certain members of the Knesset. Some Knesset 
factions have always been excluded from the Defence Committee, and 
the Finance Committee as well, ostensibly on the basis of 
quantitative considerations. 
During Golda Meir's premiership the Minister without Portfolio, 
Israel Galili, also had access to the minutes. 
The Procedural Committee of the first Knesset, an ad hoc 
body set up to allocate seats on the Standing Committees, ruled that 
only factions with more than five members were entitled to 
membership of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee. 
The third Knesset's Procedural Committee raised the threshold 
to eight members. In that way, the Communist. Party, after 1965 
two separate Communist Parties, and the Arab factions aligned to the 
Labour Party (then Mapai), have always been excluded from 
membership of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee. 
) 
So were 
the two small religious factions, Agudat Israel and Poalei*Agudat Israel, 
and the Citizens Rights List. Yet the size of the faction was not 
always the criterion for membership. The Independent Liberals for 
example (with four MK's) used to be allotted a seat on the Committee 
by Mapai, formally to the detriment of Mapai's quota as part of a 
coalition bargain between the two parties. 
During war it has become customary to enlarge the Defence and 
Foreign Affairs Committee and to coopt representatives of all the 
smaller factions, excluding the Communists. During the Six Day War, 
for example, when a National Unity Coalition _ 
was formed and 
Gahal and Rafi joined the Labour dominated Cabinet, representatives 
of Agudat Israel and the tiny Merkaz Hofshi were admitted to the 
Committee as 'observers'. 
During many years it was common that members who were unable to 
attend particular sessions were permitted to send 'substitutes'.. 
But during the heated debates on the Lavon affair in the early 
1 For a discussion of this matter during the first Knesset, see 
'Divrei Haknesset, Vol. 10: 18,10 September 1951. 
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sixties, the substitution rate became so high that the practice was 
banned and the rules were amended to allow only permanent members 
to attend meetings. 
Until the seventh Knesset, the Committee, like most others, 
consisted of 15 members. During the seventh Knesset, membership of 
all Committees was fixed at 19, but was altered again by the next 
Knesset and the Defence. Committee, like the Finance Committee, then 
had 22 members. 
I 
The membership of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee 
itself reflected its status. It comprised senior members of the 
Knesset, including prominent members of the coalition who were not 
Cabinet Ministers, and heads of the opposition parties. In fact, 
membership of the DFAC reflected the Knesset member's standing in his 
party. In the past few years the number of former Ministers among 
its members has increased. 
2 
Apart from security there was a political reason for the strict 
secrecy of the Committee's deliberations, which was the same as Ben 
Gurion's motivation when he first moulded the structure of the 
defence establishment: the desire to curtail the ability of political 
parties to intervene in defence matters. 
I 
2 
Six other committees had memberships of 17 and the Knesset 
Committee had 19 members. A new Control Committee was set up to 
deal with the. State Comptroller's Annual Report, including the 
sections on the Ministry of Defence and the armed forced. 
Members who served long terms, apart from the Mapai leadership, 
included: Menahem Begin, Haim Landau and Yaakov Meridor of Herut; 
Yosef Sapir and Eliezer Rimalt of the General Zionists; Yaakov 
Hazan and Meir Yaari of Mapam; Israel Galili and Yitzhak Ben 
Aharon of Ahdut Haavoda; Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres of Rafi. 
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When the Knesset was first established it was proposed that 
two separate Committees be set up, one for foreign affairs and the 
other for defence. It was finally decided to deal with both 
subjects in one Committee. 
) 
One of the decisive reasons was 
Mapai's determination to ensure its own domination in the Committee. 
As the ruling party it could have demanded the chair of the two 
most important Committees, Finance and Defence and Foreign Affairs, 
but could not have insisted on chairing three Committees. The 
party was not willing to entrust the chairmanship of one of the 
three Committees to an opposition party. The Committee's chairman. 
Meir Argov. cited this argument in the mid-fifties when David 
Hacohen MK again raised the idea of three Committees. Once it was 
established, both the chairmen and members of the Committee had a 
personal stake in the status quo and were unwilling to reliquish 
control. 
2 
Since the first Knesset, the Prime Minister had decisively 
influenced the appointment of the Committee chairman. The post had 
always gone to a senior member of his party who abided by the 
unwritten rules of the game; namely that the Committee should not 
make life too difficult for the Cabinet. The Committee's first 
chairman was Zalman Aranne, (29 March 1949-27 February 1955), later 
Minister of Education and a veteran Mapai leader. Meir Argov, his 
successor (until 23 November 1963) saw his task as to transmit 
1. 
2 
See Zidon, A. (1964: 253-254). 
Interview with David Hacohen, 1977. 
Cabinet decisions to the Committee, rather than to exert upward 
pressure. He attested with pride that under his chairmanship the 
Committee had never once voted against Cabinet policy. 
l 
David Hacohen, who served until 17 July 1969; had a more 
independent outlook than his predecessor, but he was also a prominent 
party leader in Haifa and was closely associated with the top echelon. 
He was the brother-in-law and close friend of Moshe Sharett, former 
Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. -Haim Zadok, who served until 
10 March 1974, had been briefly Minister of Commerce and Industry, 
and between 1974 and 1977 was Minister of Justice. . He was a member 
of the intermediate Mapai generation, but was closely associated 
with the old guard. 
Yitzhak Navon, who served until 14 June 1977, was the first 
chairman who was a Rafi leader. As Ben Gurion's Political Secretary 
for ten years, he was one of Rafi's leaders and had represented it 
in the sixth Knesset. But even his appointment did not give the 
Committee greater independence. Of all the Rafi members, Navon 
was the most closely associated with and acceptable to Mapai. 
Moreover, during his chairmanship, Peres, his personal friend, was 
Minister of Defence. Thus, once again the chairman was politically 
associated with the Minister of Defence, which fact was reflected in 
the conformist stance assumed by the Committee. The post of 
Committee chairman was considered a stepping stone to political 
promotion. 
2 Since political mobility in Israel is a sponsored 
1 
2 
See Brecher, Michael (1972: 131)'The'Foreign Policy System of Israel 
London. Oxford University Press. 
Aranne and Zadok later became Ministers, and Navon, President. 
Hacohen had reached retirement age and Argov died in office. 
mobility, the chairman is subject to pressure to conform and to-adapt 
to the views of the Government. 
I 
KNESSET RESOLUTIONS DO NOT BIND THE CABINET 
The weaknesses of the Knesset Standing Committees stem from a 
deliberate decision taken when the state was established. There used 
to be nine Standing Committees at Zionist congresses which corresponded 
to the nine Zionist Executive departments,, and the Committees reserved 
the right to direct, influence and supervise the policy of those 
departments. They performed the role of policymakers and decided 
administrative matters pertaining to the departments. It was'only 
natural that when the state was established. the existing system was 
attractive to the opposition parties. They argued that the Knesset 
Committees should be attached to Ministries and should direct their 
activities. That approach was the natural outcome of the view that the 
Cabinet was subordinate to the Knesset and should implement its decisions. 
The relationship between them was envisaged as that of master and 
emissary, the former's activity dependent on the latter's wishes. 
The conflicting approach envisaged the Knesset merely as the 
legislative authority and controlling body, with the Government serving 
as the executive, not of the Knesset, but of the state. The 
implication of that viewpoint was that the Committees would not 
intervene in the administration of Ministries but would limit 
themselves to their supervision. 
) 
This paralleled Ben Gurion's etatist approach and political aims 
to augment Mapai's power and to weaken other parties by strengthening 
Cabinet authority and weakening the Knesset. In a speech to the, 
1 See Flaxer, Yehiel P. (1977: 23-25) The Knesset and its Committees 
(Hebrew) Jerusalem. Ahiasaf. 
Knesset, he expressed his opposition to the formation of committees 
to direct and guide Ministers: 
The Opposition wishes ... to carry on with the system 
of government which existed at the time of the 
Provisional Council of the State, when each Minister 
was in a way part of a group, having by his side a 
Committee to guide and direct him .... this is not to be 
. repeated ... Committees will not 
from now on be 
attached to Ministers, but shall be auxiliary to the 
Knesset for the greater specialization and the efficient 
despatch of Knesset business. 1 
The 1949 Transition Law actually altered the relationship between the 
Cabinet and the Knesset to conform with Ben Gurion's outlook. 
Article 14 of the Law abrogated Article 2(b) of the Government and 
Law Procedure Order so that the Cabinet was no longer the 
'implementary institution' of the Knesset, as it had hitherto been 
defined (even in the Declaration of Independence, ) but rather 'the 
executive authority of the state'. 
2 
As far as the Defence And Foreign Affairs Committee was 
concerned, Ben Gurion had a specific model in mind, namely the 
Yishuv's 'Security Committee'. This body had been established in 
the early forties following a crisis period in the National Command. 
The 'bourgeois' bloc within the National Committee and the Jewish 
Agency Executive demanded a greater role in high-level policy-making 
in the defence sphere, and the Labour Movement was forced to respond 
and to set up a body where they would enjoy greater representation. 
The Yishuv Defence Committee comprised representatives of the 
1 
2 
Divrei Haknesset, Vol. l.: _ 
219 
The Declaration of Independence referred to the Provisional State 
Council (which later became the Knesset) and the Provisional 
Government (later the Government). 
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Jewish Agency Executive and the National Committee, and gave 
political representation to both the Labour Parties and the 'bourgeois' 
bloc. 'It was a step aimed to conciliate powerful public groups 
in the Yishuv to achieve a maximal consensus, by allowing them a 
share in consultations', explained Galili, the Head of the National 
Command. 
1 
The Committee was utilized mainly to collect funds for the 
Haganah and'. it also determined mobilization policy. However, it had 
a short life. During the transition period leading to statehood, 
Ben Gurion urged that the Defence Committee, like other bodies in 
the defence sphere, should be abolished. 
When the state institutions were established, the power to 
determine the conscription policy and the responsibility for the 
budget were handed to the Government. In Ben Gurion's view the 
function of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee was to act as 
the successor to the Defence Committee in one particular sphere, 
namely to represent a wide spectrum of political views in order to 
extend public support beyond the coalition basis, and tocreate a 
national consensus on defence. 
Article 12 (a) (4) of the Knesset Proeedural Code defines the 
Committee's jurisdiction: 'Foreign affairs, the armed forces and 
the security of the state'. Analysis of its activities reveals 
that it engages in legal, political-public, and symbolic functions 
both üis-ä-vis the Defence Ministry and the IDF. But does this 
wide jurisdiction actually ensure the Committee's effectiveness? 
1 Interview with Israel Galili, 1 August 1977. 
The constitutional principle, that the Cabinet`is'not the 
executive arm of the Knesset but rather the executive authority of the 
state, also determined whether the resolutions of the Knesset and 
its committees were legally binding on the Cabinet. It is. accepted 
that they are not. 
l 
A later opinion reflected a more complex 
picture, but also emphasized that only in those cases in which the 
decisions of the Knesset and its Committees were anchored in specific 
law, were they of binding validity. Otherwise 
... a, decision of the Knesset, or one of its Committees, 
which is not anchored in a specific law cannot impose 
,,,, 
legal obligation on the Cabinet, or one of its 
Ministers, to act in accordance with the decision of the 
Knesset ... 2 
Based'on this perception Justice Minister Zadok opposed a private 
bill presented in early 1976 by Abraham Katz (Likud): namely that 
Knesset decisions, including Committee decisions, would bind the 
Cabinet. ^. ý' Zadok then answered: ', 
I oppose'the bill both in-principle'and for practical 
reasons. Such a law if enacted will undermine the position 
of the Cabinet as 'the executive arm, of, the state', will 
make the Knesset and its Committees executive authorities 
and will: interrupt the Government's and the Ministers' work. 
3 
1 
2 
3 
See Rubinstein, Amnon (1974: 293,307) The Constitutional Law of 
Israel (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Schocken; and the Opinion of the 
Attorney General, No. 21.410 and 21.460. Ministry of 
-Justice, Jerusalem. 
Opinion of the Attorney General Aharon Barak to Justice Minister, 
submitted on 18 January 1976. Ministry of Justice, Jerusalem. 
See Yaacobi, G. (1979: 57). 
-. --LE GAL. AND LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS-OF THE. COMMITTEE 
° 'l 
1. The Committee deals with matters which are the subject of 
specific legislation, 'whose implementation is the responsibility 
of the Minister of Defence. They included about 30 statutes, 
for example, the 1948 IDF Order, the Defence Service Law, the 
Ex-Servicemen's Law, the Military Jurisdiction Law, the 
Disability Law, and the Medals Law. A number of laws empowered the 
Minister of Defence to pass regulations which 'then required to 
be extended intermittently, particularly the Emergency'Regulations. 
The Committee also dealt with matters like the recommendation of the 
appointment of the Soldiers'Ombudsman in the Ministry of Defence, 
and with the procedure for legislation of new laws-on defence. 
l 
2. A second area of jurisdiction is the defence budget. In 1953 
the Knesset Committee decided that the first,: second and third 
reading of the Defence Budget would be held in the Finance Committee, 
which would be empowered to invite the Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Committee to participate in. its deliberations., 
,, 
In 1969, the 
procedure was, amended and the budget was discussed, at joint 
sessions, of both Committees and a joint sub-committee. 
2 
Though the Committee did not deal with the 1975 Basic Law: 
The Army. According to Minister of Justice, Haim Zadok, it 
was thought preferable for all basic laws to be dealt with 
. by one 
Committee. Interview with Zadok 16 September 1977. 
2 The function of ''the Defence'änd Fore ign"'Affairs' Committee 
with regard to the budget is discussed in the next Chapter. 
3. The Defence and Foreign Affairs*Committee also has the power 
to intervene directly in the administrative field in certain 
cases where the law specifically empowers the Knesset to do so. 
An example is the mobilization of reservists by ministerial 
decree, 'special service', as distinct from the regular 
mobilization of reservists. 
Article 26 of the Security Service Law permits the Defence 
Minister to call up for special service any reservist still on 
the active list. This wide-ranging power was restricted by 
making it subject to Knesset approval. Since it was evident 
that such a decree would only be issued in an emergency when speed 
was of the essence, the legislation stipulated that: 
Whenever the Defence Minister issued a decree 
under Article 26 (a), he must bring it to the 
attention of the Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Committee as soon as possible. - The validity of 
the order will expire 14 days after its day of 
issue, unless otherwise authorized by the 
Committee or by the Knesset before the end of 
this period. 1 
,. 
The nature of this power is such that it leads itself to 
abuse. A Defence Minister can mobilize forces without prior- 
approval, while the date for submission to the Knesset is simply 
defined in vague terms 'as soon as possible'. Once the Minister 
issues such a decree, he can easily postpone the request for 
approval, yet Knesset members have shown themselves willing to 
restrict their own authority, as the following case demonstrates. 
1 Security Service Law, HP/17-4, p. 31. General Staff Publication. 
The 'Emergency-Regulations (Security-Areas)'. empower the Defence 
Minister to declare certain areas to be 'security areas', thus 
enabling the Government and-the IDF to operate, outside normal cii7il 
law in these territories.,, In, a debate; on 19 December 1951, Yitzhak- 
Ben Aharon (Mapam) proposed that the Knesset,, or the Defence and 
Foreign Affairs Committee, debate the-matter and render their-opinion 
before a decree was issued. --I The Chairman of. the Committee: Meir Argov 
who might have been expected to-support, this procedural proposal,, 
objected to it, and it was rejected. 
1r 
A similar case involved the Military Jurisdiction Law. 
Articles 410 and 461. empower the Defence and Foreign Affairs. Committee 
to authorize the setting up of courts martial. In emergencies, the 
Defence Minister is, empowered to set up. either summary military trials 
or-courts martial in the field. However, these require Committee 
approval within two. weeks, which must be renewed, every three months. 
The objective is to defend the rights ofrthe accused who, because of 
the-emergency situation, lacks the protection of regular judicial-- 
procedures. 
During the debate, -, Yitzhak Harari (Liberal),, a prominent member 
of the Committee, argued against its retaining these powers and 
proposed that authority be vested in the Minister alone, ironically, -., 
against the advice of the Defence Minister himself. 
2 
1 
2 
"Divrei Haknesset, V-o1.10: 753-4 
*Divrei Haknesset, vo1.18: 1966. 
Hence, it was not only Ben Gurion and his, Cabinet_colleagues who 
advocated the stringent restriction of the Knesset's supervisory 
powers, but also the Knesset members themselves. 
The Committee members had no access to operational plans of the 
I 
General Staff and had no part in the decision. making process before 
operational activities such as reprisal raids. Even in'the case of 
relatively large scale actions, with political implications, they 
only received a report after the event. The debate in the Knesset 
on the notorious 'Night of the Ducks', 1 April 1959, is a 
"vivid 
'illustration of this situation. 
On that day the Israel Radio' broadcast code names to mobilize 
reserve units. There was confusion among MK's and even Cabinet members, 
not one of whom had been informed. They were in session and'widely 
assumed that hostilities had already started. ' It later became clear 
I 
that the aim of the exercise had been. to check how speedily Arab 
armies would react to a full-scale IDF mobilization. The two 
Major-Generals responsible for the exercise, the Director of : Ama"n 
Harkabi and the Chief of Operations Zorea were rebuked and dismissed' 
from their posts for their mishandling of the operation. 
l 
After hearing the broadcast. the MK's discussed whether to hold 
a full debate on the situation. A particularly interesting view was 
expressed by Harari, who said there was no need for a, debate 
because: 
ý, , 
I! 
1' Divrei Haknesset, Vol. 26: 1874-79. 
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... the Knesset 
does not decide on each stage of a 
military operation. - It does not, decide whom to. 
mobilize and when. It does not decide whether 
mistakes have been made. It can express confidence 
or lack of confidence (in the Cabinet) and can later 
criticize -the Defence Minister. or , 
the 
: 
Cabinet as`_a 
whole and replace them ... 
(The role of the Knesset'is) to'control, the°activities 
of the executive and to'criticize them after they have 
been carried out ... This-is what"happened during the 
Sinai Campaign, when the Knesset dealt with many other 
topics, but not with the campaign itself while it was 
proceeding. It had the right to criticize it after 
it ended'. - 
This was the majority view; and the'Knesset decided not to hold 
the debate. Shimon. Peres, whose view on such matters usually echoed 
Ben Gurion's, referred . to this 
issue during the La'on affair 
He then distinguished between 'civil control, authority and advice'. 
Control was the task of a representative body, he said, but 
ý. r 
the legislature must be careful not to undertake tasks 
which'it cannot implement . -.. not to intervene in the 
process of command, which is the role of the executive. 
Control does not mean intervention during implementation, 
but rather judgement. '1 
THE PUBLIC POLITICAL FUNCTION OF THE COMMITTEE 
1. The first of the public-political functions of the Committee are 
defence policy-making and control of the executive. The definition 
of political functions is a more complex task, than to define the legal- 
legislative functions. It was already said that Knesset decisions 
which are not anchored in. specific'laws have no binding validity. 
Decisions which involve the formulation of defence policy are a classic 
example. But although the Committee has no binding power to instruct 
the Cabinet, does it not have the power to advise and to recommend 
Peres, Shimon (1965: `101-102)'The Next Stage (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Am 
Hasefer. 
policy guidelines? 
The procedure of the Knesset Committees was ostensibly intended 
to enable them to formulate policy or to exercise control beyond legal- 
legislative functions. Article 13 of the Procedure states: 
The Committee is entitled to demand explanations 
or information from the relevant Minister, on 
matters submitted to it, or falling within-its 
orbit. - The Minister must supply such explanations 
or information himself or through his representative. 
This is a central article in the code and enables the Committee to 
initiate action on matters which the Knesset plenum has not allocated 
to it. It would appear to invest the Committee with considerable 
authority, but this is not in fact the case. The code does not compel 
the Minister to act in accordance with the Committee's decision, or 
even to take account of its opinion. It could even be said that the 
exchanges between the Minister and the Committee merely provide 
information and convey opinions. 
The problem has been summed up thus:, fý 
There is an anomaly in relations between the two 
branches. On the one hand, the Committee is 
appointed to deal with areas overlapping the- 
Ministry's activities, and it is entitled to ask 
the Minister-for reports and explanations on current 
affairs pertaining to the Ministry. On the other 
hand, the Committee lacks the authority to control 
the activities of the administration, as the 
supreme institution of the state, as can the. 
American Congress, for example. The truth is that 
the Committees are trapped in a. vicious circle. 2,,. 
This is'generally true of all the Knesset's'Standing`Committees, 
but in the case of'the Defence and Foreign Affairs'Committee, I even 
Article 13 is'nöt observed. Ben GurionItold Committee members 
during the first Knesset, that there were spheres of defence and of 
1 
2 
See Opinion of Attorney General, 18 January 1976. 
Flexer, Y. (1977: 155-157).. 
foreign affairs on which he did not intend to report to the 
Committee at all. He adhered to this rule not only on professional 
military natters, but also with regard to issues of a fundamentally 
political nature. 
The Committee's power to determine policy in advance is 
relatively limited, `neither does it exercise much control after the - 
event, something which, in theory at least, has never been disputed. 
This is because the Committee lacks the legal authority of a 
Commission of Enquiry. 
l 
Article 80 of the Knesset Procedural'Code states that: -- 
Committees are entitled to invite to their meetings (1) 
experts on the question under discussion ... 
(2) any 
person or representative of a body or. group concerned 
with that matter ... (3) a civil servant responsible 
for a particular field, through the relevant Minister 
and. with his endorsement. 
Even-so, these powers are not comparable to'those of Commissions 
of Enquiry, since persons summoned to Knesset Committees cannot be 
compelled to appear. The Minister is authorized to decide whether a 
civil servant, or member of the military, "will attend, and the 
Committee cannot challenge his decision. -- This renders the Committee 
dependent on the goodwill of the witness and undermines its own 
authority. What is more, the Committee's authority to supervise 
the IDF is a function of-its relations°with'the Minister. 
Thus the Knesset's-Procedural Code consolidates the characteristics 
of military-political relations in-, Israel: relations between the 
various political groups within the civil system determine the nature 
1 See also Article 22 of Basic Law: The Knesset. 
of the boundaries between the two spheres and also the inability 
of the civil authorities to control the IDF. 
Some memberp of opposition parties have tried vainly to 
strengthen the Committee's powers. One of the latest was made 
during the. eighth Knesset by. Shmuel Tamir (Free Centre)1on 
18 June 1975. He proposed that civil servants be empowered to 
testify before the Committee whenever 40 percent of the Committee's 
members so wished. The summons would be similar to that used by 
Commissions of Enquiry, under the Investigative Committee Law of 
1968. Speaking in the debate on his private Members bill, he said: 
As a member of the Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Committee, I can inform the House with full 
authority that we acquire more information from 
the press than from the Government. 
Two elements in Tamir's proposal violated tradition. First, 
the power to compel witnesses to attend, secondly, the authority to 
summon civil servants directly and not through the Minister. 
Neither proposal was palatable to the ruling party, since the first 
might have increased the power of opposition parties, and the second 
would have strengthened the Knesset over the Cabinet. Hence, 
the entire proposal was rejected by the Minister of Justice and 
defeated by the coalition. 
2 
The demand that Standing Committees be granted the same status 
as Commissions of Enquiry was broached whenever there was a crisis 
in civil-military relations. In September 1961, during the 
Lavon affair, Peres expressed the viewpoint of the defence 
1 
2 
Tamir and his party later joined the DMC, and in 1977 he 
became the Justice Minister. 
See description of the affair in Yediot Aharonot, 19 June 1975. 
establishment when he wrote: 
The proposal to change the procedure (that a Committee 
can summon a witness only through the Minister and with 
his consent) is very dangerous in our circumstances. 
First, it exempts the Minister from some of the 
responsibility for his own office ... Secondly, it could 
undermine the loyalty of subordinates to their'superior ... 
Thirdly .. an opposition party could summon an officer 
because of his affiliations and not because of his 
qualifications .. Fourthly, to appear before a 
parliamentary Committee could develop into a public 
investigation, the witness being unable, because of lack 
of status and experience, to acquit himself adequately. 
The lack of investigative powers is only one factor determining 
the character of the Committee. Another is the Committee's own role 
perception. When asked whether the Committee regarded itself as 
a civil. arm'controlling the military, Navon, its chairmän, replied: - 
The IDF draws its own conclusions and continually 
examines the problems it faces. - It improves itself 
all the time, and does not need advice'from anybody 
outside. 2 
Speaking of supervision of the budget, Yisrael Kargman, member 
of the joint sub-committee for the defence budget and former 
Chairman of the Finance Committee, said: 
Of course we must rely on the General Staff. Even if 
someone on the Committee thinks that the Staff's 
proposal is no good, how can we decide on our own? We 
know nothing about it and must rely on the General Staff. 
3 
Because the role of the Committee was so restricted, it was 
able to function without additional professional expertise. Until 
1970 it did not even have a secretary. From 1970 a permanent 
full-time secretary -a former Foreign Ministry employee - was' 
appointed, but the Committee has no other technical or professional 
1 
2 
3 
Peres, S. (1972: 108). 
Nathan Ribon, Bamahaneh, 6 June 1976. 
Interview with Israel Kargman, 12 August 1977. 
II 
assistance, no research staff or experts or means of collecting data 
or analyzing it. It has no way of testing material received from the 
Government or of following up its recommendations. Demands for 
coopting experts have been voiced from time to time. After the 
Six Day War the chairman Zadok even dared to make such a request 
himself: 
The joint committee of the Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Committee and the Finance Committee, which deals with 
the defence budget, has powers but no instruments to 
realize these powers. No authority, outside the 
defence establishment itself, has the instruments to 
conduct precise analyses of the defence budget, and 
this should be corrected. 1 
When he was asked some years later, why no professional team had 
been appointed to assist the Committee, Zadok blamed-Knesset financial 
restrictions, but cited another reason as well. The Cabinet, `he said, 
wanted to avoid confrontation with any Committee experts. Just''as'the 
Ministry of Finance was reluctant to enhance the professional weight 
of the Finance Committee, so the Ministry of Defence and the Prime 
Minister did not want to strengthen the Defence Committee*. 
2. fi 
Knesset members proposed at various times that the expertise of 
the Committee be improved, inter alia by setting up specialised sub- 
committees. This demand was first aired in 1961, but was only 
} 
satisfied in 1974. Zadok explained the objections to such committees 
by saying that they could render the Committee plenum meaningless. 
Furthermore, there was a danger that discussion by the sub-committees 
would be conducted on a professional military level, which should be 
carried out only by the General Staff. 'The Knesset should not run 
the armed forces, but should serve as the public advisory body', he said. 
3 
1 
2 
3 
Interview' broadcast on*Galei Zahal, 25 January 1974. 
Interview with Haim Zadok, 16 September 1977. 
Interview with Haim Zadok, 16 September 1977. 
I 
The Secretary of the Committee has noted, however, that members 
never insisted on the need for a professional staff. If they had 
really wanted one, it could have been arranged. 
1 
2. The-second public-political function of the Committee is its 
role as a channel between the public and the defence establishment, 
both IDF and Defence Ministry. 
Article 13 of the Knesset Code states that the Committee should 
deal with any requests or complaints despatched to the Knesset or 
Cabinet by citizens. Few requests were submitted. The Knesset is 
not the sounding board for public criticism of the Government, probably 
because Israel has proportional representation and there is no 
contact between the MK and the voter at the constituency level. 
Secondly, until the Yom Kippur War criticism in the security sphere 
was rare. Moreover, since the creation of the post of Military 
Ombudsman most public complaints are directed to him. 
During the four. -years of the seventh Knesset, for example, the 
Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee dealt with only 152 such 
complaints. Even after the war only 330 complaints were dealt with. 
The majority concerned reserve duty, squandering, administrative 
inefficiency, barrack conditions and so on. This aspect of the 
Committee's role became more significant in the late 1970's. 
2 
3. The third political function was indicated in-. the discussion of 
the Yishuv Security Committee and the composition of the Defence 
1 
2 
Interview with Uri Radai, Secretary to Committee, 29 June 1977. 
Data from an internal report of the Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Committee, eighth Knesset. - 
iT 
and Foreign Affairs Committee in emergency periods. The Committee 
serves as the meeting point for Government and opposition factions. 
It is a mechanism of exchange between the Government and various 
political groups. The administration supplies their representatives 
with political and security information and in return it receives their 
; ýý 
political support. 
To share security secrets is ultimately necessary for any 
political group in Israel. Without control over the state's secrets 
no political group can serve as a 
, 
focus of identification for the 
ý 
electorate. Neither can it initiate appropriate policy in the sphere 
,ý "ý 
which is of the greatest public significance. The possession of 
these resources reflects the degree of proximity to the centre. It 
was therefore worthwhile for these groups to pay the high price of 
granting legitimacy to Government policy in return for a share of that 
resource. 
In order to diminish the Government's political strength, the 
. opposition 
factions claimed that by participating in the Committee they 
influenced Government policy and exercise supervision over the IDF. 
This claim is exaggerated. Some 80 percent of the Committee's- 
deliberations do not culminate in a definite conclusion, neither 
decisions, opinions or recommendations. Most meetings are confined 
to the exchange of information and evaluations. The vital importance 
of security information to Knesset members can be ascertained from 
the fact that although the Committee acquiesced for years in its 
marginal position in policy-making, it fought persistently to obtain 
more information from the Cabinet. 
' 
Without such information, it would, 
to a large extent, have forfeited its raison d'etre. 
1 Interview'with Uri Raaai, -29, June"1977. 
I-- 
THE SYMBOLIC FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE 
1. The fact that the Committee is the arena for exchange activity, 
is related to the third type of Committee function in the field of, 
values or symbols. There are various institutional and symbolic 
manifestations of the centrality of security in Israeli society, 
and of the vital significance of defence as a component of national 
identity. The Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee, like the 
principle of general conscription, is one of these manifestations. 
The Committee is a forum, wherein all representatives*of the 
collective participate symbolically in the great secret of defence. 
Like: conscription, membership in the Committee is a criterion for 
the extent of membership in the collective. Communist MK's, and 
Arab members, even from the Mapai-affiliated factions, do not take 
part. The ultra-religious parties are on the borderline. Small 
factions which do not meet the quantitative criterion but are not too 
far removed from the centre as regards social basis and values, are 
permitted to join. This explains why in times of emergency when 
the very existence. ofýthe state'is threatened, the basis of affiliation 
is extended. 
2. The second symbolic function of the Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Committee is to give expression to . the principle of civil authority' 
over, the armed forces. The symbolic expression oUthat authority is 
a significant-aspect'of the collective's consciousness, a part of the 
democratic ethos even if there is a. gap between the symbolic. and. real 
levels. P 
This point is of basic importance in military-political relations 
and reflects Israel's unique response to its dilemma as a democratic' 
society under constant siege, the nominal pattern. The civil system 
has voluntarily renounced the full implementation of the instrumentalist 
principles, and receives in return strict adherence to the symbolic 
and legal framework of that pattern. 
The political system is ready to waive the right to full practical 
realization of the instrumental pattern as long as. its legitimacy is 
not questioned. It is, therefore, evident why there are no rigid 
institutional definitions and no fixed rules of the game in the sphere 
of military-political relations. Such a fluid situation facilitates 
the preservation of the nominal pattern. 
This also explains why, when crises erupt in the sphere of 
military-political relations, and there is a threat to the value base 
of the instrumentalist model, there is an increasing. demand for more 
rigid institutional definitions and for the creation of institutionalized 
mediatory mechanisms. If mere acceptance of the instrumentalist 
principle is not enough to ensure civil authority, then concrete 
definitions and institutionalized structural arrangements are required. 
When the crisis passes, the demand for narrowing the gap between the 
symbolic framework and the actual situation dies down. 
BEN GURION'S. REIGN - LIMITED POWERS 
As in other fields of political-military relations the roles and 
the status of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee have varied 
during the years, primarily as a consequence of power relations within 
the power elite and the personalities and mutual relationship of 
the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence. Ben Gurion's 
conception of the_Committee's role has already been described. 
Yitzhak Navon summed it up. It was a 
consumer of information and provider of public support 
for Government policies. The views of its members were 
listened to, but they had little if any effect on Ben Gurion. 
1 Brecher, M. (1972: 132). 
The Committee members complained that a great deal of information 
was concealed from them. For example, they claimed that when they 
asked for details of the arms sales to Portugal and about the 
modernizing in Israel of that country's aircraft, Ben Gurion refused 
to provide the information. Elimelech Rimalt"(General Zionists) 
said that Ben Gurion refused to confirm that Holland had purchased 
Uzi submachine guns, though this fact had already been published in 
the press. 
1 
Yaakov Hazan (Mapam) related that the Israeli built 
Shavit 2 missile was one of the topics on which the Committee was 
misinformed. The Committee was also presented with a 
. 
fait accompli 
at the start of the Sinai Campaign when the war machine was set 
in motion. 
Ben Gurion tended to conceal from the Committee not only details 
of arms sales and purchases, and tactical or operational plans, but 
also the fundamental points of his national defence policy. He did 
not inform the Committee of his efforts to obtain a defence treaty 
with the US in the early 1950's. When pressed, he denied Mapam's 
allegations, and depicted his efforts to conclude a treaty as an 
attempt to secure military aid. 
2 
During a budget debate on 19 June 1950, Ben Aharon said: 
Members of the Committee do not take part in consulting, 
discussing, planning - they do not even receive 
information ... I doubt whether even members of the 
Cabinet would swear that they were associated with 
directing the defence policy of the state ... In this 
field there is autocracy .. what the Government cares 3 
about is only the survival of one-party government. 
1 
2 
3' 
See Haaretz, 6 June 1969. 
Interview with Yitzhak Ben Aharon 1977. 
Divrei Haknesset, Vol. 5; 1771-1774. 
Ben Gurion was even more evasive when it came to the secret 
services. He admitted publicly to the existence of the Shin Bet, 
the countet espionage branch, in June 1957. It was only two years 
earlier that he finally agreed that a Ministerial Committee for 
Defence should supervise the services which had hitherto been under 
his sole aegis. As Prime Minister and Defence Minister he had. 
control over all branches of the secret services: foreign political 
intelligence, the Mossad; counter-espionage, the Shin Bet; and 
naturally military intelligence, Ama"n. Until 1957 Ben Gürion 
would not permit the heads of any of the intelligence services to 
appear before the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee. Even after 
that date he tried to minimize such contacts. 
In 1963 Isser Harel, then Head of all the security services, 
resigned after a disagreement with Ben Gurion over what policy Israel 
should adopt towards German scientists working in the Egyptian 
military industries. On 27 May Ben Gurion was asked by the Committee 
about Harel's resignation. He evaded the question and stated 
briefly that Harel had resigned because he would not accept his 
opinion. The Committee members were well aware of the event and, 
like the press, knew the details, but were not able to discuss it. 
Ben Gurion's posture was a matter of principle. 
On 7 April 1963 Menahem Begin (Herut) asked the Knesset to place 
the matter on its agenda. Yitzhak Harari's conduct on this occasion 
is noteworthy. He had once claimed that the Cabinet had the right 
to act, and the Knesset only had the right to exercise control 
ex post facto: But in the debate on Begin's motion, Harari said: 
The opposition has the right at least to know 
what happens. And on the subject of the German 
scientists and the resignation of the Commissioner 
it was told nothing. 1 
Ben Gurion's policy towards the Defence Committee was 
demonstrated once again during the Lavon affair, when the Committee 
was one of the' battlegrounds for some-of the central protagonists. 
Time and again committee members complained that they were not 
informed on fundamentals. In 1961 Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff 
during the 'mishap', refused to give evidence before the Committee. 
Other complaints related to the fact that Mapai bypassed the 
Committee in. various ways. For example it established a 
Ministerial Committee (the Committee of Seven) to deal with it. 
2 
Ben Gurion's policy of minimizing the Defence Committee's 
scope of activity, level of involvement, access to data, and hence 
ability to influence policy, led him to advocate an almost total 
separation of the IDF from. -the Committee. This is a striking 
illustration of the-concept of integral boundaries. He insisted 
that only the Prime Minister and Defence Minister should appear 
before the Committee, and only after persistent pressure . by committee 
members did he agree that the Chief of Staff should accompany him. 
3 
Even then he permitted this only rarely, and reserved the right to 
decide what questions should be answered by the Chief of Staff. 
It was quite common for the Committee to request the presence of 
1 
2 
3 
Divrei Haknesset, Vol. 36: 1742-1752. 
Divrei Haknesset, Vo1.31: 2146-2162. 
See evidence by the then Director of Ama"n Maj. -Gen. 
Haim Herzog, Haaretz, 21 December 1973. 
the Chief of Staff and for Ben Gurion to refuse. When the 
Committee learned that Major-General Laskov was to leave his post 
before the expiry of his term of office, it invited him to its 
meeting. Ben Gurion refused to permit him to appear and the Mapai 
members of the Committee supported him. His wish to downgrade 
the Committee was also expressed in his refusal to improve its- 
operating facilities to increase efficiency. The pattern 
established in his day has endured, with minor alterations, to the 
late seventies. 
It is clear, therefore, why Ben Gurion's rivals in the Labour 
Movement demanded a significant change in'the status of the Committee. 
A clearly formulated demand was first made by the Club of Four after 
the elections to the fifth Knesset. Israel Galili MK, the Club's 
spokesman on defence, called for the establishment of a standing 
sub-committee to deal with the defence budget, to monitor its imple- 
mentation and to approve any budgetary amendments during the year. 
He also proposed that the'Committee be granted power to establish 
research committees to provide basic data and recommendations', to be 
ad hoc investigative committees, and a permanent sub-committee 
'empowered to ask for reports and opinions from military and academic 
experts through the. Defence Ministry'. 
1 
Eshkol, who conducted the negotiations for Mapai, said he 
'would be against any form of control which exceeds the level 
accepted in other Ministries'. However, during the discussions, 
1 Haaretz, 22 September 1961. 
he prpposed a compromise whereby 
the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee will be 
entitled to order the Defence Minister to establish 
'examining committees' on specific matters within 
his jurisdiction. If the Minister does not nominate 
the committee and submit its conclusions within two 
months, the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee 
will be authorized to establish the committee itself. 
This was a significant concession when compared with Ben Gurion's 
habitual refusal to grant the Committee any powers whatsoever. As 
Mapai's candidate for Premier, Ben Gurion opposed Eshkol's proposal, 
and it was withdrawn. 
Ben Gurion had his way on this occasion, but Ahdut Haavoda now 
joined the coalition and Yaakov Hazan, one of the Mapam leaders, 
held very strong views on the matter. 'It is a total surrender to 
the existing procedure which we have rebutted' he said in the Knesset 
on 2 November 1961, when he explained why his party had not joined 
the coalition. He added that minor modifications of the procedure 
for supervising defence were worthless, since 'the basic thing is 
missing, the right of effective control'. 
2 
Israel Bar Yehuda, one of the two new Ahdut Haavoda Ministers, 
claimed that some of his party's demands had been met and that the 
Committee would henceforth enjoy greater authority. For example, 
transfers from one defence budget item to another during the year 
would require Committee approval. The Committee would also deal 
with the State Comptroller's Annual Report on the defence establishment, 
and would use sub-committees to study particular topics more 
thoroughly, and would generally receive more detailed information. 
1 
2 
Haaretz, 28 September 1961. 
Divrei Haknesset, Vol. 36: 224, from which quotes from Bar 
Yehuda, Dayan and Ben Eliezer, on'the following pages were 
taken. 
Even more important, the Committee would have the right to ask 
the Minister of Defence for explanations and material on any matter 
which it was due to discuss, or which came under its jurisdiction, and 
the Minister would be obliged to respond himself or through his 
representative. Finally, the Committee would from time to time elect 
sub-committees to study specific defence subjects. 
Moshe Dayan, the new Agriculture Minister, attacked those MK's 
who spoke of civil control over the defence establishment: 
I don't understand and I don't agree with the claim 
that there will be control not only by the coalition 
and the Cabinet (but also by the Opposition) ... I 
don't accept the term 'civil control' at all. I 
know that what is needed for defence is above all 
direction and government, just as in any other 
department, and perhaps more than in any other 
department. And to that end there exists an 
authorized institution - the Minister of Defence. 
It was only natural that Arieh Ben Eliezer (Herut) attacked not 
only those who thought they had won more guarantees of civil control 
over the Cabinet on defence, but also Dayan, who represented the Ben 
Gurionite approach. Addressing Dayan, he said: 
I'll tell you the meaning of control. It is 
parliamentary control through the Defence and 
Foreign Affairs Committee. 
But, he continued, the Committee's powers had been extremely 
curtailed, since it could not coerce the Defence Minister into 
testifying or into supplying documents. As long as the Committee 
did-not have the status of a Commission of Enquiry, it could not 
implement its power of control. 
: ESHKOL'S REIGN - EXPENDING POWERS 
After the Cabinet was formed and the Knesset set to work, it 
soon became clear that the opposition spokesmen had been rather more 
astute in their assessment of what would happen with the Committee 
than the new coalition partners. No sub-committees were established, 
nor did any real change take place in the Committee's influence over 
the formulation of the defence budget, or its supervision. In due 
course the State Comptroller's Report was also taken away from the 
Committee. 
But the demands of the Club of Four and Eshkol's response 
inaugurated a new era in the annals of the Committee, and its nature 
became clear after Eshkol took office as Prime Minister and Minister 
of Defence. He entrusted more matters to the Committee than had 
his predecessor and provided it with fuller details on delicate 
issues. Eshkol himself said that he attributed importance to the 
Committee and that it displayed a greater interest in and knowledge 
of defence and foreign affairs than did the Cabinet, excluding the 
Ministerial Committee on Defence. 
1 
Even members of the opposition 
parties'on the Committee expressed their satisfaction at the change. 
2 
The same reasons that impelled Eshkol to alter the status of the 
Ministerial Committee on Defence led him to change his attitude to 
other Knesset Committees. By secularizing the defence sphere he 
opened up the integral boundaries between the armed forces and the 
Knesset and enabled the Defence Committee to meet more frequently with 
military personnel, headed by the Chief of Staff. 
1 
2 
Brecher, M. (1972: 132). 
Interview with Ben Aharon, 30 June 1977. 
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The latter appeared before the Committee much more frequently 
under Eshkol than under Ben Gurion. Between 11 January 1966 and 
26 May 1967 Yitzhak Rabin attended 22 sessions of the Committee, 
17 of them together with Eshkol, and twice by himself. On three 
occasions Rabin alone gave evidence although Eshkol was present. 
The Director of Ama"n, who under Ben Gurion had never attended 
meetings, now began to. Between 1965-1969 he was present 15 times, 
several times with the Minister, five times in the Minister's 
presence, and eight times alone. 
' 
During the 'waiting period' crisis, Eshkol went even further. 
He broke through the boundaries and created a new pattern of 
relations between the General Staff and the political machine. 
That was reflected in the Committee as well, and meant that 
party-political calculations became mingled with defence policy 
considerations, with the army playing as active a part in the 
process as the civilians. 
After the Six Day War, it became clear that the pattern created 
during the crisis had become a permanent phenomenon. The army's 
increased prestige as a result of its military victory and the 
flawed image of the politicians, shifted the balance of power 
between them. The Committee did not escape the accelerating process 
of convergence of civil and military thinking which culminated in 
'the concept'. Defence Minister Dayan permitted more intensive 
contacts between the Committee and the armed forces and extended 
them to previously proscribed levels. From 13 June to 14 October 1967 
I Internal report of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee, 
eighth Knesset. 
the Chief of Staff Rabin attended eight meetings of the Committee, 
four times addressing with the Minister, and four times in his presence. 
From 20 February 1968 to 19 October 1969, the Chief of Staff Haim 
Barley appeared alone on nine occasions, once with the Minister and 
once in his presence. 
Dayan also permitted other senior staff officers to meet the 
Committee, particularly the Director of Ama"n Major-General 
Aharon Yariv. During the sixth Knesset he appeared alone at eight 
out of 15 Committee sessions. During the seventh Knesset he began 
to meet regularly with the Committee, in most cases alone. The 
Coordinator of Activities in the Occupied Territories, a Major- 
General, and the Minister's Assistant, Lieutenant-General (Res. ) 
Zvi Zur, also frequently attended Committee sessions. 
During the eighth Knesset, some inessential modifications were 
introduced into the Committee's mode of operation, particularly as 
a result of the transfer of the chairmanship to a representative of 
the Mapai intermediate generation, Haim Zadok. Regular meetings 
and briefings were instituted. Zadok stipulated that each of the 
following should appear before the Committee once a month: the 
Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, the Foreign Minister, the 
Chief of Staff, the Foreign Ministry's Director-General. Others 
who appeared regularly but less frequently were the Heads of the 
secret service branches, the Prime Minister's Adviser on Energy 
and the Coordinator of the Occupied Territories. Israel's 
Ambassadors to major capitals were also invited when on home leave. 
Other arrangements which became customary were monthly tours 
of inspection of the army or the defence establishment, attendance 
at manoeuvres or exercises above the division level and discussions 
with academic institutions twice during each Knesset session. 
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Zadok was the first chairman to appoint a full-time secretary to the 
Committee. However, there were no substantive changes in the actual 
role, function or professional capacity of the Committee members. 
The opening of the boundaries did not augment the Committee's capacity 
to exert control over defence issues. 
THE PARLIAMENTARY. EXPRESSION. OF THE. POLITICAL-MILITARY PARTNERSHIP 
The uncritical attitude to the armed forces and the weakness of 
civil control over it were shattered by the Yom Kippur War, and the 
Knesset Committee received its share of criticism.. -An article 
reflecting the mood at the time said: 
Responsibility for the Yom Kippur debacle rests also 
with the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee, which 
did not fulfil its constitutional function of 
controlling the Cabinet, and did not equip itself with 
the instruments for control... 
The Chairman of the Committee, who should devote all 
his time to the job and not serve part-time, should 
have a deputy from the Opposition. The veil of . 
secrecy should be removed from the Committee's work, 
it should be equipped with experts and given the powers 
to extract evidence from witnesses and experts and to 
question Ministers and officials. ) 
The Agranat Commission also dealt with the role of the Defence 
Committee, and in the confidential section of its report it analyzed 
a series of proposals on how the Committee should more effectively 
do its work. But the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee, like 
other civil bodies did not live up to the expectations foisted on 
it 
after the war. Within about a year the armed forces restored their 
public image and their traditional relationship with the Knesset. 
1 Articles by former Attorney-General Moshe Ben Zeev and 
Dr. Eliyahu Lahovsky, Haaretz, 24 December 1973. 
However, the Defence Committee attained a new role-as the 
crisis in the Labour Party developed and weakened Rabin's Cabinet. 
In that situation the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee 
increased its weight in relation to the Cabinet rather than to the 
rehabilitated IDF. The Cabinet took the Committee into its 
confidence in discussing defence matters much more than in the past, 
and several problems raised in the plenum which would once have 
been settled by a coalition vote, were now handed to the Committee 
for discussion. 
This happened even with several military operations of 
great political significance. On one occasion in May 1974, the 
Cabinet was forced to decide whether to give in to the demands 
of PLO terrorists who had seized a school in Maalot. Another 
time it had to decide what action to take with regard to the 
hijacked El Al plane at Entebbe in July 1976. On these occasions 
the Committee convened while the Cabinet was in session and 
received briefings on events and on Government deliberations. 
The Minister of Justice Zadok later defined the change in 
the nature of the Committee's operation as 'the beginning of a 
process of integrating the Committee in the process of formulating 
decisions'. And he explained: 
The Committee has no power to decide, but there is 
a difference between a situation whereby the Prime 
Minister reports on a Cabinet decision, authorizing 
him to conduct a certain policy, and a situation 
where the Prime Minister holds discussions with the 
Committee before the Cabinet decision is taken. 
The Committee cannot compel him to decide, but it may ' 
be assumed that whereas in the first case the Committee 
could, at the most, criticize ex post facto, the Prime 
Minister will now take into account what is said to 
him. The Committee has been granted the opportunity- 
of potential participation in the decision-making 
process. 1 
1 Interview with Haim Zadok, 16 September 1977. 
To describe such a significant change in the mode of operation 
and status of the Committee is an oversimplification. A more 
feasible explanation is the weakness of Rabin's Cabinet. For 
that reason, the Cabinet preferred'to allow the opposition factions 
to share responsibility, and thus to strengthen public support for 
its decisions. -Although it meant that the opposition would'also 
r 
benefit from successful military operations, such as the Entebbe 
raid, the Cabinet was willing to pay the price to avoid shouldering 
the full responsibility for policies which failed. 
l 
Another expression of the Cabinet's weakness in 1974-77 was 
ministerial exploitation of the Committee for party-political 
rivalry. The Committee is not usually the target of lobbying, and 
such phenomena as intercession by representatives of various 
military Corps in order to increase their budgets are not customary 
in Israel. Nor do other interest groups try to influence the 
Committee, except on very rare occasions. 
In the past Ministers had used the Committee as a sounding 
board for political ideas and proposals, but under the Rabin- 
Government they, exploited it in their power struggles, which 
reached. a climax when the Minister of Defence Peres tried to get 
the Committee to support his campaign against the Prime Minister's 
wish to". cut the defence budget. The Minister even asked army 
officers to appear before the Committee to strengthen its 
opposition to Rabin's plan. This pattern of exploitation of the 
General Staff in a personal struggle between various political 
factors in the Labour Party was not an entirely new phenomenon, 
but it reached a new peak. 
Thousands came to Ben Gurion Airport to cheer the returning 
hijacked passengers and they applauded and cheered not only 
Ministers but also the leader of the opposition and member 
of the Defence Committee, Menahem Begin MK. 
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However weak the Cabinet may have been, the Committee was not 
strong enough to change the written. rules. Only one of the various 
public and confidential proposals made after the war to improve its 
working methods was ever implemented. Standing sub-committees were 
set up: one for oppressed Diaspora Jewish communities, one to 
implement the Agranat Commission's recommendations, and one-for. a top 
secret subject. A standing sub-committee on the defence budget was 
also set up to include members of the Finance and the Defence and 
Foreign Affairs Committees, and to be headed by an opposition member. 
There was no change, however, either in the technical facilities 
of the Committee or in its powers. In May 1974 'Shmuel Tamir (Free 
Centre) proposed a method for the close supervision of the IDF by 
the Committee. It postulated the classification of the entire defence 
establishment into 21 subjects, *corresponding to the number of 
Committee members, and the allocation of one subject to each member. 
The proposal was rejected. 
Other Knesset members submitted various proposals in this period. 
During a Knesset debate on the Basic Law: IDF , on 30 July 1975, 
Dov Zakin (Mapam) pröposed that the Committee be consulted on 'High 
Command Instructions', issued by the Chief of Staff with the Minister's 
approval: 
I know that with-regard to the matters discussed by 
other Committees, for example the Finance Committee, 
the term used is not only 'consultation' but also 
'approval'. I propose in the first instance 
'consultation' in order to introduce the element of 
parliamentary control. l 
That proposal, too, was rejected. 
1 Divrei Haknesset, Vol. 38: 4011. 
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The criticism in the wake of the War, that the Committee had 
not been granted access to sufficient information to enable it to 
supervise the armed forces, was countered by the IDF and the new 
Minister of Defence by a relatively simple tactic. The army was 
exposed more widely to Committee scrutiny and Chiefs of such 
Branches as Operations, Manpower and Planning, began to appear 
before it, even without the Minister. The military establishment 
increased the flow of information to the Committee, including 
current intelligence data of a relatively low classification and 
the Chairman was given access to top secret material. 
It is an erroneous assumption that the Committee's supervisory 
powers thereky increased. The Committee welcomed-the flow of 
material, but those members with military backgrounds, as well as 
Generals on active service, claimed. that this influx of information 
was as disfunctional as the concealment of information in the past, 
since Committee members were incapable of filtering or digesting 
the amount of material. 
l 
The most significant change in. the Committee in the 1970's 
has been the appointment of reserve officers as members. The 
fact that appointments to the Knesset are carried out to a large 
extent by the party leadership has in the past weakened the 
Committee vis-a-vis the Cabinet. As Amnon Rubinstein wrote 
in 1969: 
1 Interview with Maj. -Gen. (Res; Aharon Yariv, 13 July 1977. 
- 518 - 
This does not mean that citizens who have never served 
in the armed forces are disqualified from supervising 
defence matters, but the great majority of the members 
have no experience and knowledge of the army and 
defence. Furthermore, because of the aura surrounding 
the IDF, the citizen who has never served in it feels 
inferior in status (unjustifiably) and this detracts 
from his ability to question and examine senirrr officers. 
The Committee's weakness derives, inter alia, from 
the weakness of its members.. Like the Knesset plenum, 
the Defence Committee is characterized by the 
relatively advanced age of its members. Four of them 
are over 70, five over 60, seven over 50. Only three 
are under fifty. The chairman is a charming and able 
man, but his detachment from military matters has 
often made him the butt of witticisms. Only one 
member ever served in the IDF. 
The civilian's sense of inferiority in comparison with military 
. 
men was complemented by the latter's sense. of superiority, and that 
pattern of relations has seriously affected the Committee's ability 
to function. Its members, for example, cannot recall one case 
when the IDF's annual programme was ever amended by them after 
discussion in the Committee. 
This situation began to change as younger members joined the 
Committee and particularly senior reserve officers. During the 
eighth Knesset, Major-Generals Sharon, Yariv, Weizman. and Yaffe 
were members of the Committee, and their presence-modified the 
attitude of army officers when the Committee visited the army and 
when the Ministry, of Defence officials presented the budget. It 
also enhanced the Committee's self-image. 
In the Committee, as in the Cabinet, reserve officers were in 
the vanguard of the fight to strengthen the authority of the civil 
body, to improve the information flow and to expand its influence 
1 Amnon Rubinstein, Haaretz, 6 June 1969. 
over the formulation of defence policy and the supervision of the 
defence establishment. Following reports that there was a 
possibility that the Arab states might initiate hostilities during 
1975, Yariv asked for a report on the IDF's readiness for combat. 
The head of the Minister of Defence's private office was astounded 
to receive, for the first time, such a request from the Knesset. 
' 
" During the 1974 budget debate Sharon submitted an alternative 
draft budget for the Ministry of Defence, smaller by one and a half 
billion IL than the Ministry's proposal. Sharon's budget was 
rejected, but its very submission was a revolutionary innovation. 
The activity by reserve officers in the Committee complemented 
the more open approach adopted by the eighth Knesset towards defence 
matters. In sharp contrast to the past, the Knesset felt freer to 
criticize army matters. After the PLO raid on Kiryat Shmoneh in 
1974 Sharon demanded that the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee 
should sit as a Knesset Commission of Enquiry to examine the 
omissions and mishaps. He did not confine himself to directing 
blame at the political echelon, but criticized the IDF itself, an 
act which in the past would have brought him under attack from the 
opposition benches as well. 
Problems relating to the Chief of Staff's political pronouncements 
the conditions of military service, the problems of ex-servicemen 
and the politicization of the IDF were raised during 1974 in the 
Knesset and criticism was often voiced. The Knesset's involvement 
in matters formerly considered to be internal IDF concerns reached 
1 Interview with Aharon Yariv, 13 July 1977. 
its height when the National Religious Party discussed candidates 
for the post:, of Chief of Staff and issued a statement announcing 
whom it considered to be the most suitable candidate. 
1 
In Ben 
Gurion's day, this subject would have been discussed by the Cabinet 
in camera. 
The eighth Knesset's activity on defence matters and the' 
nature of the Committee's operations from 1974 to 1977 reflected the 
fact that the army would have yielded to a higher level of civil 
control had it been exerted. The Chief of Staff Gur endorsed 
proposals that the Committee should be able to summon senior officers 
to appear before it. A similar suggestion was also raised by 
Moshe Nissim MK (National Religious Party), but Rabin and Zadok 
resisted any move which might strengthen the Committee. 
2 
Hence 
there was no greater control. The disintegration process within 
the Labour Party heightened the inter sub-elite rivalry and the 
process of greater integration of the military-political 
partnership continued. 
1 
2 
See Haaretz, 5 April 1974. 
Lieut. -Gen. Mordehai Gur in Yediot Aharonot, 14 Deeember 1979. 
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11. THE IDF AND THE. DEFENCE MINISTRY 
THE ' MINISTRY OF DEFENCE -- A SUPER-MINISTRY 
The army does-not determine policy, nor'does it shape 
the regime, laws and government of this country. It 
cannot even take an independent decision on its own 
structure and operational guidelines, and most certainly 
cannot decide matters pertaining to peace and war. The 
military is the executive arm, the Israel'Government's 
defence and security arm. The nature of the regime, 'the 
guidelines of internal and foreign policy, the declara- 
tion of war and the making of peace, the organization of 
the army and shaping-of its character - all these are 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil -- 
authorities, i. e. the Cabinet, the Knesset and the 
representatives elected by the majority in free 
elections. The Government is fully responsible for 
the army to the people's elected representatives in the 
Knesset - the army is totally subordinate to the 
Government, and carries out policies and instructions 
transmitted to it by the legislative and executive 
bodies of the state: the Knesset and the Cabinet.... 
Thus David Ben Gurion defined the status of'the*IDF on 27 October 
1949.1 He envisaged it ideally as the implementer of policies, 
without the authority to decide what instruments and means should 
stand at its disposal, or to determine its own internal organization. 
But what are the authorities and powers of the Ministry of Defence? 
The official Government Yearbook did not alter its terse 
description of the Ministry of Defence between 1948 and 1977, stating 
year after year 
The overall task of the Ministry of Defence is to enable 
the IDF to carry out its function of safeguarding the 
security of the state. 
The position of the Ministry of Defence within the network of civil- 
military relations is highly complex. Ostensibly it is a civil. 
body and hence officially affiliated to the policy-makers, the army's 
1 Ben Gurion (1971: 82) Singularity and Mission Tel Aviv. Maar; shot. 
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supervisors. On the other hand, it maintains extremely close 
reciprocal links with the army,, and stands united with the military 
against the political system, the Cabinet and the Knesset, about which 
Amnon-Rubinstein has written: 
The Ministry of Defence was intended to be the 
civil. bo y supervising the' army on behalf of 
the Knesset and Government, but in Ben Gurion's 
day the controller and controlled joined 
together 
in one body known as the 'defence establishment'. 
This concept is unknown in Israeli law, and in the 
procedure of enlightened countries. But this 
misleading phrase reflects a situation in which the 
differences between elected representatives and 
executives,, _'civil-ard military Officers, have 
been obliterated, and the Ministry of Defence and1 
the military are united against 'alien elements'. 
The main objective of this chapter is to'analyze the relations 
between the military and the civil Ministry of Defence.. But this 
analysis must take into account the status of the Ministry of Defence 
in Israeli society. The Israeli military-industrial complex has 
not itself been comprehensively studied; however its power and 
influence are clearly manifested when the Defence Ministry 
appropriates almost 50% of the national budget, where about one 
quarter of the total labour force of a million and a quarter are 
employed in defence and where armaments comprise about one quarter of 
the total industrial exports. (Defence production has risen tenfold, 
from 31 million dollars in 1967 to some 300 million in 1976. ) 
Because of the centrality of security, the Ministry of Defence has 
the status of 'super-ministry', and intrudes into activities which 
fall 
within the ambit of other Ministries. For example 
it exerts influential, 
even direct control over education 
(through its impact on the curricula of 
1. Amnon Rubinstein, Haaretz, 19 January 1973. 
institutions for vocational training, through deploying female soldiers 
as teachers in development areas, through responsibility for the Gadna 
Corps etc. ). It is concerned with welfare (through dealing with the 
problems of more than 35,000 bereaved families and war invalids) and 
with urban and rural settlement (as the decisive factor in defensive 
settlement both in border areas and the Occupied Territories, and is' 
the driving force for several new towns in Israel). 'Its activity was 
also extended to foreign affairs, while Ben Gurion was Premier and 
Peres, Director-General and later Deputy Defence Minister. Since then 
it has served as a parallel and'in many cases'a superior instrument for 
the conduct of foreign relations' and, since the seventies, as a 
major factor once 
arms sales began to weigh heavily in Israel's policy 
making. Not only did the Ministry of Defence expand disproportionately 
to all other Ministries, but it conducted its affairs under a veil of 
secrecy, and was exempt from the accepted rules of public and parliamentary 
supervision. Eisenstadt ýonsidered these matters in 1967 when he 
wrote: 
The debate (on the dangers of militarization) was 
transferred'(at the end of the fifties) from the 
military to the Ministries dealing with defence; 
fear of militarization was replaced by fear of the 
threat of monopolization of defence affairs. According 
to these theories administrative or political groups 
had gained a monopoly in control of defence affairs, 
and consequently the lack of suitable parliamentary, 
and even governmental. -control was becoming evident. 
These problems arose because the defence system, and 
in particular the the. Minister of Defence, had 
established a wide-ranging network of enterprises, and 
developed widespread activity with wide economic and 
political implications. The Ministry tended to 
conduct these activities without proper supervision - 
not only by the Knesset but even by the Cabinet and 
such matters were almost totally removed ifrom the 
sphere of legitimate public controversy. 
1 Eisenstadt, S. N. (1967: 270).. -Israeli Society Jerusalem. Magnes 
Press. 
But paradoxically, it was after Ben Gurion's withdrawal that the 
security sphere's autonomy became more significant. This became 
abundantly evident after the Six Day War, when the Ministry assumed 
responsibility for the administration of the Occupied Territories 
and when military industries-.. expanded rapidly. - 
In 1971 the State Comptroller publicly referred to this problem. 
To mark the publication of his Annual Report, he criticized the fact 
that the economic Ministries had refrained from intervening in the 
economic affairs of the defence establishment, which enjoyed such a 
large share of the state budget and the GNP, and maintained a separate 
economic system. 
The civil: 'admini-. tration cannot summon up even: one 
or two dozen experts capable of confronting the Ministry 
of Defence personnel on the 1conomic plane and 
influencing decision taking. 
The reason why Israel's internal political rivalries were focused on 
the defence establishment - the army and the Ministry of Defence - is 
clearly because the Defence Ministry's activities were wider and more 
extensive than any other Ministry. 
However an examination of the relationships between the Ministry, 
representing the civil body, and the military reveals an interesting- 
situation. 
The Ministry of Defence is a withered limb of the 
defence establishment and operates in accordance 
with the dictates of the General Staff 
according to the Assistant Minister of Defence and former Deputy 
2 
Chief of Staff and Major-General (Res. ) Israel Tal 'The Ministry has 
infinitesimal influence'; said its former Director-General, Coloiel 
3 
Yishayahu Lavi. It was not only senior Defence Ministry officials who 
held that opinion, but also retired generals, who when they were in 
uniform had penetrated into the civil sphere. 
1 Haaretz, 21 April 1971. 
2 Interview with Mai. -Gen. Israel Tal, 7 August 1977. 
3 Interview with Col. (Res. ) Yishayahu Lavi, 15 August 1977. 
In the historical evolution of our defence establishment 
we always had a strong army and a dominant:. General Staff 
in contrast to the civil Ministry of Defence, so that 
both parties perceived the-Ministry's main function as 
serving the army and fulfilling its needs. 1 
'It is in effect a Ministry of supply', said the former Premier 
Yitzhak Rabin. 
2 
And-a veteran observer of the IDF and Defence 
Ministry scene sums up: 'The Ministry exists in the heavy shadow 
of the IDF, and even in those spheres in which its formal 
authority is recognized, it does not succeed in exerting it'. 
3 
THE INFANCY OF THE DEFENCE MINISTRY 
By November 1947 it was already clear that Ben Gurion was not 
allowing the Ministry of Defence a significant role in the establishment. 
Having insisted that the IDF would be basically subordinate to the 
elected civil-institutions, " he adopted a totally different attitude 
to the Ministry. He saw it not as part of the supervisory system but 
as the auxiliary arm of the army. He propounded this view at a session 
of the Zionist Executive on 6 April, where he surveyed the overall plan 
for the construction of a military force and civil defence 
institutions. The role of the latter would be '... to recruit all our 
manpower to arms and to the economy... to prepare, produce and obtain 
In other words, 'to serve the the necessary military equipment... 
4 
army and to supply its needs in manpower resources, arms and financial 
5 
management. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Interview with Rehavam Zeevi, Maariv, 20 December 1979. 
Interview with Yitzhak Rabin, 11 August 1977. 
Zeev Schiff, Haaretz, 27 May 1977. 
Schiff, Zeev and Eitan Haber (1976: 70). Israel Army and 
Defence (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Zmora Bitan 
Interview with Minister of Defence's secretary... Haim . *Israeli, 
25 July 1977. 
The inspiration for this outlook was not hard to find. At the 
time,. Ben Gurion was striving to abolish those political bodies which 
controlled the military and, above all, the Haganah National Command. 
He flatly rejected a proposal that he appoint three deputies to deal 
with civil - spheres. Ultimately he wanted the army to be directly 
and-exclusively subject to his own authority. 
He was willing to entrust management of all matters 
to the General Staff Branches and to reserve for 
himself the Minister of Defence's Private Office 
which would deal with several special subjects 
unconnected with the army. 
When he realized that he would not be able to tackle the civil 
economic aspects of military organization as well, he agreed to appoint 
civil servants to the Ministry of Defence, including a Director-General 
and a Secretary-Genera l. 
I 
" 
Ben Gurion's desire to limit the importance of the new Ministry 
insofar as possible, led him to entrust several of the functions formerly 
fulfilled by the civil body, the National Command, to the army's General 
Staff. This desire was the driving force which shaped the basic pattern 
of Ministry - IDF relations. His close associates in the Ministry 
subsequently followed his lead. The first Secretary-General recalls in 
his memoirs that he made sure that the Ministry's Departments would be 
headed by former officers 'in the Chief of Staff's confidence.? 
During and after the War of Independence some of the top Yishuv 
leaders were connected with the Ministry., Levi Eshkol was its first 
Director-General, followed by Pinhas Sapir. '-. Israel Galili dealt with 
1 
2 
Testimony of first General Secretary of Ministry of Defence 
Yizraeli_Yosef (1972: 100,128-9) Security"Mission (Hebrew) 
Tel Aviv. Am Oved. 
Yizraeli, Y. (1972: 152). 
ti` 
manpower, purchases and production, and Shaul Avigur was also active in 
the Ministry. But the Defence Ministry was neglected in comparison to 
the army. It was less homogenously organized than other 
Ministries, operating mainly by improvization, each department being 
run. as an almost separate domain, largely influenced by the status of 
its director. Eshkol, for example, was able to hold the position of 
Director-General, and at the same time to be the Secretary of the Tel 
Aviv Labour Council. 
The Ministry's weaknesses also stemmed from the fact that it was 
created in wartime, when the General Staff had. already been in existence 
for some years. This enabled the army to take over areas usually 
under civil. control. Thus, for example, research on weapons develop- 
ment, formerly conducted by the civil, Scientific Department of the 
Haganah, was not transferred to the Ministry but to the IDF, where a 
Science Corps was set up. Civil defence, usually'the function of the 
Ministry of the Interior, was not entrusted to a civil body but 
to the army itself. The IDF was granted responsibility for military 
hospitals, for the cadet corps and other civil functions. 
Of particular importance was the fact that the post of defence 
establishment spokesman was assigned to the army. It is reasonable to 
assume that defence policy explanations, which are a civil-political 
activity, should be given by the civil office. However, it was located 
inside the army and not in the Ministry or in the Minister's office. 
The historical reason is that this function began during the Independence 
War-. before the Ministry was established. But even after the smoke had 
cleared the Chief of Staff Yadin, refused to relinquish the Military 
Spokesman's office from his jurisdiction. Yadin shared Ben Gurion's 
concept of the defence establishment's structure, and hence got his 
support. He, Ben Gurion, preferred to take advantage of - having a. 
military spokesman, one who was shielded by, his uniform and who enjoyed 
national glory. Hence he did not want to hand over this propaganda 
role to a civilian working in a*government office and exposed to 
greater public scrutiny. It was one of the methods Ben Gurion used, - 
to remove the defence issue from the arena of public debate and to 
strengthen his own monopoly. 
1 
As the Yishuv political personalities retired'from the Ministry 
administrative positions, Shimon Peres came to the fore. This young 
man, who at 20 had been the Secretary of Mapai's ''Working Youth' 
Movement, was assistant to Eshkol during the War of Independence and 
one of the outstanding young men associated with Ben Gurion. In 1952 
when he was only 29, he was appointed Deputy Director-General of the 
Ministry and a year later became Director.. His close association with 
Ben Gurion advanced his political position, and he was able to reform 
the Ministry's structure. But his efforts to consolidate the Ministry 
and to appropriate functions formerly carried out by the military, '' 
encountered considerable opposition by the General Staff and successive 
Chiefs of Staff. Yadin, who was a forceful and dominant Chief of Staff, 
prevailed in the. struggle with the Ministry, but in 1952 the institutional. 
and personal battle reached its height while Makleff was Chief of Staff. 
1 Until 1966 the Ministry had no spokesman-of. its own. Peres appointed 
Pinhas Yurman to manage public relations, but, in practice, he was 
personal spokesman of the Minister. When Eshkol became Defence 
Minister, he wanted to strengthen the public relations sphere and 
appointed a journalist, Eli Nissan, to that post, with the title of 
Assistant to the Public Relations Officer. Dayan called his 
. spokesman, the 
Ministry Spokesman. 
The relations between the Military Spokesman and the IDF Spokesman 
are illustrated by the fact that in 1977 the manpower establishment 
of the former's office consisted of 60 people, while the 
corresponding Ministry staff consisted of only one man. The way in 
which defence matters were presented to the Israeli public clearly 
reflected the status of the IDF as compared to the Ministry. 
The competition over construction and property, for example, 
illustrates the rivalry. Since the establishment of the IDF, the 
Engineering Corps has-been in charge of establishing new army camps 
and installations and for their maintenance. The proliferation of 
organizational, legal and commercial problems relating to the land 
purchase and construction placed a heavy burden on the Corps, 
distracting it from its main functions. Consequently, in 1952, two" 
new units -a contractors unit and a property unit - were set up in the 
Ministry of Defence, with the task of maintaining contact with civilian 
authorities and contractors, and dealing with land transfer, construction 
and maintenance. The IDF retained responsibility for planning and the 
routine management of bases. (In 1953 the two units were amalgamated 
in the Construction and Economic Division, later renamed Construction and 
Property bepartment). 
In that period changes were also introduced-in weapons research. 
The IDF Science Corps was abolished and its functions were transferred to 
the Ministry of Defence, where a Department for Research'and Planning 
was set up. Several other functions were also transferred at that time 
from the IDF to the Ministry. 
This process was connected to two factors. The first was Ben 
Gurion's growing awareness that the army's preoccupation with economic 
affairs interfered with its concentration on its basic defence tasks. 
Hence he thought that certain functions should be handed over to the 
Ministry even if its power was thereby augmented. Moshe Dayan, then 
Chief of Operations and Deputy Chief of Staff, concurred with this view. 
Ben Gurion's confidence in his political domination of the Ministry, 
through Peres and his associates, encouraged him to change his original 
limited view of it. The second factor was associated with the 
transfer of functions from the army to the Ministry; this last 
served Peres' political ambitions. He saw the opportunity 
to build up a political power bastion for himself and the young guard 
and he utilized the Ministry to thatr end. Many of the senior civil 
servants in the Ministry and the industries associated with it were 
Rafi activists. 
The institutional conflict between army and Ministry was further 
aggravated by the personal tension and competition for-power and 
prestige between Makleff and Peres. Their differences were so blatant 
as to cause unease among the senior officers. It is customary in the 
IDF for the command of 'Attention' to be given when a senior officer 
enters a room. When both the Director-General of the Ministry and the 
Chief of Staff attended meetings, the officers did not know what 
procedure to follow. ' Some called for 'Attention' to Peres, and others 
to Makleff and it was very embarrassing) The personal-relationship- - 
between Peres and Makleff worsened when Peres pursued direct*contacts 
with the Deputy Chief of Staff. Dayan ;a technique he continued to 
employ in subsequent years. 
The disputes were submitted to Ben Gurion, who in most cases- 
supported Peres and Dayan. 'I had the clear impression that M (Makleff) 
suffered from an inferiority complex and suspected that his authority 
was being undermined. 'This is distressing and sad`, Ben Gurion wrote 
in his diary. 
2 
In mid-1953 Makleff demand of Ben Gurion on several occasions 
that IDF-Ministry relations be reformed, that the composition of the 
General Staff be altered, and that Dayan be removed from office. Ben 
Gurion flatly refused, and in September, after a lengthy discussion with 
Makleff, he wrote in his diary: 
I rejected his view that the Chief'of Staff should also be in charge of finance, supplies and economic supervision as adviser to the Minister of Defence... the Chief of Staff 
1 Interview with Maj. -Gen. (Res. ) Yosef, Geva, former CO Central Command 
and Military Attache in Washington. 
1 Ben Gurion's diary entry for 7 May 1953, See, Bar Zohar, M. (1977: 948) 
Ben Gurion Tel Aviv. Am Oved. 
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is the supreme commander of the armed forces, not an 
expert on finance, nor has he the time to deal with 
this matter. The Minister has two main assistants: 
a Chief of Staff to train the army and a civilian 
assistant (Director-General of the Ministry) for 
finance and management. The work is coordinated at 
all levels and it is good that the General Staff and 
the Director-General are in the same building. 
Makleff agreed with me but commented that there were 
personal problems. I said that I judge by principles, 
and was notIspeaking of myself, him or Peres 
personally. 
On October 11 Makleff submitted his resignation, and on the same 
day Ben Gurion announced that Dayan would be the next Chief of Staff. 
At the beginning of December he appointed Dayan to the post and Peres 
as Director-General of the Ministry. 
THE MINISTRY AND THE ARMY -'CONTENDERS FOR AUTHORITY 
The poor relations between the General Staff and higher echelons 
of the Ministry greatly concerned Ben Gurion in that period. Before 
he retired to Sde Boker he had prepared a five year plan for the IDF. 
At a special session of the Cabinet on 19 October 1953 he said 
The question which arises from time to time is that 
of the relations between the civil. authority and 
the military authority in the Ministry of Defence. 
Different countries have different regimes, and in 
almost every country there are lengthy debates on the 
powers of various authorities. This debate exists 
in Israel as-well. At times it becomes more acute and. 
hampers work, and a clear-cut decision is required. 
I could find no authoritative example in other countries 
which we could emulate because: 
(a) every country has its own customs; 
(b) conditions-here do not resemble those of England 
or America, for example. 
In the army itself there are two trends. One wants 
the General Staff and Chief of Staff to control' all 
defence and military matters on the instructions of 
the Minister of Defence, and to utilize civilian 
assistants and experts, just as several corps and 
commands utilize civilians under military administra- 
tion. The second trend favours restricting the General 
Staff's jurisdiction to 'purely' military matters, all 
financial and management affairs above the field level 
to be handled by the civil administration of the 
Ministry of Defence, who should employ soldiers in 
appropriate positions. 
Ben Gurion's diary entry fdr 23 September 1953, Zohar, M. 1 Bar 
(1977: 948). 
Because of the special security situation in this 
country, and in order to observe the two guiding 
principles of efficiency and economy, I do not 
propose to impose on the Chief of Staff concern 
and responsibility for the management and 
financial aspect. 
1. Our army is young and operates under more arduous 
conditions than possibly any other country in the 
world - because we are still'at war with all our 
neighbours and under-siege. The Chief of Staff 
and his staff must concentrate their efforts on 
military planning and raising the standards of 
our army... 
2. The question of the economy is more important to us 
than to America or even England and France, Belgium 
and Scandinavia. 
Our security depends not only on the army but to no less 
a degree on immigration, settlement and the development 
of the economy and culture. Our material and spiritual 
ability as a nation is the determinant and our needs are 
many. We cannot waste a single superfluous penny on - 
military affairs. The military mind inevitably sees all 
things from the army angle, and does not always 
appreciate the other needs of the state. And the 
Minister of Defence should not rely solely on the single 
viewpoint of the Chief of Staff. When all defence 
personnel are subordinate to the Chief of Staff - the 
army will receive only one viewpoint, because the 
army is based on a hierarchy and on discipline. 
It is not easy (though not impossible) for an army man 
to accept that there are other national needs apart from 
those of the army, and that'it is necessary to select 
priorities between defence needs and other basic needs - 
with a general balanced preference for traditional needs. 
3. By their very nature, military affairs in the narrower 
sense, and economic affairs are not identical. And a 
person gifted in one of these spheres need not 
necessarily be talented in the other... A Chief of 
Staff should be appointed above all, for his military 
qualifications. 
It therefore seems to me that we must separate all matters 
pertaining to finance, and the higher level of financial 
and economic supervision from the defence administration... 
And the Minister of Defence should have an assistant for- 
finance and manpower needs. This chief assistant is now 
called Director-General of the Ministry of Defence and 
there is no need to seek a new title. The Director should 
of course have assistants and deputies for the various 
spheres of activity, but they must work in constant 
coordination with the General Staff insitütions; -l 
particularly the Training and Manpower Divisions... 
1 Protocol of Cabinet session, 19 October 1953. 
Ben Gurion did not in fact give an accurate picture of the 
various alternatives for relations between the IDF and the Ministry. 
First. -, he should 
have distinguished between the integrated structure, 
whereby civil " and military functions are maintained within an 
integral institutional framework, and the separate structures, 
consisting of two independent hierarchies: one specializing in the 
operational function and the other in everything else. He ignored the 
possibility that the branches of the General Staff might be part of the 
Ministry, as in most of the countries he mentioned. Such a high level 
of integration of the military and the government bureaucracy. was 
unacceptable to him. The second alternative remained - namely 
institutional division by functional classification. 
But here. _, too Ben Gurion mentioned only two of a wide range of 
possibilities. The first was to unify the Ministry under the roof of 
the General Staff, the second was to differentiate between civil 
functions. to be performed by. the Ministry, and military functions to 
be carried out by the General Staff. He completely ignored a third 
possibility; that the Ministry should supervise the General Staff 
Branches. This omission was quite predictable since Ben Gurion's idea 
of civil control over the army, was that he himself should exert 
that 
control This raises a basic problem associated with the weakness of 
the civil supervisory system which Ben Gurion devised: can the Minister 
of Defence-serve in reality as the authority, and not merely in theory, 
if he lacks the staff and advisory bodies that could help him to arrive 
at a balanced assessment of army recommendations? When Ben Gurion 
decided that the Ministry would be separate from the army and would not 
serve as the supervisory body, was he not making the Minister of 
Defence the prisoner of the army? 
on 3 August 1966, -in the course of, a 
Knesset debate, the Deputy 
Defence Minister. Peres, presented'a more sophisticated version of 
Ben Gurion's viewpoint. The principle of the separation of functions 
was realized in two ways, he said: 
The horizontal method says that economic and public 
activities should be*concentrated in the hands of 
the civil: author'ity,, implementation to be entrusted' 
to the military arm. According to the vertical sep- 
aration, every matter pertaining to manpower and 
materials before they reach the army and after they 
leave it will be the responsibility of the civil 
body. While in the army they will be under military 
command. 1 
But is this a real distinction? Is it possible to discriminate 
between operational and economic activity? Who is to decide, for 
-example, how much money to allocate to training and-how-much to the 
purchase of new arms? Is the development of an existing weapon a, 
matter 'which has not yet reached the army' or not? Who should deal 
with strategic planning? 
Peres' definition neither solved these problems nor reflected the 
true facts. The IDF engaged in productive activity (from manufacturing 
shoes to building tanks), acted in parallel with the Ministry in activity 
related to 'man and materials' before and after they reached the IDF 
(Gadna activities, operating a radio station in competition with the 
national broadcasting service, construction work,. etc. ) and fulfilled 
characteristically civilian functions (bridge-building, agricultural 
work, teaching in schools etc. ). 
The 'prevailing tune in the defence establishment in Eshkol's 
time was a variation on Ben Gurion's theme: 
1 Divrei Haknesset Vol. 46: 2377-2385. 
The IDF determines what is needed, how much and when. 
The Ministry of Defence decides how and. where from. This 
formula reflected far more accurately the division of the 
roles between'the army and the Ministry. It exempted.. the 
army's role-expansion, but did not solve the problem of 
the relations between the two bodies. If the IDF decides, 
for example, that it needs 50,000 rifles, the constraints 
it dictates as to 'what and when' greatly restrict the 
Ministry's freedom to determine 'where and how'. 1 
Eshkol's formula could not lessen the main problem. in Ben Gurion's 
formula: can the Minister of Defence effectively use his authority' 
when there is a_ power imbalance between the IDF and the'Ministry: 
The annals of the 30 years of Ministry-IDF relations I are a tale 
of constant struggle over definition of spheres of operation, *authority, 
power and influence. The general public was unaware of this struggle, 
as were many politicians who were not closely associated with the 
higher ranks of the defence establishment. The Military Censor banned 
publication of criticism of the army, 'arguing that publication of 
information on differences of opinion between officers, would undermine 
public and military morale. - Any analysis of the relations between the 
army and the Ministry of Defence was also a state secret.. A statement 
by a senior civil servant in the Ministry that: 'the army dominates the 
defence establishment' was banned by the Censor. 
2 But in spite of the 
ups and downs in the relationship between the army and the Ministry and 
the shifting balance of power'between them, the fundamental characteristic 
remained the same, 'the army's predominance prevailed 
... military issues dealt with by the Minister are put 
before him by the Chief of Staff. In most cases the 
Minister does not even know that there'are other' 
contradictory opinions in the army, and there is left 
to the Minister only one possibility - to approve the 
Chief of Staff's proposal. 3 
1 
2 
3 
ýrieDrew/ 
Interview with' Maj -Gen. Israel 'Tal, 7 August 19.77. 
Goren, Dina (1976: 203-6) Secrecy, -Defence and Freedom of the Press 
Rehavam Zeevi, Maariv, 20 December 1979. 
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In 1966 the public first learned details of the institutional 
disputes which were an integral feature of the relationship between 
the Ministry and the army. Eshkol was Prime Minister and Minister 
of Defence and Dr Zvi Dinstein was his Deputy in the Ministry. The 
men who had. controlled the defence establishment before them, and who 
were pious supporters-of the doctrine that a veil should be drawn 
over the defence establishment, namely Ben Gurion, Dayan and Peres, 
were now leaders of Rafi. As such they exploited the dispute between 
the IDF and the Ministry for their own political purposes. 
RIVALS AT THE TOP 
The main protagonists were naturally the Chief of Staff and 
General Staff officers on the one hand, and the Ministry's senior 
staff on the other. It is interesting to examine the composition of 
the latter. Peres entered the fourth Knesset in 1959 as one of Ben 
Gurion's proteges, in December of the same year he was promoted from 
Director-General to Deputy Minister and held the post until Ben 
Gurion's resignation in 1963. Asher (Arthur) Ben Nathan, another of 
the young Ben Gurionites and a senior Ministry official, was appointed 
Director-General. 
I 
Throughout the period, and particularly in its 
second half, Peres, in effect, wielded ministerial powers, since Ben 
Gurion gave him considerable freedom of action and full backing. 
Peres remained in office for only a short while after Eshkol took 
over-as Premier and, upon his resignation, was succeeded by Zvi 
Dinstein. Ben Nathan resigned when Rafi-Mapai relations deteriorated 
in 1965, and was succeeded by Colonel (Res. ) Moshe Kashti, a graduate 
of the IDF economic establishment and subsequently that of the Ministry. 
Ben Nathan was the head of the Defence Ministry's delegation in 
France, in 1966 the first Israeli ambassador to West Germany. 
When Peres became Defence Minister he appointed Nathan to be his 
political assistant. 
From 1958 he had been Deputy Director-General for Finance and 
Economics, associated-with Eshkol and Sapir, and he stayed in his 
new post until 1970.1 
There were no problems between Peres and Ben Nathan, since the 
latter accepted the former's political authority. The same could not 
be-said of Dinstein and Kashti. The tension between Director-General 
and Deputy Minister was exacerbated further when Dayan came into the 
Ministry in 1967. He appointed Lieutenant-General (Res. ) Zvi Zur 
as his Deputy. Since he was not a member of the Knesset, Zur could 
not become Deputy Minister and hence was denoted Assistant to-the 
Minister. In effect, he wielded considerable power because of the 
authority which Dayan delegated to him, particularly, in the sphere of 
military industry, purchases, research and development, 'where his 
influence was virtually the same as a Minister. Inevitably, disputes 
broke out between Kashti, an Eshkol man, and Zur, *a Dayan protege, 
culminating in Kashti's resignation in 1970. 
These internal clashes continued when Lavi took over from Kashti, 
and he too submitted his resignation in 1972. His successor was Yitzhak 
Ironi, former Director of the Military Industries, who died in 1975, and 
was succeeded by Dr Pinhas Zussman. When Dayan resigned from the Cabinet, 
Zur went with him. The new Minister Peres did not appoint a Deputy or 
senior adviser, preferring a staff of several advisers. The senior staff 
of the Ministry underwent a period of upheaval, graver than any 
experienced during the tension between Deputy Minister and Director 
General. 
1 He was Chief of Payments Section, Financial Adviser to the Chief 
of Staff, and the first man, in 1956, to combine this post with that 
of Chief of Finance Division in the Ministry of Defence. Se Naor, 
Mordechai (ed. ) (1977). Strung Bow. Friends Reminisce about Moshe 
Kashti (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Milo. 
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The personal relations within the higher echelons of the Ministry 
took different forms in different periods: a pattern of acceptanceýof 
the Deputy Minister's authority by the Director-Geneial'(Peres and 
Ben-Nathan; Zur and. Troni) balanced relations (Dinstein and Kashti) 
äntagopism (Zur and Kashti, Zur. and Lavi).. But with the exception 
of periods when the two protagonists belonged to different political 
groups (Zur and Kashti, Dinstein and Ben Nathan) the disputes, apart from 
the personal element, were conducted against a background of administra- 
tive controversy on powers, definition of roles and seniority, hence 
beyond the scope of political-military relations. It is much more 
relevant to analyze the struggle between the military, in the person 
of the Chief of Staff, 'and the Ministry, represented by the central 
personality, the Director-General (Peres, Kashti), Deputy Minister 
(Peres, Dinstein) or Assistant Minister (Zur). 
TABLE 1Q 
SENIOR. -STAFF 
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 1948-1977 
Minister 
Ben Gurion (1948) 
Pinhas Lavon (1954) 
Ben Gurion (1955) 
Ben Gurion 
Levi Eshkol (1963) 
Moshe Dayan (1967) 
Deputy-Assistant Director-General 
Minister 
Shimon Peres (1959) 
Shimon Peres 
Zvi Dinstein (1963) 
Zvi Dinstein 
Zvi Zur (1967) 
Zvi Zur 
Zvi Zur 
Levi Eshkol (1948) 
Eliezer Peri (1949) 
Pinhas. Sapir (1949) 
Zeev Shind (1951) 
Shimon Peres (1952) 
Shimon Peres (1954) 
Shimon Peres 
Asher Ben Nathan (1959 
Asher Ben Nathan 
Asher Ben Nathan 
Moshe Kashti (1965) 
Moshe Kashti 
Yeshayahu Lavi (1970) 
Yitzhak Ironi (1972) 
Shimon Peres (1974) - 
Pinhas Zusman (1975) 
On only one occasion was a dissenting viewpoint voiced inside the 
Mapai leadership about the role of the Ministry. On 24 February 1955, 
Lavon submitted a document to Ben Gurion, containing proposals for 
reform to the defence establishment. Guided by his belief in the need 
to increase ministerial control of the army' and for more stringent 
civil. -, supervision, Lavon regarded the Ministry as the Minister's 
vital auxiliary instrument. He'therefore proposed various measures to 
strengthen it: the establishment of an Armaments Council, headed by 
the Minister; a merger of the Military Spokesman's Office with the 
Public Relations Department, of the Ministry of Defence; increased 
authority for the Ministry Treasurer, the appointment of three advisers 
in the Minister's private office '(finance, management, organization) with 
free access to all parts of the defence establishment. 
) 
Ben Gurion was 
consistent in his outlook, which was shared by Peres and Dayan, and 
Lavon's proposals met with no response. - 
During Peres' and Dayan's terms of office as Director of-the 
Ministry and Chief of Staff respectively,, there was a high degree of 
cooperation between Ministry and IDF, and consensus on the division 
of functions among them. Dayan was mainly concerned with improving 
the army's professional standards and expanding his own influence over 
defence policy-making, and he was only too pleased to permit the 
Ministry to deal with arms purchase, and management of economic matters. 
Peres accepted Dayan's authority not only on professional, military 
matters, but also in the political sphere, and exploited the opportunity 
to develop and expand the Ministry. Thus relations between them were 
relatively harmonious. 
On proposals to strengthen the direct authority of the Minister of 
Defence over the IDF see chapter on the Cabinet.. A copy of 
the letter is filed in the private archives of Levi Yitzhak 
Hayerushalmi, Tel-Aviv. 
When Laskov became Chief of Staff in 1958 the tension between the 
Ministry and the IDF resurfaced. Before assuming office Laskov had 
expressed his willingness to relinquish military authority over- 
Gadna, the Youth Cadet Corps, and Haga, the Civil Defence, but as 
Chief of Staff he refused to recognize the Ministry's authority in 
these spheres. 
1 
The antagonism between Laskov and Peres increased 
when the latter became-Deputy, Ministry and demanded authority not only 
to influence appointments, which were not related to specifically 
military subjects, but also to intervene in the IDF itself. Peres, 
for example, insisted on direct meetings with senior officers to 
discuss military matters. 
Laskov opposed this practice and the matter was turned over 
to Ben Gurion to decide. When Ben Gurion ruled against the Chief 
of Staff, the latter responded in an angry letter. This aroused 
Ben Gurion's 'amazement and sorrow'. 
2 
The poor relations between 
Laskov and Peres were among the factors which led Ben Gurion to 
accept Laskov's decision to retire in December 1960. Laskov, like 
Makleff, suffered friction with Peres and also held his post very 
briefly, 
The new Chief of Staff Zvi Zur also wanted structural changes 
in the defence establishment. He demanded inter alia to appropriate 
various functions in the manpower and armament spheres. But he 
eventually accepted the authority of the Deputy Minister to a larger 
degree than had his predecessor, and this may have been partly because 
of their similar political affiliation. Zur was*also willing to 
encourage a higher degree of cooperation between the Ministry and the 
army by setting up joint boides. This had first been done in 1956 when 
1 
2 
Zeev Schiff, Haaretz, 12 August 1966. 
Bar Zohar, M. (1977: 1434)". 
the financial assistant to the Chief-, of Staff became also the head 
of the Budget Department'6f the Ministry. . 
Towards the end of Zur's 
term of office, the Deputy Minister and the Chief of Staff submitted 
a far-reaching joint proposal for amalgamation of the Manpower and 
Quartermaster 'Branches of the Ministry and the IDF. Zur even agreed 
that these Branches should be subordinate to the Deputy Minister 
rather than to the Chief of Staff, and was willing to accept a 
compromise solution by appointing officers and civilians to head them 
in rotation. The proposal was eventually shelved. 
ZVI: DINSTEIN --'THE 'ABORTIVE 'REFORM 
The controversy came out into the open for the first time., as a 
result of Dr Zvi Dinstein's proposals for reform. The three main 
items in his plan were: 
(a) All IDF manpower matters should be dealt with by the Manpower 
Branch of the General Staff; . 
(b) Purchases abroad, and in Israel, for all sections of the defence 
establishment, including military industries, should be carried 
out by the General Staff : Quartermaster Branch; 
(c) Separate management of budgets and finance in the General Staff and 
the post of financial adviser to the Chief of Staff should be 
abolished, and a centre for financial control should be established 
in the Ministry of Defence. 
Additional proposals included the transfer of youth and Nahal 
affairs from the Ministry to the IDF, the establishment of a department to 
encourage domestic productions and purchase of domestic products 
by the IDF, 
the setting up of a scientific advisory body to advise the Minister and 
supervise R and D units, particularly the Nuclear Research Centre in 
Dimona and the Tactical Weapons Division. It was a far- 
reaching scheme. The transfer of various departments to the IDF 
had been proposed in the past, but this time the initiative came 
from the civil authority and was, more radical than ever before. 
l 
Dinstein claimed that his plan was aimed at. a more rational 
distribution of functions between the military and the Ministry, which 
could improve efficiency and further economy by cutting out duplication. 
According to his plan, 'he said,; -. the IDF would take over some non- 
operational functions, but the Ministry would gain strength by the 
concentration and extension of supervision and financial allocation. 
The centre for financial control was envisaged as an extended Finance 
Department, to conduct economic evaluations and analyses of the-IDF's 
demands, and to ensure close supervision by the appointment of 
2 
finance officers to all IDF units. 
Dinstein's plan encountered angry responses from both the IDF and 
the Ministry. The Chief of Staff Rabin. took a positive view of the 
idea of transferring departments to the IDF, but was violently opposed 
to the establishment of a system of budgetary control for the army, and 
the abolition of the latter's separate independent financial system. 
The Director-General of the Ministry and its senior staff were against 
all aspects of the scheme. They claimed that it would not in fact 
result in the planned manpower saving and would impose an added burden 
on the IDF in purchase and supply activity, thus distracting the army 
The army itself had never aspired to take over the functions of 
the rehabilitation of the wounded, commemoration of the war dead 
or training of demobilized soldiers. 
2 Interview with Dr Zvi Dinstein, 8 September 1977. 
from concentrating on its main function, preparedness for a possible 
war. They feared that the IDF would gain power by accepting 
additional functions, and would be able to prevent the transformation 
of the Ministry into a supervisory body. The planned centre for control 
would be nothing but a small insignificant finance department. This, 
they claimed, would disturb the existing balance between Ministry and 
IDF and might even endanger Israeli democracy. 
In the light of the severe criticism, Dinstein decided to amend 
the scheme. The settlement movements objected to the idea of transferring 
the Youth and Nahal Divisions to the army, and since they exerted 
considerable influence in the Ministry, Dinstein was forced to capitulate. 
He was also obliged to give in to-pressure by Ministry senior officials 
about the structure of purchase missions abroad. He agreed that the 
mission heads should be responsible to the Ministry and not the army, 
although it was the IDF which was to deal with purchases. The 
compromise created an anomalous structure. 
Dinstein found it hard to explain how he could ensure civil control 
by means of financial supervision. He was accused of ulterior political 
motives - of trying to win popularity within the army - even of 
endangering democracy. The Rafi group hastened to exploit the proposal and 
launched an attack on the Eshkol Government on their favourite issue - 
its unreliability in defence affairs. 
When the amended plan was submitted to Eshkol, he found himself 
under heavy pressure from both the Ministry and the IDF. He nonetheless 
gave it his backing and submitted it to the Ministerial Committee on 
Defence. Here he discovered that his coalitionary partners, Ahdut 
Haavoda and Mapam, did not like it either. They concurred with the 
argument that the plan would strengthen the IDF and weaken the Ministry 
and the civil control arm. 
Eshkol and Dinstein were forced to retreat, but since total 
withdrawal would have been interpreted as proof of error o they 
preferred to compromise. It was decided to implement only one 
recommendation, which was to transfer to the IDF the recruiting offices, 
which were part of the Manpower Division of the Ministry, while 
leaving all other manpower matters in their existing pattern. 
1 
Dinstein argued that this would prevent duplication and reduce the 
staff by 80. In order to ensure civil. supervision, civilian 
representatives would continue to serve on the public committees 
attached to recruiting offices. (These committees dealt-with payments 
to the families of enlisted men, exemptions or postponement of 
service etc. ). Dinstein continued his efforts to improve the efficiency 
of the defence industries and to convert them from government 
departments to independent companies, run on a separate economic basis 
with profit considerations. He partially succeeded by converting the 
aeronautic industry into a public company, but the military industry 
remained within the ministry. 
The storm died down but the public debate continued, the Opposition 
exploiting the issue for its own ends. On 3 August 1966. the Knesset 
discussed a proposal by Peres, which criticized the plan to transfer 
recruiting offices, and asserted that there would be no more than 17-18 
redundancies, and.. whzch was an attack on the Government. He said that 
his request that the reform proposal be discussed by the Knesset Defence 
and Foreign Affairs Committee, before the Cabinet took a final decision, 
had been ignored. 
What is the point of this Committee if a legitimate 
request for discussion is ignored by the Minister of 
Defence, who anticipates that, the Knesset and its 
Committees will become institutions eager. to 
approve accomplished, distorted facts. 2 
1 Zeev Schiff, Haaretz, 14 August 1966. 
2 See summary of Knesset deliberations, Haaretz, 4 August 1966. 
Peres also criticized the Censor's Office for having banned 
publication of facts relating to the reforms until after the Government 
took its decision, thus precluding public debate. 
... this is unprecedented 
intervention... 
politicization of censorship and diminution of 
its image. In this case it was given a task which 
serves not defence interests but miserable narrow 
political interests... 
Eshkol devoted most of his reply to explaining why it was 
necessary to convert the defence industry into a series of companies, 
i. e. units with regular financial management. The debate deteriorated 
into an exchange of personal recriminations, mainly between the 
leaders of Rafi and of the Government, and ended in a Government victory. 
Dinstein's reform scheme ended in double defeat. Eshkol's 
policy was to increase civil supervision of the military and to 
check the growth of the defence empire, which had flourished under 
Peres as Deputy Minister. But"Dinstein's proposal, if implemented, 
would have fortified the military and undermined the civil arm of 
the defence establishment. The failure was due both to the distortion of 
Eshkol's principle policy concerning the relationship between the IDF 
and the ministry, and also to a miscalculation of the political damage 
to Mapai and the Government as a result of the scheme. Rafi was now 
able to depict itself as the champion of democratization of the defence 
establishment. 
But Eshkol did not abandon the idea of fostering the Ministry of 
Defence as the planner and controller of the economic aspects of 
defence activity. He was thus able to exploit his qualifications as 
a former Minister of Finance who had economic experience. His deputy 
discussed this issue with him at length. 
I said to him: that when railway personnel propose a 
new rail line, the Transport Ministry experts 
examine the'plan. Why shouldn't the Ministry of 
Defence experts examine plans submitted by the army? 
And one should recall that at the time we were 
moving from the era of simple weapons to1that of 
sophisticated and costly weapons. system. 
Eshkol therefore appointed a team of experts led by the economist.. 
Professor Eitan Berglas, to serve as the Ministry's planning and 
evaluating body vis-a-vis the IDF. Its task was to acquaint itself 
with the planning calculations of the General Staff, to assess their 
feasibility and to estimate the requested financial allocations. Among 
the first projects whose long term cost benefit the team was asked to 
evaluate was missiles and planes. 
But the team never managed to get down to work. The'Chief of Staff 
Rabin strongly objected to intervention in what he considered his area. 
of jurisdiction. He prevented the flow of data to the team'and""told 
his associates: 
When I submit a budget I do so as Chief of Staff 
considering all Israel's security needs. I am not 
willing to have someone examine 2 
(my decisions) from 
the shopkeeper's point of view. 
Eshkol was forced to relinquish the plan. 
The Six Day War and War of Attrition had a catalytic effect on 
both the IDF and the Ministry. The military expanded at an unprecedented 
rate, adopted modern arms systems, and undertook new tasks both in the 
Occupied Territories and in the campaign against terrorist organizations. 
The Chief of Staff now became a 'quasi-minister'-: The Ministry too 
changed, first and foremost because of the development of military 
industries, .. the decision to commence production of new weapons systems, 
and the military deployment in the Territories. 
1 Interview with Zvi Dinstein, 8 September 1977. 
2 Uzi Benziman, Haaretz, 28 April 1974. ' 
THE MINISTRY'S FAILURE TO IMPOSE-ITS AUTHORITY 
The expansion of the spheres of activity of both Ministry and IDF 
called for a higher, more complex level of co"öperation and co- 
ordination. But in this crucial period the imbalance between them 
became even more acute. To cite only one example. " the IDF purchased 
a computer; for manpower deployment, purchases and supplies- in the 
late fifties, while the Ministry continued to use old-fashioned 
manual methods. When the Director-General, Lavi, proposed to 
establish. ajoint information base for the -Quartermaster Is' Branch and 
the Air Force to be integrated with the Ministry's information base, 
the IDF flatly refused to cooperate. The result was that the IDF 
prepared lists of requirements by computer methods, which were then 
sent to the Ministry and translated back into the old cumbersome system. 
It'wäs clear that reform in the Ministry was a sine qua non for its 
own effectiveness, without which it would be impossible to improve 
liaison between it and the IDF. Improvement of civil-supervision 
over the military seemed an unrealistic aspiration. 
The changes in the IDF personnel and the stagnation in the Ministry 
of Defence highlighted the gap between the two institutions. Most 
senior IDF officers had been recruited in the forties from the young 
Israeli elite, -, the Ministry, on the other hand, did not attract first 
class manpower. While the rapid turnover on the basis of merit in the 
IDF constantly brought young talents to the fore, promotion in the 
Ministry of Defence was affected by party loyalty considerations. The 
discrepancies in manpower quality and administrative standards led the 
IDF to adopt an attitude of contempt. towards the Ministry at a time 
when coordination, if not supervision, was more essential than 
previously. In the second half of the sixties. several attempts were 
launched to make the Ministry more efficient, apart from its relations 
with the IDF. 
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Efforts were also made to deal with problems arising between the 
two bodies, and more than a dozen special committees were established 
to deal with them. They had no better life, however, than the Berglas 
Committee of 1967. One was appointed on 20 September 1970 by the 
Director-Generals Lavi,, to examine the organization, structure and 
operation of the Ministry. Consisting of Dr Pinhas Zusman, Zvi Zafriri 
and Avraham Ben Yosef, --two veteran Ministry officials, and Major- 
General Israel Tal, it was asked to concentrate on those departments and 
units having points of contact with the IDF and the civilian milieu, and 
to employ a systems analysis method. 
Nine days later, the Director-General sent a letter to the Chief of 
Staff,. the Chiefs of Operations, Intelligence, "Supply and Training, '. 
Branches and Air Force and Navy Corps, informing them of the establish- 
ment of the Committee. '... In the course of its work, the Committee 
will come into contact with IDF and defence establishment factors... 
I shall be grateful if you will offer your assistance... '1 
The IDF responded swiftly. On 7 October, the Chief of Staff Barley 
wrote back to Lavi in terms teminiscent of Rabin's letter to Eshkol, 
expressing strong objections to interference by the Ministry in 
the army: 'The Committee's concern is the Ministry of Defence, and not 
the departments, arms and corps of the IDF'-. On 26 October he wrote to 
all the recipients of Lavi's letter, expliLitly: 'You are requested not 
to discuss with the Committees problems relating to the organization 
and structure of the IDF 
1' 
. The 
Committee had no alternative but to confine its activities to 
the Ministry. In the opening section of its report, it'stated that the 
1 
This letter and others on the Committee's recommendationsw are in 
the Ministry of Defence files. 
starting point for its work had been.., 'that the purpose of the Ministry 
within the system is an accepted fact'. Nonetheless several of the 
recommendations related not only to the internal structure and division 
of labour within the Ministry, but also to its boundaries. Inter alia, 
the Committee recommended the establishment of a joint General Staff- 
Ministry body for strategic policy planning, and-proposed the establish- 
ment of long-term planning for national defence; reform of the structure 
of supervision and control in the defence establishment. It proposed 
reform of the liaison between IDF units and Ministry purchase missions 
abroad:, based on direct contact without the mediation of the Ministry. 
As in the case of previous Committees, only a small proportion of 
the recommendations were implemented. But Lavi did. not ddspair of his 
attempts to increase the Ministry's influence over the IDF. Believing. 
as he did in the need to use systems analysis not only for the 
preparation of the defence budget, but also as the central instrument for 
analysis and formulation of defence policy itself, he attributed great 
importance to the Ministry. 
I thought that the Ministry shoülä represent the 
Government on defence matters, and bear overall 
responsibility for determining and implementing 
defence policy. Only the Ministry has the necessary 
wide ranging vision and can deal with defence 
functions not as isolated activities, but in 
interaction with other activities. 1 
Lavi realized that under the prevailing system of ordering weapons, 
whereby the army decided for itself which weapons systems it required 
and provided the Ministry with specifications, the Ministry was in 
effect merely the IDF's agent. 
1 Interview with Yeshayahu Lavi, 15 August 1977. 
As weapons systems became increasingly sophisticated, 
the citing of exact specifications determined what 
product would be purchased, and in most cases even 
who the manufacturer would be. Thus the status of 
the Ministry-was reduced even by its own limited 
criteria. This implied neutralization of the 
Minister's power of civil supervision. - 
Since the mid-sixties.. demands for Ministry participation in arms 
purchases have been made on three levels. At the lowest level the 
Ministry demanded to have wider margins to-: select weapons 
systems which would meet the necessary specifications provided by the 
army. At a higher level, the Ministry asked to be supplied not only 
with the IDF's first choice, but also with details of the various 
alternatives considered by the military. At the highest level it 
insisted on being granted the authority to make the final decision, 'using 
the Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System. Most demands were made at 
the lowest level,. and only rarely at the second level. Lavi tried to 
reach the highest level, but soon discovered that this was fruitless. 
One of the earlier examples concerned the Air Force Commander Mordehäi 
Hod, and the Chief of Staff, Haim Barley. In the early seventies the Air 
Force Command decided to purchase a navigation and control system, based 
on a computer, with a unit price per aircraft of 200 thousand dollars. 
The Air Force examined the technical aspects, selected a U_. S, manufacturer 
and recommended a system to the Ministry. When the order reached the 
Director-General, he refused to sign it and asked for a detailed explana- 
tion of how the decision had been taken. 
. 
General Hod objected at first, but when the Director-General 
remained adamant, he was forced to accede. Lavi then asked to examine 
the two alternative proposals considered by the Air Force, even 
appointing a team to study the problem. An important part of its data 
was collected clandestinely through personal ties with an Air Force 
officer. The team differed with the Air Force's conclusion, and the 
matter was brought before the Minister for a final decision. Lavi 
summed up the affair as follows. 
The Minister of Defence supported me in this case, but 
it was clear that he did so because I was. new. I soon 
learned that in most cases the army won these battles 
and not. the Ministry. I very soon came to realize that 
I was the only one who made an effort to introduce that 
concept. It did not correspond with. an institutional 
one. I think that on my departure there were even 
fewer people in the Ministry who supported-my outlook. 
One of the main bones of contention between the military and the 
Ministry, particularly in the mid-sixties, was the question of a 
preference for foreign equipment to local production. In most cases, 
the IDF demanded that weapons be purchased abroad. The reasons were 
very simple, the equipment was well known and reliable and could be 
obtained relatively quickly. The senior bureaucracy of the Ministry 
championed the development of local production, arguing that the draw- 
back. of delayed supply was counterbalanced by the advantage of 
consolidating the Israeli arms industry which, would contribute to 
Israel's technological advancement and ensure long-term self-sufficiency. 
The military tended to regard the Ministry as an interested party, since 
arms industries were under Ministry tutelage, and was also wary of the 
quality' of Israeli arms and the delivery period. 
An example illustrates the army's attitude. Until 1966 IDF fighter 
planes were not equipped with an air to ground communications system 
to identify enemy aircraft. When Rabin submitted a request to purchase 
this equipment, the Director-General- Kashti claimed that it could be 
manufactured in Israel. The Chief of Staff objected, both because he 
doubted the reliability of the Israeli product, and because of the long 
delivery delay. Eshkol was asked to decide the matter and arrived at 
1 Interview with Lavi, 15 August 1977. 
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a typical compromise. American- planes would be{ equipped with 
instruments manufactured in the United States, and other aircraft 
would later be fitted with Israeli-made units. 
' 
THE ARMY DOMINATES THE JOINT BODIES 
In order to ensure greater coordination between the IDF and the 
Ministry, the number of joint bodies was increased. The Chief of 
Staff was ready to accept such bodies only when he was confident that 
he could manipulate them, or in the isolated cases when the Minister 
insisted. In 1956 it had been decided that the head of the Ministry's 
Budget Department would also'serve as financial adviser to the 
Chief of Staff. This dual role was in line with the trend towards 
coordination, but the fact that a uniformed officer was appointed to 
the. post enabled the army to exert great control over this central 
means of civil' supervision - the budget. 
2 
It expressed the civil- 
military partnership at the administrative level, parallel to the 
civil-military participation at the political level. 
After the Six Day War the Minister of Defence Dayan wanted to 
operate directly in the Occupied Territories. He decided that the Co- 
ordinator of Activities in the'Occupied Territories, " a 'senior ministry- official, 
directly subordinate to him, would also be the head of the Military - 
Government Division of the General Staff. Because of Dayan's considerable 
interest in this field, the Ministry became the dominant factor. vis-ä- 
vis the _Coordinator. There was some opposition to this within the IDF. 
1 That decision cost an Israeli pilot his life when he was inadvert- 
ently shot down by Israeli troops while flying over the Dimona 
reactor during the Six Day War. When war broke out_ only the 
American planes had been equipped with the new units, and this 
particular aircraft, a Mirage, was shot down by a Hawk missile 
fired by the anti-aircraft unit guarding the reactor. 
2 See detailed analysis in the next chapter. 
The Military Governor of the West Bank was subordinate to the Commander of 
Central Command Major-General Rehavam Zeevi, and the latter argued 
that his own authority would be undermined if the Governor was also 
directly answerable to the Coordinator and the Minister. But the Chief 
of Staff. Barlev1 who usually strongly opposed Ministry intervention in 
military matters, accepted the Minister's argument in this case: -'The 
problem of the Occupied Territories is primarily political, and neither 
Zeevi nor the paratroopers should deal with and decide on such matters', 
he said. 
1 But when Peres succeeded Dayan and showed less interest in 
the West Bank, the army's standing grew to the detriment of the 
Ministry. 
Another example of a merger between General Staff and Ministry units 
was the sphere of research and development (R and D). Here, relations 
were more complicated than in the two previous cases. When the IDF was 
set up, the Haganah unit dealing with weapons research was converted into 
the Science Corps'of the IDF and existed as such until 1952. under 
Peres, the Ministry of Defence began to develop military industries, and 
the unit was moved*to the Ministry, its functions were expanded, and the 
Department for Research and Planning was established. Afterthe emphasis 
shifted to sophisticated weapons systems and additional research factors were 
required, the Department was separated from the Ministry, and in 1958 the 
Authority for Weapons Development RAFAEL was set up. 
Rafael, the Military Industries and Aeronautical Industries, dealt 
with "R and D itself, while the IDF retained the function of planning the 
R and D, which was done in the Tactical Weapons Division. The 
Ministry, however, was conducting. similar activity coordinated by its 
Chief Scientist, "in what has been know since 1967 as the Chief 
1 Interview with Haim Barleu, 21 July 1977. 
Scientist's Office. It was intended to serve as the guiding and 
coordinating factor on all aspects of research and development 
subjects, but it also conducted research itself in its departments 
of electronics, weapons systems, materials and processes, and its 
long-term planning department. 
The dispute between the Ministry and the IDF on research and 
development intensified in the early seventies. The army wanted to 
dictate development policy to defence research institutions, while the 
Ministry's research bodies wanted the IDF, as consumer, to adapt itself 
to the development capacity of the defence establishment. This was 
particularly evident with budgets. The Chief of Staff Barley wanted 
the Tactical Weapons Division to have the authority to decide indepen- 
dently on R and D budgets, i. e. on research policy, while the Ministry, 
jealous of its own status, opposed direct IDF control of R and D. Said 
Lavi: 
I argued that the'decision should be ours, that'decisions in 
this sphere were significant not only as regards the enriching 
of the IDF, but also had civil implications for industrial- 
ization of the country, the economy etc. Therefore the 
considerations of the civil arm are no less, and perhaps more 
important than those of the army, which sees one side of the 
picture. l 
The outcome was a compromise, it was decided to set up a joint 
body - the Division of Research and Development. The Chief of that 
Division is an officer and member of the General Staff forum, subordin- 
ate both to the Chief of Staff, (through the Chief of Operations) on 
development of weapons systems and definition of IDF needs, and to the 
Director-General-of the Ministry on budgets, manpower, research, and 
foreign contacts among other matters. In June 1972 the executive 
departments of the Chief Scientists Office moved over to the New R and 
D Division, based mainly on what. had been the Tactical Weapons Division 
while the Chief Scientist's Office retained only advisory functions. 
1 Interview with Yeshayahu Lavi, 15 August 1977. 
The IDF and the Ministry continued to bicker over the new 
Division. A documented analysis of the influence exerted by each 
"body is not possible as a great deal of the relevant material is 
classified. However, even a structural analysis supports the 
proposition that the IDF gained the upper hand in the struggle. 
Although the Division is supposed to consist of civilians and army 
personnel, the latter öutnumber the former by two to one. And since 
their. promotion depends on the IDF more than the Ministry, they tend 
to represent IDF viewpoints. The fact that the unit, is headed by an 
officer, strengthens this tendency. 
As long as the R and D unit was subordinate to the Deputy Minister,, 
Zur_. he was the supreme authority, with almost ministerial powers. He 
was the final arbiter on the allocation of funds to various development 
bodies and on their operation. The status of the Chief Scientist was 
undermined, but Zur's authority ensured the predominance of the 
civil arm. When Zur retired from the Ministry in April 1974, the 
balance shifted in the army's favour. 
Major-General Tal tried toiamend the situation when he became 
Assistant to the Minister in mid-1975, whereby R and D was controlled 
through civil. channels by the Director-General, the Scientific 
Adviser to the Minister serving only in an advisory capacity. Tal 
wanted the unit to be subordinate to the Minister through the Scientific 
Adviser. On these conditions, Professor Dostrovsky agreed to accept 
the pest. 
The new arrangement was greeted with apprehension by the IDF, 
including Brigadier-General Inbar, then head of R and"D, 'and the 
Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Gur, because of fear that the army 
would lose its influence-over the unit. As a result, contacts between 
the Chief Scientist, the Ministry and Research and Development were 
disrupted for about a year, the latter operating under IDF influence. 
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In August 1976 Dostrovsky threatened to resign if matters did not 
improve, and he did so one month later. 
' 
The new Scientific Adviser 
to the Minister took office, and the situation remained unchanged. 
The head of Research and Development is still subordinate to the 
civil arm, but since his civilian superiors lack authority, and his 
primary affiliation is to the IDF, the latter exerts greater influence. 
2 
1974-1977: THE ARMY'S POWER EXPANDS 
When Peres became' Minister in 1974 a significant shift in the 
balance of power between the IDF and the Ministry was anticipated but 
the expectations were not fulfilled. 
3 
In early 1975 Major-General (Res. ) Rehavam Zeevi submitted a plan 
to Peres for the reorganization of the defence establishment, so that 
the civil sector of the defence establishment should supervise the 
military and not serve it. To this end it was necessary to amend the 
structure of the Ministry, since it suffered from"a lack'of instruments 
affiliated to the Minister for decision taking. 
1 See Yediot Aharonot, 31 August 1976. 
2 
Since 1967 ad hoc bodies affiliated to both Ministry and IDF have 
been set up, for example the body dealing with military fortifications 
in Sinai. See Haaretz, 24 October 1975. 
3 See Eli Landau, Maäriv, 28 July 1974. 
I told Peres that he was seeing only the tip of the 
pyramid, that is the Chief of Staff's stand, and that 
the Chief of Staff should not be the Minister's exclusive 
adviser. I cited Gur's decision to raise the ranking of 
the professional officers to Colonel., The Minister 
approved the Chief of Staff's decision, while lacking the 
means for efficient examination, although many people in 
the General Staff disapproved of the decision, since it 
involved raising he ranking at the lower ranks of 
command officers. 
Zeevi proposed the establishment of units in the Ministry, parallel 
to General Staff Branch, to supervise the Staff decisions. The main 
point of his proposal was the establishment of an advisory council on 
defence around the Minister, consisting of representatives of the 
General Staff and their civilian'counterparts in the Ministry. The 
proposal was too revolutionary for the Israeli structure, nor was it 
congruent with the Minister's interests. 
Peres did not deal with fundamental issues. during his first year in 
office. Instead of reforming Ministry-IDF relations, a task he was 
reluctant to undertake, or altering the internal structure of the 
Ministry, which he found difficult, he chose to set up an advisory 
staff. But this 'brains trust', instead of solving problems, created 
administrative tangles. 
Zur was succeeded by Major-General (Res. ) Mordehai Hod, former 
Chief of the Air Force. Hod's attempt to win the same status as his 
predecessor failed because of IDF objections and opposition by the heads of 
military industries and senior Ministry staff, also because the 
Director-General refused to tolerate an intermediary between him and 
the Minister. The strongest objections were voiced by the Chief of 
Staff 'The Minister has only one military adviser, and that is the 
Chief of Staff' Gur said. 
2 
1 Interview with Maj. -Gen. (Res. ) Rehavam Zeevi, 7 July 1977. 
2 Eitara Haber, Yediot Aharonot, l4 September 1975, and 24 December 1974. 
At a later stage an attempt to compromise was made. Instead of 
ranking between Minister and Director-General, Hod would be granted 
authority in certain spheres, mainly development and research and military 
industry, while the Director-General would remain directly subordinate 
to the Minister and would be responsible for other spheres, purchases, 
manpower: and finance. But this new distribution of authority was not a 
success. Hod was effectively neutralized by the senior Ministry staff 
and he retired at the end of 1975. 
Hod was not the only member of-the 'brains trust' to resign. Within 
eighteen months advisers to the Minister, most of them former army 
officers or academics, replaced one another in rapid succession, and the 
-disputes over authority and definition of tasks continued. Professor 
Colonel (Res. ) Yuval Neeman, for example, was appointed political adviser 
to the Minister, the intention being that he would serve as Acting Deputy 
Minister, and subsequently part-time Chief Scientist. Later he resigned. 
Major-General (Res. ) Professor Yehoshafät Harkabi was supposed to deal 
with long-term strategic planning, but soon resigned. Professor Saadia 
Amiel, who was intended to deal with strategic research also resigned, 
and eventually headed the small Special. Activities Unit. The Ministry's 
Chief Scientist was also replaced as a result of controversies over R and 
D. Peres then asked various people to join the Ministry, including 
Major-General (Res. ) Dan Tolkovsky, Professor Moshe Arens MK (Herut) and 
others, but all refused. 
I 
In late 1975, eighteen months after Peres took office, no real 
changes had been made in the Ministry. Zeev Schiff, military commentator 
of Haaretz, defined the situation as follows: 
1 Peres expanded the ministerial staff by appointing a number of Rafi 
activists, including Elhanan Yishai, who had been, inter alia, Ben 
Gurion's secretary, and Moshe Netzer, former Deputy Secretary' of the 
Labour party (representing Rafi). The former was appointed to head 
industrial development within the Ministry and the latter was placed 
in charge of civil defence. Asher Ben Nathan was appointed political 
adviser to the Minister. 
The present situation cannot continue... what the 
Ministry needs is a reorganization of working methods 
and functioning. It. is a vast body resting on spindly 
legs, ' a Ministry in which no real change has taken 
place since Eshkol was Minister. There is a crying 
need to examine the entire functioning system 
and its reciprocal ties with the IDF. It is 
obvious that no changes can be made without people 
of high quality, but what the Ministry needs are not 
only people but also modern working methods and an 
integral advisory, - planning and implementary system. 
The various advisers still do not constitute a work 
team, and certainly not a staff corresponding to the 
IDF General Staff. The implementation of this task 
will restore the Ministry and c9nsiderably influence 
Shimon Peres' political future. 
The State Comptroller, in his Annual Report on the Ministry and the 
IDF, criticized the Ministry's omissions. In Report No. 25, published 
in April of that year, he described flaws in liaison between the army 
and the Ministry on fortifications. in Northern Command. IL 345 million 
were allocated for the project, wrote the Comptroller, and there were 
delays and unreasonable duplication between the IDF's Chief Engineering 
Office and the Ministry's Construction Centre. Such flaws were also 
found in other spheres of Ministry activity. 
2 
In late 1975 the Minister tried to reconsolidate Ministry control 
by appointing a single Deputy., directly subordinate to him. He asked 
Zur to return to the Ministry. But his decision aroused-criticism within 
the IDF and particularly by the General Staff, *whose status was 
threatened thereby, and they criticized Peres for reappointing a 'has 
been'. "' However, the main opposition came from the Chief of Staff Gur, 
who was anxious that someone might intrude into his domain and undermine 
his almost impregnable position. 
1 Haaretz, 1 August 1975. 
2 State Comptrollers Report No. 25 (1975: 790-798) See summary of 
criticism of Ministry of Defence and IDF in that period in'book 
by Avneri, Arye (1977: 149-173) The Avalanche (Hebrew). Tel Aviv. 
Revivim. Reference is to chapters 16 Slaughter of the Sacred Cow' - 
and 17 'Manifestations of Corruption in the Defence Establishment' 
, Z. 
Major-General Israel Tal, former Chief of Operations who left the army 
in 1974, and subsequently took charge in the Ministry, of the development 
of the Israeli tank Merkava, was appointed to be the Minister's adviser. 
Tal had a radical vision of army-Ministry relations. He disapproved of 
the imbalance between the civil Ministry's powers and those of the 
General Staff, but more fundamentally he rejected the arbitrary separation 
of functions within the defence establishment, which he considered to be 
of an integral nature. Hence he advocated a radical reform of the system 
from top to bottom, to include the Minister himself. 
Tal found an ally in the Ministry's Director-General Zussman, who 
shared his concept. But he met a formidable opponent in the shape of 
the Chief of Staff Gur. The latter not only disagreed with Tal, but 
insisted that as the Minister's adviser Tal was precluded from interfering 
in the army. In the same manner Gur had discounted Sharon as the Prime 
Minister's adviser. Gur did not interpret Tal's and Sharon's actions as 
an effort to reinforce civil authority over the army, but perceived 
them as an expression of 'no confidence' in him, the Chief of Staff. 
He explained: 
When Arik Sharon was the adviser to Prime Minister Rabin - 
it was as if the Prime Minister could not rely on his 
Defence Minister and the General Staff and needed another 
dounsellor - and when the Defence Minister Peres appointed 
Tal as his adviser - here was another senior officer who 
might have to examine the General Staff's recommendations. 
But to my delight Sharon left Rabin as-his adviser, and 
Talik, after a short period, if at all, stopped interfer- 
ing with anything associated with the IDF, and the General 
Staff and the Chief of Staff continued to fulfil a function 
which they are required to perform in ac1ordance with the 
-formal definition of a democratic state. 
1 Lieut. -Gen. M. Gur in an interview with Davar, 20 April 1978. 
After his appointment as the Minister's adviser, Tal wanted to 
implement a far-reaching reorganization plan in the defence 
establishment, but he soon realized that there was no possibility 
to penetrate into the army. When he criticized the level of 
preparedness -a hyper-sensitive issue after the October War - Gur 
would not allow him to. investigate. Tal anticipated that his Minister. 
would support him, because he wanted to provide him with the ways and 
means to exert more control and supervision over the army, and to 
fashion for him an efficient organization with a new institutional 
structure. But Peres opted for Gur's way, and Tal had to abandon his 
original plans. Schiff described the Minister's decision in these 
words: 
Peres, who did not grow up in the army cannot afford 
to expose himself to such antagonism (with the Chief 
of Staff)... then the army will not support him (if he 
chooses Tal's way)... such a reality lends advantage to 
the Chief of Staff's and General Staff's power centre 
in the power struggle (with the Ministry). 
On 19 November 1975, Tal and Zussman presented their reorganization 
plan for the Ministry of Defence, a plan intended to improve the 
Ministry's structure, so as to render the distribution of functions 
more efficient and strengthen central control units. Proposals for 
internal change included the establishment of a new organizational 
stage between the existing departments and the Director-General and 
a staff coordination. level between the Director and the various units. 
2 
1 
2 
Zeev Schiff, Haaretz, 28 November 1975. 
For example, it was decided'that three'economic units: 
the Finance Division, the Budget Division and the Economic 
Adviser, would be placed under one coordinating body. The 
Administration of Industries got the function of coordina- 
ting Military and Aeronautical industries, some of Rafael's 
production and other Ministry industries. 
But although the structure of the Ministry was changed and a new 
Ministry-IDF body was set up (the Planning Division) the basic 
premise underlying the distribution of functions remained. The theory 
that the structure should be basically altered to create an integral 
system was rejected, as was the view that the Ministry should be the 
body controlling and directing the IDF. According to Tal: 
Theoretically speaking, the Ministry should-be the 
binding authority for the-IDF, not because civilians 
rule soldiers, but because the Ministry is the staff 
of the Ministier of Defence for operating the army. 
But in actual fact, the General Staff dictates to and 
manipulates the Ministry and the latter is a withered 
limb of the defence establishment, dealing only with. 
technical management of budgets and books,. sales and 
purchase... there are two separate hierarchies, without 
integration, of joint staff work. The General Staff is 
the dominant hierarchy and the Ministry operates 
according to its dictates... and the Ministry is the 
servint. The Minister is subservient to the military 
arm. 
Tal's comments, like Zeevi's proposals for reform, or Lavi's 
campaign, draw attention to an interesting phenomenon. The most 
active campaigners for changing the Ministry's status vis-a-vis the 
army were senior army officers. who had retired from service and 
taken up posts in civil sector's of the defence establishment. One 
cannot ignore the fact that it was their new professional positions, 
which underlay their initiative. But whatever their motives, 
they were clearly more eager to reform the military-Ministry 
relations than were people with a civilian background. One of them 
said: 
We have reached a stage in the development of the 
State and the army when we cannot leave the army 
and defence in the sole hands of the military and 
defence men. Clemenceau said that war is too 
important to be left to the generals... this is true 
not only-for war itself but also for the war machine, 
1 Interview with Israel Tal,, 7 August 1977. 
that is to say the army and the ancillary systems. 
There is an urgent need to fashion the means and 
the procedures to implement civil control over the 
defence system. This control has to be consistent, 
permanent, efficient and professional. In spite 
of the assumption and the conviction that no danger 
from the military threatens Israeli democracy, and 
unconnected to this issue - civil control over the 
military has to be guaranteed. 1 
The entry of so many ex-officers into the Ministry cannot therefore 
be regarded merely as military takeover of the Ministry, but rather as a- 
more complex process in which a semi-civilian nucleus might emerge in the 
future to withstand the General Staff's tremendous power. 
WHERE IS MANPOWER-POLICY' DECIDED? 
The weaknesses of"the Ministry in its relations with the IDF through 
an historical analysis have been examined. These relations are now 
illuminated by an analytical examination of one area, the IDF's manpower 
dimension and organization. 
The army does not determine policy, nor does it shape 
the regime, laws and government of this country. It 
cannot even take an independent decision on its own 
structure and operational guidelines. 2 
Thus Ben Gurion presented his blue-print for the IDF. One of the most 
striking illustrations of this instrumentalist approach has been the fact 
that the length of military service is determined by the Knesset, according 
to the Defence Service Law. The Minister'of Defence is empowered to 
extend service according to a special order, but his decision must be 
approved retroactively by the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the 
Knesset. The assumption is that this order will be utilized when 
necessary to expedite the recruitment process or briefly to delay demob- 
ilization without recourse to the protracted process of amending the law, 
which entails three readings in the'Knesset. 
1 
2 
Rehavam Zeevi, Maariv, 20 December 1979. 
See 'Ben Gurion in page 521. 
The length of military service has been determined since 1949 by 
Knesset resolutions and subsequent legislation. In November 1966, the 
security situation having deteriorated, service was extended by law to 
three years. This arrangement continued until January 1968, not 
through amending the law, but by an order of the Minister of Defence, 
ratified by the Foreign Affairs Committee, -delaying demobilization by 
six months. The order was provisional and referred to 'gradual and 
provisional postponement of demobilization', to be reconsidered 
1 
towards the end of March 1969. At the height of the War of Attrition, 
the provisional arrangement was extended, it was then explained, 'in 
the light of the. security situation, which has not eased, and as long 
as this situation continues"'. The War of Attrition ended,. but the 
order was not rescinded and postponement. of demobilization became a 
permanent arrangement. 
It was argued that the order had been used in a transient 
situation and because it was inadvisable to make frequent amendments 
to the law. But the preference for resorting to provisional orders 
rather than to regular legislation can be viewed in another light 
as well. Since the Foreign Affairs Committee's approval of 
ministerial orders-is virtually automatic, the IDF considers it 
preferable to determine the length of service without becoming 
involved in public debate. The legislative process, which is lengthy 
and cumbersome and above all public, does not permit this, and 
weakens the military. Professor Amnon Rubinstein has said that: 
1 
This quotation and those following are taken from an article by 
Professor Rubinstein, Haaretz, 20 December 1972. 
The Defence Service Law did not intend the Minister 
of Defence's orders to serve as a substitute for 
legal extension of service. Such extension must be 
implemented by the Knesset, through explicit 
legislation... it is a grave flaw that the Knesset 
has acquiesced in the sidestepping of its own 
authority and the conversion of a provisional 
administrative order into a substitute for the law. 
The length of service is only one aspect of the army's 
manpower policy. In Israel it has a considerable significance 
outside the defence establishment It has repercussions on the 
economy and society because of the moratorium between graduation from 
high school and the attainment of independence, and since the 
individual is obliged to contribute to the community, fie has 
expectations of reward from society. It is feasible to assume that 
decisions on length of service should take wider and non-military. 
considerations into account. Who can evaluate such considerations? 
Certäihly not the Knesset or Foreign Affairs Committee which suffer 
from a lack of staff bodies and experts. The Minister is able to take 
a'decision, and in fact, in 1951, Ben Gurion decided, against the 
objections of the Chief of Staff, to reduce the size of the IDF on 
social and-economic grounds. But subsequently manpower calculations 
and the deployment of forces became so complicated that the Minister 
was no longer able to take decisions on the basis of intuition alone. 
But what other instruments did he have at his disposal? 
The IDF itself, as an interested party, could not assess the 
situation objectively. The most suitable institutional source 
appeared to be the Ministry. But although a Recruitment Department 
was set up4in the Ministry after the Recruitment Law was passed, the' 
General Staff Manpower Branch determined the scope and standards 
of recruitment, the Ministry acting mainly in an executive 
capacity. Until 1966 the Ministry possessed the necessary 
instruments for intervention, but following Dinstein's reform, whereby 
the main recruitment powers were transferred to the army, it lacked 
legitimacy to participate in policy-making. In the absence of adequate 
civil-instruments, therefore, Ben Gurion's instrumentalist approach 
remained nothing but a theory. 
The confrontation between military and civil considerations was 
illustrated in the public debate on Dinstein's reform scheme. High 
school graduates were recruited, until then, on two dates close to the 
end of the school year, in July and November, so that upon demobiliza- 
tion they would be able to commence university studies without losing 
a year. Those enlisting in November faced that danger, but the army 
tended to release many of them early. (This is relatively arbitrary. 
Soldiers who refused to go on officer courses, for example, or those 
who were trained in certain skills, were not granted early demobiliza- 
tion). But in August 1966 the army did not want to mobilize the 
high school graduates on these two dates, but rather at four separate 
times. Hence some of them were forced to wait about ten months for 
their call-up. They lost a year's study in addition to a year of 
service. The army wanted to distribute the high school graduates among 
all the call-up groups, a demand that was objected to by the civil 
authorities. 
In 1973, the army decided to shorten military service for new 
immigrants. The proposal was approved by the Minister of Defence, 
after being discussed and agreed' " by the General Staff, but was not 
submitted to other civil. bodies for approval. The Knesset, for example 
did not even seek information on the matter. 
1 
1 Amnon Rubinstein, Haaretz, 19 January 1973. 
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The IDF never disputes the right of the Minister, as the representative 
of the civil -establishment, to act as final arbiter on manpower. 
Furthermore, the Minister influences recruitment policy in exceptional 
cases: for example, granting of exemptions to yeshiva students 
(according to the coalitionary agreement with the religious parties),. 
allocation of soldiers to agricultural work (according to an agreement 
with the youth and kibbutz movements), etc. In certain rare cases, 'he 
even acted against the demands of the Chief of Staff but there 
was normally no occasion for confrontation, since IDF demands were 
usually met. 
1 
Professor Rubinstein writes: 
It is easy to imagine what would happen in Israel if 
every Ministry, every public body, decides how many 
people and how much money it needed. Nobody would 
accept such a situation. Yet in a matter of such 
vital significance, as the length of military serv- 
ice, the power to decide was entrusted to the very 
body demanding the extension of service. Needless 
to gay, nobody suspects the Minister of Defence, the 
Chief of Staff and their staff, of devious calcula- 
tions, or suggests that their demands are not backed 
by genuine needs. But 'genuine needs' is a flexible 
term, and even angels2cannot reach balanced decisions 
on their own affairs. 
As far as the quantity of mobilized manpower was concerned the IDF 
found legitimate ways to operate outside the spirit of the law. However, 
regarding the structure of army ranks the army had no need to be devious. 
The ranks and their hierarchy were not established by Knesset law, nor 
even by the Defence Minister's regulations, but in army orders. Hence 
the IDF itself determined this matter in its internal instructions. This 
was naturally condoned, although it contradicts the theoretical model on 
which the IDF is ostensibly based, and which only a few voices challenged. 
3 
1 
2 
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On differences between the Minister and the Chief of Staff on the aims of 
Nahal, see Dayan, M. (1976: 346). Whereas the Chief of Staff wanted to 
utilize the Nahal for mainly military objectives, Ben Gurion supported the 
view that its goals should be mainly civilian and settlement-orientated. 
Amnon Rubinstein, Haaretz, 20 December 1972. 
Hadar, Zvi (1976: 220) 'The Command Authority of the Chief of Staff and 
the Defence Minister. ' Hapraklit (Hebrew) V. 231, No. 3. 
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THE PLANNING BRANCH - THE'IDF'S ARM INTO THE POLITY 
Another example of army penetration into a strictly civil sphere 
by capturing a civil-military mediatory mechanism occurred in strategic 
planning. The weakness of Israeli civil strategic planning has already 
been referred to in a previous chapter. In as much as such planning was 
done, it was almost exclusively controlled by the military, and the few 
attempts to conduct strategic planning either outside-the Ministry of 
Defence or even by the Minister's staff body failed. 
'-- 
The attempt to 
establish a joint unit of the IDF and the Ministry shared the same'fate. 
On the other hand, the IDF since its: establishment had such a planning 
body, which constituted'part of the Operations Branch. 
During Ben Gurion's'term of office as Minister,. there was no 
strategic planning body in the Ministry. After his appointment as 
Minister, Eshkol tried several times to set up such bodies, particularly 
within the Ministry, by establishing a long term strategic planning' 
unit, headed by Professor Eitan Berglas. There was even an attempt to 
set up an institution along the lines of the Rand Institute, but this 
2 
too failed. 
1 
2 
Interview with Saadia Amiel, 1977. 
A proposal in this spirit was submitted to the Prime Minister by 
Professor Yehezkel Dror, an expert on policy analysis, and the main 
campaigner in Israel for the introduction of rational methods of 
policy planning into Government. He was also the main partner after 
the Six Day War in an initiative to establish the Tevel Institute. 
In 1975, he was appointed adviser on these matters to the defence 
establishment, but retired in 1977 and expressed his disillusionment 
at the reluctance of the establishment to adopt these methods. 
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The attempts to locate the strategic planning function outside 
the defence establishment was doomed to failure in-the Israeli 
political culture and pattern of civil-military relationship, as 
were the efforts to establish a planning unit outside the IDF. They 
failed, above all, because of. objections by the Chief of Staff and army 
itself. Instead, the function had gradually expanded within the 
Operations Branch, and the new post of the Chief of Operations 
Assistant for Planning was created. 
Dayan too, as Defence Minister tried to develop the strategic 
planning function within the Ministry by setting up a special 
department, but he failed. Whereas civilians wieldeda certain amount 
of authority in research and development, mainly through the Minister's 
assistant- Zur, the strategic sphere was almost exclusively dominated 
by the General Staff. The first indication of a change was when Zussman 
was appointed economic adviser to the Minister. Zussman'started from -' 
an economic standpoint, 'but he infended to move into political-strategic 
planning. However the outbreak of the 1973 war aborted his-programme. 
In the wake of the Yom Kippur War the public feeling that 
some of the defects and failures in the defence establishment 
were the result of the civil arm's weakness vis-a-vis the military, 
the lack of an institutionalized structure, and of a clear functional 
division between the civil and military arms, fortified the demand 
to strengthen the civil strategic planning networks. Dayan approached, 
among others, Professor Neeman and Major-General Shlomo 
Gazit, the 
former Coordinator of Activities in the Occupied Territories, to head 
a long-term planning unit. However, the Government resigned 
before a 
decision was taken. 
Peres inclined to a greater extent, than his predecessors, to base 
the Ministry's decision making process on staff work, and he was even 
more anxious than was Dayan to extend this activity. However, he was 
no more successful than his predecessors. He made even more intricate 
the definition of the roles and functions of the several defence 
planning bodies and their composition, and "his working methods, 
indecision, evasiveness, eagerness to compromise, 'and his energetic 
activities which resulted in nothing'- caused frustration t. o. the people 
involved in this sphere, among whom were some of his long-time close 
friends. 
1 
At first Peres appointed Harkabi to be his adviser on political 
strategy. But it soon transpired that the goal could not be attained 
without a wide institutional infrastructure. Harkabi's foreword to 
the Defence Budget Paper was strongly criticized by the Knesset Foreign 
Affairs and Finance Committees. He-came to the conclusion that, in the 
ätmosphere prevailing between the Ministry and the IDF, neither. 
external advisory bodies nor Ministry units could tackle strategic 
issues. 
Another scientist, who was closely associated with the defence 
establishment. was Amiel. He had hoped to be appointed the Ministry's 
chief scientist but had not been successful. The attempt to appoint 
him Harkab'i's deputy also failed. Eventually, Peres decided to establish 
a long-term planning unit, headed by Amiel, which would be directly 
subordinate to the Minister, but even that plan collapsed. The background 
was the development which occurred within the army's planning function. 
1 
Amiel, Saadia (1979) To The End Tel Aviv. Maariv. 
The army also concluded that there was a need to enlarge and 
extend long-term planning, so much so that it ought to become a 
separate branch with equal status to other General Staff branches, 
and that its head should be a member of the General Staff. Because 
the Ministry resented handing over civil issues to a military unit it 
was agreed that Aga"t, the Planning Branch, would be a joint body, to 
serve the army and the. Ministry,. its head subordinated to the Chief of 
Staff and the Minister. In all matters associated with the building 
up of the IDF, the new branch would be subordinate to. the Chief of 
Staff, and in finance, procurement and the organization of the emergency 
economy and political matters it would coordinate with the Ministry's.. 
Director-General. The decision was cosmetic, using arguments about the 
need to integrate more the Ministry's and the army's planning functions. 
But, in reality, it was a compromise decision resulting from the 
conflict between the two bodies for authority and power. 
And how would the long-term planning unit.: accommodate itself to the 
new enlarged planning branch? The Chief, of the B ranch. Major-General 
Avraham Tamir, opposed the existence of the new unit and tried to abort 
it. He argued that the several planning units should be coordinated 
not separate. Amiel argued for planning pluralism, which would avert 
conformity and encourage the discussion of alternatives and enable 
options to be put to the Minister. As a compromise, Peres proposed that 
Amiel head a Special Tasks unit. attached to the Minister, and to 
allocate to it some specific strategic planning problems. Thus it was 
in fact a victory for Tamir, a predictable victory, and Amiel sorrowfully 
summed up the situation: 
Shimon acceded to the military's demands, and his 
acceptance was accompanied with more than a grain 
of satisfaction that he would be the one to rule over 
the military system. Perhaps this can be explained 
by the fact that he, Peres, lwas always a civilian 
who had not worn uniform... 
Though Aga "t was staffed by both officers and civilians, its 
organizational skeleton consisted mostly of military personnel. It 
utilized many academics on reserve duty, or under special contract, 
but the unit heads were-most"lY- army men, whose personal advancement 
depended on their relations with the IDF. It was located within the 
General Staff office area. The branch dealt more often with military 
issues than civil ones, and its army contacts were much more intensive 
than with the Ministry. Although it was set up as -a joint. body, it 
served to provide the IDF with a legitimate instrument to invade the civil 
planning sphere. 
After the Yom Kippur War, - and particularly during the negotiations 
with Egypt and Syria for disengagement, the : Branch and its Head 
Tamir played a prominent political role as the main staff unit of the 
political team conducting the negotiations. Since the Branch was 
established it has grown, expanded the scope of its activities and 
penetrated into the economic, construction and settlement development 
fields, which are by nature civil. The Head of the Branch enjoyed high 
prestige which strengthened it not only inside` 'the military but 
throughout the Government. Just as during the years 1967-1973, the army's 
intelligence activities in the civil sphere expressed the degree of its 
penetration into state politics and the extent of the political-military 
meshing, so in the years 1974-1977 it was the planning department which 
did it, and its position continues to grow. 
2 
1 Amiel, S. (1979: 89). 
2 From the start of the 1977 peace initiative between Egypt and Israel 
until the exchange of Ambassadors, the Branch., has become one of the 
most important elements in-the Government in Israeli-Egyptian relations. 
In as much as the-Branch was the Minister's staff unit it did not 
fulfil its function to enable him to scrutinize the General Staff's 
proposals by contesting them with alternatives. In the same way that 
the ministry's Budgeting Department is the Chief of Staff's long arm 
into the office, so the Planning Branch is the army's instrument to 
intrude into the Minister's and Ministry's political planning. The 
imbalance in status between the Ministry and the army did not inhibit many of 
the heads of the political-defence establishment from continuing to 
uphold the theoretical model as if it matched reality. In 1979, the 
former Defence Minister Peres claimed: 
The defence establishment was therefore constructed as a balance 
Y4 with a military scale and a civil. scale. The General Staff 
controls everything done in the army, in operations, training, 
planning and intelligence. From the moment the civilian becomes 
a soldier, until he reverts to being a civilian... he Defence 
Ministry is responsible in the economic sphere, finance, 
procurement, industries, development and science, and rehabilita- 
tion - and it operates as a coordinating, body for all these 
activities. But it is also a body which complements the General 
Staff and contends with it in the economic sphere. It is 
important for the General Staff to be an efficient body... it is 
no less important that the civilian staff have the capability to 
change and control without creating friction... the General Staff 
preceded the Defence Ministry, for that reason it was essential 
to establish the Ministry as a counter-balance to an already 
existing solid and efficient structure. Its establishment was 
also necessary to avoid a situation whereby the-Defence Minister. 
would receive reports only from a single source, and to ensure 
an economic element in the security sphere's extensive activities. 
Peres gave a more honest description of the reality when pressed- 
in an interview about the defence budgetýhe was asked about the lack of 
instruments in his Ministry to assess the IDF's budget proposals. He 
replied that there was no need for such instruments. If this approach 
were accepted, he said, it would be necessary to set up another General 
Staff in addition to the existing one, which was pointless. If the 
Minister of Defence had no confidence in his General Staff, no solutions 
would be to any avail. 
2 
1 Peres, Shimon (1979: 40-41) (Hebrew) Now, Tomorrow. Tel Aviv. Mabat. 
2 Shimon Peres in interview with Haim Isak, Davar, 17 October 1975 and 
interview with Peres, 7 August 1977. 
Rabin spoke in the same spirit: 
My. own theory is that budget, deployment of forces, 
priorities, everything that pertains to or affects 
the structure of the fighting forces, the military 
doctrine, the weapons systems etc, is in the domain of 
the IDF and the IDF should decide thereon. I would not 
be willing to accept the view that someone who knows 
nothing about the army should examine these matters. 
The problem is not who gives advice but who will be 
responsible for its implementation. If someone proposed 
a scheme for the structure of the army, conflicting with 
the view of the-Chief of Staff, who is responsible if it 
does not succeed in wartime? The Chief of, Staff or the 
committee which proposed it? The test is unequivocal - 
who will be held responsible? Responsibility rests with 
the Chief of Staff and therefore it is his privilege to- 
be the final arbiter on such matters. I can think of no 
Chief of Staff whose decisions on such matters were 
fundamentally tampered with. These matters naturally 
require formal approval by the Ministry, the Cabinet, 
and the Foreign Affairs Committee, but the comments and 
influence of these institutions are marginal in 
comparison with the weight of-the General Staff and the 
Chief of Staff. Who can give a better answer to. 
professional problems than professional army men? 
Ministerial responsibility rests with the political level, 
with the Minister, and there is no justification for the 
existence oflthe Ministry as a stage between the Minister 
and the IDF. 
Ben Gurion founded the Ministry of Defence as a very small 
Ministry, virtually a Minister's bureau. He prevented the establishment 
of a big Ministry because he wanted to strengthen the Minister's 
supervision over the army, without at the same time having to combat 
other civil factors who wanted to share in civil control. Although the 
office matured and was expanded by his disciples it had only a marginal 
relationship with the army. Furthermore, its marginality brought about 
the fact that not even the Minister'could exercise the functions intended 
by the system's architect, Ben Gurion. Without the Minister's own staff, 
without'civil control mechanisms and without effective mediatory 
agencies - between the Ministry and the army, the relationship between 
the Minister and the IDF lost -its control pattern and became a military- 
civil partnership, in which the Minister's authority was, in most cases, 
nominal. 
1 Interview with Yitzhak Rabin, 11 August 1977. 
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12. THE DEFENCE BUDGET 
Y 
THE STATE BUDGET AS A FUNCTION OF THE DEFENCE BUDGET 
Just as the budget reflects national defence policy, so the way 
it is prepared expresses the relationships between the various bodies 
active in the defence sphere. This chapter does not. deal, therefore, 
with the substantive aspects of the defence budget, but has-used the, 
process of its formulation, implementation and supervision,. to 
integrate the analyses of the relations between the military and the 
institutional network described in previous chapters, the parties, 
Cabinet, Knesset and Ministry of Defence. 
The state budget is intended to reflect Government policy, to 
optimize the limited financial resources at its disposal for the 
various national goals. In reality the budget does not do this. 
Instead. of a process of overall optimization, the resources are 
divided up mainly as a result of power struggles between the Ministries, 
which is a reflection of the federal structure of the coalition and 
the 'ownership by default' system of Israeli government. 
In preparing a new budget the Ministers rely to a large degree 
on previous allocations, and each Ministry demands a higher amount 
than in the previous year and usually gets what it wants. Thus, 
the basic premises for the allocations to the different Ministries is 
not re-examined each year. The defence budget is no exception. 
l 
Bdt there is a basic difference in the manner in which the share 
of the defence budget in the. overall budget is determined. When Robert 
1 See article by Moshe Arens MK, Haaretz, 23 February 1975. 
In 1977 Arens was pppointtd Chairman the Knesset Foreign _ Affairs and Defence Committee. 
MacNamara was US Secretary of Defence in 1961, he founded the method 
of 'arbitrary budget ceiling'. The President would inform the Defence 
Department that the total income of the Federal Government minus 
regular expenditure (such as the interest payment of debts) and 
the cost of internal programmes,, -would serve as the ceiling for the 
annual defence budget. 
1 
_. 
Under US President John F. Kennedy, MacNamara moved over to 
the 'Planning-Programming- Budgeting-System', which first defined the goals 
of defence policy as a function of national needs, not-as the 
institutional interests of defence bodies-and then presented- alternatives 
for their attainment and examined how-they could be achieved at 
optimal cost. Ostensibly a situation was created whereby the obstacle 
to fixing the proportion of the defence budget within the national 
budget was removed. But the abolition of the arbitrary budget ceiling 
was accompanied by two additional changes. First, the centre of 
gravity, where the decision on the size and allocation of the-budget 
was taken, was shifted from the armed forces to the civil Secretary 
of Defence. Secondly, a system - PPBS - was constructed which enabled 
2 
overall reassessments. 
Israel suffers from the drawbacks of both systems. The slice of 
budgetary cake cut for the defence budget is not determined as the' 
remainder of the total resources, after regular expenditure and 
1 
2 
See Bender, Robert A. (1974: 93) 'The Defence Budget and Civil- 
Military Relations'. In Cochran, Charles L. Civil-Military 
Relations, Changing Concepts in the Seventies New York. 
The Free Press. 
See Enthoven, A. and Smith K. '(1971) How Much is Enough? 
New York, Harper'& Row,, 
civil allocations- have -been coinsumed: =`: Ön the. contraty., -` the size- of 
the defence share determines the size of the civil shares. In other 
words, the amount of the civil budgets- is a function of the amount of 
resources remaining after the, allocation to defence. Furthermore, 
"ät certain times def ence 'expenditure determines the' size of the 
-budget, including-the income component. 
From the mid-fifties onward there developed within the defence 
establishment a concept which dictated the attitude towards the 
defence budget. -That-concept claimed that the state could not rely 
on external guarantees even if such existed. This was because its 
dimensions, demography, infrastructure, the size of its armed forces, 
and the time needed to mobilize reserves, created the eventuality of 
an acute and rapid transition from debacle in the battlefield to the 
possibility of the annihilation of the state. The conclusion was 
that only the IDF's strength and ability could safeguard the existence 
and sovereignty of the state and the well-being of its population. 
This being so, the buildup of IDF forces was influenced first 
and foremost by the evaluation of the growth of those Arab armies 
defined as the enemy: it was . measured according to the 'worst 
eventuality' and took relatively wide defence margins into account. 
l 
Since the mid-sixties the term 'enemy might' has encompassed not only 
the 'confrontation states' but also the 'expeditionary states'. 
The 1975/6 defence budget was, a typical illustration of that 
way of thinking. The defence budget of the Arab states which were 
The Defence Ministry spokesman Mordehai Barkai defined this 
as follows: 'Defence, by its very nature, and in Israel in 
particular; cannot tolerate errors of'judgment'. See his article 
in Davar, 
_3 
October 1971. 
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involved in various ways in the conflict, was evaluated in that year 
as some 10 billion dollars (60 billion IL). The IDF estimated that 
in order to maintain the military balance the Israeli defence budget 
needed to total about half that sum. The financial sources at the 
disposal of the state in that year were calculated at some 90-billion 
Israeli lirot, about 70 billion from GNP and a 20 billion capital 
import. Hence the civil budget had to be 60 billion IL (90 minus 
30). 1 If this sum sufficed for civil' steeds, so much the better. 
If not, the Government would be obliged to increase income by capital 
imports or a deficit budget. 
Other factors than the need to match the enemy's might, therefore,. 
were regarded as constraints which should be taken into account, but 
which were secondary in importance. For example, since in most 
years there were international restrictions on sales to Israel, it 
was not feasible to compare alternative costs of arms. What was 
available was bought. ' When there were more accessible arms markets 
the main constraint was the shortage of foreign currency. Consequently 
an effort was made to increase the sources by capital imports from 
Diaspora Jewry through donations and loans, from the West German 
Government in the fifties and sixties, but mainly and at an ever- 
increasing rate from the US Government. 
The second drawback of the Israeli system is the fact that the- 
size of the defence budget is, in effect, determined within the armed 
forces. Civil bodies, including the Ministry of Defence, play a 
small and marginal role in the decision. It is the military who 
determine and define Israel's defence needs. 
1 .` Moshe Arens MK,: Haaretz 23 February 1975. 
The combination of these two characteristics meant that, 
because of the centrality of defence in Israel, over the years, no 
discussion has been held at the highest political level to 
confront what were defined as military needs, with the economic 
'share which the state could afford to put at the disposal of the 
military. The decision making process for the defence budget was 
almost totally detached from that for the overall distribution of 
the national cake. The former was carried out in a different place 
to'the latter, and was transmitted to the formulators of the overall 
budget almost as a predetermined factor. ' According to the spokesman 
of the Minister of Defence: 0 
The defence budget, as distinct from the budget of 
any other Ministry, is primarily the outcome of 
what occurs outside the borders of the country, 
among the enemy and in the sphere of world 
technological and scientific development. The 
need to implement social objectives can have no 
effect on its scope or change its place in the 
order of priorities. 
) 
As the defence budget grew at an average annual rate of 21%, 
reaching in 1978 a level that was. 15 times higher than in 1948, the 
defence establishment succeeded in building up a military strength 
whose maintenance created problems beyond the question of the-size 
and current cost of the army. Nonetheless, the expenditure on 
defence was not derived from the economic might of the state and 
even in the seventies costs and alternative costs were not a 
decisive factor in determining defence needs. Under conditions of 
the protracted conflict, the centrality of security and the 
considerable political power of the military, it was very difficult 
1 Mordehai Barkai, Davar, 3 October 1971. 
to adopt the approach of 'how much security should be achieved and 
at what price? '. 
Whereas in other societies with instrumentalist armies the 
tension between the rising demands of the army for a larger budget, 
and the reluctanceof public opinion to allocate large sums to 
defence has increased in. 
-the past 
two decades, no such antagonism 
existed in Israel. The anxiety that the high rate of expenditure 
on defence could eventually injure the economic and social strength of 
the state was not widely held and was expressed only from the late 
sixties and early seventies. 
1 
Simultaneously criticism began to 
be voiced for. the first time on the military's decisive position 
in determining the defence budget. 
The planning of the new budget is initiated shortly after the 
previous-year's budget has begun to be implemented, namely in May-June. 
The Financial Adviser to the Chief of Staff, who is also the Head'of 
the Bddget Diiision of the Ministry of Defence, informs the budgetary 
bodies in various corps and commands of the guidelines for the coming 
year. These guidelines are general and deal with central priorities. 
For example, whether a period of military activity or relative quiescence 
is anticipated. The budgetary bodies are called on to submit their 
proposals according to two priorities. The first is the expenditure on 
plans already approved by the Chief of Staff and the second the additions 
which they anticipate or consider desirable. 
1 
See, for example, Weinberger, I. (1977), Economic Might and 
National Security, Paths to-. Israel's Economic Independence-Tel Aviv. 
Dvir. These arguments were published; particularly in the press, in 
periods of debate over the defence budget. See for example, Avräham 
Ktishiiir, Davar,. 25 and 27 September 1971. The main source of these 
views, which also supplied data to the press, was the senior Finance. Ministry staff. 
The internal discussions in the army continue until October 
and the last stages are discussion within the top echelons of the 
General Staff Operations Branch and finally with the Chief of Staff. 
There the 'contour plan' is formulated which serves as the basis 
for the army's budget demands. At this stage the Budget Division 
of the Ministry is brought up to date on the anticipated size of 
the national budget and adapts the contour plan to make it the 
defence budget proposal. This is approved by the Chief of Staff 
and then receives the final approval of the Ministry's senior staff 
and the Minister. 
The fact that the IDF works according to a five-year plan has 
a considerable impact on the way in which its annual budget is 
constructed. In effect, it is an incessant updating of the five- 
year plan. This explains the incremental nature of the budget and 
its constant growth from the previous year's budget. Exceptional 
events, and particularly a full scale war, outdate the entire five- 
year plan and necessitate the construction of a new one. But in 
between such' leaps the growth has been organic and incremental. It 
was, therefore, not customary to examine the basic ratio between 
the defence budget and the civil components of the national budget. 
Furthermore, because it was based on the past, even fundamental 
premises were not re-examined. They were rather accepted and the 
variations from year to year tended to be quantitative. Consequently 
although the budget constantly expQnded the system was-basically 
-characterized by relative stability and conservatism. 
-1 
1 See Uzi Benziman, Haaretz, 28 April 1974. 
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THE MINISTRY IN THE ARMY'S SERVICE 
The key question in the consideration of the defence budget 
is who determines it . The description by MacNamara's assistants 
Enthoven and Smith on-. the American situation could have been 
written about Israel: 
Very few people, apart from several economists, believed* 
that economists should determine economic policy. Few, 
apart from welfare. workers, believe that welfare workers 
should determine welfare policy. More believe that 
teachers-are entrusted with the formulation of education 
policy. All these are considered too important to be 
left to experts. What is actually needed in all those 
spheres is more 'civil control'. But, surprisingly 
enough, many believe that national defence policy 
should remain the exclusive domain of military men... 
The prevailing conviction in Israel until the seventies was 
that the General Staff was the only body which knew better than any 
other the needs of the IDF, its buildup and structure, its weapons 
systems, military doctrines and operational programme, and should 
therefore formulate the budget. In other words, it was the army 
which should determine what defence budget it needed. 
The situation is that the consumer, the IDF, 
determines both its own needs and the scope of 
consumption. There is nobody to examine these 
indices and demands, even on a superficially 
professional level. 2 
Apart from its contradiction to Ben Gurion's conception that 
military men should not deal with finance at all, the fact that the 
military budget is determined by the IDF raises the basic question' 
as to whether the army is the institutional body best able to 
provide'the professional answer to the needs of national security. 
Is there not a danger that its institutional interests will influence 
1 
2 
Enthoven, A. and Smith, K. (1971: 62). 
Zeev Schiff, Haaretz, 10 October 1971. 
the definition of defence needs? In this context MacNamara was 
possibly correct in saying: 
No large organization - military or civil, public or 
private - can automatically strive to attain wider 
national goals, distinct from its own restricted and 
partial benefit, without external guiding and leadership. 
The question is not who will replace the army, but who in 
addition to-it will participate in defining the goals of-national 
security, and in-determining the-optimal ways to attain them. And this 
is relevant whether the extra-militarybody is a radical 'leading and 
guiding' factor, according to. MacNamara's definition, or only a conser- 
vative 'balancing and checking' factor. These are in fact the tasks of 
the. Ministry of Defence and the Minister heading it. 
The development of the role of the Head of the Budget Division of. 
the Ministry of Defence demonstrates strikingly the standing of the 
Ministry in the formulation of the defence budget. As long as this 
function-existed separately from that of financial adviser-to the Chief 
of Staff, the Ministry of Defence had an instrument through which it 
could influence the construction of the army's budget. When the two 
functions were-amalgamated in 1956 that instrument was lost. The official 
holds both titles, but in actual fact the amalgamation marked a military 
takeover of the civil function. The lexicon of Israel's security, under 
the entry 'Financial Adviser'to the Chief. of Staff' admits that the need 
for amalgamation derived from the fact that the Financial Adviser to the 
Chief of Staff-had no authority to issue instructions to the Ministry's 
employees who dealt with the separation of the defence budget. '2 
1 
2 
R. MacNamara quoted by Enthoven and Smith (1974: 61). 
Schiff, Zeev and Haber, Eitan (1976: 252) Israel Army and Defence 
(Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Zemora Bitan Modan. See also Naor, Mordehai 
(ed. ) (1977) Taut Bow (Memorial Volume to Moshe Kashti), Tel 
Aviv. Milo. _ 
. 
The Financial Adviser has the rank of Brigadier-General and 
was a member of the General Staff. He gained the post as a 
consequence of his relation with the Chief of Staff on whom his 
status and promotion relied, and in many cases the two men were 
personal friends. The majority of the staff in the Ministry of 
Defence unit were military men, and their social'and professional 
reference group was closer to the General Staff than to the Ministry. 
It is not surprising, -therefore, that since the'task of Financial 
Adviser and Head of the Budgetary Division were amalgamated 'an. 
instrument of checks and balances has been forfeited, the civil-- 
system has lost the ability to control the preparation of the 
budget!. 
That instrument did not operate very effectively prior to that. 
But after the amalgamation even if the Ministry had wanted to 
activate it it could no longer do so. What remained were informal 
relations- between the Chief of Staff, the Director-General of the 
Ministry, or the Minister's Assistant, and the Financial Adviser to 
the Chief of Staff who was the Head of the Budgetary Division. 
Under Zur and Elazar there were good working relations between the 
Minister's assistant and the Chief of Staff, and the two cooperated 
in preparing the budget. 
2 
Relations between Tal and Gur were so 
poor that the Financial Adviser became, in effect, the mediator 
between the Minister's Assistant and theýChief of Staff, until Tal 
decided 'to retire from-the game'. Gur's dominant status meant 
that he exerted considerable influence on the preparation of the 
1 
2 
Interview with Col. (Res) Yishayahu Lavi, 15 August 1977. 
Bartov, Hanoch (1977: 179) Dado, Tel Aviv. Maariv.. 
budget of the, Ministry sections `äs well. . 
'When it was proposed 
in 1975 that Ministry representatives should take part in General 
Staff financial deliberations, the proposal was unequivocally 
l 
rejected by Gur. 
It is, therefore, clear why the Director-General-Colonel (Reg. ) 
Yishayahu Lavi, failed in his attempts to strengthen the civil 
function, inter alia by computerizing budgeting and creating an 
information bank in the Ministry, thus eliminating the IDF's 
exclusive access to such information, and abolishing that particular 
bastion of power. His proposals were vehemently rejected, the 
Financial Adviser to the Chief of Staff Brigadier-General Nehemia 
Cain enlisted the aid of the Chief of Staff Barley in that 
. respect. 
'That was my breaking point in the Ministry' Lavi later 
confessed. 
2 
The Budget Division is one of many units in the Ministry. What 
about the others? The civil Ministry is equipped with instruments 
to examine the financial impact of IDF needs, as supplied by the 
military, but it lacks the means to ascertain whether they are, in 
fact, vitally necessary. The Ministry could, for example, 
scrutinise a certain request for artillery, make economic calculations 
as to where'and at what price it was worth buying the equipment 
which best met the specifications. But it was not able to examine 
whether the purchase was in fact necessary and if the need could not 
be met in some other way. Therefore, the Ministry did not use 
budgeting as an instrument to determine policy, but operated as-a 
1 
2 
Interview with the Military Secretary of --the Defence minister, 
25 October 1978. 
Interview with Col. (Res. ) Yeshayahu Lavi, 15 August 1977. 
treasury, dealing with expenditure according to a predetermined 
plan, other considerations being formulated in the military framework. 
In an interview to Haaretz on 24 March 1969, Dr. Pinhas 
Zussman, who later became the Director-General of the Defence 
Ministry from 1975-1978) said: 
The defence establishment has not so far employed an 
economist to deal only with the examination of the 
implications of defence expenditure for the economy, 
the examination of costs, efficiency of weapons- 
systems and to search for ways. -. of obtaining the 
security we require with the lowest possible 
expenditure. The Planning Department of the Ministry 
was not headed by economists and eventually withered 
away. The heads of the-defence establishment were 
preoccupied with current problems and when attention 
was directed at economic issues it was restricted 
to the sphere of the Ministry's administrative 
efficiency. 
Have matters improved since then? As a result of the leap in 
the defence budget and the decision to produce domestically 
sophisticated weapons systems, after 1967, it was-decided to create 
a new post in the Ministry, namely an Economic Adviser, to be 
subordinate directly to the Assistant Minister Zur and the Director- 
General Kashti. 
The Adviser began to make examinations of the type formerly 
lacking in the-Ministry, but his job was not sufficiently 
institutionalized to grant him any power. Zussman, the first to 
hold this position, had a military past and was popular with the 
senior IDF staff. The Chief of Staff, therefore, enabled him to 
carry out his investigations. David Cohav, who succeeded him, 
lacked such personal rapport and was not accepted by the Chief of 
Staff, hence-his activity was less evident. It was. the IDF which 
decided how influential the Economic Adviser to the Minister 
would be. - 
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THE DEFENCE MINISTER'S ROLE 
Even those who objected to granting the Ministry "decisive part 
in deciding the defence budget, did not dispute the fact that the 
right to be the final arbiter was reserved to the Minister. This 
in itself reflected the nominal character of the Israeli-. - 
instrumentalist pattern. Can a Minister of Defence influence 
national defence policy through the budget structure, 
_withoüt"'even 
refering to his role as 'minister as leader', and 
adopting instead the more traditional approach of the 'judging 
minister'. The former leads and initiates alternative aims whereas 
the second decides between options presented to him. In order to 
do -that, he must receive alternate proposals and possess the ability 
to examine them or, in the event that only one proposal is submitted, 
to test it against others presented in the same detail. 
To do that. the Minister has, to have the means within the 
Ministry. Because he did not, he had no choice but to rely on the 
material submitted to him by the IDF and this generally contained 
composite views and not alternative proposals. The IDF's unified 
structure and the Chief of Staff's status prevented bitter clashes 
between the various forces but, at the same time, decreased the 
number of viewpoints according to which the budget could be 
evaluated. 
In many cases matters were submitted to the Minister for 
decision. Some were grave, such as how to build up the Air Force, 
with many older aircraft or a smaller number of latest models? 
Should armour continue as an auxiliary force to infantry or should 
it become the key force among the land units? What doctrine should 
the Navy adopt and what equipment should it purchase to implement 
it? - Others were less significant. 
But if these and other decisions were submitted to the Minister 
it was because the IDF had not arrived at an integral consensus or 
because of differences of opinion between the IDF and the Ministry. 
To bring the matter before the Minister for decision, rather than for 
formal approval, implied an-inability within the decision making system 
to agree. And, what is more important, in almost all cases the Minister 
was 'judge' rather than 'leader' and his assessment was a function of 
what was submitted to him by the contestants. 
The impossibility of examining alternatives in depth., together 
with the pressure to achieve maximum security, created a situation 
whereby Defence Ministers tended to adopt a pattern of decision- 
making which incorporated 'a little of everything'. Eshkol, for 
example, was presented in the early 1960's with the proposal that 
the Navy be equipped with missile vessels. The proposal was 
formulated in the General Staff after the year's defence budget 
had already been approved. It contained clearcut priorities: first 
priority to the Air Force, second to the Armoured Corps and third 
to the Parachute Corps. The Minister's economic advisers demanded 
that Eshkol reject the IDF's proposal, arguing that 'the IDF must 
decide if it wants to change the order of priorities, but we cannot 
accept a budget based on certain priorities and then ignore it'. 
Eshkol decided that instead of purchasing 12 equipped vessels, as 
the IDF had requested, three would be acquired but without 
equipment. 
) 
Interview with Moshe Zanbar, 30 November 1978. Zanbar has served as 
, as Head of--Budget '. Division, Minister of. Finance, Economic Adviser to 
the Finance Minister and Governor of the. Bank of Israel. He was 
a political. associite. of Levi Eshkol and Pinhas Sapir. 
Quite frequently the Minister served as an accelerating factor 
in IDF budget increases. Ezer Weizman's story of Eshkol's 
insatiable desire to help the IDF and the Air Force is characteristic: 
(Eshkol) would always ask: 'Have you got enough 
equipment, devices, spare parts, ammunition? Is it 
enough, or do you need more? Tell me, tell me, children, 
and we'll rack our brains so as to get it for you!. ' And 
we did not hesitate.. and told him what was lacking (and 
something always is) and he racked his brains and got it. 
l 
The very small number of cases when the Minister cut the 
defence budget on his own initiative, is confirmation that he usually 
accepted the IDF's schemes. Ben Gurion did it in 1951, but he 
served also as Premier and was conscious of the need for economic 
austerity because of the influx of immigrants. Only in 1974, after 
2 
the Yom Kippur War, did Dayan dare to act similarly. 
No unclassified research can examine the process of budget 
preparation within the IDF. Therefore, even assuming that a 
profound and efficient process occurs to determine conceptions, to 
define aims, to examine priorities, to consider the optimal means 
of attainment, which would make the finished product the best 
possible under the circumstances, the question of what happens 
afterwards remains. Does the civil establishment play any part in 
the decision-making3 
Gad Yaacobi MK, apparently reflected the true situation when he said; 
_ See-Wietzman, 
Ezer_C1975ý- 242). On Eag1es-'wings_. 
_ýieýýätrý: _Týi 
2 
It was symptomatic. of the 1977 political upheaval that the 
new Minister, Major-General (Res. ) Ezer Weizman, chose the 
method of budgetary cuts to assert his control over the defence 
establishment. 
Col. (Res. ) Simcha Maoz, an expert in defence economy argues 
that it is impossible to prepare the budget independently of the 
army's plan. These are the two blades of the pair of scissors. 
The main problem of the defence budget in Israel is not the fact 
that it is built according to targets but that the planners work 
independently of the budget formulators. Dvar Hashavua, 12 
August 1977. 
I doubt whether the civil arm is involved in determining 
the conception and order of priorities. In effect, 
the Minister of Defence receives a finished product 
from the General Staff. The foundations are built by 
the military sector exclusively or primarily. ' 
Attempts by Ministers, inter alia by Peres, to involve the 
Ministry after the military had completed the preparation of the 
budget proved to be futile. The ability to exert influence would 
have existed if the Ministry had been integrated in the process. 
But to this the Chief of Staff Gur objected vehemently. 
What is the IDF's starting point in the preparation of the 
draft budget? According to Yaacobi: ". 
The starting point is the question what is needed? It 
is not, what can be done within the framework of the, 
possibilities? The assumption is that if, from the 
first, matters are determined within the framework of 
possibilities, according to Finance Ministry constraints, 
the defence establishment a priori, forfeits its 
bargaining position and condemns itself to a smaller 
budget. Therefore, only when the budgetary framework has 
been consolidated in the army and reaches the 
Minister and the Chief of Staff, is the overall 
framework determined between the Defence Ministry 
and the Finance Ministry, through concurrence or 
differences of opinion. 
I 
THE FINANCE MINISTER - CASHIER FOR DEFENCE 
The civil sector's opportunity to criticize the draft budget 
rests on the Ministry of Finance and above all on the Minister. 
However, unlike all other civil Ministries whose budgets were 
formulated each year after a tussle with the Ministry of Finance, 
the relations between the Ministries of Defence and Finance 
displayed other features. Although the defence provision was the 
largest in the national budget, the Ministers of Defence and Finance 
1 
2 
Interview with Gad Yaacobi MK, 19 August 1977. 
Interview with Gad Yaacobi MK, 19 August 1977. 
"inclined to agree the share for the defence budget, the Minister 
of Finance having usually acceded to the Defence Minister's 
demands. Finance Ministers, who did not conceal the fact that they 
reduced the budget proposals of other Ministries, were proud that 
they responded to allthe"'needs, of the Defence-Minister and in some 
cases provided even more-. than was requested. 
l 
Only at the end of the sixties was the defence-'budget the 
product of a struggle between the Defence and Finance Ministers, 
a contest which occasionally caught the public's attention. In 
this period the defence budget increased considerably in comparison 
to the pre-Six Day War period. Its share of the GNP rose from 11% 
to more than 20%, and from one quarter of the state budget to more 
than one-third. But the increased budget and the additional burden 
it imposed on society was only a partial explanation of those 
disputes. The crux of the explanation was the political struggle 
within the Labour Party. 
Whereas the Ministry of Defence was headed by the Rafi leader 
Dayan, 'the Finance Minister, Sapir; 'was one of the leaders of the 
veteran Mapai sub-elite, but as long as Ben Gurion was Defence 
Minister his budgetary demands'were reinforced by his other post 
as Premier. When the post of Premier was'separated, from that of 
Defence Minister, 1the Finance Minister Sapir could enjoy the 
Prime Minister's support, either Eshkol or Golda who were'members of 
his own sub-elite. 
Furthermore, apart from political disputes with Dayan and 
See e. g. Gilboa, Moshe A. (1968: 34,41,70) Six Years, Six Days 
Tel-Aviv. Am Oved. 
Rafi, Sapir was the leader of the dovish camp in the Labour Party 
and as such antagonistic to Dayan's policy. The struggle over 
the size of the defence budget became, therefore, not only a 
political struggle between the two rival factions in the Labour 
Party, but also a general fight over defence policy. 
l 
Hence from 
1968 onwards a new situation evolved concerning the defence budget, 
when a civil focus outside the defence establishment became 
intent on influencing its formulation. 
But, curiously, Sapir's view of the Finance Ministry's role in 
determining the defence budget was minimalist. Whereas with 
regard to. all civil- Ministries the Finance Minister believed that 
his Ministry should decide both the overall allocation and the 
internal distribution of the budget and its various clauses, his 
approach to the defence budget differed. Sapir's view was that the 
Finance Ministry should determine an overall ceiling but that the 
defence establishment alone should decide on the internal 
distribution. 
Answering journalists who asked'for his opinion on the 
financing of the defence budget Dayan answered 'It is of no interest 
where this money is taken from'. Sapir, on the other hand, defined 
himself as the 'cashier -for the Defence- establishment' who doesn't have 
to understand what is done with the money supplied: 
'If the Defence Minister tells me that 'X' more lirot 
are needed and it is impossible to do without them 
then I will not be tight fisted. ' I wouldn't, accept 
that the death of one young man will weigh on my 
1 See Zeev Schiff, Haaretz, 7 October 1971 in a series of articles 
describing the struggle around the defence budget: 'The public 
debate on the size of the defence budget has recently gone off 
the rails. Instead of dealing with practical matters and 
economic and military-defence spheres, it has taken on a 
political tone... The division is not between economists and 
defence experts, but above all between personal supporters... 
Sapir et al against Dayan and associates. 
1 
conscience. 
In so doing Sapir found himself confronting many of the senior 
civil servants of the Finance Ministry. The Director-General Yaakov 
Arnon supported him but the Head of the Budgeting Division 
Moshe (Zandberg) Zanbar belonged to the second school of thought 
and argued that the same rules should be applied to-the Defence 
Ministry as to other Ministries. When Eshkol was Prime Minister 
and Defence Minister he supported Zanbar and even invited him to 
attend General Staff deliberations when economic matters were 
discussed. But after Dayan had entered the Defence Ministry both 
Ministry and-military applied the autonomist conception again and 
objected to the Finance Ministry having access to their affairs. 
However, Sapir himself did not embrace the conception whole- 
heartedly. He did not want to engage in actual defence problems. 
and knew that if he interfered-in'the'internal structure 
of the budget, responsibility could be imposed on him which he was 
reluctant to accept. Therefore, even when he demanded that the 
Defence ministry's draft budget be cut, he was careful to deal only 
with overall sums and to refrain from indicating specific items. 
The most concrete expression of Sapir's attitude to the 
defence budget was the size of the unit of the Budget Division in 
the Finance Ministry dealing with it. Until 1972 the subject was 
dealt with by one staff member on a part time basis. This was 
when the budget already constituted half the national budget and 
the number of Division employees dealing with all the other 
1 Interview with Moshe Zanbar, 2 December 1978. 
Ministries was several dozen. 
1 
Only. in 1972 was it decided by the Finance Ministry heads to 
set up a special unit to deal with the defence budget and four 
persons were allocated to the task. By 1977 there were seven, and 
the unit, unlike other units in the Budget Division, was in Tel Aviv 
so as to be near the Defence Ministry. But in talks-which Sapir 
held with the unit's staff he made clear what he required of them. 
The unit was never intended to serve as an agency to formulate 
the budget, but rather as a kind of private investigator for the 
Finande Ministry, and even more, for Sapir himself, within the 
defence establishment. 
Had the unit's staff wanted to'influence the preparation of 
the budget they would have found it very difficult to do so. The 
Defence Ministry adopted various tactics to prevent the Finance 
Ministry staff from interfering in their affairs. Several of these 
techniques were summed up in a confidential document prepared in 
the Budget Division on 16 February 1972 and submitted to the 
Finance Minister. It stated, inter alia: 
Para 1. Submission of draft defence budget: 
a) The draft budget (i. e. the contour budget draft) 
is not submitted to the Finance Ministry on the date 
fixed for the submission of draft proposals by all 
other Ministries, but later. This means that 
despite the decisive weight of the defence budget, 
in Government budgetary planning, there is no 
possibility to evaluate it within the framework 
of the overall planning and with reference to the 
economic priorities. The late submission leaves 
time only for a superficial perusal. 
The Defence Ministry comments on this: the schedule 
is dictated by the fixed times of General Staff 
deliberations. There is no readiness to change them. 
1 In the sixties, for example, Shalom Shiran dealt with it and 
devoted half a day per week to the'defence budget. His 
successor, Yaakov Agmon did the same. 
Finance Ministry proposal: the draft defence 
budget should be submitted at the same time as other 
Ministry budgets. If it is necessary to change the 
timing of internal discussions in the Defence 
Ministry - this should be done. 
b) The draft proposal (contour) is submitted in 
general terms, unlike the explicit detailed 
proposals of other Ministries. In effect, there 
is no debate on the details of the draft budget 
as for other ministerial budgets. The form of 
submission does not enable an examination of 
priorities, Either within the framework of the 
proposal or in comparison with other Ministries. 
For example, if there are specific items for 
construction but the sum allocated to 
construction in the defence proposal is inclusive, 
then there is no possibility to debate that 
subject. 
The document goes on to enumerate additional similar drawbacks: 
c) The division of the approved budget into sub- 
clauses and expenditure details, as detailed by 
the Defence Ministry, is not done in accordance 
with the Budget Law as it is in other-Ministries. 
The Defence Ministry interprets as sub-clauses 
and expenditure details under the Law, the five 
page abstract of expenditure appearing at the 
opening of the draft budget ... this situation 
actually prevents the possibility of examining the 
priorities submitted by the Ministry, and, what 
is worse, leads to an absence of knowledge of the 
changes made in the Ministry's operational plan 
during the, year, and these are many. 
The document enumerates a long list of differences in the 
form the budget is submitted by the Defence Ministry in contrast 
to all other Ministries, such as the composition of the clauses, 
their numbering or difference classification. This prevents a 
comparative analysis of the budget on a uniform basis with other 
Government expenditure and does not facilitate an examination of 
the budget where the determination of future budgets is concerned. 
The Division therefore demands that 
the form of submission of the budget be adapted to 
the instructions of the Head of the Budget. Division, 
including specific instructions, economic 
classifications and numbering. One cannot accept the 
argument of the Ministry of Defence that as far as it 
is concerned, the abstract satisfied the law. It is 
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proposed that representatives of the Budget 
Division in the Finance Ministry participate 
in discussions on the defence budget held in 
the Budget Division of the Defence Ministry. 
The document enumerates flaws in the method of dealing with the 
foreign currency section of the defence budget (para. 3), or changes 
and surpluses in the budget (para. 4). In the clause dealing with 
the structure and multi-year reporting of the defence budget 
(para. 2), it states, inter alia: 
a. There is no significant monthly implementation 
report on the defence budget. 
b. There is no'reporting whatsoevei. of commitments 
met to the detriment of the plan approved in the 
budget. This means that during the preparation of 
the budget, there is no authorized report of the 
implementation of the current year's budget. Nor-is 
there a periodic report. 
The replies of the Defence Ministry to the Budget Division's comments 
are documented, 'The Ministry sees no possibility of changing the 
procedure. It is not capable of reporting as demanded. ' The 
Division therefore proposed several amendments to make possible 
correct planning, budgeting, follow-up and supervision. 
One of the most interesting items in the document reveals that 
of the 70 clauses in the budget, purchase plans which amount to more 
than 50% of the Ministry's budget, appear in only one sub-clause. 
This means that the expenditure on individual projects is by no 
means clear. In effect, the addition of various schemes, including 
new ones, was implemented in this way without the issue being 
brought before the authorized factors for approval. 
This has also attracted the State Comptroller's attention and 
at a press conference in April 1970, after the publication of his 
annual report, he stated: 
Allocation of the defence budget according to sub- 
clauses and details of expenditure as submitted to 
the Finance Committee of the Knesset for approval, 
is in some cases, all-embracing, i. e. without 
division by goals .... as regards the great part 
of the budget, allocations are approved globally 
and internal changes are made by the Ministry 
without approval under the Budget Procedure Law. 
The allocation loses its significance if sums can 
be transferred without parliamentary approval from 
one plan to another. 1 
The Comptroller returned to this issue in the following year's- 
Report. At his annual press conference, he lamented the failure of 
the economic Ministries to intervene in the economic affairs of the 
defence establishment. Being alert to the changes of the 
autonomist approach to defence he warned against the danger that 
the defence establishment would exist as an economic 
system separate from the civil system, because of the 
tremendous weight of the defencq budget with respect 
to national budget and the GNP .... the civil 
administration did not have one or two dozen experts 
capable of tackling the Defence Ministry personnel 
on their economic plan and of influencing decision- 
making. 2 
LIMITED INTERVENTION BY THE CABINET 
The army was always of the opinion that the Ministry officials 
were mere merchants who could not serve as mechanisms of budget 
control. However, it never denied that the Cabinet had the ultimate 
authority to take decisions. But what about the Cabinet itself? 
Was it not at the apex in the formulation of national defence policy? 
The answer is negative. The Cabinet has never possessed a unit 
capable of examining, analyzing and evaluating the proposals 
brought before it and has never been able to initiate such a process 
itself. In the absence of a supreme comprehensive national defence 
body, the Ministers have accepted the material submitted to it by 
1 Haaretz, 29 April 1970. 
2 Haaretz, 21 April 1971. 
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the Minister of Defence. 
As long as the Cabinet was presented with a budget proposal 
approved by the Ministers of Defence and Finance, the-Ministers 
_ 
were not even privileged to hear alternative proposals considered 
by the IDF and the defence establishment. They were presented 
only with the final product. Cabinet Ministers had no opportunity 
of knowing what occurred within the defence establishment, what 
were the considerations pondered before a decision was taken. 
In such a situation the Ministers have no way of 
expressing a practical opinion on how the budget is 
allocated, for example, to argue the need to increase 
the number of fighter planes at the expense of naval 
strength. Therefore, the Cabinet has always 
contented itself with asking questions, requesting 
explanations, posing problems, but has never submitted 
proposals which could change the draft budget. l 
The Cabinet may enter into more detailed discussion if the 
Prime Minister is interested in doing so, as for example in the 
case of the establishment of new airfields, or the introduction of 
new weapons' systems, long-term financial and defence obligations which 
have implications for the IDF and the state. 
The Cabinet more usually took a more active role when the 
Ministers of Defence and Finance disagreed. But instances when the 
entire Cabinet-would devote its energies to a serious and detailed 
discussion of the budget's components were rare. When it happened 
'the deliberations were steeped in an atmosphere created by the 
tensions of personal and political prestige'. The more common case 
was that the Ministers did not decide, 'but expressed their 
opinions, transferring the decision to a small number of Ministers. 
2 
1 
2 
Interview with Gad Yaacobi, 19 August 1977. 
Yaacobi, Gad (1979: 198) The Government Tel Aviv. Am Oved, 
Zmora-Bitan Modan. 
But the decision taken in the Cabinet did not usually determine 
specific allocations in the budget, but related to the overall 
framework in the same way as the discussions between the Ministers 
of Defence and Finance. The decision was usually a compromise 
between the two sides. 
one should not deduce from this that the Cabinet does not'take 
decisions on defence matters which are of a long-term budgetary 
significance' Decisions in the'sphere of missile development, 
submarine purchase or other sophisticated arms systems; the decision 
to manufacture fighter planes, missile vessels and tanks in Israel - 
all these were taken by the Cabinet. But the question is not where 
the formal decision is taken, but rather to what degree is this 
forum capable of serving as more than a rubber stamp for proposals 
processed, formulated and concluded elsewhere. 
The fact that the Cabinet refrains from chbosing between 
alternatives has led Ministers of Defence, and particularly Dayan, 
to adopt sophisticated techniques of sidestepping the budgetary 
restraints. During the financial year he would present to the 
Cabinet draft proposals on-'defence matters of budgetary significance, 
usually on arms purchases, although the expenditure was not 
included in the approved annual budget. Thereby, he could minimize 
the disputes in discussions of the draft budgets, but could increase 
the budget during the year by additional Cabinet decisions-. 
) 
After being approved by the Cabinet, ' the draft budget is 
brought before the Knesset, where the civil sector is afforded the 
last opportunity to influence it before it is enacted. Despite the 
relative weakness of the Knesset, its influence on the national budget 
is considerable, and the Finance Committee is known as one of the most 
effective and influential components in the legislature. 
1 
2 
Interview with Moshe Zanbar, 2 December 1978. 
See Zidon, Asher (196 : 230-233) The Knesset (Hebrew) 
SPECIAL KNESSET PROCEDURE FOR THE DEFENCE BUDGET 
The Knesset procedure for dealing with the national budget has 
been modified over the years, but is basically as follows. The draft 
budget is placed on the Knesset table not later than 1st January 
with the intention that the Budget Law will be passed by the Knesset 
no later than 31 March. After a general explanation by the Finance 
Minister, a debate takes place during the first reading of all its 
sections. Immediately after the Minister's speech, the Finance 
Committee is authorized to convene and to prepare the budget Bill 
for the second reading. The Committee deliberates, then brings the 
draft budget back to the plenum for a vote on its recommendations. 
2 
The Defence Ministry budget is the only one which is dealt 
with in a totally different fashion. From the establishment of 
the state until 14 July 1953 it was not discussed by. the Knesset 
at all, but was approved without the size of the budget or its 
content being known to the members. Because of the desire to conceal 
its size and to keep the entire budget a close secret,, it was 
divided'in two.. The unclassified section was, submitted as the budget 
of the Defence ministry, like that of other Ministries. But this 
was the smaller part and related only to the Ministry's civilian 
activities. The larger share, including the entire military budget, 
was dispersed through various sections of the national budget with 
no details. Inter alia, part of the development provision in the 
1 
2 
See Zidon, Asher (196,: 230-233) The Knesset (Hebrew) 
See Knesset Procedural Code, Part 3: Procedure for discussion 
of the state budget, 22 January 1963. 
various Ministry's budgets was to cover the defence budget, whose 
greater part appeared under 'reserves'. 
' 
Knesset members debated the defence budget in plenum ignorant 
of individual items and their purpose. During a debate on the 
Defence Service Law 1949, Yaakov Meridor (Herut) demanded that the 
Minister of Defence reveal at least the overall sum of defence 
expenditure. 
2 
He reiterated this demand in the budget debate in 
the following year and said that non-submission of the defence 
budget allows the unsupervised utilization of funds. He also argued 
that the failure to submit the entire budget to the Knesset was not 
intended to meet security requirements, but was done because Ben 
Gurion did not want the budget's approval to depend on the Knesset. 
3 
To evade parliamentary supervision the Government exploited the 
security pretext in the budgetary sphere as well. 
But in 1953 the procedure for the discussion of the defence 
budget changed. ' The arrangement whereby various of its items were 
lodged in the development and reserve provisions of other Ministries' 
budgets continued to exist, but it applied to a smaller proportion of 
the funds. It was accepted that the Knesset must be able to discuss 
and to approve the defence budget without abusing its confidential 
nature. The instrument chosen was the Finance Committee. Like the 
Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee it was constituted only of 
representatives of the large parties, and did not therefore 
encompass the communist or the Arab minority parliamentary parties. 
1 
2 
3 
Interview with Israel Kargman, 12 August 1977. 
DivrQi Haknesset, Vol. 2: 1452,30 August 1949. 
Divr'ei Haknesset, Vol. 5: 1975 and 1687,2 June 1950. 
On 14 July 1953 the Knesset Committee decided that: 
The Defence Ministry budget in all its parts will be 
discussed in first, second and third readings by the 
Finance Committee. The Finance Committee will be' 
authorized to bring the Foreign Affairs and Defence 
Committee into its deliberations. ) 
Not all Knesset members were enthusiastic about this solution, 
which undermined the status of those who were members of neither 
Committee. However, no better solution was found and the procedure 
was adopted and remains-in force. 
In the seventh Knesset the procedure was amended once more. 
It was decided that the budget would be discussed by the two 
Committees in joint session. The procedural code was thereby 
legalizing a practice adopted in 1953. At the beginning of the 
eighth Knesset the two Committees totalled 40 members, and it'was 
apparent that the budget discussion would consume most of their 
time. Consequently, it was decided that the two Committees would 
open the debate, but that most of the work would be done by the 19 
member joint sub-committee. After the sub-committee has concluded 
its deliberations the budget is brought back to the joint committee 
plenum. In this way the Committees served as a kind of miniature 
Knesset which deals with the first and third readings, while the 
sub-committee conducts-.,. the detailed work of the second reading. 
The forming of the sub-committee was a significant innovation 
in the procedure for the defence budget debate because it was headed 
by a representative of the largest opposition party. The Labour 
Party, whose representatives served as chairmen of the two Knesset 
These resolutions were reiterated at the beginning of each 
Knesset term for example in the Knesset Procedural Code ratified 
in November 1965, Clause 102: 56. 
Committees, could not but agree to this. The fact that the first 
candidate for chairman of the sub-committee was Major-General (Res. ) 
Sharon (Likud) averted resistance by the defence establishment to 
the appointment of a member of the Opposition to that vital role. 
The procedure is as follows. The joint Committee holds 
three discussion sessions. The Minister of Defence, his Deputy or 
Assistant, the Chief of Staff and the Economic Adviser to the 
Ministry or Head of the Budget Division appear before it as do 
others requested by the Defence Minister. The general debate is 
devoted mainly to reports and the sub-committee's members' questions 
are designed to elicit information. 
The discussion is then transferred to the sub-committee for 
some three months. Meanwhile, the national budget, including the total 
defence budget, has been ratified by the Knesset. If the sub- 
committee wants to amend clauses in the defence budget it can do so 
unilaterally, but changes in the total sum must be brought before 
the Knesset plenum for ratification. 
I 
THE WEAKNESS OF PARLIAMENTARY SUPERVISION 
To what extent could the Finance Committee effectively 
examine the defence budget? Apart from professional, technical aid 
by one adviser neither this Committee nor the Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Committee has the assistance of any auxiliary instruments. 
The work is carried out entirely by the Knesset members themselves, 
I Since the Knesset plenum is not a forum for debating the budget, 
the problem arose of where to discuss reservations to the joint 
Committee's amendments. The procedure with regard to other 
issues was that reservations were submitted to the plenum. 
According to the Knesset Procedural Code the Finance Committee 
itself is authorized to decide whether reservations will be 
submitted to the plenum or not. There were usually more and 
when any was raised they were not submitted to the Knesset, but 
discussed in the Committee. 
the great majority of whom had neither economic training nor 
military experience. 
When asked to decide between alternatives, it can be argued 
that as public representatives, they do not need professional skills, 
because they are required to determine policy. But since they are 
presented with the finished product, they have almost no possibility 
to scrutinise it. 
The committee members have noted the absence of a professional 
apparatus as the main cause of its low level of effectiveness. The 
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Cömmittee, -Haim Zadok 
said that 
'the committee members lack an instrument to research 
and examine subjects in their sphere of jurisdiction. 
What we need are instruments to examine the 
possibilities to introduce greater efficiency and 
saving in the defence establishment, from outside 
that establishment. 1 
Senior committee member Adi Amorai (Labour) said that 'every 
debate on the defence budget is a farce'. The minimal influence 
2 
exerted by the Committee on the defence budget is also expressed by, * 
the absence of lobbying. The sole occasion when it was lobbied was 
in the early seventies by the aeronautical industry, represented 
mostly by Moshe Arens MK. Interested parties know that it is 
preferable to exert influence on the military, since the Committee 
is not a significant factor in determining the budget. 
The manner in which the defence budget was dealt with by the 
Committee was reflected in the fact that committee members were permitted 
1 
2 
Haaretz, 22 May 1975. 
Interview with Adi Amorai MK (Labour), 10 July 1977. 
to peruse the budget book document only inside the committee room. 
They are not allowed to remove it for perusal even to other rooms 
in the Knesset building. To what extent can a committee member 
lacking professional knowledge of economics, or any technical 
help study and analyze the budget proposal effectively under such 
conditions? 
The Committee's members' inexperience in defence matters 
was also reflected in their attitude to their function. They have 
refrained from taking responsibility for significant decisions in 
national defence policy. Israel Kargman (Labour), who was Chairman 
of the Finance Committee for many years, said 
'We have, of course, to rely on the General Staff 
when it tells us for example of the need for more 
missiles rather than planes. Even if someone in 
the Committee thinks otherwise, who are we to 
decide such matters? We know nothing about it and 
must rely on the soldiers. '1 
The civilian politicians' self-image did not raise their status in 
the eyes of the military. The common attitude of IDF senior 
officers towards them was: . 
'What can party emissaries know about 
the army and defence .... they only hamper us.... '2 
Any determined opposition within the Foreign Affairs and the 
Finance Committee-was always to the right of the Government. Herut 
later Gahal and to a certain extent the National Religious Party 
were hawkish and nationalist and always ready to support the defence 
establishment's budget proposals even when Labour Party members 
argued that its share of the national budget was too large and 
1 
2 
Interview with Israel Kargman, 12 August 1977. 
Weizman, E. (1975: 317). 
should be cut. So even a reduction in the total budget, which 
was the only way to exert influence when decisions were not taken 
on specific items, could not be effected. 
The absence of professional expertise, together with the 
unwillingness of the committee members to exert their influence to 
formulate the budget meant that it almost never underwent serious 
modification between its submission to the Committee and its 
enactment. The paucity of comment by the Finance Committee does 
not suggest that the Committee has in fact examined the budget items 
properly. The number of significant comments by the Committee on 
the budget could usually be counted on the fingers of one hand. 
About half of the defence budget is devoted to arms. procurement 
and is not dealt with"by the Committee at all. They have almost 
nothing to do with the items relating to frontline deployment, 
operations, alertness, maintenance and training. The subjects. 
usually dealt with by the Committee are those of a public nature, 
but they have marginal significance in the budget. They consider 
such items as food, service conditions, clothing, transportation or 
construction, culture and canteen services. In early 1970 a 
special sub-committee, headed by Moshe Baram MK (Labour) 
deliberated for many weeks and finally submitted recommendations 
on the distribution of dairy foods to IDF units - chocolate drinks 
and processed cheese! 
Only in the seventies did the Committee begin to display a 
greater desire to exert influence in grave matters, but it did so 
when a fierce debate was raging within the defence establishment, 
and the rival parties used the Committee to enlist support for 
their cause. The Committee recommended, for example, that the 
method of financial calculation for the reserve duty days be 
changed to prevent superfluous mobilization. It also discussed 
questions of domestic production in preference to foreign- purchases. 
But the items dealt with were few and their budgetary significance 
was marginal. 
After the Yom Kippur War the Knesset Committee became more 
assertive in defence budget discussions and the defence establishment 
submitted its budget in greater detail. But the end result differed 
little. Whereas until 1973 the Committee was ineffectual through 
lack of information, after the October War it was submerged in too 
much detailed information. Consequently the Committee has difficulty 
dealing with basic policy subjects and becomes overwhelmed. Some 
of the improvement in the Committee's operation in the seventies 
derived from the fact that since the seventh Knesset the number of 
members who are reserve officers has increased. But even they 
tended to place the emphasis on budgetary items with a public 
significance and refrained from dealing with the central issues of 
the defence budget. Furthermore, in Committee, as in the Cabinet, 
reserve officers tried not to make difficulties for their former 
colleagues and present friends. 
l 
Although the custom of dispersing the defence budget items 
among the various Ministries has been abandoned, and since the early 
sixties the entire budget has been submitted to the Knesset, it was 
only after 1968 that the Cabinet published the total of the defence 
budget. Eshkol initiated this against the advice of the defence 
1 Weizenaa, E. (1975: 320). 
establishment, whose leaders had unwillingly to capitulate. Thus, 
in that year, Israel's most important secret was revealed, the 
size of the defence budget. However, many of its basic components 
remained concealed, such as the foreign currency items, and its 
structure and details were still withheld from Knesset members 
who were not committee members. 
Furthermore, certain sections are classified even where 
committee members are concerned. The security services budget is 
submitted to the Committee only as a general framework without 
details and no debate is held. For many years the nuclear 
development budget was not included in Government budgets ratified 
by the Knesset, but was conducted as a kind of private budget by 
the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence. And only in the 
late sixties was the nuclear development budget submitted by the 
Minister to a confidential sub-committee of the Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Committee. 
THE BUDGET DIVISIONS BATTLE TO EXERT CONTROL 
After the Defence Budget Law had been passed the civil sector 
is still able to supervise its implementation, but has not done so. 
Whereas the budgets of other Ministries were under constant super- 
vision by the Finance Ministry and, when necessary, by the Knesset 
Finance Committee, the defence establishment was the exception to 
the rule. 
Since they were not responsible for the preparation of the 
defence budget, the Finance Ministry staff refrained for many years 
from supervising its implementation. Towards the end of the 
sixties there was an upsurge 
in efforts to do that but they failed. 
But the Defence Ministry used to deviate from the budget as 
approved. On 22 November 1967 Moshe Zandberg, Head of Budgets 
Division in the Finance Ministry, despatched a letter to the Chief 
Accounts Controller. Dov Ben Dror, criticizing the statement of the 
Defence Minister Dayan- in a meeting of the Ministerial Committee 
on Defence. Dayan had said that his Ministry- spent some half 
million lira per day beyond its ratified budget and that in the 
coming year, 1967/8, it would do the same. Copies of the letter 
were sent to Zur, Assistant to the Defence Minister, and to Kashti, 
Director-General of the Ministry. 'There can be no justification 
for a deviation without an amendment of the law' Zandberg wrote. 
' 
Seven days later Zandberg wrote to Kashti complaining 
about the construction of two additional stories on the Defence 
Ministry building in Tel Aviv. without the permission or prior 
knowledge of the Finance Ministry, and in breach of agreements. 
'It is difficult to reconcile what is happening with proper. working 
procedures' the letter declared. 
In addition to the problem of deviations from the budget and 
the carrying out of projects without budgetary approval, there was 
the particularly grave problem of the supervision of the Ministry's 
long-term commitments. Although budgetary approval was given for 
only one year, the Ministry signed long-term commitments, thereby 
rendering an annual approval meaningless. On 19 Decemberý1967 
Zandberg wrote to the Finance Minister, Pinhas Sapir (with a 
copy to the Prime Minister and others) denouncing the Defence 
Ministry's budgetary excesses: 
Money was spent beyond the budget .... and there is 
also the Defence Ministry activity .... they are 
acting in violation of the agreement .... that the 
Defence Ministry, in all matters relating to 
-detailing and supervision of the budget and its 
implementation, is subject to the same rules as 
other Ministries. 
1 This letter and the following correspondence are in the 
archive ofthe respective Ministries. 
This was an arrangement arrived at several times between 
the Ministries of Finance and Defence with the collusion of the 
Prime Minister. The letter enumerated several of the deviations 
from the 1967/8 budget which caused the annual budget to reach 
2.1 billion lira instead of the 1.8 billion which had been approved: 
It is essential to-adopt budgetary supervision methods, 
to ensure that defence expenditure does not exceed the 
budgetary framework approved by the Cabinet and 
Knesset. 
A. To apply to the defence budget the instructions 
of the State Budget Law, according to which the 
commitment sums (construction, purchase, 
equipment) and commitment plans are details in 
the budget proper. Changes in these commitments 
must be introduced legally. 
B. The Defence Ministry budget will be constructed, 
managed and supervised in accordance with the 
instructions of the Budget Division, like all 
other Ministries. 
C. All changes in the budget will be made in 
accordance with the regulations of the Budget 
Law and not as is now the practice with the 
defence budget, when transfers and changes 
are presented in composite. 
In conclusion the Head of the Budget Division stated that 
he could not, in fact, supervise the budget. On 22 December 1967 
the Finance Minister, Pinhas Sapir, sent an additional letter to 
the Prime Minister on the procedure for dealing with the defence 
budget, and wrote: 'It-cannot be accepted by any properly run 
administration'. 
Shortly afterwards, on 4 March 1968, the Finance Minister 
wrote to the Defence Minister regarding the 1968/9 budget and 
argued again that the Defence Ministry was operating according to 
a budgetary plan which had not been approved and which had no 
provision in the budget submitted to the Knesset. He reiterated: 
The budgetary arrangements operating for all other 
Ministries, in accordance with the Budget Law on 
the basis of which you agreed in your letter of 
24 December 1967 to act, have not yet been implemented, -and this arouses my concern. 
Sapir was referring to a letter he had received from Dayan, 
in which the Defence Minister wrote 
'I do not dispute the fact that the defence budget 
should be administered according to law, as in 
the practice in all other Ministries, and I 
propose that this be guaranteed by arrangements 
to be determined by Finance and Defence Ministry 
staff. ' 
The letter was sent to the Prime Minister, with a copy to 
the Finance Minister. But despite this statement, Defence Ministry 
violations of the regulations continued. Particularly troublesome 
was the problem of the long-term commitments. On this issue the 
Finance Minister again wrote to Dayan on 15 August 1968, asking 
him 
'not to enter into any commitment entailing payments 
beyond one budgetary year, without the prior 
approval of the Finance Ministry, so as to avoid 
difficult budgetary situations, in which the 
national budget for years to come is bound by 
purchase agreements or other contracts entered 
into by the defence establishment without the prior 
knowledge of the Finance Ministry. ' 
When patterns of conduct in the Defence Ministry did not change 
and the budgetary deviations continued, the Chairman of the Knesset 
Finance Committee, Kargman was made privy to the situation. In 
the course of the correspondence between him and the Defence 
Minister Dayan, the latter wrote on 8 June 1972, refuting what he 
had written to the Prime Minister and Finance Minister in December 
1967: 
Having examined the subject I do not now believe that 
the Defence Ministry should and can change its present 
working procedure. 
Despite the repeated warnings by the Finance Ministry, backed by 
the Prime Minister on the one hand and the Chairman of the Knesset 
Finance Committee on the other, nothing changed. Attempts by the 
Finance Ministry to influence the Defence Ministry failed. 
This situation continued after the Yom Kippur War, despite 
the increased public and political awareness of the need for civil 
control of the defence establishment. As in previous Governments, 
the Ministries of Finance and Defence were retained by the same 
sub-elites of the Labour*Party. Dayan was replaced by Peres, and 
Sapir by his colleague and ally.. Yehoshua Rabinoiitz. 
I 
The 
impression of the senior civil servants in the Finance Ministry 
was that Peres was more willing than any of his predecessors to 
expose the army and the Ministry to the Finance Ministry's 
inspections, but he roused strong resistance in the army. On 
19 January 1975 the Deputy Head of Budget Division in the'Finance Ministry 
wrote to his chief, with an outline proposal for a discussion of 
the defence budget problem. He wrote: 
The budget is designed to cover the working plan of 
the Defence Ministry and the IDF. It is of a 
significant size in comparison with any short- or 
long-term economic plan for the state. In the past 
few years the-custom has developed whereby the 
Finance and Defence Minister determine the framework 
of the budget, and the internal distribution is made 
within the Defence Ministry, without participation by 
the Finance Ministry. 
A detailed budget proposal is submitted to the Minister 
shortly before being submitted to the Knesset Committee 
and thus it is not possible for the Finance Ministry 
to examine the Defence Ministry's demands. The multi- 
year plans of the IDF were not conveyed to the Finance 
Ministry and it was impossible to conduct a serious 
examination of the budget before it was brought to 
the Finance Ministry .... in its current management 
of several issues (manpower, transportation, special 
projects) the Defence Ministry employs procedures 
which sidestep the customary procedures of other 
Ministries. 
l Yehoshua Rabinowitz was Tel Aviv Mayor before becoming a 
Minister in the Rabin Government and one of the leaders of Mapai. 
The document explained the influence of such planning on 
national production factors, problems which derived from the absence 
of multi-year planning, proposed procedures for current administration 
of the budget, suggested that multi-year plans for expansion be 
placed in a framework distinct from the current budget, and 
detailed proposals for the preparation of the budget: 
It is anticipated that the Finance Ministry will be 
a partner in preparing all stages of the budget, for 
example by submitting alternative budgets, analyzing 
costs of military plans submitted to the Government 
in accordance with the ability of the economy to 
withstand alternative levels of defence expenditure. 
The method of preparation of the budget, its structure, 
implementation, and in particular deviations were discerned by the 
State Comptroller. From the end of the sixties, and -especially . 
in the seventies, he became a critic of the IDF and the defence 
establishment, not only where preparation of the budget was 
concerned but also regarding the lack of budgetary control within 
the Ministry itself-and the way in which his own ability to 
supervise was hampered. 
In his Report No. 20 for 1968/9, published in April 1970, 
he noted that the Defence Ministry should have presented him with 
their report of income and expenditure not later than four months 
after the end of the financial year like all other Ministries. 
Instead, the reports between 1964 and 1966 had been submitted only 
in November, and for the 1967/8 only in December: 
The accounting system of the Defence Ministry does 
not stand up to updating demands, which are vital if 
it is to fulfill its task properly. As a result, its 
efficiency as an administrative instrument and 
supervisory body is affected. We cannot accept this 
situation with regard to financial activities of so 
large a scope, and the Defence Ministry and Finance 
Ministry must amend this situation. 
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Similar criticism of the way in which reports were submitted and 
the delay in submission was reiterated in subsequent Reports. 
' 
The 1975 report complained of a seven and 'a half month delay. 
The delay in submitting the financial report not'only 
hampered criticism of the budget's implementation as 
reflected in-the annual ministerial report, but also 
affected supervision of the Ministry's operations, 
their effectiveness and financial significance. The 
phenomenon of the delayed submission. of the report 
has lasted for many years. 2 
The State Comptroller noted that the various supervisory and 
control units of. the Defence Ministry did not effectively monitor 
activities costing hundreds of millions of lirot, and perhaps 
even billions: 
During the'1974-financial year the Defence Ministry. 
budget division authorized the various units of the 
defence establishment to engage in contracts and 
projects which were not specified in the budget. 3 
At the end of the financial year the Division requested the 
approval of the Knesset Committee retroactively for transfers of 
sums already approved for other purposes. In 1974, for example, 
714 million Israeli pounds were spent on activities without 
budgetary cover which were approved retroactively, which meant 
that the relevant'arguments regarding alternative planning and 
budgeting were never submitted and no steps were taken to ensure 
the supervision of projects which had not been specified in advance 
in the budget. In this fashion not only was civil supervision of 
the defence establishment affected but the budget lost its function 
as an instrument for determining national defence policy. 
1 
2 
3 
State Comptroller's Report No. 20, p. 450, Report No. 19 for 
1969: 544, 'and Report No.. 21 for-1970: 641. 
State Comptroller's Report No. 25 for 1975:. 749=. 50. 
State Comptroller's Report No. 26 for 1976: 829. 
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THE ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS OF THE AUTONOMOUS DEFENCE SPHERE 
The method-of preparing the defence budget and the way in 
which its implementation was controlled is one of the most vivid 
manifestations of the autonomist concept imposed on the defence 
establishment since. statehood. Although the defence budget devours 
the largest slice of the national-budget and has a decisive 
influence on the whole of society, -it is determined and carried 
out as an independent unit, apart from and practically disconnected 
from the decision makers in the civil sphere. 
The budget as the instrument which determines the size and 
structure of the army, its operations and policies is prepared, 
crystallized and implemented inside the defence establishment and 
the external factors have almost no influence on that process. 
.. 
The defence sphere was made autonomous ostensibly to effect 
its depoliticization. However, the outcome was that the defence 
establishment-was divorced from the civil system and had different 
norms. Furthermore inside the defence establishment itself an 
imbalance arose between the military and civil arms. ---Yaacobi said: 
As soon as the stage of preparation by the General 
Staff is concluded and the budget is sent out to the 
civil sector, the process of selecting among 
alternatives is in effect over, and the civil. 
establishment has almost no influence over the 
direction of policy. l 
The imposition of Ben Gurion's autonomist concept after 
statehood led to that situation. When Eshkol was enthroned as 
Prime Minister and Defence Minister, the Finance Minister began 
for the first time to penetrate into the autonomist sphere of the 
defence establishment. However, the political crisis in May 1967 
and Dayan's entry into the Defence Ministry halted the brief 
process. After that a new factor operated in the disconnection of 
the defence establishment from the civil economic sphere, which was 
1 Interview with Gad Yaacobi MK, 19 August 1977. 
the rivalry between the Labour Party's two sub-elites. The civilian 
leaders in the defence establishment who wanted to prevent Mapai's 
old guard from encroaching into their territory, brought about a 
deterioration in their own relations with the military. 
An internal document p=epared by the Finance Ministry, 
analyzing the impact of the defence budget on the national economy, 
states, inter alia: 
It is essential to arrive at a crossroads where it is 
no longer possible to continue in the same direction. 
As long as defence expenditure does not affect 
national goals, there may be no need for a reappraisal. 
But from the point when any additional expenditure on 
defence means the exacerbation of inflation or the 
worsening of the balance of payments, and any 
addition of manpower is damaging to economic growth, 
it is vitally necessary to scrutinize the size of the 
budget, its aims, components and anticipated 
expenditure. 
The might of the IDF today, although it-is the true 
guarantee of the existence of the state, constitutes 
a burden which is approaching the point where the 
state cannot shoulder it. If the state wishes to 
bear this burden it must discard other loads. It 
cannot shoulder all the burdens simultaneously. 1 
This document was echoed about a year later by Moshe Zanbar: 
Maximum security is not necessarily guaranteed by 
the maximum allocation of budget and resources 
strictly to defence. In times of war, yes, but in 
times of peace, may be not. The decision should be 
taken after a general and an exhaustive consideration 
of all aspects of national security. 2 
1 -Internal document of Finance Ministry budget division: 'Burden of 
Defence on the State Economy. ' April'1979, written'by the defence 
team, A. Novak with D. Zedaka with comments by the Head of the 
Budgets of the Ministry, Professor E. Gerglas. 
2 Moshe Zanbar, Maariv, 14 March 1980. 
This conception implies that the process of preparing the 
defence budget and supervising its implementation must be removed 
from the almost exclusive hands of the military and placed under 
wider civil scrutiny. Proposals in this spirit have begun to be 
voiced in the past decade, but they contravene the basic characteristics 
of the Israeli pattern of military-political relations. The 
subject of defence economy is not studied in the universities and 
there is a dearth of experts in the field. The blanket of 
secrecy compounds the difficulties in developing research, except for 
the few inside the defence establishment. Any change relating 
to the budget requires a profound reform of that pattern. 
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13. CRISES IN POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
1954 - THE MISHAP AND THE LAVON AFFAIR 
To the same extent that the image of state control over the 
instrumentalist army exists in Israel, the image also prevails that 
political-military relations are static, ' stable and constant. However, the 
reality is that the political-military partnership is fluid and 
is undergoing a process of continuous change. At different times 
and in varying circumstances during Israel's first thirty years of state- 
hood. a large-number of crises have occurred. The multiple crises 
have exposed the intrinsic weaknesses which are inherent in the 
arrangements between the army and the political system. 
' The first 
acute crisis happened 
in 1954, the year of the 'mishap', the year 
the seeds of the Lavon affair were sown. 
The 'mishap' was the term coined to describe sabotage actions 
carried out'in, Ygypt in July 1954 by IDF Intelligence Unit 131, whose 
members were caught, tried and convicted by the Egyptians.. The actions 
were intended to damage the growing political relations between Egypt and the 
West, namely Britain and the-Uriiied'States. The revelation of the 
network provoked in Israel the question, 'who gave the order, ' the 
Defence Minister Pinhas Lavon or the Director of Military Intelligence 
Colonel Benjamin Gibli. The protracted and convoluted post mortem 
1 The term 'crisis' means a severe disturbance or imbalance in 
the system, a situation which arises for a short period under acute 
external or internal pressures, when the system lacks 
predetermined routines to cope with the problems created by the 
pressure. The consequence is that the survival of the system is 
doubtful and that it experiences a process of rapid change. The 
closest example of the use of the-word 'crisis' in the sense that 
it is used here is in analyses of crises in international relations. 
For a summary of the term as employed by different scholars-like Ole 
R. Holsti, Charles F. Herman and others see the theoretical introduction 
of Geisl, Benjamin (1974) The SiX Day War. A. Study. in'the 
Setting 
and Process of Foreign Policy Decision; Making under Crisis Conditions. 
Unpublished Ph. D. thesis. The Hebrew University, Jerusalem. 
brought to the surface the deteriorating relationship between the 
political and defence top echelons, and became the root from which 
the Lavon affair grew. 
' 
The axis of the affair was Lavon's struggle against Ben 
Gurion to exonerate himself from responsibility for the 'mishap'. 
However, the essence of such affairs are that they are not one 
dimensional. More and more groups are sucked into, the whirlpool 
which they create, and they become a medium through which a large 
number of public conflicts are conducted. 
The Lavon affair had more dimensions than any other in Israel. 
It embraced disputes about the structure of the political institutions; 
debates over the etatist and voluntarist approaches; struggles over 
the two attitudes towards national security - the authoritarian and 
the conciliatory; the contest between the two perceptions of foreign 
and defence affairs - the European orientation involving Israel's 
nuclear programme, and the US orientation negating Israel's entry into 
the nuclear era, and the battle to determine the relationship between 
the defence establishment and the civil sector, particularly the 
pattern of civil control and the divergence of modes of operational 
and binding norms within the defence sector. 
1 The Lavon affair has been extensively described in Israeli 
. literature. 
The most recent comprehensive book, written to 
present the Ben Gurion and Rafi viewpoint, is by Eshed, Hagai 
(1979) Who Gave the Order (Hebrew) Jerusalem. Edanim. The 
affair is also detailed in Bar Zohar, Michael (1977: 1041-1065, 
1471-1518) Ben Gurion Tel Aviv. Am Oved. For earlier books 
which present the viewpoint of Ben Gurion's opponents see 
Arieli, Yehoshua (1966) The Collusion. Tel Aviv. Kadimah and 
Hasin, Eliahu and Horowitz, Dan (1961) The Affair Tel Aviv. 
Am Hasefer. Ben Gurion dealt with the matter exhaustively 
and compiled his own case in his book Things as They Are (1965) 
(Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Am Hasefer. Another compilation of material 
appears in Sharett, Moshe (1978) Personal Diary. Vol 3. Tel 
Aviv. Maariv. 
The several dimensions to the affair assumed varying levels of 
importance for the different groups in Israeli society. The nuclear 
debate, for example, was known to only a very small circle- even 
inside the, political leadership. However, the Lavon affair was 
fundamentally a power struggle between the two Labour Party sub- 
elites. In the mid-fifties the issue was whether Ben Gurion was 
entitled to appoint his own heirs, and. -by the end of the decade the battle 
for the succession had commenced. 
The Lavon affair provided a focus for the two sub-elites in their 
power struggle. They used it to express that struggle in the 
language of an ideological debate and to present it to wider social 
and political circles in order to mobilize their support. Had this 
power struggle not existed, the 'mishap' would not have escalated into 
an affair, and had the affair not exploded the protagonists in the 
power struggle would have had to find another issue to serve their 
purposes. . 
The several groups who joined the fray concentrated on one or 
other of the interwoven issues. The leaders of the Labour Movement 
could discriminate between the central and ancillary issues. However, 
according to the Movement's rules of the game the internal power 
struggle was concealed from the general public. Thus, for example, even 
the question of Israel's nuclear option was viewed by some Mapai 
leaders through the lense of that struggle. Pinhas Sapir, who was a 
prominent opponent of Israel's nuclear advancement, objected to it 
neither on strategic nor economic grounds: 
What worried. him was who would have control over the 
nuclear weapon. The nuclear issue was handled by the 
Defence Ministry, particularly by the Deputy Minister 
Shimon Peres, and Sapir was worried that the fingers 
of the Rafi leaders would be on the nuclear button. l 
1 Interview with Yigal Allon, 29 September 1977. 
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t 
1954 is considered to be a crisis year. But politicians. ' as well 
as students of Israeli history tend to view it as an aberration 
in the annals of the, state, as a period when an exceptional 
combination of circumstances shook the national security system and 
the Government's administration. The reality was that the defence 
establishment elites exploited the aberration perception which was 
absorbed into the mythology of political-military relations in 
Israel. Although several factors combined together to make 1954 an 
unusual year, it was not, nevertheless, an aberration. - On the contrary, 
during that year some of the basic structural flaws in the national 
-security system devised by Ben Gurion became apparent and were 
demonstrated in a dramatic way. Ben Gurion had left the Cabinet 
at the beginning of the year and during his absence it. became clear 
that the structure erected by him in the security sphere was 
collapsing. 
l 
1954 - BEN GURION'S STRUCTURE DISINTEGRATES 
The thread that ran through the events of 1954 was the 
undermining of legitimacy throughout the entire political system. 
Because of the centrality of security it was expressed primarily in 
that sphere at all levels, both within the civil and military top 
echelons and along the contiguous lines between the military and 
civil authorities. 
1 Ben Gurion had retired temporarily to Kibbutz Sde Boker to" 
contemplate his next step in his social and political revolution. 
Inter alia he wanted to change the electoral system from 
proportional to'first past the post', to obliterate the parties 
structure and to found a two party system on the British model. 
Throughout 1954 the political system pivoted around the 
abysmal relationship between Prime Minister Sharett and Defence 
Minister Lavon. They were contenders in the succession battle 
and their characters and mentality were poles apart. There was also a 
wide discrepancy between their views on foreign. äffairs and security: 
Sharett led*Mapai's conciliatory group, while Lavon was a prominent 
'activist'. 
The consequence of their differences was a total breakdown in' 
communication between them, the Defence Minister's denial of the Prime 
Minister's authority, and the impossibility to formulate and to 
articulate a cohesive policy. This resulted in the simultaneous 
pursuit of contradictory policies implemented by different arms of 
the state. Lavons' strength and Sharett's weakness allowed the 
army to penetrate into the diplomatic field not only without the 
Prime Minister's knowledge, but also against his explicit policy. 
l 
Had there been a clear delineation of the jurisdiction of Prime 
Minister, Defence Minister and Foreign Minister, and had the 
relationship between the Foreign and Defence Ministries been fixed 
constitutionally, and even had the mediatory mechanisms between the 
bodies which together determined national security policies been 
institutionalized, the appalling personal relationship between Sharett 
and Lavon could have caused a malfunctioning of the system. 
However, in the absence of all the ameliorating factors a genuine 
crisis arose. The operation of the IDF Intelligence Unit 131 in 
Egypt was only one example. 
.. 
An even more acute'crisis of authority surfaced between the'political 
and military echelons. Lävon had stepped into Ben Gurion's 
shoes as Defence Minister. The civilian Lavon, who throughout his 
political career had been an extreme dove, when appointed Defence 
1 See Sharett, M. (1978). 
Minister made an about face to become an extreme hawk, wanted 
to impose his -authority on the military. That was not an easy task 
because of, -the personality of the 
Chief of Staff. 
On the eve of his departure Ben Gurion had appointed Dayan as 
Chief of Staff and Peres as the Director-General of the Defence 
Ministry. Not only did Dayan and Peres view negatively all attempts 
0 
by the new Minister to curb their control over the. army and the 
Ministry, but they also perceived Lavon as a political adversary. 
Although Lavon belonged to the Mapai veterans leadership he was 
considerably younger and constituted a real threat to the young ones, 
Dayan and Peres. 
Seeking to exert control over the military and anxious about 
Dayan's political power, Lavon tridd to weaken his command authority 
by making personal contact with officers, even going so far as to 
give them direct orders. Dayan opposed that vehemently and was twice 
on the verge of resigning. At the beginning of April Lavon set out 
his position in a draft which he sent to Dayan. He stipulated in the 
introduction: 
The Defence Minister is responsible to the Cabinet for 
the national defence establishment. Any limitations on 
his contacts with the IDF's personnel and institutions 
belies that authority... usually the Defence Minister 
invites soldiers whom he wants to see through the Chief 
of Staff. However, in special circumstances, he will 
summon them directly... the directives of the Defence 
Minister which require action will be given through the 
Chief of Staff, with the exception of emergency situations 
which need the cancellation or postponement of an action. 
Lavon demanded immediate and unlimited contact with four officers, 
the Director of Military Intelligence, the Staff Officer responsible 
to the UN Armistice Commissions, the Army Spokesman and the officer in 
charge of the Military Government. 
' 
Dayan rejected Lavon's formulation, 
1 Eshed, H. (1979: 61). 
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especially because it would enable the Minister to give orders 
directly to officers. He explained: 
I proposed in a note to the Defence Minister a formulation 
which would enable him to acquire information by inviting 
officers through the Chief of Staff. However instructions 
would only be issued through me. ' 
Lavon opposed this suggestion and the outcome was-that the 
dispute was left unresolved. No binding rules were formulated. 
Against that background-Lavon froze a deal to buy French tanks, 
countermanding the Chief of Staff's decision without his 
knowledge. When Dayan learned of it he wrote to Lavon on 15 June 
offering his resignation. Lavon would have preferred to accept it, 
but. knowing that Dayan had the support of Ben Gurion, who though 
in retirement in Sde Boker was still the 'real' national leader, 
he could not accept it. Dayan, on his part, did not want to resign 
and therefore the two were formally reconciled. Lavon conceded to 
Dayan on the issue of the tanks; but the personal relations were 
unchanged and the friction over the institutional principle 
remained. Lavon's relationship with Gibli was especially a thorn 
in Dayan. 's side. Gibli openly testified to the. Olshan-Dori 
committee: 
I deal in fields where the division between the General Staff 
and the Foreign Ministry is not clear, like'the Armistice 
Commission and the army spokesman's office. In these matters the 
Defence Minister instructs me directly. There were a few 
occasions when the Minister dealt with me personally and we 
frequently met for private chats. 2 
1 For Dayan's evidence to the Olshan - Dori committee see 
Eshed, H. (1979; 62). 
2 Eshed, H. (1979: 62). 
Lavon's attitude to Military Intelligence expressed the 
inner contradiction in his perception of his role as Defence 
Minister. On one hand he wanted to strengthen the Minister's 
position and the civil administration which supervised the army. 
On the other hand, because of his power struggle with Sharett and his 
own desire to be active in foreign affairs, Lavon made military 
intelligence a political factor. It became almost a parallel 
Foreign Ministry, which not-only collected.. '-and analyzed. defence 
information, but also engaged in purely political issues and served 
as an operational body in those issues. 
But the tremors in the authority relationship between the 
political and military echelons were not the exclusive product of 
Lavon's conduct-, they- were just as much a consequence of the army's 
thrust into the political sphere. Above all else they were the 
result of Chief of Staff Dayan's personality. ' That officer did not 
conceal his political inclinations throughout his military service. 
He was extensively engaged both privately and publicly in state 
and party politics after his appointment as Chief of Staff. During 
1954 he developed a peculiarly close relationship with Ben Gurion whom 
he used often to visit-in Sde Boker. 
Dayan did not disguise his activist view and'when it contradicted 
the Government's policies he operated against them. As long as 
Dayan had the Defence Minister's support the two colluded, but when 
the Minister did not endorse the Chief of Staff's viewpoint, Dayan 
-carried out actions which 
had neither civil approval nor backing. Then 
he either concealed his actions from the Minister, or knowingly 
misled him in his reports. 
Lavon alleged that it was a common IDF practice during that 
period to extend the scope of operations beyond the original instructions 
and later to falsify the reports to him. When he appeared before the 
Knesset Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee in 1960 Lavon 'said that Dayan 
used frequently to deceive him about the army's operations: ' he 
used to... enlarge several times beyond his instructions the scope 
of the operations during their performance. Later on Dayan frankly 
admitted, when giving evidence to the same Knesset Committee: . 
I did not conceal my passive participation when Lavon 
misled Sharett. I explained that I knew that Sharett was 
misled by Lavon (by not putting him in the. picture) but if 
Lavon takes it--upon himself to do that, I do not have to 
interfere. Furthermore, I totally oppose Sharett's political 
perception and was aware from time to time that he did not 
approve actions. I saw in his disapproval harm to the state. 
I have no reason to help him to do that beyond what my duty 
requires of me. 2 
Dayan went even further than that in his attitude to the civil 
echelon and attempted to change Sharett's moderate policies in 
unconstitutional ways. He was closer to Lavon's defence and foreign 
affairs perception, but that was irrelevant once the two embarked on a 
desperate struggle for power. Dayan's hostile attitude 
to Sharett and Lavon, coupled with his strong desire. to contrive their 
abdication so that his political patron Ben Gurion would return, 
induced him to undermine the Government actively and publicly. The 
systematic weakening of the Government's authority was so insidious 
that Dayan nourished a truculent. spirit in the army and in so 
doing was helped by the Defence Ministry's Director-General Shimon 
Peres. Their collaboration during that year was the foundation of a 
long term partnership. 
Dayan's activities were not hidden from Sharett's eyes. He had 
to struggle not only against his own Defence Minister, who rejected 
his authority and pursued policies which he had not approved, but also 
I 
2 
Tevet, Shabtai (1972: 421) Moshe Dayan Tel Aviv. Schocken. 
For Dayan's evidence see Haaretz, 21 February 1965. 
against the Chief of Staff who 'conducted a campaign of slander... 
a whispering campaign against Sharett and the Cabinet. 
" 
Sharett tried to elicit Ben Gurion's help and sent to him the 
Head of the security services Iser Harel as his personal messenger. 
Ben Gurion, however, was more susceptible to Dayan, who had told him 
that if the Government pursued its moderate policy that it would 
provoke 'many (in the army) not to take part in the elections, or 
even to vote for 'Faction B' (Ahdut Haavoda)'. 
2 
I 
THE AFFAIR - THE UNLEARNED LESSON 
There was not only a disruption in the chain of authority within, 
the Government and between the civil echelon and the military, but also 
inside the army the'command chain was severely shaken. The direct 
contact between officers, notably the Intelligence Director with the 
Defence minister-, was one cause. Another was the behaviour of a group 
of important generals who thought that Israel should initiate a second 
round of war, either to conclude the unfinished War of Independence, 
to change the armistice lines, or simply to pre-empt the Arabs who, 
the generals believed,. were themselves planning a second round. The 
IDF's top echelons, led by the Chief of Staff, made no secret of their 
view and openly promoted it. At the tactical level it was shown in 
the activist climate prevalent in some army units, especially in the 
101 Commando Unit headed by Major Arik Sharon. The generals openly 
encouraged an increase in retaliatory raids, both in quantity and 
scope, to compel the Government to escalate tension with the Arabs. 
Because some actions were carried out even without the knowledge of 
the Government leaders, sometimes even without the explicit instructions 
2 
Sharett's diary entry for 
. 
28 January 1955. 
Ben Gurion's diary entry for 25 January 1955. 
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of the General Staff and Chief of Staff, a system to. falsify reports 
was evolved in the army's chain of command. 
1 
The peculiar characteristics of the year 1954 were concentrated 
and manifested-in the part played by Unit 131 in the 'mishap'. 
It was a difficult year for Israel both diplomatically and militarily. 
The situation along the borders deteriorated and the naval blockade in 
the Suez Canal and the-Gulf of Eilat was intensified. The US wäs'-striving 
to establish a regional defence system based on, an Egyptian-Iraqi 
pact, without. providing balancing arnis to Israel. Britain 
too contributed to Israel's sense of insecurity when it decided to 
withdraw its forces from the Suez zone, and to bequeath most of its 
installations and equipment to the Egyptians. 
Some IDF generals led by Gibli, together with Defence Minister 
Lavon, concluded that the only way to halt those developments was to 
rattle British and American confidence in their new allies, particularly 
in Egypt. To that end they decided to introduce a catalyst through 
acts of sabotage against Western installations, and to make it 
appear that Egyptians were the instigators. Unit 131 was used for the 
purpose. 
The Unit, Which had been, established during the War of Independence 
inside the Mossad to perform special duties for the Foreign Ministry, 
had clandestine cells in the Arab states. Its original purpose 
was to carry out special operations inside Arab territories, 
particularly in the field of psychological warfare. After the war 
it was'decided that the unit would be subject to a dual authority, 
both civil and-military, and would be supervised by Reuven Shiloah, 
who headed the Mossad, which was'the Foreign Ministry's intelligence 
1 Margalit, Dan (1968) Command Unit 101 (Hebrew): Tel Aviv. Möked. 
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arm; and by Brigadier-General Makleff the Head of Operations Branch 
to whom Ama"n, the IDF's'intelligence arm, was accountable. 
The unit was intended only to operate in wartime, hence the 
dual supervision raised no problem until 1954. But during that 
year, after a reshuffle in the defence establishment when the intelligence 
department became an independent Branch, the civil supervision over 
Unit 131 ceased. Harel opposed that and demanded a return to the 
former arrangement. He urged that authority over the unit should be 
vested both in the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sharett who was 
responsible for the Mossad, and in the Defence Minister Lavon. Lavon 
and Dayan opposed Harel's scheme, and in the end formal authority 
over the unit was left open and indeterminate. In practice control 
over the unit was the military's prerogative. 
The activating of Unit 131 cells in Egypt, whether on the 
instructions of the Ama"n head or the Defence Minister, was curious. - 
The unit's field of activity was strictly political, to shake the 
British-Egyptian friendship, yet it was activated at the army's 
behest without the knowledge of either the Prime Minister or. of the 
Cabinet. 
The 'mishap' demonstrated the shattered hierarchy and authority 
chain in the defence sphere which typified the whole of 1954. But 
fundamentally 1954 was not an aberration deriving solely from the fact 
that 'the communication system was based on lies and mutual deception'. 
' 
It is true that the strained personal relationships were unprecedented, 
but they only resulted in the breakdown of the proper functioning of 
the administration and in a crisis in political-military relations 
because they existed in a particular institutional framework. The 
institutional structure had the same basic components both before 
the crisis year 1954 ind"after. 
1 Hareven, Aluph (1978: 3-19) 'Disturbed Hierarchy; Israeli 
Intelligence in 1954 and 1973', The Jerusalem Quarterly No. 9. 
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When Ben Gurion left his Jerusalem office for Sde Boker the 
functions and authorities of the Prime Minister and the Defence 
Minister were not defined. There were no effective mediatory agencies 
between the political and military sections in the policy making 
framework. Consequently there was no process to crystallize binding 
policies and it was feasible for incompatible policies to exist 
simultaneously. 
Because there was no clear legal basis for civil control over' 
the military in such crucial matters as the jurisdiction of the Dire- 
ctor of Ama"n, and because the reciprocal rights and duties of the 
Defence Minister and Chief of Staff were not defined there were 
no institutional curbs to make it difficult for Lavon and Dayan to 
operate behind each other's back and to distort or to suppress reports. 
Because the autonomist concept had been imposed on the security 
sphere there were no effective civil mechanisms either in-the Knesset 
or Cabinet which could identify irregularities in the functioning of 
the defence system. 
Not only was the Minister unable to impose his influence through 
the-state channel, neither could he assert himself through the 
party channel. This resulted from the Chief of Staff's being the 
Defence Minister's political rival and who, being strong, could 
oppose his superior's view. 
The lessons in the 1954 crisis of political-military relations 
were not"learned. The 'mishap' was only one component in the political 
crisis of that year, and the Mapai leaders who were cognisant of it 
saw it as secondary. They wanted, primarily, to solve the political 
crisis and the only way which seemed appropriate to them was to 
bring Ben Gurion back to the Cabinet. In so doing they perpetuated 
the institutional conditions which had enabled the-crisis to develop 
in the first place. When Ben Gurion returned from Sde Boker, initially 
only as a Defence Minister, at the first meeting he told Dayan to 
. ý.. 
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'issue an order which will, -lead to the 
depoliticization of the 
military'. 
1 
Practically Ben Gurion continued to follow the same 
pattern of political-military relations which had existed before 
1954. 
on his return as Defence Minister, Ben Gurion was presented with 
a proposal which urged that the defence establishment be placed on 
a different footing. The proposal was made by Lavon who had been, 
manoevered into resigning. The central point in his proposal was that 
political-military relations should have a constitutional basis which 
would both clearly delineate the civil and military echelons' 
authorities and would strengthen civil control. Fundamentally, Lavon 
proposed to eradicate nominal civil control, to abolish dual. 
control, to consolidate state control on a formal, institutional 
footing and to establish some mediatory mechanisms between the army 
and the political leadership. ` 
Lavon arrived at these conclusions because of his personal 
experiences with Dayan, Peres and Sharett, but his concept contained 
the essential principles to solve the inherent disadvantages in 
the existing structure of political-military relations. Ben Gurion, 
Dayan and Peres held no discussion on Lavon's scheme, which they 
perceived as a contrivance which would enable Lavon to attribute his 
resignation to their rejection, rather than to his part in the 
'mishap'. In their eyes the main cause of the 1954 crisis was Lavon 
himself and they therefore calculated that 'with his departure they could 
bid farewell to the sickness. ' 
3 
1 
2 
Dayan, M. (1976: 137) Milestones Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Edanim 
and Dvir. 
Lavon set out his proposals in a letter to Ben Gurion 24 February 
1955. Private archive of Levi Yitzhak Hayerushalmi. 
3 Eshed, H. (1979: 166,271). 
The next few years proved that the truth was otherwise. When 
the"Lavon affair spiralled and the former Defence Minister-testified 
to the Knesset Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee 
in 1960, it was 
apparent that many of the fundamental institutional defects had not 
been changed. In his evidence Lavon described the penetration into 
foreign affairs by the Defence Ministry, its undermining of the 
Foreign Ministry and its construction of a military-industrial 
complex. He accused the defence establishment heads of profligacy,; 
and even of corruption, which they concealed behind the veil of 
secrecy, ducking and weaving to evade parliamentary control. 
Lavon also indicted the General Staff for its military failures 
and defective organizational structure, and charged it with pursuing 
an-independent ptilicy without civil authority. ' 'There were operations 
performed without my knowledge and others carried out not in 
accordance with my precise instructions', he said. 
l 
Lavon's appearance before the Committee emitted a violent shock- 
wave and provoked Ben Gurion into describing Lavon's behaviour as 
'the desecration of the sanctity of security! 
2, It was the first time 
that a Mapai establishment figure had unveiled to the eyes of other 
parties' respresentatives the secrets of the sphere which had been 
the exclusive preserve of Mapai leaders, and had launched a public 
attack on Ben, Gurion's autonomist concept, portraying a negative 
picture of the defence establishment's top hierarchy. When Lavon 
broke the Mapia veterans' rules of the game, which included those 
of Ben Gurion's opponents, he brought down on his own head a 
verdict of political suicide. 
1 
2 
3 
See Bar Zohar, M. (1977: 1488). 
Protocol of the Mapai Central Committee, 12 January 1961. 
Protocol of Levi Eshkol's speech to the Mapai Central Committee, 4 
February 1969, when he proposed to dismiss Lavon from his post as 
Histadrut secretary-general. 
The fate of Unit 131, which was the core of the 'mishap' reflected 
that la plus.. ca change c'est plus la meme chose. In spite of its 
civil function the unit remained within the orbit of military 
Intelligence until 1963 when it was transferred back to the Mossad. 
The reason for that was Harel's resignation'as Director of the 
Mossad. Ben Gurion, then Prime Minister and Defence Minister once 
more, appointed the head of Ama"n. Brigadier-General Amit to be 
acting head of the Mossad as well. When Amit completed his military 
career he remained as the Director of the Mossad. Because he had, 
for a while, occupied both thrones he was able to take Unit 131 with 
him to the Mossad, and no-one in Ama"n could prevent him. 
1 
At the root of the affair was the political struggle within 
Mapai.. The political-military relations structure was merely one 
of the combat arenas.: For that reason it was easy for the contestants 
not to institutionalize or to define the structure rigidly. Ben 
Gurion's comeback was a victory for the'young guard' and enabled them 
to prolong their control over the defence establishment. The 
arrangements which obtained until 1954 were designed to strengthen that 
control. and to augment their political power. Hence they preserved 
them even after 1955. For the same reasons it was convenient for the 
'young guard' to classify 1954 as an aberration whose only cause was 
Lavon. The war of succession in Mapai and the contest between the 
two sub-elites did not die down when Ben Gurion returned to the 
Government in 1955, so it was predictable that the repercussions of 
the inherent flaws would break out again. 
1 Interview with Iser Harel, 8 July 1977. 
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THE BEN BARKA AFFAIR - CONTROL OVER THE SECURITY SERVICES 
The question'who gave the order'was also at the centre of 
another affair which took place 13 years after the 'mishap'. At 
that time Eshkol was Prime Minister and Defence Minister and Rafi 
was an opposition party. The later mishap had the necessary 
components to inflate it into another 'affair. ' That did not 
occur because the mishap was in the security services, around which 
the blanket of secrecy was wrapped more tightly than around the army, 
and also,. because it occurred very shortly before the Six Day 
War. It was the kidnapping and murder of Mahadi Ben Barka. 
Ben Barka, a prominent leader in the Moroccan opposition, was 
. kidnapped on 
29 February 1965 in a Paris street and was subsequently 
shot by emissaries of the Moroccan King Hassan. 
I The French trial, 
which was held after 20 months of intensive investigation, precipitated 
a political storm in France and shook French-Moroccan relations. 
It became apparent that the kidnapping had been carried out with 
the participation of some high-ranking officers in the SDECE, the 
French security services, who opposed President De Gaulle's policy 
of withdrawing from Algeria. 
It was revealed in the investigations and trial that the Israeli 
Mossad had assisted the French and Moroccan security services in 
the preparations for the kidnapping. Close contacts between the 
three services, French, Moroccan and Israeli, had existed for some time. 
Ben Barka's fate was not known for a number of years after 
he had been kidnapped. At the end of 1975 the American 
weekly Time revealed that he had been killed. See Time 
29 December 1975. 
In the early sixties French-Israeli relations flourished and the 
cooperation touched the most sensitive nerves in the security 
services. Israel and France were involved in a joint missile 
development programme (the Jericho ground to ground missile, known 
as the MD660 in France) and a joint nuclear development programme. 
Israeli-Moroccan relations seemed cool on the surface, but were actually 
quite warm. Israeli intelligence services had helped to form and to train 
both the King's personal guard and the Moroccan security services. *The 
revelation that the Mossad had a role in the incident gave De Gaulle, 
who had been wanting to cool down France's relations with Israel for 
several years, an.. excuse to do that. He subsequently ordered the 
curtailing of intelligence contacts with Israel and on the eve of the 
Six. Day War he ruptured the"relationship between the twö states. 
The central question in Israel about the Mossad's part in the 
incident was'who gave the order: As in 1954 an, appointed civil 
servant stood against an elected politican, not the Director of 
Military Intelligence on that occasion, but the Director of Mossad 
Amit, against Eshkol. The Ben Barka crisis was not a crisis in 
political-military relations but in the relations between the polity 
and the security services. However it was one link in the chain of 
crises because it contained the same fundamental problem. 
In 1965, as in 1954, the defects in civil control over the 
defence sphere derived from the struggle between the two sub-elites 
in the Labour Party, a struggle which persistently undermined 
civil control. After Harel resigned in 1963 Ben Gurion had not learned. 
the lesson of 1954 when the Director of Military Intelligence was 
directly subordinate to the Defence Minister and not through the 
Chief of Staff. Ben Gurion created an even more intricate structure. 
Amit was at the same time Director of Aiua"n, hence subordinate to 
the Chief of Staff, and Director of Mossad, hence subordinate 
to the Prime Minister and Defence Minister. - Chief of Staff 
Rabin was understandably very critical of the arrangement: 'It 
is a defective structure which invites accidents, misunderstandings 
-f1 
and malfunctioning, 
In June 1963 after Ben Gurion's final resignation, Eshkol 
arrived to find Amit as Director of the Mossad. That fact caused 
him, and even more so the Ahdut Haavoda leaders, considerable 
anxiety. Amit had served as second in command to Dayan during the 
Sinai campaign and was loyal to him and Ben Gurion. But Eshkol 
determined to win the hearts of the Rafi supporters and when Amit 
showed his willingness to cooperate with him, Eshkol strove to build 
up a rapport with him. 
2 
Amit's control over. the Mossad caused increasing inconvenience to 
the veterans and the Ahdut Haavoda leadership as the relations 
between the two Labour factions worsened. Eshkol was pressed to 
appoint Harel to be the Prime Minister's A. dviser on Intelligence, 
a new post superior to the heads of all the intelligence services. He did 
just that, but'it'did not smooth the ruffled feathers of the intelligence 
chiefs. Harel and Amit were personal rivals with different 
personalities and professional perceptions. Amit was not acceptable 
to Harel and neither did he appreciate the creation of the new post 
above him or the man who filled it. It was against that background 
in the intelligence community that the Ben Barka affair erupted. 
The political environment was similarly a hothouse to nourish 
the mishap into another affair. The Moroccan opposition leader was 
kidnapped two days before the elections to the sixth Knesset, the 
1 
2 
Rabin, Yitzhak (1979: 118) Memoirs (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 
Maariv. 
For that reason in the early period Eshkol also left Shimon 
Peres in the position of Deputy Minister of Defence. 
only election which Rafi contested as an independent party 
against the Alignment of Mapai and Ahdut Haavoda. After the 
formation of the new Government, Rafi concentrated its opposition 
attack on what it perceived as Eshkol's and the Cabinet's incompetence 
in the security sphere. The Ben Barka mishap provided them with an 
appropriate justification. 
The confusion surrounding the question, 'who gave the order', set 
the two camps at each other's throats as it had done eleven years 
earlier. The Ahdut Haavoda leaders and some of the Mapai veterans 
argued that Amit had given the order without the Prime Minister's 
approval. Rafi leaders, on the other hand, asserted that Eshkol had 
given the order and should take the responsibility. 
The details of the incident remained cloudy as did the 
interpretation of the central document in the affair. It was a 
letter from Eshkol to Amit from which one could infer that he had 
agreed to the Mossad assisting the Moroccans to kiddap Ben Barka'and 
so the questions raised in 1954 were raised again. Was the approval 
explicit? _ Had 
it been given retroactively? Even if the Prime 
Minister had not instructed the Mossad, should he not shoulder the 
responsibility for the actions of his civil servants? The strict 
censorship imposed on the affair did not allow a public debate, so it 
was conducted by Mapai behind closed doors. 
The incident became known to the Mapai leaders when one of the 
Mossad members told Israel Galili the Minister of Information about 
it. Galili summoned Harel and asked him about it. Harel replied 
that he knew nothing, and a rapid investigation elicited that Abba 
Eban_ the Foreign Minister was also ignorant of it. 
When Harel confided in Eshkol, Eshkol asked him to probe the 
entire incident, which Harel did. He concluded that the onus of 
responsibility was on Amit's shoulders and that he should resign. 
Eshkol confided in his associates in the Mapai leadership and they 
formed a small internal committee to enquire into the affair. The 
committee members were Golda Meir, Shaul Avigor, Yaacov Shimshon.. - 
Shapira and Eliezer Shoshani. 
l 
The web of interests was even more intricate than Harel's 
investigation had shown. They examined the mishap in the context of 
Rafi's attempts to topple Eshkol's Government. They soon realized. 
that Eshkol's and Amit's knots were too tight to unravel, and that- 
Amit's resignation would further complicate things for Eshkol. In 
typical Mapai fashion, as in 1954, they decided to maintain the 
personal status'quo and not to touch anyone. 
Other party members found that unacceptable and did not want 
the matter swept under the carpet. In 1966 a group of four party 
activists, Shoshani, David Golomb, Senta Yoseftal and Mordehai 
Nisiyahu circled round the party leaders demanding a firm verdict 
as to who was to blame, Amit or Eshkol. But the Mapai leaders 
attributed their conduct to a political motive to damage Eshkol. 
Even the proposal put to Golda Meir, that she should succeed Eshkol 
did not shake her conviction that the group wanted to benefit Rafi. 
2 
Consequently the group's request was not granted and its members had 
to pay for their temerity. Golomb, a Knesset member popular with 
the veterans, was removed from the candidates list before the next election. 
3 
Avigor. had been involved in defence matters since the Haganah days 
and was considered a person of high principles. Shoshani was the 
Chairman of the Servicemen's Department for many years. Shopira was 
the Justice Minister, and Golda Meir the Party's Secretary-General. 
2 See a hint in Gilboa, Moshe (1968: 174) Six Years, Six Days 
(Hebrew) Tel Aviv. Am Oved. 
3 Golomb was the son of Eliahu Golomb, the Haganah leader. In 1977 
he returned to the Knesset as a member of the Democratic Party for 
Change-together with Amit. 
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As much as the Mapai veterans tried to conceal the 
Ben Barka affair, their political rivals wanted to expose it 
and to utilize it to attack Eshkol's Government. On 9 September 
1966 the 'sensational weekly Boule published a front page story 
titled 'Yigal Allon - Prime Minister. Mischief by the Israeli and 
French Security Services in the Ben Barka affair'. 
The censor and the security services were not content to give 
them a routine report and a- few hours after the copies were off 
the presses policemen raided the premises and the newsuendors and 
confiscated all copies. The paper's two editors Shmuel Mor and Maxim 
Ghilan were detained until their trial on 6 June 1967. They were 
charged with contravening Art. 23(d)"of the Criminal'Law-(State 
Security) 1957, a law which deals with espionage and which prescribes 
up to a 15 year prison term. The journalists were accused of 
disseminating secret information even though it might be false. 
They were found guilty on 12 February 1967 and sentenced to one year's 
imprisonment. 
The trial was held in'camera, neither the verdict was published 
nor the fact of the magazine's confiscation, and the journalists' 
detention. However, the rumour spread among other journalists, but 
the censor banned the publication of any information. It was the 
first and only time in Israel when journalists were tried and 
convicted on an espionage charge. The imbalance between the. crime 
and the punishment aroused the suspicion that 'the sequence of 
censorship, police and legal procedures were not a result of security 
considerations but of political ones. '1 
1 Haaretz leader, 20 February 1967. 
The Government's efforts to Plug any possible leak failed. 
on 19 February 1967 the New York Times published a lengthy and 
detailed story about the arrest, the closed trial-and the confiscation 
of the magazine. Israeli correspondents filed their stories and in 
accordance with the censorship regulations, which allow the 
publication in Israel of material. even if secret originating 
in the foreign press, appeared in the Israeli press. The conspiracy 
of secrecy was shattered. 
Censorship of the intelligence and party aspects persisted, so 
the public furore centred around the Boule incident and not directly 
around the Ben Barka affair. The storm raged for about a month 
and centred'around press freedom. Condemnation of the Government 
both at home and abroad eventually forced the-Cabinet to ask the 
President to pardon the journalists, who were released one month 
after their trial. 
" 
The question of press freedom languished, but the Ben Barka 
affair and the issue of control over the intelligence and secret 
services was never the subject of a public debate because of the grave 
political reservations. Harel, who a few years before had shifted 
his support from Ben'Gurion to the veterans, perceived the politicians' 
justifications as immoral and he resigned. Amit remained as Director 
of the Mossad until 1968. When his term ended the veterans drew 
the personal conclusions from the Ben Barka affair and appointed as 
Amit's successor Major-General (Res. ) Zvi Zamir, a former Palmah' 
member, friend of Allon and close to the veteran leadership. After 
Zamir's retirement in 1974 the new incumbent was another reserve officer, 
1 After the New York Times article the official Government Press 
office in Jerusalem reported the arrest and the. trial. 
See communique in Israeli newspapers 20 February 1967. 
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major-general Yitzhak Hofi, who belonged to the same political 
¢roup, who had been Allon's candidate as Chief of Staff, but had 
lost to Dayan's candidate Mordehai*Gur. Control through the 
party political channel had been successfully restored. 
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THE CRISIS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S AUTHORITY IN THE WAITING PERIOD 
The Six Day War in June 1967 and' the 'waiting period' that 
preceded it in-May, have=not. only been extensively described by, the 
participants but also by academics, One explanation is that the 
period constituted an international crisis of the gravest order. 
The 'hot line' between the Kremlin and the White House was used for 
the first time. The way the crisis developed was an archetypal 
exercise in uncontrolled escalation and has since fascinated 
scholars. No less important than the international and the party 
political crises was the crisis in political-military relations. 
That aspect has attracted the least attention. The development 
sequence during the 'waiting period'fits the definition of a crisis 
within a system: 
A situation where the mechanisms for the maintaining of 
boundaries and the consensus surrounding the systems basic 
and. ultimate values are suspended or destroyed. Both 
values as such and the rules regulating the interaction of 
those concerned in adhering to them are affected. 2 
For a'short period in May 1967 the political-military pattern 
went through an accelerated process of change, which involved the 
disintegration of the, previous pattern and the Adoption of a new 
one, whose principles remained after the war. The crisis in political- 
1 
2 
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military relations developed against the background of the political- 
military and the party-political crises. The first began 
on the 14 May 1967 when Egyptian forces entered the Sinai Peninsula,. and 
the second on 23 May, when the Cabinet decided to delay any military 
response to the Egyptian move, and to try to resolve the crisis through 
diplomatic channels. It continued until 1 June during which time 
the Government, and particularly Eshkol, lost its legitimacy not only 
in the eyes of the opposition and coalition parties, but also inside 
Mapai institutions. Only with the establishment of a National Unity 
Coalition, when Gahal and Rafi, joined the Cabinet, and the, wresting- 
of the defence portfolio from Eshkol by Dayan was the political crisis 
ende d. 
l 
One of the manifestations of the crisis in the security sphere 
was the issue of convergance of the decision making process in the 
security sphere. The open and conciliatory-pattern introduced by 
Eshkol into the defence establishment, similar to the one in the 
civil sector and unlike Ben Gurion's closed and autocratic pattern, 
could be discerned in the fateful debates held in May 1967. On 
the morning of the 27 May the Cabinet once again discussed whether 
or not to go to war. The vote was balanced 9 to 9 including Eshkol 
who voted for war. He could in fact have persuaded at least two of the 
three Mäpai ministers to change their minds and to vote with him but 
2 
he refrained from doing so. 
I 
2 
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The conflict between the authoritarian and conciliatory 
outlooks continued throughout the crisis period. Lova Eliav, 
Deputy Minister for Commerce and Industry, a member of the 
intermediate generation and close to Eshkol, and the 
veterans, proposed a typical compromise to solve the leadership 
problem. Allon and Dayan should both be appointed Deputy. Prime 
Ministers for the emergency period, and the war would be conducted by 
a triumvirate. 
) 
The political motive was clear. The arrangement 
would give Dayan power, but it would also state that Eshkol's 
successor had not yet been determined. Yitzhak Navon MK articulated 
his mentor's approach: 'When there is a committee there is naturally 
dissension. Somebody has to decide, somebody has to have the capacity 
to decide'. 
2 
The crisis of authority was so acute that a member of Mapai's 
secretariat, who was chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Committee, David Hacohen said: 
War is too serious a matter to be left in the hands of 
the ministers, it should be given to the generals and 
they should decide what and when. 3 
The crisis in political-military relations during the'waiting 
period'was as severe as the political crisis. It is accepted 
that the G. H. Q. exerted constitutional pressure on the Government 
to go to war and particular reference is made to three meetings held 
between the Prime Minister and groups of generals. 
.1 
2 
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The first took place on 25 May. Eshkol visited the Southern 
Command with Allon and met the Commander Brigadier-General 
Yishayahu Gavish and the commanders of the three divisions 
Brigadier-Generals Israel Tal, Avraham Yaffe and Arik Sharon. 
There are several versions of the verbal exchanges in that encounter; 
One understated account records that 'It is indisputable that 
Eshkol realized that he and the military men did not transmit on the 
same wave length':; another goes further and states that 'the meeting 
became a sharp confrontation when the officers openly doubted the 
reason behind the Cabinet decision to make a further delay'. 
2 
A more serious meeting was held on 28 May after a Cabinet' decision 
to postpone, for another fortnight, the decision as to whether to go 
to war or not. Chief of Staff Rabin asked Eshkol to explain the 
Cabinet's decision to the high command. The military censorship 
forbad publication of that encounter for many years. However, from the 
details which were disclosed, it is clear that the language used by 
some of the generals was not appropriate for public servants when 
talking to their political master. One of the generals described 
the Cabinet's diplomatic efforts as'begging; another argued that the 
Cabinet would be responsible for a high casualty rate in the war 
because of the postponement, a third even dared to suggest that a 
moment might arrive when a military man should ask himself whether 
the good of the state had priority 'over the Government's instructions. 
Tempers were high, so much so that Allon proposed that the discussion 
be adjourned to a later time, and before anybody had the opportunity to 
3 
answer, Eshkol and Allon left the room. 
The details of the third encounter remained confused. It occurred 
when the Chief of Operations, Brigadier-General Ezer Weizman, went into 
1 
2 
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the Prime Minister's office, -ripping off his rank-insignia and 
throwing them on Eshkol's desk saying: 'If you do not give (the 
order to open war) Jewish history will never forgive you'. 
' 
In all the encounters, as in many other informal meetings that 
the generals had with the politicians during that month, six argu- 
ments were adduced to justify Israel's initiating a war without 
further delay. 
1. If the IDF did not initiate the war then the Egyptians 
would, - and Israel would lose, in additioii to-. the already 
lost strategic surprise, the advantage of a tactical 
surprise. 
2. The Egyptian army was rapidly improving its position in 
Sinai, hence the sooner the Israeli attack was launched 
the less prepared would the Egyptians be. 
3. Egypt. had knowingly carried out a series of provocations 
which since 1956+had been considered by Israel as casus 
belli, and that the failure to respond would undermine 
the basis of Israeli defence policy which was founded on 
a deterrent doctrine. 
4. The Egyptian move had altered the political and military 
balance in the area and only war would restore the status 
quo ante. 
5. An Israeli pre-emptive strike would enable the IDF to make 
military gains which after the war would be. political 
bargaining cards which could be exchanged for political 
gains. 
6. Israel should utilize the war to rectify the. territorial 
distortions of the War of Independence and to conquer the 
territories which were not then captured, particularly in 
the West Bank. 
'0f the six arguments, only the last one opposed the Government's 
policy. It was raised by only a very few people of the 
high command 
as a _supplementary 
point. Although the generals exerted 
strong verbal pressure on the politicians to go to war, they did not 
1 Weizman, Ezer (1976: 219) On Eagles Wings. London. Weindenfeld 
and Nicolson. 
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break the rules of the game adopted in Israel until 1967. They 
did not deny the right of the civil echelon to make the ultimate 
decision, nor did they threaten to act against the Government's 
opinion. It was the exertion of pressure, but no force was 
'exerted. "The"IDF was an aggressive pressure group but not a. 
rebellious one. 
During that period Rabin counterbalanced the pressure from 
the generals. Even after some senior officers had insisted on launching 
an attack he still advocated political and diplomatic initiatives. 
In a discussion on 21 May with the Heads of Branches he said, 'The 
political -powers -judge that they can solve the problems by'political 
means, one should let them exhaust all the opportunities. ' He 
presented the same suggestion. to the Cabinet on 23 May. 
Some generals, in particular the leaders of the activists, 
Weizman. and Yariv, realized that the Cabinet opposed the launching 
of a total war and. therefore proposed a limited operation such as an 
air strike against the Egyptian Air Force. Rabin, in contrast, 
indicated the disadvantages of going to war when he gave his opinion 
to the Cabinet and the Prime Minister. 
From Eshkol's vantage point Rabin's stance was not helpful. 
Rabin's hesitation compelled him to try to exhaust all possible 
diplomatic moves before embarking on a total war. But that policy 
was interpreted as timidity, vacillation and weakness, and it 
accelerated the process of the declining confidence in Eshkol's 
leadership. After the war Eshkol said bitterly: 
Had the viewpoint presented to me by the Chief of Staff 
(Rabin) been similar to that of Brigadier-General Barley, 
the only general who was not hysterical and who argued 
I 
Rabin, Y. (1979: 146-168). 
consistently that the IDF was able to win, I would 
have more easily resisted the political attacks against 
meal 
on the other hand Rabin was not helped by Eshkol's behaviour 
during the crisis and he lacked a political shoulder to lean on. 
Eshkol, _heýwrote, was 
'exhausted, the burdens of the time. and the defamation 
campaign (against him) combined to shake his position. 
His authority was also damaged in the eyes of other 
ministers who were influenced by the ill will spread 
by the Rafi members and also by senior commanders... 
clipped wings and curbed authorities, with no power to 
exert his authority over the Cabinet, not through his 
own fault but because of the trageic circumstances. I 
could no longer find in him a stable prop to share the 
burden. 2 
The vicious circle of negative reciprocal influence harmed 
both. Eshkol and Rabin and was one-of the causes for Rabin's break- 
down and Eshkol's losing the defence portfolio. However, in spite 
of all that, the Chief of Staff was a counter weight to the military 
pressure on the Government to go to war. The crisis in the 
relationship between the politicians and the generals was not that 
the army forced the Cabinet to go to war against its better 
judgement. Wherein did the crisis lie: First, there was a dramatic 
and rapid change in the nature of the boundaries between the political 
and military systems at both the party and state levels. Secondly, 
for the first time in the state's history the army interfered directly 
in the purely political issue of the Cabinet's composition. 
1967 - THE COLLAPSE OF'THE BOUNDARIES 
In spite of the changes that Eshkol introduced into political- 
military relations he retained one institutional element which had 
been formulated by Ben Gurion, integral boundaries between the military 
I Interview with Miriam Eshkol, 17 August 1977. 
2 Rabin, Y. (1979: 148). 
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and all political parties but Mapai. That element collapsed in 
May 1967 as a result of pressure exerted by both the politicans and 
the military. 
Desperate for political-military knowledge to chart a course 
through the international and party political crises, politicians 
courted generals for information. The latter supplied it willingly 
in exchange for political knowledge and particularly for the 
opportunity to influence the political-military process. Consequently 
an"intense interaction between generals and politicians took place 
when international, party, military and personal issues were inter- 
twined. The military personnel dealt with inter and intra-party 
issues and wanting to have influence in the Cabinet they even decided 
who would lobby whom. 
l 
To the same extent that generals meddled in party politics, 
politicians intruded into purely military matters, not only on general 
assessments but also in detailed discussions of operational plans. 
Rafi leaders, who were kept informed during the crisis, talked 
incessantly about military matters, On 21 May the party leaders discussed 
operational military plans. They did so on two more occasions during 
the next few days. On 27 May, when a meeting took place in Ben Gurion's 
residence in Tel Aviv, an incident between Ben Gurion and Dayan erupted. 
The former began to discuss military operational plans. Dayan rose 
from his seat blazing and said: 'I am not ready to discuss military 
plans in a party forum. '2 Dayan who wanted to defend Ben Gurion's own 
concept was furious with his mentor and he declared that he would not 
take part in any further meetings if operational plans were raised. 
1 It was irresistible to send the military Chief Rabbi Brig. -Gen. 
Shlomo Goren to lobby the Ministers from the National Religious 
Party. Interview with Aharon Yariv, 13 July 1977. 
2 Nakdimon, S. (1968: 133). 
During the'waiting period'it was not only the type of 
boundaries between the army and parties and the nature of 
interaction across them which were modified. The army's 
boundaries with the state institutions also changed. In no other 
period were there so many attempts to adapt the structure of the 
civil institutions dealing with defence matters than during the 
last three weeks of May 1967. All of them were designed to 
rehabilitate the Government's authority in security matters, both 
in the eyes of the public and the army. 
As in the past Mapai leaders tried to solve the party-political 
crisis by modifying the institutional structure of the security 
system. Some of their changes were radical and were outside the 
law. 
Several suggestions were put forward to set up a national 
security coucil, either as an advisory body or as an executive 
body. Another suggestion was to change the Cabinet structure by 
giving it additional functions, like those of a war cabinet, with 
the inclusion of both Ministers and people from outside the Cabinet. 
Another proposal urged the appointment of an assistant to the Prime 
Minister for security matters with the status of a Cabinet Minister or 
of two Deputy prime ministers. The formation of a ministerial Defence 
Committee to comprise both Ministers and outsiders was also proposed. 
The common denominator in the dozen or so proposals in this period 
was the determination to prevent Rafi from wresting authority over 
security from the veterans. Eshkol eventually realized that the 
pressure to relieve him . of authority over security was irresistible, 
and he agreed to split his roles and relinquished the defence 
portfolio. 
But it did not enter his mind to offer it to Rafi, and therefore 
he agreed that Yigal Allon be appointed Defence Minister. However Eshkol 
had made a tactical error by delaying for too long the decision to split his 
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tasks. When-he finally agreed to-do so the Opposition was notsatisfied, 
and the request that Rafi. be'given the defence portfolio turned into an 
ultimatum. 
Nevertheless Mapai maintained their efforts to thwart Rafi's 
demands. A few of the Mapai veterans thought that the prevention 
of Rafi's return to Government was more important-than preserving the 
instrumentalist nature of the IDF, so much so that in an endeavour 
to relax Rafi's pressure to join the Cabinet, they suggested that 
Dayan be brought back into the IDF as Commander of the 
Southern Front. Only a few people in Mapai were horrified by this 
proposal. One of whom was Baruch Azanya MK,. a loyalist 
of the old guard, who said in Mapai's secretariat on June 1st 1967: 
Rafi wants a coup or sub-coup around Ben Gurion... we take 
upon ourselves a horrible responsibility, and the 
responsibility is this, that after sometime - that I cannot 
be precise about - something in the Israeli democracy will be 
shaken. I would not like that to happen. I want the Knesset 
to remain, I want one party to curb another, now Gahal does 
that to Rafi. This will continue to happen if we choose the 
only wise course now, which is that Dayan must not open the 
door to other Rafi members, an action which will bring with 
it severe tremors. 1 
Azanya was in the minority. On the other side Avraham Ofer 
thought that offering Dayan a military role would not only reduce 
public pressure on Eshkol, but might even induce Dayan to return to 
the Mapai fold, 'I appreciate his long held wish to disengage himself 
from Rafi. By chance the two things now coincide. '2 
, It was not the 
first time that it. had been suggested to give an 
army position to an opposition leader to buy his support for the military 
elite. In 1946 Ben Gurion appointed Israel Galili as had of the 
Haganah National Command to persuade him to return to Mapai. 
3 The 
Independent Liberals executive committee received the proposal about 
1 
2 
3 
Protocol of Mapai secretariat, ) June 1967. 
Protocol of Mapai secretariat, ) June 1967. 
Uri Milstein. Ilvar Hashavua, 21 and 28 September 1979. 
652 - 
Dayan very critically. At a meeting held on July Ist 1967. Gideon 
Hausner M. K. said that the appointment was 'a military appointment 
which was devised to solve internal political problems. 'This is 
politici2ation of the military. It is worse than a Government crisis'. 
' 
On 27 May a proposal was put to Gahal that Dayan should either 
be appointed as 'a supreme commander for the IDF, 'or to be commander 
of the Southern Command or even to a new position parallel to the 
Chief of Staff. Gahal angrily rejected the suggestion, arguing that 
any alteration in the structure of the military command would lead to 
'demoralization in the army, would damage the Chief of 
Staff... would breed lack of confidence in him and would 
shatter the command structure. '2 
But they also knew that giving a military job to Dayan would fortify 
Eshkol's Cabinet and lessen the demand to overthrow it, or to 
establish a Government of National Unity. 
Dayan himself proposed to Rabin on 31 May that he should be 
given a newly created post, the commander of the southern theatre. 
This idea did not accord with IDF's command structure, which went 
through the Chief of Staff and General Staff to the commander of the 
Southern Command. Rabin opposed the suggestion. He was embittered 
by the politicians, who while so protective of their own interests 
did not flinch from damaging the army and its capability, and who 
3 
would pursue those interests even if they did harm the army. Dayan 
fäiled to get the. military post, not because it was not offered 
to him, but because it was : inadequate for Rafi and Gahal who demanded 
that he be given ministerial responsibility. 
1 
2 
3 
Nakdimon, S. (1968: 244). 
Nakdimon,. S. (1968: 116). 
Rabin, Y. (1979: 166). 
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1967 - THE ARMY CHOOSES THE DEFENCE MINISTER 
The new boundaries erected during the'waiting period'survived 
the June war. In comparison the -second manifestation of the political- 
military crisis in the 'waiting period' was transient and unique, 
but its ramifications were more severe than of the first aspect. It 
contravened the IDF's normal principles of behaviour and impinged 
on the foundations of Israeli democracy. 
During the 'waiting period' the army leaders not only demanded 
that the politicians launch a war immediately, but also wanted to 
deprive Eshkol of the defence portfolio, to bring Gahal and primarily 
Rafi, into the Cabinet, to establish a National Unity Coalition 
and to appoint Dayan as Minister of Defence. There were several 
reasons for the army leaders' demands. The generals did not perceive 
Eshkol's efforts to solve the crisis by diplomatic means as a 
considered preference for a political solution to a military one. They 
saw it as hesitancy, vacillation and a lack of authority and leadership 
and they therefore wanted a- Defence Minister whose authority was 
unshakeable., 
Secondly, they did not want simply a decisive Minister, but one 
who would decide to launch a war. Weizman , for example, who was one 
of the most fervent of the generals who wanted to bring Rafi into the 
Cabinet, knew that. in 'so doing the 'activists in the Government would 
become a majority. 
A few generals had a third reason which went beyond the immediate 
crisis and touched far-reaching policy goals. They wanted Gahal and 
Rafi in the Cabinet hoping that the war would enable the army to complete 
the unfinished task of the War of Independence 'and to rectify the borders 
on the eastern front. 
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The inclusion of Gahal and Rafi was not the customary way to 
enlarge the Cabinet, but a revolutionary change in Israeli political 
history. Since the state's establishment Herut lacked legitimacy to 
deal with security matters, and only after it joined the National 
Unity Coalition could it get rid of that stigma. In May 1967 when the 
generals were actively trying- to include Gahal in the Government, they 
were doing something previously inconceivable. 
The fact that the generals' activities were unknown to the 
public was not because of their discretion,. on the contrary they 
discussed the issue openly in many meetings during the. three' 
week period. It was the censor who prevented the publication of 
stories about those contacts to conform with the image that 'the army 
is not involved with politics'. Even after the war the censorship 
of this issue was maintained. When Rafi leaders met on 1 June, 
Ben Gurion's argument in support of Dayan's joining the Cabinet 
was: 
I have heard from three senior commanders that the 
inclusion of Dayan is a necessary condition to breathe 
life into the army's flagging confidence in the political 
leadership... There are difficult moods in the army 
and who knows what will happen in the army. The army 
has to have confidence and it will have it when Moshe 
Dayan is Minister of Defence. ' 
The generals' efforts were augmented by their long time 
friends. An impressive number of senior officers in reserve including 
Major-General (Res. ) Haim Laskov, Brigadier-Generals (Res. ) Dan 
Tolkovsky and Yehoshafat Harkabi, the Director of the Mossad 
Brigadier-General (Res. ) Heir Amit and others had meetings with the 
parties' leaders, especially with Mapai's and implored them to form 
a Government of National Unity and to give the defence portfolio to 
Nakdimon, S. (1968: 256). He described 3 more cases where 
generals had contacts with politicians to urge Dayan's 
inclusion in the Cabinet, but their names were censored. See 
pages 126-132,159. 
Dayan. In so doing they joined many other civilians, but their 
arguments about the implications of such a move on the military were 
particularly significant. 
The generals had two candidates for Defence Minister. At first 
many of them preferred Allon, but as the crisis progressed the support 
for Dayan swelled. Both candidates were generals-turned-politicians 
and both of them advocated an immediate war. Though the generals 
had preferences for one or the other because of their particular 
inclinations to one of the two sub-elites, the strong common 
denominator was that the Defence minister must be a former military 
man and not a civilian. Although he belonged to Dayan's opponents' 
group, Brigadier-General Haim Barley accurately expressed that feeling 
when he described the atmosphere after Dayan's appointment. 'We 
felt that we had a representative in the Cabinet. '1 
The army's opinion of the candidates for the defence portfolio 
was not only taken into account by opposition parliamentarians like 
Ben Gurion but also by Eshkol and the veterans' supporters. Mapam 
leader Yaacov Hazan consulted Chief of Staff Rabin before he finally 
decided whether or not to agree to Dayan's entry into-the Cabinet. 
Eshkol also discussed the matter with Rabin on the same day. The 
army's view of Dayan had a deep significance when Mapai's central 
committee dealt with the matter in its decisive meeting on 1 June, 
the day the National Unity Coalition was formed. 
2 
Both before and after the May 1967 crisis army officers 
expressed their opinion on the appointment of a new Defence Minister. 
In 1964 Ben Gurion consulted, Dayan as to whom he should appoint instead 
of Lavon. In 1963 a group of generals including Rabin and Amit asked 
1 
2 
Interview with Haim Barlev, 21 July 1977. 
Rabin, Y. (1979: 178) and the protocol of the Mapai Central 
Committee. 
Ben Gurion not to resign from the Cabinet. But these and other 
examples were not identical with the May 1967 incident. Then the 
army was a central and crucial factor which brought about Dayan's 
inclusion in the Cabinet. 
In his analysis of civil-military relations in Israel, Horowitz 
asserts that Israeli society'is 'schizophrenic'. The political 
system acquiesces in the military's involvement in national defence 
matters, but the army abides by the rules of the game in all other 
spheres including the political one, and so the two components coexist. 
l 
The `waiting period' demonstrates that this assertion is 
debatable.. Between the 14 May and 1 June 1967 the army played an 
important role in the political process. It expressed no confidence in 
the Prime Minister-and Defence Minister, it strenuously lobbied-all 
parties to change the Government's composition, it insisted that the 
new Defence minister was a former officer and it calmed down only 
when its candidate was at the helm of the defence establishment. 
Although the army did not employ force but tactics of political 
bargaining, those too were not customary, neither according to the 
constitutional principles of the IDF nor even with the actual practices 
of the nominal control pattern. Thirteen years after the 1954 crisis 
it was demonstrated that the army's involvement in the political process 
had not been an aberration, and-that during the 1967 crisis the army 
enlarged and deepened its involvement beyond policy and decision 
making into influencing the Government's composition. 
1 Horowitz, Dan (1979) Civil-Military Relations in Israel 
an unpublished paper, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem. 
- "ýSý 
1973 - TIE CRISIS OF THE DEFENCE MINISTER'S AUTHORITY 
/ 
The final crisis in the period ending in 1977 occurred during 
a war, the 1973 October War. Unlike the 'waiting period' it did not 
accompany a political crisis but rather a military one. The latter 
derived from the strategic shock with which the war broke out, 
and caused the SDF to lose. its equilibrium'for. the first few days. 
One of the expressions-"of the military crisis in the institutional 
sphere was the creation of entirely new functions. In the Southern 
Command the new position of Front Commander was created above the 
Commander of Southern Command. The Chief of Staff was given an 
assistant for the first time, to the annoyance of the Deputy Chief 
of Staff. A new layer was placed above the military spokesman, an 
officer responsible for information, and a dozen or so other new 
positions were improvised at the higher levels of the command chain 
in the first days of the war. The new structure was quite unlike 
the contingency plans for transforming the IDF from peace to war. 
The crisis was also demonstrated by the multiple cases when 
the command chain mapped, especially in the higher ranks. A noteable 
example was Major-General Arik Sharon who broke the Chief of Staff's 
regulations by disobeying his superiors' commands. He refused to 
carry out orders, contacted the Defence Minister and other politicians 
directly bypassing his superiors in the Southern Command and G. H. Q. and 
for all those actions his superiors wanted him court-martialled. An 
interview given by him to Harper's magazine during the war was 
published in the Israeli press on 20 January 1974: 
... I am commanding 15,000 soldiers and I have to fight with 
them, but at the end of the day I will screw you all. First 
I'll cross the Canal and screw the Egyptians, and then I'll 
come back and screw you all, and you had all better 
wear helmets. 
Fivedays later on 25 January 1974 he said in an interview 
to Maariv: 'The Chief of Staff is guilty of the blunder. He 
should be fired at once. ' 
The Sharon incident exposed the depth of the symbiotic 
relationship between the army and the party political system. What 
had begun to surface in the Six Day War became routine in the 1973 
war, when tens of officers-turned-politicians returned to active 
service and military decisions became influenced by party political 
interests. When Chief of Staff Elazar complained to Dayan'_ ear that 
it brought about 'compromises which distort battle logic', Dayan 
answered 'from this point of view we are a truly miserable state'. 
1 
The political-military crisis in the Yom Kippur War was mainly 
the breakdown in the Defence Minister's authority. Beyond the 
principle problem of the ministerial responsibility of the Defence 
Minister and the division of powers between him and the Prime Minister 
a question dealt with by the Agranat Commission, was a crisis in the 
actual authority of the Defence Minister over the military. Over a 
very brief period during the war the Minister changed the command 
pattern several times, from one extreme to the other, and a disagreement 
broke out between the Minister, and the generals about his role and 
authority. Commanders doubted his authority and disregarded his 
orders. The entire code for the system's operation was altered. 
Dayan's behaviour has been extensively described in the 
literature about the war. Herzog described it as follows: 
The shock of the war caused something to snap in Dayan. 
The initial Arab onslaught and success threw him into a 
fit of pessimism, which coloured his evaluations right 
through the war... It is difficult to evaluate the logic 
Bartov, Hanoch (1978: 251,252) Dado (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 
Naariv. 
behind his thinking... Dayan was repeatedly indecisive... 
he moved from the extreme of complete confidence... to 
a state of complete depression and lack of confidence in 
the same forces a day later. 
1 
Had the Defence Minister's function and authorities been 
clearly delineated and the division of responsibility between himself 
and the Prime Minister on one hand and the Chief of Staff on the 
other been clearly defined, Dayan's breakdown would still not have 
been prevented. However, it would have been confined to the personal 
level only, --as - happened with Rabin on the eve of the 1967 June War. 
But since that was not so, Dayan's personal tragedy was interlocked 
with the institutional breakdown of the Defence Minister Dayan. 
on the eve of the war he behaved as in former days, he not only 
gave operational orders to the army,. but also ignored the chain of 
command and bypassed the Chief of Staff in so doing. 
2 When war 
erupted there was an immediate change in his behaviour. By high noon 
all his preconceptions were shattered as though the Defence Minister 
Dayan had become a different man. 
The metamorphosis in Dayan's position was reflected first in his 
relations to the political echelon, simultaneously Chief of Staff 
Elazar's authority increased. 
It became apparent that the (inner) Cabinet (Golda, 
Galili, Allon, Dayan and their advisers) inclined to the- 
assessments and stability of the Chief of Staff and 
Dayan's supremely authoritative position evaporated 
overnight. 3 
It was evident during the war that to most-principle issues 
and problems brought before the'inner'Cabinet'or to the full Cabinet, 
the Defence Minister and Chief of Staff offered conflicting opinions. 
In almost all cases the political echelons approved the Chief of 
Staff's proposals rather than the Defence Minister's. 
1 
2 
3 
Herzog, Chaim (1975: 278) The War of Atonement (Hebrew) Edanim. Jerusalem 
English version London. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
When he visited Northern Command on the Friday before the 
war, he gave orders to the commander, by passing the Chief of 
Staff. 
For several examples see Bartov, H. (1978). 
If Dayan's position regarding the Cabinet was shaken his 
authority vis-a-vis the army disintegrated. In the first few days 
of the war he restrained himself from giving any orders. He 
expressed an opinion, but when asked by the commanders whether his 
opinion was an order, he"answered in away which reflected his desire 
not to be held accountable and said that it was. 'ministerial advice', 
a term which could not clarify the proper authority of the commanders 
and their civil superiors. 
Later when he did issue instructions, some refused to obey him 
and even questioned his authority to do so. Had a general disobeyed 
Ben Gurion's commands in 1948 or 1956 or Dayan's in 1967, it is 
improbable that he could have done so without suffering a court- 
martial. In 1973 such incidents had no repercussions. 
-Dayan's weak position with the military commanders led him 
to visit the front lines frequently rather than to sit in 
the high command bunker in Tel Aviv. . To solve the problem which 
he thereby created he appointed on 13 October, Major-General (Res. ) 
Meir Amit as a liaison between himself and G. H. Q. That was another 
institutional improvisation which ceased after the war. 
At the beginning of the second week of the war the mood in the 
army improved after some gains and simultaneously the Defence Minister 
began to restore and to assert his authority. On 13 October he 
instructed the Chief of Staff's Deputy, Major-General Tal, to bring, 
for his approval, any operational plans which involved either penetration 
into enemy held territory or strategic bombings. 
Elazar. was aggravated by the change in Dayan, who wanted to be the 
Minister again.: 'without his finger no finger will pull any trigger', 
but he said nothing. Two days later Dayan tried to tighten his control 
even more and his liaison officer Amit had harsh words with the 
Chief of Staff to which Elazar sharply retorted: 
I don't go along with that. Sorry. Air force attacks 
during the day I'm not submitting for approval. Only if 
we do something special, but I'm not going to ask permission 
for attacks on airfields or artillery batteries... we 
are already ten days into the war. I only sought 
permission when I thought they (actions) had an 
extraordinary political dimension, and I am continuing tp 
conduct the war. (If) the Minister wants to know what 
is going on - you are here. Every evening there is a 
plan for tomorrow - show it to him. I am not conducting 
a war with a seal of approval on each of my moves. I 
haven't done that during the last ten days and I'm not 
going to do so now... The Minister of Defence may come, 
sit here, get the plans, approve them and conduct the 
war. But as things are now, it cannot be. 1 
A week later Dayan again modified his mode of operation and 
reverted to his habit of giving direct orders, bypassing the Chief 
of Staff. After a few such occasions when Elazar heard that Dayan 
had given a direct order to Major-General Gonen, he told the latter: 
'Whatever the Minister tells you is very interesting. However, orders 
you will receive only from me. ' Gonen complied. 
2 
When the cease-fire came into effect, Dayan tried to restore 
the system which had existed throughout his term as Defence Minister. 
and to exert his control over the army. The announcement of Gonen's 
transfer from Commander of the Southern Command was not made from 
the Chief of Staff's office-as in the past, but from the Defence 
Minister's office. The battles had ended and so had Dayan's crisis 
of authority, but the war had illuminated the unstable constitutional 
foundations of the Minister's position. For that reason Dayan's 
efforts to restore the status quo ante failed. In that setting Major- 
General Tal's'rebellion took place. 
1 
2 
Bartov, H. (1978: 207). 
Bartov, H. (1978: 228). 
GENERAL TAL'S 'REBELLION': THE BACKGROUND 
That incident happened in the period commencing with the 
cease-fire on 25 October 1973 and ending with the signing of the 
Israeli-Egyptian. Disengagement of Forces Agreement on 18 January 
1974. On 31 October 1974, Lieutenant-General Barley concluded his 
reserve duty as Head of the Southern Front a new post which was then 
discontinued. He took--off his uniform and returned to the Cabinet, 
the Chief of Staff Elazar appointed his own deputy Major-General Israel 
Tal to be Commander of the Southern Command, and he retained his post 
as Deputy Chief of Staff. His post as head of the Operations. 
Branch was given temporarily to Major-General (Res. ) Rehavam Zeevi. 
As soon as Tal reached the Southern Command he recognized that he was 
confronting an intricate political and military web. 
It was a period of intensive diplomatic negotiations, while 
the military situation was complicated. 
) 
The IDF units on the west 
bank of the canal controlled a deep and long corridor of 1,600 sq. kms, 
and they encircled the Egyptian Third Army which was on the east bank. 
However, the Israeli bridgehead was relatively narrow and the 
Egyptians held a considerable amount of territory, 1,200 sq. kms on 
the east bank. Consequently the lines of contact between the two 
armies were long and meandering and the friction points were numerous. 
2 
Taking into account the blow sustained by the IDF in the first 
days of the war, by 24 October it had a considerable military 
advantage over the Egyptian forces. However, the Arab diplomatic 
achievments;. the US pressure on Israel, and the low national morale 
persuaded the top political echelon that an agreement with Egypt had 
1 For that period and the negotiations see Margalit, Dan (1971) 
Message from the'White"House (Hebrew) Tel Aviv. 0 tpaz. 
2 See Adan, A. (1979: 322). 
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to be achieved. It would disengage the forces and put the state 
on the track of a political agreement, provided the conditions of 
the agreement were not detrimental to Israel. The UN Security 
Council Cease-Fire Resolution on 22 October was imposed on the IDF' 
when it was in full flood capturing the west bank of the canal. 
Therefore, although Israel formally accepted the cease-fire, the IDF 
continued to advance into Egypt to encircle the Third Army and the. 
town of Suez, using as a pretext that Egypt had ignored the cease-fire. 
" 
However even after the firing had died down on--25-October-.. there 
were those who saw no urgency in reaching an accommodation with the 
Egyptians. Defence Minister Dayan, Chief of Staff Elazar, Major- 
General Sharon and some others thought that the war had not yet 
reached a decisive stage, and that the'IDF could achieve that and 
even britig-Egypt to an unconditional surrender. That attitude had 
two variations, either to renew fire unilaterally or to exploit the 
many incidents along the cease-fire lines in order to escalate to a 
second round of all out. war. Exchanges of fire were routine along 
the meandering lines and in the first two months after the cease-fire 
there were more than 450 viilations. 
2 
Shortly before Golda Meir's trip to the United States in early 
November, intensive discussions took place in the political and military 
top echelons to formulate the next military and political-moves. In 
those talks Major-General Tal emerged as a strong and adamant opponent 
of the activist policies of his superiors, Elazar and Dayan. Tal argued 
that because of the international constraints there was not the 
slightest possibility of striking a decisive blow at the Egyptians and 
that-Israel would not, therefore, reap any political benefit if it 
1 See hints of that in Dayan, M. (1976: 706-707). 
2 Adan, A. (1979: 314-321). 
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initiated another round of hostilities. Furthermore, he doubted 
the IDF's capacity to-achieve even the military objectives. 
The disagreement between the activists' and the conciliators' 
also concerned the war plans if the firing were to break out Again. Sharon 
believed that if that happened the IDF should 'attack the Egyptian 
forces on the west bank of the Canal' between the Israeli corridor 
and Cairo. There were others who, like Dayan and Elazar, preferred 
the IDF to annihilate the encircled Third Army on the east bank. Tal 
opposed both concepts, preferring that the firing should nöt. start 
up again at all. He argued that if a war was forced on Israel then 
Israel should assume a defensive posture. 
During the deliberations it became evident that those-who 
supported the activist view were in a minority and the discussions 
concluded with an acknowledgement that Israel should reach a political 
agreement with the Egyptians and should honour it. These deliberations 
were kept from the public and were only hinted at'by the Chief of 
Staff in the Order of the Day on his resignation, in which he said 
without elaborating that the cease-fire had been imposed on the IDF. 
As_far as the operational plans-were concerned, the General 
Staff decided that if the appropriate political conditions were 
created, then the Southern Command would attack the encircled Third 
Army on the east bank and destroy it. For that reason the Chief of 
Staff ordered Major-General Adan to transfer some of the units in his 
division, which was on the west of the Canal, eastwards to prepare for 
the anticipated attack on, the encircled army. 
However the. conclusions of the supreme political echelon were 
not translated literally in to action by the IDF. The activists 
captained by Sharon with the tacit blessing of Defence Minister and 
Chief of Staff adopted a palicy of keeping the border on the boil. 
The moderates., led by Tal argued that the activists wanted to 
push things so that 'appropriate political conditions' would be 
generated so that a total war would start again. Consequently he 
opposed the General Staff's-decision to transfer Adan's units eastwards. 
In fact; -he ordered Adan first to move back a brigade westwards and 
then the entire division in preparation for a defensive war on that 
front. 
But the controversy was primarily about the operational routine 
involved in holding the lines. Dayan was among those who advocated 
the iron hand against the Egyptians in response to any violation of 
the cease-fire agreement. He explained: 
In my opinion it was very important that during the negotiations 
on the disengagement of forces, the Egyptians should not 
receive the impression that Israel was apprehensive about 
a renewal of hostilities, and that the IDF could contrive to 
hold out on the west bank of the Canal if necessary. In my 
opinion the only way to make an agreement which will suit 
us, depends on the Egyptians appreciating that although we 
are prepared to reach an agreement and to withdraw to the 
east bank, it is a voluntary move on our part and not under 
duress. They should know that shooting incidents will 
cost them dearly and that they should worry much more than 
we do about a renewal of hostilities. 1 
Tal asserted that the political arguments employed by Dayan and 
Elazar were a pretext, and that powerful personal interests were 
behind them. Dayan and Elazar had not concluded the war in the 
victorious way to which the IDF had become accustomed, and politically 
Israel emerged from the war with the weaker hand. They also realized 
that the responsibilities for the blunders might be put on their heads 
and therefore had a personal interest in striking the Egyptians 
once more. It was said in the army corridors that Dayan and Elazar 
2 
had failed their first chance and were anxious for a second. 
1 
2 
Dayan, M. (1976: 705). 
Interview with Maj. -Gen. Israel Tal, 16 September 1977. 
There were many opportunities, not only the incidents provoked 
by friction between the armies and by the tenseness of the soldiers, 
but because the IDF wanted to dig in and to consolidate its hold on 
the lines which provoked artillery bombardments by the Egyptians. 
The two combatants also wanted to improve their position by capturing 
new areas, and this happened several times in the Mount Ataka 
vicinity. In such circumstances it was not difficult to drift into a 
total war, which was even more likely because there were officers in 
the Egyptian high command who also wanted to precipitate that. 
GENERAL TAL'S 'REBELLION': THE CONFRONTATION 
One of the decisions which the Southern Command had to take was 
how to react to Egyptian fire in the northern zone. Dayan said that to 
confine retaliatory fire to that particular zone was inadequate and 
ordered a response in other zones too. He also urged the interruption 
of food and water supplies to the besieged Third Army as an appropriate 
response. Tal vehemently opposed that policy, arguing that it contravened 
the cease-fire agreement, and he blamed Dayan for purposely provoking an 
escalation in direct contradiction to the Government's policy. Dayan 
later recalled: 'Our policy was to react forcefully by returning fire and 
to interrupt the food convoys to the Third Army as a deterrent. ' For 
some inexplicable reason the most intense Egyptian fire was in the 
Ismaeliya zone commanded by Sharon. Dayan relates, 'Arik knew that there 
was approval for the policy of severe retaliation'. 
1 
But whose policy was it and whose approval? It was certainly the 
policy of the Defence Minister and Chief of Staff, but was it the 
Government's policy? The Commander of Southern Command Major-General Tal, 
Dayan, M. (1976: 705). 
Sharon's immediate commander, explicitly opposed that policy and had 
instructed the officers under his command not to open fire without 
his order. He prohibited the -halting of supplies to the Third 
Arniv- änd- the -return=of`fire in one ione-_if it had ben opened 
in another. 'Furthermore, 'Tal even forbade the bombardment of 
the Egyptians if-they struck at our vulnerable points-. 
" 
The dispute between Dayan and Tal became more acute when Tal 
openly criticized the Minister for breaking the Government's policy, 
and demanded to receive all orders and instructions in writing. Dayan 
refused to do that, and the result was that in some zones the officers 
obeyed the commander of the Southern Command and a policy of restraint 
was practised; while in Sharon's zone a different policy was adopted, 
since he did not ask Tal for permission before opening fire. The 
disagreement between the Minister and Major-General Tal boiled over 
on two occasions. In one case there was a discussion in which all 
Southern Command officers participated. Dayan presented to them 
his political and military assessment and ordered them to pursue an 
active firing policy. When he had finished speaking Tal asked for 
the floor, and to the astonishment of the company declared 'whatever 
the Minister said was information, but orders you will take 
only from me'. The direct challenge to the Minister in front of the 
officers was very severe indeed and Dayan asked Tal whether he 
challenged the political echelon's right to issue commands, to which the 
general answeredi 'I do not. But as the Chief of Southern Command I 
receive orders only from the Chief of Staff'. Turning to his officers 
he added that who ever disobeyed his orders would be dismissed. The 
angry Minister stormed out of the meeting. 
2 
1 
2 
Adan, A. (1979: 318). 
Interview with Maj. -Gen. Israel Tal, 16 September 1977. 
In the second incident Tal rescinded orders given by Dayan. 
It, happened when he was at the G. H. Q in Tel Aviv and received a 
telephone call from his deputy, who said that Dayan had ordered him 
to capture another peak in the Ataka mountain region. He also told 
him that Southern Command was already making preparations and that 
two battalions and an artillery unit were ready to move. 
Tal immediately instructed his deputy: 'The order is counter- 
manded. Wait for me, ' and he flew to his Sinai Command headquarters. 
During that day the atmosphere there was as on the eve of battle and 
all forces were in a state of alert. Tal called Dayan and told him 
that he was against the operation. He added, 
The operation is nothing but a provocation designed to 
launch a general war. I haven't heard that the Government 
approved-it, and I will not, therefore, obey the command. 
It is an unconstitutional order. - 
The firm position taken by the Commander of the Southern Command 
caused the cancellation of the operation and the lowering of the 
state of alert. 
Two months after his appointment Tal was summoned to the Chief 
of Staff and was told that it had been decided to appoint. Major-General 
Adan to be commander of the Southern Command and that he, Tal, was 
invited to resign. Tal refused and demanded that his dispute with 
Dayan be taken to the courts for adjudication. He added that if he 
was dismissed from the army he would go to the public and reveal 
the truth. He also contacted his friend Yitzhak Rabin MK and told 
him the story. The latter brought Allon and Golda into the picture. 
In accordance with her wishes the official announcement of Tal's 
resignation, planned for that day, was cancelled, but she did not agree 
to the opening of a judicial enquiry into the events. 
The compromise reached was that Tal would remain as Deputy Chief 
of Staff, but would not retain his post as the Head of the Operations 
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Branch and Major-General Yitzhak Hof i was appointed to that post. 
Ostensibly Tal remained as second in command of the IDF; but in reality 
his position, carried no authority. That function without the 
responsibilities of Head of Operations Branch is marginal in the 
IDF's structure. He knew, therefore, that it would be meaningful 
to remain in that position only if it eventually led to the position 
of the Chief of Staff. When the Defence Minister did not promise 
that post to him, Tal decided to leave the army. 
But the dispute between Tal and Dayan could not be kept a 
secret inside the IDF. While many officers knew of the attempts to 
dismiss him and of his demand to retrieve his authorities as Head of 
Operations Branch this information was banned from publication by the 
censor. In March 1974 the ferment in the army reached a pitch 
unknown since the 'generals revolt' in 1948. Senior officers lobbied 
the high command and the political leadership urged them to accept 
Tal's demands. 160 pilots wrote letters adking him not to leave the 
army, sending copies to the Prime Minister. Officers.; and soldiers in 
some field Corps, especially in armour and engineering, did not conceal 
their dissatisfaction concerning Tal's fate. 
Whatever military personnel were unable to do openly could be 
done legitimately by civilians. Approaches of a special character 
made by several widows of officers killed in the October War and also 
by injured Armoured Corps personnel were made to the national leaders. 
When it became apparent that Dayan would remain as Defence Minister 
in the new Cabinet established after the war, Tal understood that he 
had no chance of leading the army in the future, and he preferred to 
join the Defence Ministry to direct the Israeli tank development project. 
The gulf between Dayan and Tal was too wide to be bridged, 
and although it reached a climax with Tal's 'rebellion' it had already 
existed for a few years as Tal dissented from Dayan's political 
views. Tal knew too that Dayan would not forget an incident 
which had happened on the morning of 9 October, the worst day for 
the IDF during the Yom Kippur War. Tal described the mood of 
the IDF's high command that morning: - 
The war was perceived on that morning not only as being 
at a critical point, almost beyond despair, but also as 
a war simply of national and physical existence. 
Dayan felt 'that a mortal danger faced the heart of the state of 
Israel', and 'the spirit of Masada' overlay the words of the 
Defence Minister. 
' 
In that atmosphere, the senior IDF commanders Elazar, his 
deputy Tal, Ama"n head Zeira, and Major-General (Res. ) Aharon 
Yariv met with Defence Minister Dayan to decide what'to do if the 
worst came to the worst. In that meeting a fateful decision was 
made, to prepare the IDF for a non-conventional operation. At dawn 
the order was given to make the necessary preparations. Tal was 
firmly against the decision and agrued that the conventional IDF 
could withstand the war. 
In the morning Yariv and Zeira retracted their earlier support 
for Dayan's view and joined Tal. The dramatic decision was reversed. 
Dayan's pessimism which had induced him to urge the fateful 
decision, and Tal's optimism, which was justified during the war, 
widened to such an extent that it fractured the relationship 
between the general in the Minister's hat and the stateman in the 
General's beret. 
1` Bartov, H. (1978: 122,115-116). 
on 19 March 1974 the army spokesman published a laconic 
announcement: 
Deputy Chief of Staff Major-General Israel Tal has decided 
to retire from his military service in the IDF. He will 
terminate his service on Wednesday 21 March. Major-General 
Tal was asked by the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister 
and the Chief of Staff to continue his military service. He 
did not accede to their request. 
Two days later the military correspondent of Yediot Aharonot wrote: 
The resignation had been announced the day before yesterday 
on the radio and yesterday in the press in a way which was* 
to say the least a little distorted, and it did not paint 
the full picture also because of the censor's intervention. 
The full story of Tal's personal drama was not published. However, 
the principles of the relations between the political and military 
echelons were also not put before the public. The war did not bring about 
a real change in the basic structure of the Labour Party's elite and 
the same political factors which had encouraged the existence of the 
particular pattern of political-military relations remained. Further- 
more, in the wake of the war the Israeli political leadership was 
weakened and-the stability of the Labour Party's leadership was so 
shaken that the strengthening of civil, control over the military became 
more difficult than in the past. 
IS THE SYSTEM STABLE 
Each one of the crises occurring in political-military relations 
in Israel before 1977, including the 'generals'revolt' of 1948, was 
manifested by a sudden, rapid, and acute change in the existing. structure 
of political-military relations, and by the formation of a new structure. 
When the crisis was over there was a retreat from the prevailing crisis 
structure to a new one, different from the pre-crisis structure. 
In all the instances where civil authority was shattered, the 
process began in the civil sector, which later brought about a crisis 
in the civil echelon's authority over the military. It was not 
the officers' challenge to the civilians which provoked the crisis 
in civil legitimacy. The personal nature of the authority crisis 
was plain. Lavon in 1954, Eshkol in 1967, and even Dayan in 1973 
lost their personal authority over the commanders, but the commanders 
did not challenge the principle that the authority was vested in the, 
civil body. Even in 1973 the dispute was over the way the Minister 
perceived his constitutional role and not simply about his 
institutional authority. 
This evidence attests to the fact that the source of the 
weaknesses in political-military relations which caused the crises 
was not in the personality of the people involved as Hareven thinks. 
l 
It was the lack of an institutionalized structure with regulatory 
mechanisms, -with institutional checks and balances and mediatory 
agencies which could limit the personal influence of the role-performers, 
and which could enable the system. to operate without being so dependent 
on psychological traits and inter-personal relationships. 
The way in which the political leadership dealt with these crises 
did not alter during the thirty year period. At the actual crisis 
time it attributed only a marginal significance to the deterioration 
in political-military relations, and concentrated mainly on trying 
to solve the core political problem, sometimes even at the price of 
breaking the principles governing'political-military relations. After 
the crisis ended the political leadership never had time to 
scrutinize the weak institutional links and to try to grapple with the 
roots of, the problem. They rather made an effort to move to the next 
item on the agenda and to restore things as they were before the crisis. 
1 He has proposed the examination of the complementary psychological 
traits of the Prime Minister, Defence Minister, Chief of Staff 
(and director of the Military Intelligence Branch) before they 
are appointed to find a compatible trio, to prevent all the three 
from being heroes as in 1954, or 'cautious' as in 1967. 
Hareven, A. (1978: 3-19). 
Ostensibly that is what happened, but in reality the political 
elite gave a push to the process of development of military 
democracy in Israel. Each crisis lengthened the permeable sections 
of the boundaries between the military and political systems in all 
three areas, public, party and national. In each crisis the forms 
adopted by each sector expanded. Each crisis tightened the intermingling 
and meshing of the military and political systems and enhanced the 
convergence of the normative code, patterns of behaviour and principles' 
of operation in the two sectors. 
The fact that political-military relations in Israel have suffered 
crises and have collapsed each time that they were under 
pressure, necessitates a new evaluation as to whether Israeli society 
is so remote from the possibility of a radical change in the pattern 
of those relations, when conditions exist which could precipitate 
further crises. 
"- 674 - 
14. -CONCLUSIONS 
The overriding question in an examination of political-military 
relations in Israel is what prevented that state, undergoing a 
protracted war, from becoming a Laswellian 'garrison state'. The 
central proposition in previous studies claims that it was the strength 
of the political institutions which averted the IDF's intrusion i; to 
politics. That proposition is untenable, and this analysis of political-. 
military relations in Israel during the first 30 years of statehood 
demonstrates not only that the IDF was never detached from politics, 
but that its involvement has grown and expanded. 
l 
In the first period 
after the establishment of the state the IDF''s politicization was 
manifested in the national area, and to a minor extent in the party area, 
having permeable boundaries only with Mapai. Since 1967 its integral 
boundaries with other parties have opened and since 1974, it has also 
become engaged in public politics. With regard to the second aspect, 
the direction of influence, a similar phenomenon has occurred. In the 
early 1950's the main current was from the Party to the army, and the 
IDF only influenced national politics,. but not public or Party policies. 
Later there was exchange across the boundaries in both directions and 
the army began to exert influence also in the latter areas. 
From its infancy the scope of the IDF's activities has extended 
beyond the military field. 'Throughout the first 30 years of statehood 
there was a continuous relocation of the boundaries of the security 
sphere, and by redefining civil sectors as legitimately within that 
sphere, the IDF was not seen to be intruding into the civil domain. 
See the schematic representation in page 171 for the 
following analysis of the military's involvement in 
politics. 
The army also modified its approach to national security matters. 
It was assumed when the officer corps was established that it would 
formulate its opinion on those issues according to professional, specific 
criteria. After the capture of the territories in 1967 other criteria 
were apparently introduced and there was a combined approach. Only after 
1977 was there a further shift, when ideological inclinations began to 
influence military evaluations directly. 
The method of political activity changed from the second to the 
third grade between 1974 and 1977. Whereas until then the IDF's involvement 
was known to the political and military establishments but was concealed 
from the public by censorship, after the Yom Kippur War it became overt. 
It is only in one aspect, the means of operation, that the IDF has not yet 
reached the third and highest degree of politicization. Although it moved 
from the constitutional to the bargaining means when the political leadership 
authority declined, it has never used force to impose its will on the 
politicians. Figure No. 3 is a schematic description of the process of 
the deepening IDF's participation in politics: 
IDF's Participation in Politics 1947 - 1977 
Aspect Period 
50's late 60's 70's 
Area 123 
Means 222 
Direction 123 
Scope 333 
Approach 123 
Method 123 
The pattern of political-military relations that prevails in Israel 
is not therefore instrumentalist, and cannot be correctly described as 
civil control. A nominal pattern is a more accurate description. While 
normatively the IDF was under civil control, in fact it was 
in partnership 
with the civil authorities. But what has prevented the military from 
raising even further the level of participation? For example, though 
the IDF was always involved in purely civil domain (the 'scope' aspect) 
why had it not enlarged the numbers of the issues it was involved 
with? And most important, what has caused the Army to acquiesce in its 
subordination to the political elite? 
The account of Israel's political history, and the analysis of 
the crises in political-military relations indicate that it was not the 
strength of the political institutions. The power struggle between the 
two rival sub-elites within the Labour Movement weakened the political 
elite vis-a-vis the generals. For that reason the ill-defined 
constitutional arrangements were perpetuated by the politicians. The 
explanation for the military's acquiescence does not lie in the polity 
but in other sub-systems, namely in the value-psychological and social 
sub-systems. 
From the first steps taken to form a military organization in 
the Yishuv the civilian leaders pursued an intensive indoctrination: 
force for its own sake was considered immoral and its use could only 
be justified with a responsible social movement which could prevent the 
transformation of a man into a predator. 
l 
The founders of the Haganah insisted that it be called a defence 
organization, not an army, and that its members should be known as 
defenders and not soldiers, a notion that was ineradicable after state- 
hood when the Haganah was transformed into the IDF. There is no 
legitimacy either for a separation between or for divergence of the 
civil values and the military mind. The attempts to erect boundaries 
between the two-value sub-systems failed. 0 
1 See P. 135. 
It was not coincidental that in the late 1970's, when the extent 
of the military's intrusion into the political sphere was already 
considerable, that some officers began to question the IDF's self- 
perception and ideological premises. Those like Major-General (Res. ) 
Benjamin Peled who argued that Israel should define its national goals, 
and in particular the size of the state, according to its military 
abilities, were in a minority. 
1 
More representative of the IDF's 
spirit was Major-General (Res. ) Israel Tal who said: 
In the army there is no-consensus in any field, and the 
range of opinions and beliefs is the same as in civilian 
society. But it is true that today there are some 
expressions which deviate from the principles that were 
rooted in an entire generation. influenced by Ben Gurion, 
and which perceived security as an existential spiritual 
value which is antagonistic, antithetical to militarism. 
It was always self-evident, a univeral- truth, that 
power is synonymous with independence and etatism. 
But we have always perceived security not as an independent 
matter but as-an organic part of a larger complex of values 
and aims. 
In professional language the IDF commanders were educated 
from the IDF's birth that the army's mission is to deter, 
to prevent war, and only if deterrance fails - to be a 
compellent force. Our slogan was never the simplistic 
principle of decisive force. We never argue that the aim 
justifies the means and that it is permissible to use 
weapons-freely *2 
Whether or not the IDF's commanders of the 80's bind themselves 
to the concept that power must be subordinated to civil values, and 
hence generals to society's authoritative representatives, the 
politicians, remains to be seen. But until the late seventies it was 
a characteristic of the military elite reared and crystallised during 
the Yishuv period. 
2 Interview with Maj. -Gen. (Res. ) Israel Tal, Monitin, No. 2 
October 1978. 
The forces that curbed the extent of the armyts expansion into 
politics were not confined to the psychological-value sub-system, but 
existed also in the social sub-system. Both are characterized by 
permeable boundaries with the military. Civil society had supremacy 
over the army because several mitigating mechanisms were present on 
its boundaries with the military. Hence although the. permeability of 
the boundaries allowed a certain influence by the*army on society, the 
mechanisms were strong enough to contain it and to ensure that civil 
influence exceeded military influence. Two such mechanisms are the 
second career structure for professional officers, and their intimate 
reaction with civilians on reserve duty, particularly in times of war. 
There are also social mechanisms which tend to a lack of cohesiveness 
in the military elite. 
The multiplicity of institutional linkages between the army 
and the social and value spheres, and the efficiency of the mitigating 
mechanisms on these boundaries prevented the isolation of the IDF from 
civil society, hence civil society and values prevailed. However, 
that was not the case for the political sub-system. In order to 
ensure civil control over the military Ben Gurion strove to disconnect 
the army from politics, contrary to the Haganah tradition. But in 
Israeli society, which is highly politicized, his two aims were 
inconsistent. Hence Ben Gurion failed lamentably. The dual control 
p attern involving the clandestine use of the Party arm was the first 
sign of incompatability, and his reluctance to institutionalize means 
of state control, to avoid having to accommodate the parties in the 
Israeli polity, inevitably made civil control ineffective. Ben 
Gurion's inability to achieve his aims made the pattern of political- 
military relations a partnership between generala and politicans. 
Both at times when one of the two rival, tabour Party sub-elites 
held the reins and when they were held jointly, the power struggle between 
then was focussed on control over the defence establishment. That 
inhibited the institutionalization of effective civil control mechanisms, 
weakened the politiciansF authority and dragged the army into the intra- 
party conflicts. Consequently the political-military partnership moved 
towards the developmental construct of military democracy. 
Though': Israel is the only example of a western democracy with 
such a high level of military involvement in politics for such a long 
time, it should be said that other states have had a similar experience, 
however for a very limited period. The best example is that of Britain 
during World War I. The external war, even a dormant war, is undoubtedly 
the major factor that fragmentizes the boundaries between the military 
and the civil sectors, and enhances convergence processes in society. 
One can distinguish three periods of political-military relations 
in Israel: 1947-1957,1958-1967 and 1967-1977. The first is 
characterized by Ben Gurion's effort to make the security sphere 
autonomous. However, Ben Gurion's mistake was not to use mediatory 
mechanisms between the two sub-systems, institutional linkages that could 
in practice guarantee civil supremacy. In Israel, the likelihood of 
maintaining an autonomous security sphere was remote. The 1954 crisis 
showed that the autonomist structure could not preserve civil control 
under systemic pressures. 
During the second period, noteably after 1963, an opposite trend 
emerged when Eshkol struggled to secularize security issues, a process 
that demanded the 'de-Ben Gurionization' of the security sphere. He 
thought to achieve civil control by reversing Ben Gurion's practices, 
and he erected permeable boundaries between the army and the political 
institutions, public, party and national, to expose the military to 
more civil supervision and control. But changing the nature of the 
boundaries has not been sufficient for that purpose. By opening them 
without fixing strong mediatory mechanisms he enabled the army to penetrate 
. further 
into politics. When the political crisis of May 1967 occurred it 
became evident that the civil control mechanisms were ineffective. 
The third period began after the Six Day War when the forces tending 
to greater convergence of the military and the polity strengthened, and 
the partnership between the military and the polity became closer in all 
aspects of politics. The differentiation between the political and 
military elites became blurred, their interests converged, political 
considerations became intertwined in military decisions and vice-versa, 
while the number of generals-turned-politicians who tried to use the 
security sphere to pursue their political rivalries increased. Israel 
moved further away from the instrumentalist model of civil-military 
relations toward the developmental construct of military democracy. 
The process of deepening participation during the three periods 
points out the importance of the mediatory mechanisms between the 
military and the civil sectors. The problem of segregation and 
alienation , 
is seen the most dangerous to civil dominance in the western 
democracies. The Israeli case shows that danger exists also when the 
boundaries are fragmented; and while convergence processes can occur 
either when integral or permeable boundaries exist, it is mainly the 
type of the mediatory mechanisms that determine the outcome of the 
institutional interactions. It is possible to discern four basic 
attributes of all the various mechanisms that were used in the political- 
military interactions. The following questions reveal them. 
1. Is there a formal definitional clarity about the location of the 
boundaries? In other words, do the representatives of the army and the 
polity in the interaction agree about the division of labour between the 
two sectors? What is civil and what belongs to the military? 
2. Are there clear rules of the game for the interaction and are they 
accepted by both parties? For example, are there agreed procedures 
of conflict-resolution when civilians and officers disagree or dispute 
during the interaction? What are these rules: competitive or consensual? 
Do the parties take part in the interaction willingly or because they are 
bound to do so? 
3. What is the degree of the institutionalization of the mediatory 
mechanisms? Are they permanent, temporary or ad-hoc arrangements? Are 
they based on laws, are they statutory or unstructured meetings? 
4. What are the respective powers of the parties to the interaction? 
This includes their respective status within their own institutions, as 
well as the decisive question who, the army- or the civilians, have the 
veto rights and the decisive vote? 
Mediatory mechanisms will be effective and efficient whenever there is 
clarity about the location of the political-military boundaries; when the 
mediatory mechanisms are well institutionalized; when the two parties to 
the interaction agree about procedures and rules of the game; and when 
there is an un-ambiguity about the authority relations between the partners. 
Whenever the formal authority of the politicians match the de-facto held 
power civil supremacy will prevail. 
While only a few of the mediatory mechanisms that existed in the 
institutional interaction in Israel have had these attributes, the large 
number have lacked them and were therefore weak and inefficient. In these 
circumstances the penetration of the army into the politicians' domain was 
inevitable. 
Thus the answer to the question, what prevented Israeli commanders from 
toppling down the elected politicians is paradoxical. The army did not take 
control over the decision-making process because the civilians agreed to 
its having a high level of participation. Officers have not been 
motivated to use force to pursue their interests because in many ways they 
were satisfied by the civilians. The mere fact that it has to contend with 
a continuous state of war, even when latent, consumes most of its. -energies. 
But what will happen if these conditions are changed? If war ceases 
will Schumpeter's aphorism pertain to the IDF, 'created by the wars 
that required it, the machine now creates the war it reqüires. '1 If its 
institutional interests are not met will it comply passively? What will 
replace the effective civil control mechanism that will have disappeared 
when the military elite will be composed solely of the post-independence 
generation of officers? They do not venerate their civil superiors as 
the first military elite revered the founding fathers. 
. In spite of the protracted war, the centrality of security and the 
pervasiveness of the IDF Israel remains a democracy. The Government 
still decides on war and peace, the Ministry of Defence has the power, 
if it chooses to exercise it, to determine inter alia, the army's budget, 
and the Knesset members can, if they insist, augment their control and 
supervision over the army. Just as politicians were'the ones who 
advanced the development towards military democracy, so it was the 
politicians who tried to limit the army's political power. The nominal 
pattern gives them the right, authority, and powers to do so, and social 
forces and values would support them. At the same time other forces in 
Israel are budging the army towards a greater role at the pinnacles of 
power, or possibly even in a rapid and dramatic development. This last 
possibility has always been discounted in Israel; this in turn again 
raises questions raised in the introduction ra remark on the sociology 
of social science in Israel. 
For almost thirty years Israeli politican scientists have indicated 
stability*as the central feature of Israeli politics. The fact that the 
balance of power between the main political parties did not alter, 
despite the population's threefold growth and far reaching demographic 
change, led them to perceive the Labour Party as immutably dominant. 
1 Schumpeter, J. (1951: 25) 'The Sociology of Imperialism', in-Two 
Essays N. Y. Meridian Books. 
When the results of the 1977 Knesset elections were announced the fall 
of the Labour Party was defined as an 
'upheaval'. Asked to explain the 
unpredictablec event, social scientists suddenly unearthed plenty of 
evidence that beneath the calm surface of Israeli politics far reaching 
processes of change had occurred: 19 Cabinets in 30 years, an 
increased 
number of floating voters, a growing correlation between ethnic origin:; 
and political affiliation, the shattering of the basis of party loyalty 
and a deterioration in the Labour Party's ability to manipulate the 
electorate. 
Research into civil-military relations in Israel has not progressed 
far in 30 years. and the proposition that Israel is a stable democracy 
immune from military participation in Government still dominates the 
literature, influenced among other things by the strong democratic 
inclinations of the researchers. An 'upheaval' cannot be ruled out. 
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